To eliminate wasteful spending and improve the management of counter-drug intelligence.

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will
resume consideration of H.R. 1585, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 1585) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2008 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other
purposes.

Pending:

Nelson (NE)(for Levin) amendment No. 2011, in the nature of
a substitute.
Warner (for Graham-Kyl) amendment No. 2064 (to amendment
No. 2011), to strike section 1023, relating to the granting
of civil rights to terror suspects.
Kyl-Lieberman amendment No. 3017 (to amendment No. 2011),
to express the sense of the Senate regarding Iran.
Biden amendment No. 2997 (to amendment No. 2011), to
express the sense of Congress on federalism in Iraq.
Reid (for Kennedy-Smith) amendment No. 3035 (to the
language proposed to be stricken by amendment No. 2064), to
provide Federal assistance to States, local jurisdictions,
and Indian tribes to prosecute hate crimes.
Motion to recommit the bill to the Committee on Armed
Services, with instructions to report back forthwith, with
Reid amendment No. 3038, to change the enactment date.
Reid amendment No. 3039 (to the instructions of the motion
to recommit), of a technical nature.
Reid amendment No. 3040 (to amendment No. 3039), of a
technical nature.
Casey (for Hatch) amendment No. 3047 (to amendment No.
2011), to require comprehensive study and support for
criminal investigations and prosecutions by State and local
law enforcement officials.

The amendments (No. 2997), as modified, and (No. 3017), as modified,
are as follows:

Amendment NO. 2997, as modified

At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:

SEC. 1535. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON FEDERALISM IN IRAQ.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Iraq continues to experience a self-sustaining cycle of
sectarian violence.
(2) The ongoing sectarian violence presents a threat to
regional and world peace, and the longterm security interests
of the United States are best served by an Iraq that is
stable, not a haven for terrorists, and not a threat to its
neighbors.
(3) A central focus of al Qaeda in Iraq has been to turn
sectarian divisions in Iraq into sectarian violence through a
concentrated series of attacks, the most significant being
the destruction of the Golden Dome of the Shia al-Askariyah
Mosque in Samarra in February 2006.
(4) Iraqis must reach a comprehensive and sustainable
political settlement in order to achieve stability, and the
failure of the Iraqis to reach such a settlement is a primary
cause of violence in Iraq.
(5) Article One of the Constitution of Iraq declares Iraq
to be a ``single, independent federal state''.
(6) Section Five of the Constitution of Iraq declares that
the ``federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made up of a
decentralized capital, regions, and governorates, and local
administrations'' and enumerates the expansive powers of
regions and the limited powers of the central government and
establishes the mechanisms for the creation of new federal
regions.
(7) The federal system created by the Constitution of Iraq
would give Iraqis local control over their police and certain
laws, including those related to employment, education,
religion, and marriage.
(8) The Constitution of Iraq recognizes the administrative
role of the Kurdistan Regional Government in 3 northern Iraqi
provinces, known also as the Kurdistan Region.
(9) The Kurdistan region, recognized by the Constitution of
Iraq, is largely stable and peaceful.
(10) The Iraqi Parliament approved a federalism law on
October 11th, 2006, which establishes procedures for the
creation of new federal regions and will go into effect 18
months after approval.
(11) Iraqis recognize Baghdad as the capital of Iraq, and
the Constitution of Iraq stipulates that Baghdad may not
merge with any federal region.
(12) Despite their differences, Iraq's sectarian and ethnic
groups support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.
(13) Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on
November 27, 2006, ``[t]he crisis is political, and the ones
who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of
innocents are the politicians''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States should actively support a political
settlement in Iraq based on the final provisions of the
Constitution of Iraq that create a federal system of
government and allow for the creation of federal regions,
consistent with the wishes of the Iraqi people and their
elected leaders;
(2) the active support referred to in paragraph (1) should
include--
(A) calling on the international community, including
countries with troops in Iraq, the permanent 5 members of the
United Nations Security Council, members of the Gulf
Cooperation Council, and Iraq's neighbors--
(i) to support an Iraqi political settlement based on
federalism;
(ii) to acknowledge the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Iraq; and
(iii) to fulfill commitments for the urgent delivery of
significant assistance and debt relief to Iraq, especially
those made by the member states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council;
(B) further calling on Iraq's neighbors to pledge not to
intervene in or destabilize Iraq and to agree to related
verification mechanisms; and
(C) convening a conference for Iraqis to reach an agreement
on a comprehensive political settlement based on the
federalism law approved by the Iraqi Parliament on October
11, 2006;
(3) the United States should urge the Government of Iraq to
quickly agree upon and implement a law providing for the
equitable distribution of oil revenues, which is a critical
component of a comprehensive political settlement based upon
federalism;
(4) the steps described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3)
could lead to an Iraq that is stable, not a haven for
terrorists, and not a threat to its neighbors; and
(5) nothing in this Act should be construed in any way to
infringe on the sovereign rights of the nation of Iraq.
At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:

SEC. 1535. SENSE OF SENATE ON IRAN.

(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) General David Petraeus, commander of the Multi-National
Force-Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10,
2007, that ``[i]t is increasingly apparent to both coalition
and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Iranian
Republican Guard Corps Qods Force, seeks to turn the Shi'a
militia extremists into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its
interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and
coalition forces in Iraq''.
(2) Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States Ambassador to
Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10,
2007, that ``Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While
claiming to support Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively
undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies
of the Iraqi state''.
(3) The most recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq,
published in August 2007, states that ``Iran has been
intensifying aspects of its lethal support for select groups
of Iraqi Shia militants, particularly the JAM [Jays al-
Mahdi], since at least the beginning of 2006. Explosively
formed penetrator (EFP) attacks have risen dramatically''.
(4) The Report of the Independent Commission on the
Security Forces of Iraq, released on September 6, 2007,
states that ``[t]he Commission concludes that the evidence of
Iran's increasing activism in the southeastern part of the
country, including Basra and Diyala provinces, is compelling.
. . It is an accepted fact that most of the sophisticated
weapons being used to `defeat' our armor protection comes
across the border from Iran with relative impunity''.
(5) General (Ret.) James Jones, chairman of the Independent
Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, stated in
testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate on September 6, 2007, that ``[w]e judge that the
goings-on across the Iranian border in particular are of
extreme severity

[[Page S12094]]

and have the potential of at least delaying our efforts
inside the country. Many of the arms and weapons that kill
and maim our soldiers are coming from across the Iranian
border''.
(6) General Petraeus said of Iranian support for extremist
activity in Iraq on April 26, 2007, that ``[w]e know that it
goes as high as [Brig. Gen. Qassem] Suleimani, who is the
head of the Qods Force . . . We believe that he works
directly for the supreme leader of the country''.
(7) Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the president of Iran, stated on
August 28, 2007, with respect to the United States presence
in Iraq, that ``[t]he political power of the occupiers is
collapsing rapidly. Soon we will see a huge power vacuum in
the region. Of course we are prepared to fill the gap''.
(8) Ambassador Crocker testified to Congress, with respect
to President Ahmedinejad's statement, on September 11, 2007,
that ``[t]he Iranian involvement in Iraq--its support for
extremist militias, training, connections to Lebanese
Hezbollah, provision of munitions that are used against our
force as well as the Iraqis--are all, in my view, a pretty
clear demonstration that Ahmedinejad means what he says, and
is already trying to implement it to the best of his
ability''.
(9) General Petraeus stated on September 12, 2007, with
respect to evidence of the complicity of Iran in the murder
of members of the Armed Forces of the United States in Iraq,
that ``[t]e evidence is very, very clear. We captured it when
we captured Qais Khazali, the Lebanese Hezbollah deputy
commander, and others, and it's in black and white . . . We
interrogated these individuals. We have on tape . . . Qais
Khazali himself. When asked, could you have done what you
have done without Iranian support, he literally throws up his
hands and laughs and says, of course not . . . So they told
us about the amounts of money that they have received. They
told us about the training that they received. They told us
about the ammunition and sophisticated weaponry and all of
that that they received''.
(10) General Petraeus further stated on September 14, 2007,
that ``[w]hat we have got is evidence. This is not
intelligence. This is evidence, off computers that we
captured, documents and so forth . . . In one case, a 22-page
document that lays out the planning, reconnaissance,
rehearsal, conduct, and aftermath of the operation conducted
that resulted in the death of five of our soldiers in Karbala
back in January''.
(11) The Department of Defense report to Congress entitled
``Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq'' and released on
September 18, 2007, consistent with section 9010 of Public
Law 109-289, states that ``[t]here has been no decrease in
Iranian training and funding of illegal Shi'a militias in
Iraq that attack Iraqi and Coalition forces and civilians . .
. Tehran's support for these groups is one of the greatest
impediments to progress on reconciliation''.
(12) The Department of Defense report further states, with
respect to Iranian support for Shi'a extremist groups in
Iraq, that ``[m]ost of the explosives and ammunition used by
these groups are provided by the Iranian Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force . . . For the period of
June through the end of August, [explosively formed
penetrator] events are projected to rise by 39 percent over
the period of March through May''.
(13) Since May 2007, Ambassador Crocker has held three
rounds of talks in Baghdad on Iraq security with
representatives of the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran.
(14) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on
September 10, 2007, with respect to these talks, stating that
``I laid out the concerns we had over Iranian activity that
was damaging to Iraq's security, but found no readiness on
Iranians' side at all to engage seriously on these issues.
The impression I came with after a couple rounds is that the
Iranians were interested simply in the appearance of
discussions, of being seen to be at the table with the U.S.
as an arbiter of Iraq's present and future, rather than
actually doing serious business . . . Right now, I haven't
seen any sign of earnest or seriousness on the Iranian
side''.
(15) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on
September 11, 2007, stating that ``[w]e have seen nothing on
the ground that would suggest that the Iranians are altering
what they're doing in support of extremist elements that are
going after our forces as well as the Iraqis''.
(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate--
(1) that the manner in which the United States transitions
and structures its military presence in Iraq will have
critical long-term consequences for the future of the Persian
Gulf and the Middle East, in particular with regard to the
capability of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to pose a threat to the security of the region, the prospects
for democracy for the people of the region, and the health of
the global economy;
(2) that it is a critical national interest of the United
States to prevent the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran from turning Shi'a militia extremists in Iraq into a
Hezbollah-like force that could serve its interests inside
Iraq, including by overwhelming, subverting, or co-opting
institutions of the legitimate Government of Iraq;
(3) that the United States should designate Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist
organization under section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act and place the Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps on the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists,
as established under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act and initiated under Executive Order 13224; and
(4) that the Department of the Treasury should act with all
possible expediency to complete the listing of those entities
targeted under United Nations Security Council Resolutions
1737 and 1747 adopted unanimously on December 23, 2006 and
March 24, 2007, respectively.
Insert prior to section (6) the following:
(16) Ambassador Crocker further testified before Congress
on September 11, 2007, with respect to talks with Iran, that
``I think that it's an option that we want to preserve. Our
first couple of rounds did not produce anything. I don't
think that we should either, therefore, be in a big hurry to
have another round, nor do I think we should say we're not
going to talk anymore . . . I do believe it's important to
keep the option for further discussion on the table.''
(17) Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated on September
16, 2007 that ``I think that the administration believes at
this point that continuing to try and deal with the Iranian
threat, the Iranian challenge, through diplomatic and
economic means is by far the preferable approach. That's the
one we are using . . . we always say all options are on the
table, but clearly, the diplomatic and economic approach is
the one that we are pursuing.''

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be 2
minutes of debate equally divided and controlled between the two
leaders or their designees on the Biden amendment.
Who yields time?
Mr. LEVIN. Senator Biden will control the time.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield back my time.

Constitutional Review Commission

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I have discussed with the Senator from
Delaware modifying his amendment expressing the sense of Congress on
Federalism in Iraq.
My concern with the wording of the amendment stems from the fact that
the Iraqi Sunnis did not participate fully in the drafting of the
constitution of Iraq and the Sunni community voted overwhelmingly
against it but were unable to prevent its adoption in a referendum. As
a result of their dissatisfaction with the constitution, an agreement
was made to convene a Constitutional Review Commission to review the
constitution and to make recommendations for changes to the Iraqi
Council of Representatives for submission to the Iraqi people. One of
the benchmarks that the Iraqi political leaders agreed among themselves
called for the Constitutional Review Commission to be formed by
September 2006; for the Commission to complete its work by January
2007; and for a constitutional amendments referendum to be held, if
required, in March 2007.
The Constitutional Review Commission has not completed its work
despite several extensions of time; the most recent extension being
until the end of this year. In recognition of the agreement to have a
Constitutional Review Committee, the legislation establishing
procedures for the creation of new federal regions in Iraq will not go
into effect until 18 months after enactment of the legislation, which
is April 2008.
Accordingly, I appreciate the modifications that Senator Biden is
making to his amendment to reflect that the political settlement
regarding federalism referred to in his amendment should be based upon
the ``final'' provisions of the Iraq constitution. This will allow for
the possibility of changes being made as a result of the work of the
Constitutional Review Commission. I also appreciate Senator Biden's
modifying the amendment to note that whatever the political settlement
is, be it pursuant to the current or revised constitutional provisions,
it should be based on the ``wishes of the Iraqi people and their
elected leaders'' as we don't want to suggest that we are trying to
impose anything on the Iraqis.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to thank my colleague from Michigan
for his suggestions. I believe that federalism and the creation of
federal regions would be in the best interest of the Iraqi people and
holds great promise for a political settlement among the Iraqi
political leadership. I know that my friend is particularly concerned
about the opposition of the Sunni community to the constitution. I
agree with him that, at, the time of

[[Page S12095]]

adoption of the constitution, the Sunnis were opposed to many aspects
of it including those provisions relating to federalism among others.
But in my last visit to Iraq, my conversations with key Sunni leaders
reveals a sea change in thinking. There is a growing recognition by the
Sunni leadership that Sunnis will not get a fair shake if they are at
the mercy of a strong central government controlled by their rivals in
the Islamist Shiacamp. One key leader told me that he now understands
that federalism is the best option for the Sunnis. Nonetheless, it is
not my intention to forego the possibility that the Iraqi
Constitutional Review Commission may recommend changes to their
constitution nor that the United States should seek to impose a
settlement on the Iraqis. I would note, however, at in the last draft
proposed by the commission on May 23, 2007, none of the proposed
changes would revoke any of the provisions of the constitution which
permit the creation of federal regions. However, in deference to the
Senator's concerns, I have amended the language to account for the
possibility of the issue of regions being reopened by the Iraqis.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am checking to see if there is anybody on
our side who wishes to speak for any amount of time.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded back. The question is on
agreeing to the Biden amendment, as amended.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Obama) is
necessarily absent.
Mr. LOTT. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator
from Arizona (Mr. McCain).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 75, nays 23, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 348 Leg.]

YEAS--75

Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Brown
Brownback
Byrd
Cantwell
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Chambliss
Clinton
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Feinstein
Grassley
Gregg
Harkin
Hatch
Hutchison
Inouye
Isakson
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerry
Klobuchar
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McCaskill
McConnell
Menendez
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Salazar
Sanders
Schumer
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Tester
Warner
Webb
Whitehouse
Wyden

NAYS--23

Alexander
Allard
Barrasso
Bond
Bunning
Burr
Coburn
Corker
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeMint
Dole
Enzi
Feingold
Graham
Hagel
Inhofe
Kyl
Sessions
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich

NOT VOTING--2

McCain
Obama
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 75, the nays are
23. Under the previous order, requiring 60 votes for the adoption of
the amendment, the amendment is agreed to.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 3017

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be 2
minutes of debate, equally divided, prior to a vote in relation to
amendment No. 3017, offered by the Senator from Arizona.
Who yields time?
The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, very briefly, this amendment is a sense
of the Senate introduced by Senator Kyl and me. The findings document
the evidence that shows that Iran, working through its Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, has been training and equipping Iraqi
extremists who are killing American soldiers--hundreds of them.
This sense of the Senate calls on the administration to designate the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, allowing
us to exert economic pressure on those terrorists who also do business
and to stop them from killing Americans.
Because some of our colleagues thought paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
sense of the Senate may have opened the door to some kind of military
action against Iran, Senator Kyl and I have struck them from the
amendment. That is not our intention. In fact, our intention is to
increase the economic pressure on Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps so that we will never have to consider the use of the
military to stop them from what they are doing to kill our soldiers.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will oppose the Kyl-Lieberman amendment
for one simple reason: this administration cannot be trusted.
I am very concerned about the evidence that suggests that Iran is
engaged in destabilizing activities inside Iraq. I believe that many of
the steps the Senators from Connecticut and Arizona suggest be taken to
end this activity can be taken today. We can and we should move to act
against Iranian forces inside Iraq. We can and we should use economic
pressure against those who aid and abet attacks on our forces and
against Iraqis. The administration already has the authority to do
these things and it should be doing them.
Arguably, if we had a different President who abided by the meaning
and intent of laws we pass, I might support this amendment. I fear,
however, that this President might use the designation of Iran's
Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist entity as a pretext to use
force against Iran as he sees fit. While this may sound far-fetched to
some, my colleagues should examine the record in two particular
instances.
First, is the misuse of the authority that we granted the President
in 2002 to back our diplomacy with the threat of force. My colleagues
will remember that, at the time, we voted to give the President a
strong hand to play at the U.N. to get the world to speak with one
voice to Saddam: let the inspectors back in and disarm or be disarmed.
We thought that would make war less likely.
But in the 5 months between our vote and the invasion of Iraq, the
ideologues took over. The President went to war unnecessarily, without
letting the weapons inspectors finish their work, without a real
coalition, without enough troops, without the right equipment, and
without a plan to secure the peace.
The second example is the administration's twisting of our vote on
the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 as an endorsement of military action
against Iraq. Let me quote the Vice President from November 2005:

Permit me to burden you with a bit more history: In August
of 1998, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution urging
President Clinton take `appropriate action' to compel Saddam
to come into compliance with his obligations to the Security
Council. Not a single senator voted no. Two months later, in
October of '98--again, without a single dissenting vote in
the United States Senate--the Congress passed the Iraq
Liberation Act. It explicitly adopted as American policy
supporting efforts to remove Saddam Hussein's regime from
power and promoting an Iraqi democracy in its place. And just
two months after signing the Iraq Liberation law, President
Clinton ordered that Iraq be bombed in an effort to destroy
facilities that he believed were connected to Saddam's
weapons of mass destruction programs.

The Vice President made this argument despite this explicit section
of the Iraq Liberation Act: ``Nothing in this Act shall be construed to
authorize or otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed
Forces.''
These examples are relevant to the debate today.
The Authorization for the Use of Military Force approved in September
2001 would appear to limit the scope of authority it contains to the
terrorists who conducted or aided the attacks of 9/11, or harbored
them. But the President and his lawyers have frequently argued for a
broad reading of this law,

[[Page S12096]]

and believe they are fighting a ``global'' war on terrorism. In letters
to Congress under the war powers resolution, the President has stated
that he will ``direct additional measures as necessary'' in the
exercise of self-defense and ``to protect U.S. citizens and interests''
as part of this global war.
I do not think the suggestion that the President designate an arm of
the government of Iran as a ``terrorist'' entity provides any authority
to do anything. After all, it is a nonbinding measure. But this
administration already has an unduly broad view of the scope of
executive power, particularly in time of war. I do not want to give the
President and his lawyers any argument that Congress has somehow
authorized military actions. The lesson of the last several years is
that we must be cautious about acting impulsively on legislation which
can be misconstrued, and misused to justify actions that Congress did
not contemplate.
With a different President who had a different track record, I could
vote to support this amendment. But given this President's actions and
misuse of authority, I cannot support the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I have grave concerns about this amendment.
I spoke at length on the floor yesterday about them. We have never
characterized an entity of a foreign government as a foreign terrorist
organization. If we are saying that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is
conducting terrorist activities, what we are saying, in effect, is that
the Revolutionary Guard is conducting military activities against us.
This has the danger of becoming a de facto authorization for military
force against Iran.
We have not had one hearing. I recommended yesterday that the
amendment be withdrawn so we can consider it in the appropriate
committees. I oppose passage at this time in the hope that we can get
further discussion.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Obama) is
necessarily absent.
Mr. LOTT. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator
from Arizona (Mr. McCain).
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Menendez). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 76, nays 22, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 349 Leg.]

YEAS--76

Akaka
Alexander
Allard
Barrasso
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burr
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Chambliss
Clinton
Coburn
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Corker
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeMint
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Enzi
Feinstein
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Isakson
Johnson
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Martinez
McConnell
Menendez
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Salazar
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner
Whitehouse

NAYS--22

Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Brown
Byrd
Cantwell
Dodd
Feingold
Hagel
Harkin
Inouye
Kennedy
Kerry
Klobuchar
Leahy
Lincoln
Lugar
McCaskill
Sanders
Tester
Webb
Wyden

NOT VOTING--2

McCain
Obama
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 76, the nays are
22. Under the previous order requiring 60 votes for the adoption of
this amendment, the amendment is agreed to.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

Amendment No. 2196 to Amendment No. 2011

Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending
motion and amendments be set aside, and that amendment No. 2196 be
called up.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object--and I won't--is this the
amendment which the unanimous consent agreement, previously arrived at,
referred to?
Mr. COBURN. It is.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Coburn] proposes an
amendment numbered 2196.

Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be waived.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To eliminate wasteful spending and improve the management of
counter-drug intelligence)

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. __. NDIC CLOSURE.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, none of
the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be
used for the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) located
in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, except those activities related
to the permanent closing of the NDIC and to the relocation of
activities performed at NDIC deemed necessary or essential by
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the
appropriate Federal agencies.

Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be given 30
minutes to speak on this subject. I have every intention of speaking
less than that, but this is to allow me the flexibility to do so.
I also plan on reserving that time until such time as we come back
from our policy luncheon.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, is there any time agreement
on this amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is not.
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
motion and all pending amendments be set aside.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 2999, as Modified, to Amendment No. 2011

Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Webb and myself,
I call up amendment No. 2999 and ask that the amendment be modified
with the changes at the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Missouri [Mrs. McCaskill], for Mr. Webb,
for himself, Mrs. McCaskill, Ms. Klobuchar, Mr. Brown, Mr.
Casey, Mr. Tester, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Whitehouse, Mr. Sanders,
Mr. Levin, Mr. Carper, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Kerry, Mr.
Johnson, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Obama, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Harkin, Ms.
Stabenow, Mr. Dodd, Ms. Landrieu, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Bayh, Mr.
Pryor, and Mr. Byrd, proposes an amendment numbered 2999, as
modified, to amendment No. 2011.

Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The
amendment is so modified.
The amendment (No. 2999), as modified, is as follows:

At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:

[[Page S12097]]

SEC. 1535. STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF WARTIME CONTRACTS AND
CONTRACTING PROCESSES IN OPERATION IRAQI
FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.

(a) Commission on Wartime Contracting.--
(1) Establishment.--There is hereby established a
commission to be known as the ``Commission on Wartime
Contracting'' (in this subsection referred to as the
``Commission'').
(2) Membership matters.--
(A) Membership.--The Commission shall be composed of 8
members, as follows:
(i) 2 members shall be appointed by the Majority Leader of
the Senate, in consultation with the Chairmen of the
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(ii) 2 members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, in consultation with the Chairmen
of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform of the House of
Representatives.
(iii) 1 member shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of
the Senate, in consultation with the Ranking Minority Members
of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(iv) 1 member shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of
the House of Representatives, in consultation with the
Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on Armed Services
and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the
House of Representatives.
(v) 1 member shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Defense.
(vi) 1 member shall be appointed by the Secretary of State.
(B) Deadline for appointments.--All appointments to the
Commission shall be made not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
(C) Chairman and vice chairman.--
(i) Chairman.--The chairman of the Commission shall be a
member of the Commission selected by the members appointed
under clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A), but only if
approved by the vote of a majority of the members of the
Commission.
(ii) Vice chairman.--The vice chairman of the Commission
shall be a member of the Commission selected by the members
appointed under clauses (iii) and (iv) of subparagraph (A),
but only if approved by the vote of a majority of the members
of the Commission.
(D) In the event a Commission seat becomes vacant, the
nominee to fill the vacant seat must be of the same political
party as the departing commissioner.
(3) Duties.--
(A) General duties.--The Commission shall study and
investigate the following matters:
(i) Federal agency contracting for the reconstruction of
Iraq and Afghanistan.
(ii) Federal agency contracting for the logistical support
of coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom.
(iii) Federal agency contracting for the performance of
security and intelligence functions in Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.
(B) Scope of contracting covered.--The Federal agency
contracting covered by this paragraph includes contracts
entered into both in the United States and abroad for the
performance of activities described in subparagraph (A),
whether performed in the United States or abroad.
(C) Particular duties.--In carrying out the study under
this paragraph, the Commission shall assess--
(i) the extent and impact of the reliance of the Federal
Government on contractors to perform functions (including
security, intelligence, and management functions) in
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom;
(ii) the performance of the contracts under review, and the
mechanisms used to manage the performance of the contracts
under review;
(iii) the extent of waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement
under such contracts;
(iv) the extent to which those responsible for such waste,
fraud, abuse, or mismanagement have been held financially or
legally accountable;
(v) the appropriateness of the organizational structure,
policies, practices, and resources of the Department of
Defense and the Department of State for handling contingency
contract management and support; and
(vi) the extent of the misuse of force or violations of the
laws of war or federal statutes by contractors.
(4) Reports.--
(A) Interim report.--On January 15, 2009, the Commission
shall submit to Congress an interim report on the study
carried out under paragraph (3), including the results and
findings of the study as of that date.
(B) Other reports.--The Commission may from time to time
submit to Congress such other reports on the study carried
out under paragraph (3) as the Commission considers
appropriate.
(C) Final report.--Not later than two years after the date
of the appointment of all of the members of the Commission
under paragraph (2), the Commission shall submit to Congress
a report on the study carried out under paragraph (3). The
report shall--
(i) include the findings of the Commission;
(ii) identify lessons learned on the contracting covered by
the study; and
(iii) include specific recommendations for improvements to
be made in--

(I) the process for developing contract requirements for
wartime contracts and contracts for contingency operations;
(II) the process for awarding contracts and task orders for
wartime contracts and contracts for contingency operations;
(III) the process for managing and providing oversight for
the performance of wartime contracts and contracts for
contingency operations;
(IV) the process for holding contractors and their
employees accountable for waste, fraud, abuse, or
mismanagement under wartime contracts and contracts for
contingency operations;
(V) the process for determining which functions are
inherently governmental and which functions are appropriate
for performance by contractors in an area of combat
operations (including an area of a contingency operation),
including a determination whether the use of civilian
contractors to provide security in an area of combat
operations is a function that is inherently governmental;
(VI) the organizational structure, resources, policies and
practices of the Department of Defense and the Department of
State handling contract management and support for wartime
contracts and contracts for contingency operations; and
(VII) the process by which roles and responsibilities with
respect to wartime contracts and contracts for contingency
operations are distributed among the various departments and
agencies of the Federal Government, and interagency
coordination and communication mechanisms associated with
wartime contracts and contracts for contingency operations.

(5) Other powers and authorities.--
(A) Hearings and evidence.--The Commission or, on the
authority of the Commission, any subcommittee or member
thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out this
subsection--
(i) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and
places, take such testimony, receive such evidence,
administer such oaths; and
(ii) subject to subparagraph (B)(i), require, by subpoena
or otherwise, require the attendance and testimony of such
witnesses and the production of such books, records,
correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents,

as the Commission or such designated subcommittee or
designated member may determine advisable.
(B) Subpoenas.--
(i) Issuance.--

(I) In general.--A subpoena may be issued under
subparagraph (A) only--

(aa) by the agreement of the chairman and the vice
chairman; or
(bb) by the affirmative vote of 5 members of the
Commission.

(II) Signature.--Subject to subclause (I), subpoenas issued
under this subparagraph may be issued under the signature of
the chairman or any member designated by a majority of the
Commission, and may be served by any person designated by the
chairman or by a member designated by a majority of the
Commission.

(ii) Enforcement.--

(I) In general.--In the case of contumacy or failure to
obey a subpoena issued under clause (i), the United States
district court for the judicial district in which the
subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or
where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order
requiring such person to appear at any designated place to
testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any
failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the
court as a contempt of that court.
(II) Additional enforcement.--In the case of any failure of
any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when
summoned under authority of subclause (I) or this subclause,
the Commission may, by majority vote, certify a statement of
fact constituting such failure to the appropriate United
States attorney, who may bring the matter before the grand
jury for its action, under the same statutory authority and
procedures as if the United States attorney had received a
certification under sections 102 through 104 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192 through 194).

(C) Access to information.--The Commission may secure
directly from the Department of Defense and any other
department or agency of the Federal Government any
information or assistance that the Commission considers
necessary to enable the Commission to carry out the
requirements of this subsection. Upon request of the
Commission, the head of such department or agency shall
furnish such information expeditiously to the Commission.
Whenever information or assistance requested by the
Commission is unreasonably refused or not provided, the
Commission shall report the circumstances to Congress without
delay.
(D) Personnel.--The Commission shall have the authorities
provided in section 3161 of title 5, United States Code, and
shall be subject to the conditions set forth in such section,
except to the extent that such conditions would be
inconsistent with the requirements of this subsection.
(E) Detailees.--Any employee of the Federal Government
employee may be detailed

[[Page S12098]]

to the Commission without reimbursement from the Commission,
and such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and
privileges of his or her regular employment without
interruption.
(F) Security clearances.--The appropriate departments or
agencies of the Federal Government shall cooperate with the
Commission in expeditiously providing to the Commission
members and staff appropriate security clearances to the
extent possible pursuant to existing procedures and
requirements, except that no person shall be provided with
access to classified information under this section without
the appropriate security clearances.
(G) Violations of law.--
(i) Referral to attorney general.--The Commission may refer
to the Attorney General any violation or potential violation
of law identified by the Commission in carrying out its
duties under this subsection.
(ii) Reports on results of referral.--The Attorney General
shall submit to Congress a report on each prosecution,
conviction, resolution, or other disposition that results
from a referral made under this subparagraph.
(6) Termination.--The Commission shall terminate on the
date that is 60 days after the date of the submittal of its
final report under paragraph (4)(C).
(7) Contingency operation defined.--In this subsection, the
term ``contingency operation'' has the meaning given that
term in section 101 of title 10, United States Code.
(b) Investigation of Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and
Mismanagement.--
(1) In general.--The Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction shall, in collaboration with the Inspector
General of the Department of Defense, the Inspector General
of the Department of State, the Inspector General of the
United States Agency for International Development, the
Inspector General or the Director of National Intelligence,
the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, and
the Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and
in consultation with the Commission on Wartime Contracting
established by subsection (a), conduct a series of audits to
identify potential waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement in
the performance of--
(A) Department of Defense contracts and subcontracts for
the logistical support of coalition forces in Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom; and
(B) Federal agency contracts and subcontracts for the
performance of security, intelligence, and reconstruction
functions in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring
Freedom.
(2) Scope of audits of contracts.--Each audit conducted
pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) shall focus on a specific
contract, task order, or site of performance under a contract
or task order and shall examine, at a minimum, one or more of
the following issues:
(A) The manner in which requirements were developed.
(B) The procedures under which the contract or task order
was awarded.
(C) The terms and conditions of the contract or task order.
(D) The contractor's staffing and method of performance,
including cost controls.
(E) The efficacy of Department of Defense management and
oversight, Department of State management and oversight, and
United States Agency for International Development management
and oversight, including the adequacy of staffing and
training of officials responsible for such management and
oversight.
(F) The flow of information from the contractor to
officials responsible for contract management and oversight.
(3) Scope of audits of other contracts.--Each audit
conducted pursuant to paragraph (1)(B) shall focus on a
specific contract, task order, or site of performance under a
contract or task order and shall examine, at a minimum, one
or more of the following issues:
(A) The manner in which the requirements were developed and
the contract or task order was awarded.
(B) The manner in which the Federal agency exercised
control over the contractor's performance.
(C) The extent to which operational field commanders are
able to coordinate or direct the contractor's performance in
an area of combat operations.
(D) The extent to which the functions performed were
appropriate for performance by a contractor.
(E) The degree to which contractor employees were properly
screened, selected, trained, and equipped for the functions
to be performed.
(F) The nature and extent of any incidents of misconduct or
unlawful activity by contractor employees.
(G) The extent to which any incidents of misconduct or
unlawful activity were reported, documented, investigated,
and (where appropriate) prosecuted.
(4) Continuation of special inspector general.--
(A) In general.--Notwithstanding section 3001(o) of the
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for
the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (Public Law
108-106; 5 U.S.C. App. 8G note), the Office of the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction shall not terminate
until the date that is 60 days after the date of the
submittal under paragraph (4)(C) of subsection (a) of the
final report of the Commission on Wartime Contracting
established by subsection (a).
(B) Reaffirmation of certain duties and responsibilities.--
Congress reaffirms that the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction retains the duties and responsibilities
in sections 4 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App. 4; relating to reports of criminal violations to the
Attorney General) and section 5 of the Inspector General Act
of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 5; relating to reports to Congress) as
expressly provided in subsections (f)(3) and (i)(3),
respectively, of section 3001 of the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of
Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated such sums as may be required to carry out
the provisions of this section.

Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, today we have an important opportunity
to do some good-government. It is so hard in the context of the
conflict in Iraq to get beyond some of the political posturing that
has, frankly, been inevitable. As campaigns have occurred, and we have
campaigns looming next year, there has been a tendency for this body to
separate at the middle and not find common ground.
We have an opportunity this afternoon to find common ground, and my
job over the next few minutes is to try to convince my colleagues that
this attempt to create a War Contracting Commission is not about
politics, it is about reform.
It would be hard not to notice the scandals that have occurred in
relationship to war contracting. I come to this as a student of history
and a huge fan of Harry Truman. I am honored to stand at his desk as I
speak today. I am honored to follow in his tradition when he said: War
profiteering is unacceptable, especially when you realize it is
skimming away and denying the men and women who are fighting resources.
In a very modest fashion, at a time that he, frankly, was not
supporting his President, who was of his party, he was saying to the
President: We need to do some reform here, even though the President
was a Democrat, just as he was, and he began looking at war
profiteering. Frankly, that is where Harry Truman first made his mark
in the history books of this country. It was because he realized this
was so much bigger than being a Democrat or Republican; it was about
how we behave when we place men and women in danger on behalf of our
Nation. In that vein, this amendment is going to try to take the
politics out of the issue of war contracting and try to make things
better. Let me first summarize what the amendment is going to do.
It will establish an independent and bipartisan eight-member
Commission--bipartisan eight-member Commission, four Republicans and
four Democrats. They will study and investigate Federal agency
contracting for reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, Federal funding
and contracting for the logistical support of coalition forces in Iraq
and Afghanistan, Federal contracting for the performance of security
and intelligence functions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and will expand the
special inspector general's role to include the responsibility of
logistical support and security and intelligence functions.
Currently, the special inspector general, Stuart Bowen, only has
jurisdiction over reconstruction funds in Iraq. Clearly, frankly, as I
met with contracting officials on my trip to Iraq and Kuwait, where I
spent most of my time talking to the people who have taken
responsibility for issuing these contracts and monitoring these
contracts, as I talked to all of them, I mean at every meeting I kind
of just went: Oh, my gosh, this is so bad--except when I met with the
SIGIR.
When I met with the people who worked for the special inspector
general, I was so comforted as an auditor. These were professional
auditors, and they were on top of it. They were identifying the
problem, they saw the shortcomings, whether they were in the way
contracts were distributed or let or, frankly, not competed or whether
they were in the monitoring of those contracts, the definitization of
those contracts, the oversight of those contracts, or the way we
actually pay bonuses on some of those contracts. All of those issues
have been looked at by the SIGIR. They have been limited because their
jurisdiction was limited. This will expand their jurisdiction and, most
importantly, efficiently, it partners them with the Commission. So we

[[Page S12099]]

do not have to hire a huge staff for this Commission; they can utilize
the work of SIGIR, the work of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction, to come to conclusions about how we can do better.
Honestly and sincerely--I know Senator Webb and I have talked about
this at great length--this is not about ``gotcha,'' this is about
turning the corner, because, let's be honest, will there ever be a time
where we are not contracting at this kind of level? Will we ever go
back to a time when we have Active military peeling potatoes and
cleaning latrines? Will we ever go back to a time where we have Active
military driving all of the supply trucks? Will we ever go back to a
time where we have Active military providing all of the security needs?
I am not sure we will because our struggle is to maintain a Volunteer
military but provide them all the support they need in terms of
logistics.
Frankly, there are some efficiencies that could be gained if we were
contracting in a way that took care of the taxpayer dollars. I do not
argue that contracting might be necessary--in fact, better in some
instances--but not the way we are doing it now.
Now, you say: Well, there are a lot of people looking at this. That
may be true. There have been a lot of journalists who have looked at
it. We have certainly had various parts of the Department of Defense
and the military, various inspectors general, and we certainly have
SIGIR. But let me just point out one thing. As one of the generals said
to me when I was in Iraq, sheepishly: You know, everything you are
seeing in terms of mistakes that have been made, most of them were made
in Bosnia. And by the way, there was a lesson learned after Bosnia,
except there was one problem: They forgot to learn the lesson.
So if we are going to elevate this problem to where we really
acknowledge that it is systemic, it is overarching, and it is
interagency, what do we have if we do a congressional hearing? Well,
first of all, we are going to have a committee that has more Democrats
than Republicans on it, so we have at the very outset the allegation
that it is political. We also have battling turf. Is it Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs? Is it Armed Services? Is it Foreign
Relations? Because all of the problems swirl around all of those
committees. How do we get above the interagency issue if we do not have
this kind of commission?
The makeup of the Commission would be as follows: eight people--two
people appointed by the majority leader in the Senate, two people
appointed by the Speaker in the House, one person appointed by the
minority leader in the Senate, one person appointed by the minority
leader in the House--that gets you to six--and then one person
appointed by the President of the United States and one person
appointed by Secretary Gates at the Department of Defense.
Now, are we going to have a long bureaucratic commission that just
does a lot of testimony and we do not get to the end? No. They must
finish their work within 2 years. And they must, as I mentioned before,
partner with the SIGIR, partner with the Special Inspector General of
Iraq Reconstruction, in a way that they can efficiently take the work
that has been done by a number of different agencies and a number of
different oversight entities, a number of different auditors and bring
it together and identify how do we, in a contingency, contract in a way
that takes care of taxpayers' money?

Now, we have an election coming up. I have to tell you, I have talked
to a couple of my friends across the aisle, and I am concerned about
the vote on this amendment because there is a knee-jerk reaction. If we
are talking about war contracting, this is political. This is a
political witch hunt. It is the D's versus the R's. Let me say that I
do not think they have taken time to look at how bipartisan this is
because if they did, I think it would assure them that this is not an
attempt to do this. We have to fix this, and we have to fix it as
quickly as possible. It has to do the work within 2 years.
We have modified the amendment to reassure my friends across the
aisle that, first of all, if one of the President's appointments or if
one of the other appointments who would represent the Republican Party
on this Commission were to quit or for some reason not be able to
continue to serve, someone of the same party must be appointed. So we
are never going to get to a situation if we have a new President that
the new President could say: I am going to appoint two. If the new
President were a Democrat, you would end up with six to two.
The other thing that is important to remember is we have modified the
amendment so the report of this Commission will come out after next
year's election, January of 2009. What a great way to start a new
Congress and a new Presidential term. The new President and the new
Congress can look at these recommendations--very similar to the 9/11
Commission, very similar to the Baker-Hamilton Commission--and realize
there are systemic institutional problems with the way we have been
contacting and get it fixed.
I have met with the special inspector general for Iraq, Mr. Bowen,
and he has indicated his support for this approach. This is not about
in any way diminishing the role of the special inspector general for
Iraq--just the opposite. It is going to give the special inspector
general a voice that is above the political din in order to issue
recommendations. They are going to have their capping report ready next
March. That will be a great starting point for this Commission, to look
at SIGIR's capping report of all of their work on Iraq reconstruction.
Let me give you a list of some of the groups that have supported this
amendment, and we have had many, many groups that have come to the
support of this.
First, the Project on Government Oversight is very strongly in favor
of it. POGO particularly supports the independent and bipartisan nature
of this Commission and the recommended collaboration and consultation
with the special inspector general and the expansion of the role of the
special inspector general.
OMB Watch, a Government transparency, fiscal policy, and regulatory
watchdog nonprofit, wants to applaud the Commission on War Contracting
Establishment Act; that is, in fact, this amendment.
The Government Accountability Project also has indicated their
support.
The Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America have indicated their
support.
The Taxpayers for Common Sense has weighed in with their strong
support of this amendment.
The Federation of State PIRGs, public interest research groups, has
weighed in with their support also, and Common Cause has indicated this
is a good government, bipartisan way to fix a serious problem. I may
return later to talk about some of the scandals. There have been many,
many scandals. Some of them are heartbreaking. Some of them make you
want to tear your hair out; whether it is the way some of the
whistleblowers have been treated, whether it is contracts that have
ballooned out of control, whether it is paying bonuses to companies
that haven't done their work, $200 million in bonuses to companies that
have not done their work. We obviously have issues with the security
company Blackwater and who has authority over them and to whom are they
accountable when they take action in the war zone. It is heartbreaking
that some in our active military--unfortunately, more than a few--have
been charged and pled guilty to actually taking bribes, tens of
millions of dollars in their pocket. The Department of State IG, there
are problems with whether the investigations have been conducted.
Whether you agree that the investigations have occurred in the State
Department or they have not, why not do a bipartisan commission that
will look at this fairly under the light of transparency and good
government, without the cloud of politics and accusations by one
political party or another?
I am especially proud of the fact that this is an amendment that was
cosponsored by the nine freshmen Democrats who arrived here in January.
We, frankly, probably are not as well versed or schooled in some of the
turf fights that occur between committees. It will be a long time
before any of us need to worry about whether our committee, as chairman
or ranking member, has the ability to have a hearing. We look at it
with the eyes of the general public. We come here fresh from

[[Page S12100]]

speaking with thousands and thousands of people we represent. We hear
their frustration that billions of dollars have been lost, tens upon
millions of dollars have been stolen, and an incredible amount of money
wasted in the name of contracting. We also have 20 cosponsors on this
amendment which we believe is very important. I welcome the support.
I do emphasize that we can behave today like people probably expect.
We can have a 50-50 vote, and the American public is going to sit back,
if we have a 50-50 vote, and they are going to say: What in the name is
going on? How do you get a 50-50 vote on an effort, with four
Republicans and four Democrats, to get a handle on war contracting? How
does that happen? We all sit around and talk--I know the Republicans
talk about it; we talk about it--about our approval ratings and why our
approval ratings are not higher. This is our chance. This is our chance
to say to the American public: We are spending your money wisely,
making sure the men and women who fight get the armor they need and the
MRAPs they need on their humvees, instead of billions being wasted on
war profiteering. This is our chance to show them we can come together
and overcome the politics of this place for the good of our national
security and the strength of our military.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. WEBB. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call
be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cardin). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I would like to add to the comments made by
my colleague from Missouri about the Truman Commission follow-on that
we have jointly introduced, along with other freshmen Members on the
Democratic side, the Independent side, and with a total of 27
cosponsors as of this morning.
I don't think there is a more important or volatile issue, in terms
of Government accountability, than the issue of the expenditures that
have gone into Iraq and Afghanistan and the accountability of not only
contractors but of the quasi-military forces operating there. We have
put a great deal of effort into designing a wartime commission that was
inspired by the Truman Commission in World War II but has its own
uniqueness, given the issues of today. I am very proud to be one of the
original sponsors on this amendment. I hope Members on both sides of
the aisle can support it.
We are attempting, in a fair way, with experts in the field--not
simply a group of Senators forming a panel, bringing in experts from
the areas, experts in competence from the areas they would be looking
at in a short period of time, 2 years--to examine the amounts of money
that have been spent, where this money has gone, to try to bring some
accountability into the system and to make their reports, in some cases
with legal accountability, and then to wrap it up and go home. This is
not an attempt to create a permanent standing organization but, rather,
one that can come in with the right people, take a look at what went
wrong, make a report to the American people and, in some cases, give
them their money back, since all of these now nearly a trillion dollars
have been spent on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan without a lot of
accountability--that is taxpayer money--to try to find out how it was
spent.
In most cases, it has been spent properly. But in those cases where
it has not, we want to get people their money back and get
accountability to the people who did not spend it back. This is about
improved transparency. It would be forward looking in terms of looking
at systemic problems and attempting to address them.
It is more than that. This amendment is supported by nearly every
major taxpayer watchdog group. We are now, with the present state of
the Department of Defense and of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
outsourcing war in ways that we have never seen before in our history.
Hundreds of billions of dollars have been allocated for reconstruction
and for wartime support, creating a strong potential for fraud, waste,
and abuse. This commission will ensure financial accountability in
those areas where there has been fraud, waste, and abuse with
provisions that allow for legal accountability in cases of wrongdoing.
It also will look at such organizations as Blackwater, which has
recently been in the news for the alleged series of wrongful killings
of Iraqis and excessive use of force. This is an area that has slid
past us as a representative government which is a cause for great
concern for anyone who has been involved in national security affairs
over the years. We now have in Iraq 180,000 contractors working in a
war where there are 160,000 troops. They are doing a whole panorama of
chores that traditionally have been done by military people, all the
way from operating the mess halls to providing security for even, on
some occasions, General Petraeus himself. There is no accountability,
none, in terms of legal accountability for actions that have been taken
that result in inappropriate use of force and, in some cases, wrongful
deaths of people in the area. This committee would help address that.

We are also looking at basic contractor accountability. As one
example, not long ago the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction reported that of the $32 billion at that time that had
been spent on reconstruction and relief funds--this is State Department
programs--$9 billion was unaccounted for. We need desperately to have
an independent, fair, objective analysis of what has happened, what is
happening, not only for accountability but also to help us design a
structure for the future. Again, we are not trying to create a new
bureaucracy. The commission will rely on the inspectors general in
agencies that already exist for most of the analysis. We are sunsetting
the provision at 2 years. We are very comfortable with SIGIR's
excellent performance in uncovering waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq of
reconstruction projects. We believe that is proof of the ability to do
this on a more comprehensive and thorough level.
I strongly urge our colleagues on both sides of the aisle to lay
aside political differences and come together with the reality that all
of us have an obligation to put accountability into the system for the
American people and, in some cases, to give people back the money they
spend in tax dollars for programs that were wrongfully carried out or,
in some cases, not carried out at all.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. COBURN. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum
call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 2196

Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I have an amendment pending. This is a
straightforward amendment. Over the last 10 years, we have spent a
half-billion dollars of Defense Department money on a program run by
the Justice Department that has achieved probably the least of any
program in the entire budget of the Department. This is the National
Drug Intelligence Center. It came into being initially through directed
spending on a Defense appropriations bill. The reason for adding this
amendment to the authorization bill is to preclude any further money on
spending on this intelligence center and only allowing money to shut it
down and have it consolidated with other intelligence centers.
If we think about what $500 million could be doing for us now in the
Defense Department in the true defense of our Nation and then look at
the history of this center, this isn't about trying to direct things
against any group of people or any Congressman or Senator. It is about
the commonsense view that we ought to be spending money in a
prioritized way that gets us results.

By any measure--anyone's measure--including the Justice Department,
all the other national drug intelligence centers--all of the others--
the former directors of this intelligence center, and the directors of
others, this intelligence center has been looking for a mission and has
accomplished very little.

[[Page S12101]]

Of the two things they have accomplished, one is highly expensive and
not accurate. The other is the investigation of intelligence
information captures on drugs and could be well done at any other
facility we have.
The Department of Justice believes the drug center's operations are
duplicative and reassigning their responsibilities would improve the
management of counterdrug intelligence activities and would allow for
funds to be spent on the additional hiring of more drug enforcement
officers. So we are going to have anywhere from $30 million to $40
million a year continued to be spent on this center. What this simply
is, in the authorization, is a prohibition that we will not do this.
When the Department of Justice, which is charged with running this
center, says it does not work, it is not effective, it is not
accomplished, and should be consolidated, we have to ask the question:
Why does it continue? It continues through the force of directed
spending in the Defense appropriations bill.
Now, how is it we have drug enforcement funded through the Defense
Department to give the money to the Department of Justice to run a
program they say is ineffectual? The whole purpose for this amendment
is to not castigate anyone but to say: Shouldn't we be spending the
money more wisely? Shouldn't we be accomplishing, with that $500
million we already spent, something of value to the American taxpayer
rather than something not of value?
This amendment would protect Defense dollars from being misspent and
improve the management of our counterdrug intelligence efforts by
eliminating the wasteful spending. It would also direct the necessary
funds to close the NDIC. It also would say any activities that might be
performed by the center that are deemed necessary, which are minimal--
let me emphasize that again: minimal in terms of all the experts we
have throughout the rest of the Government--that they would, in fact,
be transferred to the appropriate agencies.
In 2002, this intelligence center received $42 million--$39 million,
$44 million, $39 million, $38 million, $39 million--for a total of $509
million since its inception. It is duplicative, it is unnecessary, and
it is unworkable.
Even the former director said: Most of the time the work was shoddy,
of poor quality, and quite often wrong. This is the same director who
is no longer there--a Mr. Horn--who was admonished by the Department of
Justice for his excessive spending while he was there, on travel, on
international things that had nothing to do with the NDIC's goals or
direction.
Mr. President, there have been numerous articles written, two of
which I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, one being
a complete dossier on this agency from US News & World Report.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the U.S. News & World Report, May 9, 2005]

A Drug War Boondoggle

(By Bret Schulte)

the white house wants to kill it, but a little government agency may
manage to live on

It merits only the briefest of mentions in the president's
new budget, but those few lines of type could represent the
final chapter in a long and twisted Washington saga. Stashed
away on Page 1,181 is a paragraph that would effectively kill
the little-known National Drug Intelligence Center, located
in Johnstown, Pa., the site of the famous flood of 1889.
Bush's budget proposes that the center's $40 million annual
budget be slashed to $17 million--just enough to facilitate
``the shutdown of the center and transfer of its
responsibilities. . . to other Department of Justice
elements.''
If President Bush has his way, the center would be one of
154 programs eliminated or cut as part of his promise to curb
federal spending. But as any veteran of Washington's budget
wars will tell you, closing even a single federal program can
be a herculean task. Perhaps no example is more illuminating
than the NDIC, which, in its 12 years, has cost taxpayers at
least $350 million. The facility has run through six
directors, been rocked by scandal, and been subjected to
persistent criticisms that it should have never been created
at all.
Pork? In the beginning, the Johnstown center did have some
friends in the White House. With the blessing of President
George Herbert Walker Bush, then drug czar William Bennett
proposed the creation of the NDIC in 1990. Its mission: to
collect and coordinate intelligence from often-feuding law
enforcement agencies in order to provide a strategic look at
the war on drugs. But the Drug Enforcement Administration,
worried that its pre-eminent role in the drug war was
slipping away, openly fought the idea. So did many on Capitol
Hill, arguing that the new center would duplicate the efforts
of existing intelligence centers, notably the El Paso
Intelligence Center, operated by the DEA. With little support
in the law enforcement community, the NDIC looked all but
dead. Enter Congressman John Murtha. The Pennsylvania
Democrat, who chaired the House Appropriations Subcommittee
for Defense, tucked the enabling legislation for the center
into a Pentagon authorization bill, with the caveat that it
would be placed in his district.
The center was troubled from the start. Murtha's new drug
agency was funded by the Pentagon, but the Department of
Justice was authorized to run it--an arrangement bound to
cause problems. ``All of us wanted the NDIC,'' says John
Carnevale, a former official with the Office of National Drug
Control Policy, as the drug czar's office is known. ``But
none of us wanted it in Johnstown. We viewed it as a jobs
program that Mr. Murtha wanted [for his district].''
Murtha bristles at implications that the Johnstown center
is a boondoggle. ``They say anything we do is pork barrel,''
he fumes. The congressman argues that the federal government
should spread its facilities around the country, citing the
security risk of a centralized government and cheaper
operating costs elsewhere. But ``obviously,'' he says, ``I
wanted it in my district. I make no apologies for that.''
Headquartered in a renovated department store downtown, the
center has brought nearly 400 federal jobs to Johnstown, a
struggling former steel-mill town. Law enforcement agencies,
ordered to send employees to the new center, had trouble
finding skilled analysts or executives who would agree to
live in Johnstown. Even the bosses didn't want to go. The
first director, former FBI official Doug Ball, traveled back
and forth from his home near Washington. His deputy, former
DEA agent Jim Milford, did the same and made no bones about
it. ``I've never come to terms,'' Milford says, ``with the
justification for the NDIC.''
In 1993, when the NDIC officially opened, the congressional
General Accounting Office issued a damning report citing
duplication among 19 drug intelligence centers that already
existed. And many involved in the process said the idea of
gathering information from other law enforcement agencies for
strategic assessments on drug trafficking just wasn't
workable. In some cases, federal law prevented agencies from
sharing sensitive intelligence; in others, rival agencies
simply refused to give up proprietary information. ``The
bottom line,'' Milford said, ``was that we had to actually
search for a mission.''
Stonewalled, the NDIC began operating, effectively, as an
extended staff for other drug agencies, working on projects
too cumbersome, peripheral, or time-consuming for their own
teams of intelligence analysts. The center was costing about
$30 million a year, but, as a former official of the drug
czar's office put it bluntly, ``we saw nothing'' from it.
Former DEA official Dick Canas, who took over the NDIC in
1996--one of the few bosses who actually moved to Johnstown--
was determined to elevate the facility's status. He began
collating and analyzing ``open-source information''--
intelligence already available to the public--and pulling it
all together in one place. The plan was ``nonthreatening'' to
other agencies, Canas argued, and would at least provide
policymakers with a general overview of the war on drugs.
That project morphed into an annual report called the
National Drug Threat Assessment, which officials say is of
some real value.
The Johnstown center racked up one other success. Its
``document exploitation'' program regularly dispatched
analysts into the field to process files seized by other law-
enforcement agencies using software it developed called RAID
(real-time analytical intelligence database). Johnstown
analysts used the software to organize data and help law
enforcement agencies develop investigative leads.
Cronyism? In 2000, the Clinton administration tried to
define the center's role more sharply by releasing the
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan, which restricted the
reach of the Johnstown center to domestic intelligence only.
Canas, gone by 1999, was replaced by another DEA executive,
Mike Horn, who was the fifth interim or permanent director in
six years; Horn kept an apartment in Johnstown but traveled
back to a home in the Washington area on weekends.
Horn's tenure made everything that came before it seem
placid. Despite the NDIC's domestic mandate, Horn and his
assistant, Mary Lou Rodgers, made frequent trips abroad to
promote a new version of the RAID software in places like
Hong Kong, London, and Vienna, racking up nearly $164,000 in
travel expenses in less than four years. A Justice Department
investigation in 2003 admonished Horn for ``unprofessional
conduct in. . . dealings with Ms. Rodgers,'' but that wasn't
the end of it. A letter-writing campaign by NDIC employees
accused Horn of continued travel abuse and cronyism,
prompting another review by Justice lawyers last year. It was
also discovered that the new

[[Page S12102]]

version of the RAID software promoted by Horn had yet to be
developed. Many NDIC insiders say morale was poor.
In March 2004, Associate Deputy Attorney General David
Margolis suspended Horn's power to authorize travel for
Rodgers. In June 2004, Margolis fired Horn. The Justice
Department won't comment on the matter. Horn claims all
travel was approved and says he has not been made to pay
restitution. Horn blames the low morale on malcontents who
resented the quality of work he demanded. ``I recognized that
a lot of reports were God-awful, poorly written, poorly
researched, and, in some cases, wrong,'' he says. Some
insiders say that under Horn, the center got as close as it
ever would to producing some truly strategic intelligence
reports. Not surprisingly, in light of the morale and other
problems, others disagree.
Either way, the White House appears to have had it with the
NDIC. In its budget report, the Office of Management and
Budget says ``the proliferation of intelligence centers
across the government has not necessarily led to more or
better intelligence, but rather more complications in the
management of information.'' For the Johnstown center, it's
an ironic coda, then, that the White House is simultaneously
supporting a new program--the multiagency Drug Intelligence
Fusion Center. Blessed by the DEA, the fusion center will be
located in the Washington area. It has already received $25
million from Congress in start-up costs and is slated to open
its doors later this year. The idea that a different agency
can do the job the NDIC failed to do has left some shaking
their heads. ``You have to ask, `What is the master plan?' ''
said a former official in the office of the drug czar. ``The
answer is there is no master plan.'' Proponents say the new
agency will succeed because its location makes sense.
That doesn't mean the NDIC is finished. It has supporters
in state and local law enforcement, and even some federal
officials have come to respect its document exploitation
division. The NDIC's biggest supporter, though, is Murtha.
``I can assure employees that the NDIC won't be closed,'' he
said in a public statement after Bush's budget was released.
While Murtha is no longer chair of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense, he remains the ranking Democrat and
a backroom dealer with few equals. In the Senate,
Pennsylvania Republican Arlen Specter will fight to keep the
center open from his seat on the Appropriations Committee.
The showdown could come as soon as next month, when
appropriations subcommittees begin tackling the budget.
To paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of Johnstown center's
death may be premature. ``Barring another flood,'' says a
former law-enforcement official, ``I doubty you'll see it go
anywhere.''
____

[From the Centre Daily News, Sat., June 30, 2007]

Official: Disputed Pa. Facility Plays Vital Part in Drug War

(By Daniel Lovering)

For years, the National Drug Intelligence Center has
operated quietly on the upper floors of a former department
store, with scores of employees authorized at the highest
levels of government security.
But the Justice Department facility, which blends into the
landscape of this once-thriving mill town 60 miles east of
Pittsburgh, has long caught the attention of critics in
Washington.
Watchdog groups and lawmakers have blasted it as a pet
project of U.S. Rep. John Murtha, whose special funding
requests--or earmarks--have sustained the center since it
opened in his home district in the early 1990s.
It has been derided as a product of pork barrel spending
and an unnecessary outgrowth of the war on drugs that
duplicates work done elsewhere. The Bush administration has
tried to close it, requesting millions to cover shutdown
costs.
The latest salvo came last month, when Rep. Mike Rogers, R-
Mich., tried to remove an earmark for the center, drawing
Murtha's ire.
But the NDIC has persisted, despite lingering questions
about its effectiveness in coordinating the efforts of
federal authorities to collect and analyze intelligence on
the domestic trafficking of cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine
and other drugs.
Acting director Irene S. Hernandez insists the center plays
a critical and unique role in the nation's anti-drug effort,
and that its mission has evolved from an initial focus on
trafficking syndicates to its current emphasis on broad
trends.
``We can do an independent assessment of the drug
trafficking situation, and we can say this is what's
happening,'' Hernandez told The Associated Press in an
exclusive interview. ``There's nobody else positioned to do
what we do.''
She said the center differs from other agencies, which may
be preoccupied with tactical operations, and informs policy
makers.
Over the years, directors have come and gone, in one case
under a cloud of scandal. The current director, Michael F.
Walther, an army reservist and former federal prosecutor, is
currently serving in Iraq.
The center's funding has been precarious--a factor that has
impeded hiring efforts, officials say. With a budget of $39
million annually, the center's survival again appears
uncertain as a spending bill moves through Congress.
The NDIC conducts what it calls strategic assessments of
illicit drug trends. It analyzes evidence for federal
investigators and prosecutors, gathers intelligence, trains
law enforcement officers and produces a raft of reports. Some
of its work is classified.
Its 268 employees have top secret security clearance and
include 121 intelligence analysts with backgrounds as diverse
as real estate, chemistry, banking and law. It also uses
contractors, some of whom are retired federal agents. In
their midst are a small number of analysts from the Drug
Enforcement Administration and other agencies.
Hernandez, who joined the agency in 2004 after a 27-year
DEA career, points to the center's ability to cull
information from seized evidence--including ledgers, phone
and real estate records, computers and cell phones--and
funnel that data to investigators and prosecutors, helping
them build cases against suspects. The center has developed
its own software, including a program currently used by U.S.
military investigators in Iraq.
It works with a broad range of law enforcement agencies,
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Internal
Revenue Service, and supports the National Counter terrorism
Center's efforts to sever ties between drug traffickers and
terrorists.
The NDIC assisted in an operation that led to the arrest of
one of the world's most hunted drug traffickers, Pablo Rayo
Montano, and helped detect growing abuse of the painkiller
OxyContin, officials said.
Its marquee report, the National Drug Threat Assessment,
charts patterns of drug production, availability and demand.
Some law enforcement officials and academics praise the
report, but former drug officials question its value as a
policy instrument.
Gary L. Fisher, a professor at the University of Nevada-
Reno, called the report objective and independent. ``It
really accurately reflects how futile the (drug) supply
control efforts have been,'' he said. ``You'll find the DEA
reports are much more biased to fit their agenda.''
Another professor, Matthew B. Robinson of North Carolina's
Appalachian State University, said he and a colleague used
the report to challenge assertions by the Office of National
Drug Control Policy, the White House agency responsible for
the drug war.
The data showed illicit drugs are cheaper and purer today
than they were in the 1980s and 1990s, said Robinson, co-
author of ``Lies, Damned Lies, and Drug War Statistics: A
Critical Analysis of Claims Made by the Office of National
Drug Control Policy.'' Some local law enforcement officials
lauded the reports, saying they circulated them among their
analysts.
But John Carnevale, a former ONDCP official who worked
under three administrations and four drug czars, said the
center's work was of no value to him when he was in
government, though he has since used its reports.
``I had access to the data well before they did,'' said
Carnevale, now a Maryland-based consultant. ``So I pretty
much ignored them.''
Eric Sterling, president of the Criminal Justice Policy
Foundation, an advocacy group based in Maryland, said: ``In
many respects it seems that their stuff is out of date. . . .
I would describe it as a tool of limited value.''
Critics have also questioned the center's location 140
miles from Washington, citing political maneuvering by
Murtha.
``I know what their capabilities are, I know what they can
do, but that didn't need to go to Johnstown, Pennsylvania,''
said James Mavromatis, a former director of the El Paso
Intelligence Center, a Texas-based DEA agency.
He said the center could have been housed at the El Paso
facility, closer to the U.S. border with Mexico, where most
illicit drugs enter the country. The NDIC had considered
moving a team there, he said.
The NDIC's document analysis differs completely from EPIC's
work, he added, despite criticism they overlap completely.
NDIC officials and others contend that the center's
Johnstown address is hardly a hindrance. It may be an asset,
they say, as its low cost of living appeals to job
candidates.
Asa Hutchinson, a former DEA head and a former Republican
congressman, said he was ``a fan of folks performing
important government services, and not necessarily in
Washington.'' But he conceded the center may need
adjustments.
``I think it is underutilized,'' he said. ``I think they
can expand their mission, and I think that should be
examined.''
An activist group, Citizens Against Government Waste,
recently chided Murtha for threatening fellow congressman
Rogers with legislative reprisals after Rogers tried to
strike a $23 million earmark for the center.
``We're not saying there shouldn't be an NDIC,'' said David
Williams, the group's vice president for policy. ``What we're
saying is, why should one member of Congress be able to set
up a field office like this?''
Rogers said he believed the El Paso center was supposed to
be the main drug intelligence agency.
``I strongly believe it is not a good use of very valuable
intelligence resources,'' he told The Associated Press,
adding that $23 million amounted to the salaries of hundreds
of DEA agents.
The Bush administration evidently agrees. Sean Kevelighan,
a spokesman for the Office of Management and Budget, said the
center has ``been slow to delineate a unique or useful role
within the drug intelligence community.''
For that reason, the OMB's 2008 budget request ``fully
funds all shutdown costs'' of about $16 million he said.

[[Page S12103]]

Mr. COBURN. I quote from the Centre Daily News of this last June:

. . . the NDIC has persisted, despite lingering questions
about its effectiveness in coordinating the efforts of
federal authorities to collect and analyze intelligence on
the domestic trafficking of cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine,
and other drugs.

What is at stake here? Running this center means we will not have
enough DEA agents--and we do not. Running this center continues to
spend $30 to $40 million a year that could do great things for our
military. Why would we not want to redirect or at least prohibit the
continued funding through this Defense authorization bill?
Now, there are going to be some claims: Why are you doing this here?
Why aren't you doing it on an appropriations bill when it comes
through? We cannot have it both ways. We heard in the debate on WRDA
that authorizations matter, and it is important for us to have
priorities. So the claim is you should not be doing this here on the
Defense authorization but, rather, on the appropriations bill. The
authorization is the place to do this, to limit the expenditure of
funds on something that does not pass muster by anybody's standard.
So it is my hope that consideration will be given to this amendment,
and that we will truly have the courage to make a vote to spend money
wisely. To continue to spend money on this center means we are going to
continue to throw $40 million away, according to the Department of
Justice, which runs this center, in something that will not give them
any benefit.
I cannot think of a greater thing we could do than to start doing
this and look at every program such as this that is not accomplishing
any goals. There are no metrics to measure it, other than what the
Department of Justice says.
There will be claims saying it has programs that work. They have some
programs, but they are highly expensive. They are not as efficient, and
they are always late. So over the 12 or 13 years this center has
existed, only two of those programs have been successful, and they are
not as successful as the other programs within the Department of
Justice in this very area. So it is hard to justify the basis for this
center.

Amendment No. 2999

Finally, Mr. President, I want to spend a minute talking about the
Webb amendment. One of the things we know is that we do not do a good
job on contracting. I know some of the Members on my side of the aisle
perceive the potential for this commission to be used in a political
framework. I am not worried about that. I do not think it is intended
to be used in a political framework. I think it is intended to hold the
agencies accountable for how they spend the money and whether we are
going to get a handle on our contracting procedures, both through the
State Department and the Defense Department so we can see we actually
get value for the money we spend.
I am highly supportive of the amendment because I think it is going
to give us transparency, it is going to give us recommendations, and it
is going to make clear where we have confusion now in how we contract
and whether we get value for our money.
With that, I reserve the remainder of my time and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.

Amendment No. 3035

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I rise to speak on an amendment that we
will have a cloture vote on at some point today or tomorrow, Senator
Kennedy's and Senator Smith's Hate Crimes Prevention Act--a vote by
which I hope the Senate will succeed, in a robust way, to invoke
cloture and to move forward.
Nine years ago, a young man sat in a bar having a good time, like
many young men throughout America. Not unlike thousands of young adults
at bars across America, this young man needed a ride home from the bar.
So he asked two people he had befriended for a ride. They agreed. On
the way home, they robbed him, they pistol whipped him, and tied him to
a fence, leaving him for dead. They committed this brutal crime for one
reason--and one reason only--because the victim was gay.
Since that time, the Congress has been struggling to enact the
Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act--a
bill I am proud to cosponsor. It has received bipartisan support in
both the House and the Senate. But for some reason, we have been unable
to make the bill a law. Today--as soon as this vote takes place--I hope
that will change.
Hate crimes violate every principle upon which this country was
founded. When our Declaration of Independence proclaimed that ``all men
are created equal''--of course, I would take that to mean today all men
and women are created equal--it did not go on to say, however, ``except
Muslim or Sikh or homosexual Americans.'' It had no exceptions to the
rights and liberties Americans had under the Constitution and that
Declaration. The freedoms we often take for granted--freedom of speech,
freedom of association, freedom of religion--become empty promises if
we do not protect all those who seek to exercise these freedoms under
the Constitution.

Sadly, right now we are not protecting all of our citizens. This is
not, by the way, about providing special rights. It is about ensuring
constitutional rights.
Local, State, and Federal governments need additional resources and
authority to investigate and prosecute hate crimes based on race,
ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, disability, and gender
identity. That is exactly what this bill will do. It will allow the
Department of Justice to assist in these investigations and
prosecutions, and it will provide grants for State and local
governments struggling with the costs and logistics of prosecuting
these crimes.
Some people may not think hate crimes are a real problem in this
country. They are absolutely mistaken. In 2005--the most recent year we
have data on--8,380 hate crimes were reported. Of the single-bias
incidents, 54.7 percent were racially motivated; 17.1 percent were
motivated by religious bias; 14.2 percent resulted from sexual
orientation bias; 13.2 percent by ethnicity or national origin bias;
and a little under 1 percent by disability bias.
My home State of New Jersey experienced at least 756 bias incidents,
47 percent of which were based on racial bias, 36 percent were based on
religious bias, and 11 percent were based on ethnic bias. I say ``at
least 756 bias incidents'' because we do not know how many of these
vile attacks have gone unnoticed and unprosecuted due to the scarce
resources currently available to local law enforcement.
Now, I am proud to have been the author of New Jersey's landmark bias
crimes law when I was in the State legislature. We said then we could
not eradicate hate or bigotry in New Jersey with a single law, but we
could send a strong societal message that such acts would not be
tolerated. With this law, we can do the same for our great Nation.
Of course, you do not need to rely on my numbers or my experiences to
know that hate crimes are alive and well in the United States. All you
have to do is watch television.
Last Thursday, thousands of protesters descended on the small town of
Jena, LA, to protest the treatment of six young African Americans. The
town was a picture of racial tension, all of which came to the surface
months ago when three nooses were hung from a ``whites-only'' tree at
the Jena High School. Perhaps if we had stronger hate crimes
enforcement, this original action which provoked such violence and
started the town down its path would have been properly handled and
would have never escalated to the degree it did.
Make no mistake about it, hate crimes are a serious problem in the
United States--a problem we can no longer afford to ignore.
Some may protest that this is not the time or place to be debating
hate crimes legislation. I disagree. For some, it never seems to be the
right time or the right place.
Members of our military are not immune from hate crimes. To the
contrary, hate crimes can happen anywhere there are emotions, anywhere
there are people with the capability to hate. In 1992, a Navy sailor,
Allen Schindler, was murdered by two fellow sailors because of his
sexual orientation. In 1999, PFC Barry Winchell was similarly killed
because his attackers believed--believed--he was gay. The military has
recognized that hate

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crimes are a problem and sought to prevent them, but more can and must
be done.

It is absolutely appropriate to protect members of our Armed Forces
from the vicious attacks that constitute hate crimes while we are
debating the Department of Defense authorization bill. It is absolutely
the right time to enact this hate crimes legislation. After all, what
are our men and women doing in uniform? They are fighting for us around
the world to preserve our way of life and to promote democracy, and all
of them take an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution. Let the
preservation of the rights of all Americans be the essence of what they
are fighting for.
I will vote to invoke cloture on the hate crimes amendment offered by
Senator Kennedy and Senator Smith, and I urge my colleagues to do the
same.
Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 2999

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to speak for a few minutes in
support of the Webb-McCaskill amendment that would establish a
contracting commission relative to contracting in Iraq, but it also
does another very important thing, which is it broadens the
jurisdiction of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,
or SIGIR. Over the last 4 years, the United States has spent more than
$20 billion on reconstruction contracting in Iraq. In report after
report, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, SIGIR,
has demonstrated that this effort was poorly planned, inadequately
staffed, and poorly managed.
For example, the special inspector general has reported that plumbing
was so poorly installed at the Baghdad Police College that dripping
sewage not only threatened the health of students and inspectors but
could have affected the structural integrity of the building.
The special inspector general reported that the security walls built
for the Babylon Police Academy in Hilla were full of gaps and
deficiencies, some of which were filled with sandbags; lighting systems
and guard towers called for in the contract were never installed. As a
result, the academy was vulnerable to attack.
The special inspector general reported that a prison in Nasiriyah was
originally supposed to house 4,400 inmates, but the scope was reduced
to the point where it would only house 800. After most of the available
money had been spent, the contract was terminated due to schedule
delays and cost overruns.
He reported that neither the government nor the contractor could
verify the status of a new oil pipeline from Kirkuk to Baiji because
project monitoring was very limited and sporadic. However, at least 25
percent of the welds on the pipeline was defective, and one major canal
crossing was only 10 percent complete. The failure to complete this
project resulted in the loss of as much as $14.8 billion in oil
revenues to the Iraqi Government.
He reported that after the Army Corps of Engineers spent $186 million
on primary health care centers throughout Iraq, the contract was
terminated with only 6 health care centers completed, 135 partially
constructed, and the remainder ``descoped.'' The special inspector
general determined that the contractor had lacked qualified engineering
staff, failed to check the capacity of its subcontractors, failed to
properly supervise the work, and failed to enforce quality control
requirements.
The Department of Defense has spent even more money on logistical
support contracts for U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. There have
been numerous indications of fraud, waste, and abuse in these contracts
as well. For example, recent press reports indicate that the Department
of Defense contracting officials in Iraq and Kuwait received millions
of dollars in kickbacks, tainting several billion dollars of DOD
logistics support contracts. Similarly, the Armed Services Committee
held a hearing in April on Halliburton's LOGCAP contract for logistics
support in Iraq. Our committee learned that the company was given work
that appears to have far exceeded the scope of the contract. All of
this added work was provided to the contractor without competition. The
contractor resisted providing us with information that we needed to
monitor and control costs. There are almost $2 billion of overcharges
on the contract, and the contractor received highly favorable
settlements on these overcharges.
Unfortunately, the special inspector general does not have
jurisdiction over Department of Defense logistic support contracts, and
the Department of Defense inspector general who does have jurisdiction
refused for several years to send auditors to Iraq and is now playing
catchup. As a result, billions of dollars have been spent on these
contracts without sufficient oversight.
In addition, there have been numerous reports of abuses by private
security contractors operating in Iraq. More recently, the Iraqi
Government has complained about an incident in which employees of
Blackwater, Inc., allegedly opened fire on innocent Iraqis in Baghdad.
This incident is apparently the latest in a long series of similar
cases in which Blackwater employees were alleged to have used excessive
force.
Unfortunately, the special inspector general does not have
jurisdiction over private security contractors. The DOD inspector
general does not have jurisdiction over State Department contractors
like Blackwater either. Published reports in the last few weeks
indicate that the State Department inspector general has systematically
avoided looking into allegations of contract abuse in Iraq.
In short, despite almost 5 years of allegations of waste, fraud, and
abuse in Iraq contracting, we continue to have huge gaps in our
oversight of these activities. The Webb-McCaskill amendment will
address these gaps by, first, establishing an independent commission to
look into Federal agency contracting for reconstruction, logistical
support, and the performance of private security and intelligence
functions in Iraq and Afghanistan; and, second, expanding the
jurisdiction of the special inspector general to logistical support
contracts and contracts for the performance of private security and
intelligence functions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Under this provision, the special inspector general, in collaboration
with other relevant inspectors general, would conduct a comprehensive
series of audits of logistical support contracts and private security
contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan comparable to the audits the special
inspector general has already conducted for Iraq reconstruction
contracts. The commission would review these materials, conduct
hearings, and issue a report identifying lessons learned and making
specific recommendations for improvements that should be made in future
contracting.
So the Webb-McCaskill amendment would ensure that we finally have
appropriate oversight over the full range of contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan. It will ensure that we are in a position to learn from the
mistakes we have made, and we will be better positioned to avoid making
similar mistakes in the future. I hope there will be a broad bipartisan
vote for Webb-McCaskill, just the way there is already broad bipartisan
sponsorship for their amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I could ask my distinguished chairman
and longtime colleague a question, I read this amendment, and it seems
to me it has laudatory goals. But it is--we are outsourcing the work of
the Congress, and, most specifically, outsourcing the work of our Armed
Services Committee. That is the thing that concerns me.
We have two very distinguished sponsors, our colleague from Virginia
and our other colleague on our committee. But I find it difficult to
rationalize how this commission would function at the same time in a
manner that literally outsources the responsibilities of our committee.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his question. Our
committee, as the Senator knows perhaps better than any other Member of
this body, has a huge responsibility month

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after month, year after year, on the authorization bill. Most of our
focus is on that bill in terms of staff assignments.
We also from time to time do have oversight hearings. We have had a
couple on Iraq, but in terms of what is needed with the immense fraud
and abuse and waste that has gone on in Iraq, we could assign our
committee nothing else and still not catch up to what needs to be done
relative to the waste and the fraud and the abuse that has taken place
in Iraq contracting. We have perhaps three or four staff members
assigned to investigation. They are in the middle of an investigation
now. They could not possibly--with the very small number of staffers
assigned to that responsibility--take on the breadth of work which
needs to be done relative to Iraq.
Also, this amendment not only has a contracting commission, but it
also is going to amend the Special Inspector General Act relative to
Iraq to fill in a number of gaps which exist in the inspector general's
jurisdiction.
The areas which I just outlined that the current special inspector
general does not have jurisdiction over, we must have a modification of
that jurisdiction in order that the special inspector general will have
that capability which is now omitted from the tasking of the special
inspector general. As the Senator also knows because he was responsible
for the appointment of a number of these commissions, our committee
supports, and indeed has led the way, in the creation of independent
commissions all the time. It was not an abdication of our jurisdiction
or our authority when the Packard Commission was created, when the
section 800 commission was created, or when the Service Acquisition
Reform Act Commission was recently created. There are many commissions
that we appoint, and we are leading the way and have led the way to
have created, and in no way does that diminish the jurisdiction of our
committee.
In fact, it is quite the opposite. The creation of these commissions
has been able to lead to reforms, legislative reforms at times, which
our committee then is able to take up and adopt, hopefully, in many
cases, and in fact has adopted in many cases.
So there is nothing novel about the creation of commissions. As a
matter of fact, I think the Senator from Virginia, perhaps almost on
his own, was the creator of a commission which we recently heard from
to give us the independent assessment of the military capability of the
Iraqi military forces, the commission led by General Jones.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I acknowledge that, yes, I did conceive
that idea, and successfully, with the help of Senator Byrd and others,
got that legislation through. But that was for a tightly defined
purpose within a prescribed short period of time.
This one, I believe, is of 2 years duration. Mr. President, I say to
my distinguished chairman, I have listened to him recount some of the
commissions that our committee has sanctioned. But I am now prepared on
this floor to tell my chairman, if you believe we need extra help, I
will lead the effort with you to get more money from our committee to
take over some of the responsibilities that the Senator is about to
recommend to the Senate be outsourced to a commission.
Mr. LEVIN. Did we outsource to the Packard Commission, the reforms
they recommended?
Mr. WARNER. I remember that Packard Commission very well, but that
was a tightly knit commission for a specific purpose. I used to be at
the Pentagon and worked under David Packard as Secretary of the Navy.
We were fortunate to get him to do that. This seems to be an omnibus
situation to me. I am concerned about having the inspector generals,
which, again, is a creation by our committee, against some of the
administration's wishes. They weren't overly keen on putting inspector
generals in there. Our colleague from New Jersey has a bill to have an
IG now for Iraq. I want to support that. But these inspector generals
have to report to this Commission, I understand. I would not want to be
a party to amending the law there. They were created by the Congress,
and they should report to the Congress, not to a commission.
Mr. LEVIN. I don't think working closely with the Commission
collaboratively in any way means they are not going to report to us.
They will continue to report to the Congress. There is no shift of the
reporting function. As a matter of fact, the IG for Iraq does not have
the authority which should have been given to him, and would now be
given to him by this bill, for instance, on logistics support
contracts. Why in heaven's name should the special IG not have
logistics support contracts jurisdiction?
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if you want to take those provisions out
and make it a freestanding amendment, I would be supportive of
modifying it.
Mr. LEVIN. I have never seen as much fraud, waste, and abuse. There
is no analogy in the history of this country, I don't believe, for the
amount of fraud and waste and abuse that is taking place in Iraq and
Afghanistan. I don't think our committee could do anything else if we
took on that responsibility. I think we would be having hearings every
week, when we need to have hearings on all of the other matters under
our jurisdiction. I don't know that we could do an authorization bill
properly if we took on this responsibility. It is too massive.
I wonder whether the Senator can give me one example in American
history where there has been this degree of waste, fraud, and abuse. We
now see a massive investigation taking place because of the alleged
fraud of a number of members of the armed services. I cannot remember
anything comparable. This is a massive undertaking. It is most
appropriate that we have a special commission to do that. There is no
reason why they should not work in concert with an IG. We don't want
them overlapping and conflicting.
The issue is whether we are going to take on this responsibility one
way or the other. This is only one practical way to do it. I wish we
had the resources and time in our committee to do the kind of oversight
that has to be done relative to Iraq. To me, it has been the most
shocking abuse of the taxpayers' dollars that we have seen. As a
practical matter, I think the former chairman of the committee would
acknowledge it would take a huge amount of staff and committee time.
I want to give one example. We have an ongoing investigation right
now, and it is very small relative to the size and scope of this one.
We wanted to talk to a witness. During this investigation, a number of
witnesses talked to us voluntarily, but a few witnesses would not. In
our committee, we don't even have subpoena power unless the full
committee votes for it. The Senator from Virginia was very helpful to
me, as he remembers, in getting the full committee to vote for a
subpoena. I extended my appreciation to him then, and I do it publicly
now for his cooperation and that of Senator McCain. Every one of those
subpoenas required a vote. Then there had to be a hearing. We have to
go through a hearing of our committee to hear from a witness that is
subpoenaed, even though that should be through a discovery process.
Even our rules are so limiting in our committee that we could not
undertake an investigation of this scope.
This is a massive undertaking. To me, it would be suggesting, for
instance, that if there was an Iran-Contra Commission, somehow or other
the appointment of that Iran-Contra Commission--there was a special
committee of the Congress. Was that an abdication of the work of the
existing committee? I don't think so. It fit a special need at that
time. Each of the committees from which that special committee was
drawn didn't have the resources to do it on their own. So each of these
are designed for a purpose.
I don't know why there would be objection. The reason for the length
of time that the amendment takes is twofold: One is that this is a
major investigation that will take a lot of time because its scope is
huge. Secondly, we want to take it out of politics. I think the
sponsors will speak to this, and perhaps already have. This should not
be something where there is going to be a report in the middle of a
Presidential campaign. It ought to end after that campaign is over. I
think they provide for interim reporting, as I remember, in January
after the Presidential campaign.
So I hope there will be bipartisan support. It is not a political
effort. The report comes after the Presidential

[[Page S12106]]

campaign. There is no practical way that our committee has the
resources to undertake the travel and the responsibility and the scope
of this. This is huge. There has never been this degree of waste that I
know of in American history. I know enough about this already from our
one hearing, on one matter, involving one contractor, involving the
scope of a contract that we touched literally with the tail of an
elephant or donkey. It is massive.
I plead with the former chairman here, who knows exactly the
responsibilities of our committee, who knows more than anyone in this
body what responsibilities our committee has, that there is no
practical way, given our bill that comes up every year, given our
nominations process with which the Senator is fully familiar--we have
four nominations that we have to hear tomorrow. We have dozens of
nominations each year. On top of all of that, we have oversight, which
we try to do in a number of areas. We had oversight on the Boeing
contract. That was one contract that took a significant amount of time.
We did some major good. I don't know the magnitude, but if you look at
the Boeing contract, for instance, this contracting abuse scandal has
to be a multiple of 10 to 100 times that one investigation. I plead
with my friend to support this as the only practical way to get our
hands around this situation.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I know our chairman has another
engagement. We will return to this debate. This thing really poses, in
my judgment, new ground for the committee, to outsource this much
responsibility of oversight. At this point, I will yield the floor. I
see our colleague seeking recognition.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri is recognized.
Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, if I may address the question of the
Senator from Virginia briefly, I think it is important to keep this in
context.
First, the Senator from Virginia worries that the Armed Services
Committee was giving up jurisdiction in order to form this Commission.
I think it is important to remember that this mess is not just the
jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee. This mess is also the
jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee. It is also the
jurisdiction of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee. In fact, an argument can be made that this is the modern-day
Truman Committee, and the chairman of that committee is none other than
Senator Levin, who chairs the Special Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations.
One could make the argument that the State Department should be
answering to Foreign Relations for the messes in contracting in terms
of reconstruction. One could argue that the active military should be
answering to Armed Services. Government Affairs should be looking at
the whole mess. The bottom line is that this Commission does two
important things: First, it gets above all of the agencies to bring all
of the problems to one place, so we don't have the turf fights over
which committee has jurisdiction over this particular problem that we
have encountered like never before. As the Senator from Michigan,
chairman of the committee, said, we have never had this kind of problem
before in terms of an armed conflict.
The other thing to remember is that, unlike those committees, this is
bipartisan. This Commission is four Democrats and four Republicans. It
is not a commission where one party is going to take precedence over
the other party. We have a representative of the President and the
Secretary of Defense on this Commission. So the bipartisan nature
allows us to get above this knee-jerk reaction we have around here that
if they are for it, we are against it; and if they are against it, we
are for it. This is way too important to engage in that.
Finally, in terms of time period, this has a set time; it is only 2
years. The first report is due after the Presidential election in
January 2009--the first interim report. Next year, when the capping
report is presented to us, they can give it to this Commission, and
they can look it over. Stuart Bowen is onboard with this. We discussed
it at length, and he thinks this is a great way to move forward and get
this above each individual committee and above some of the
partisanship. Frankly, we have engaged in it. We are not without sin
here. My party has engaged in partisanship over this. I understand that
it may feel that this is an effort to engage in partisanship. That is
why we went out of our way to say it is going to be bipartisan in
nature, limited in time, getting above the various committees that have
jurisdiction here because of the State Department's involvement, DOD's
involvement, and the involvement of the Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee--three different committees, including
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. The first interim report
is due January 2009. The final report must be presented by January
2010. This is a 2-year period of time to work and collaborate.
By the way, I tried to count up--and I am sure the Senator from
Virginia is aware of this--how many people we have working in the
Department of Defense in auditing and auditing-related activities.
There are 20,000 people. Now, if you think about that in the context of
what has gone on, you realize we need some help. How do we have 20,000
people in contracting and auditing and related investigative activities
in the DOD and have the kind of runaway abuse that we have had.
By the way, in talking to the generals in Iraq who are involved, they
were focused on their mission. I have no ill will toward these
commanders who were trying to get a job done in terms of a military
context. That is why we need this Commission, to give the military
clear guidance, along with the State Department, of how we fix this
systemically. What kind of training do we need to do? These detailees
within these various areas given the contract oversight responsibility,
the CORs, are not trained right now. They don't have the core
competency in terms of contract monitoring that we must have under
these conditions where we are contracting at an unprecedented level. If
you look at the modifications we have made, where we have actually said
we are not ever going to allow this Commission, in terms of members
leaving, to get to anything other than a four-four, we are never going
to have a situation where it is not completely bipartisan and where
they are not going to focus with expertise on ways they can guide our
committee and guide the committee I serve on, Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and guide the Foreign Relations Committee in
making sure we help the State Department and Department of Defense and
any other Government agencies involved, including inspector general
agencies and other auditing agencies. Frankly, GAO does a lot of this
work for Congress, and we take their reports.

I think that in light of what has occurred and the scope of this
beyond the jurisdiction of any one committee, 2 years is a reasonable
finite time to come with concrete, meaningful suggestions that get us
above this partisan rancor over the conflict in Iraq and using it as a
political football that we have a tendency to throw around here with
some frequency.
The Senator's leadership on this particular issue is so key to us
having success with this amendment. I ask the Senator to take some time
to look at it. I will be happy to visit with him about the conversation
I had with Stewart Bowen about the valid approach we are making that I
think will bring about some of the same positive results that were
brought about in the past, whether it was the 9/11 Commission, the
Baker-Hamilton Commission or the other commissions the Senator from
Michigan referenced that the Senator has been involved with and party
to in terms of wanting outside eyes at some point to help us get beyond
some of the stuff that goes on that we cannot help.
I think it is tremendously important, and I implore the Senator from
Virginia to take a look at it again and see if we haven't done the
things that will reassure him this will be an augmentation of the Armed
Services Committee's work instead of an abdication of their
responsibility.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from
Missouri. I must say, having been on this Armed Services Committee now
29 years with my good friend, Senator Levin, we ``old bulls,'' as we
are referred to, are very much impressed with our new member, her
vigor, her

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foresight, her determination to get things done. She has stirred us up
in a very constructive way, I might say.
As to this measure, this will require a little more study on this
side. But I am concerned with the fundamental proposition that we are
abdicating the duties of the committee, but we are not quite there yet
in this debate to try to reach some final determinations.
An interesting observation: 20,000 individuals, and probably that is
correct. They are scattered not just in Washington but all across
America in military departments. The Department of the Army has its
procurement center outside the Nation's Capital.
In a sense, as the chairman said and I think the Senator from
Missouri has said, the enormity of the problem out there--is the
Senator suggesting that the enormity of that problem is a consequence
of this 20,000 or so not performing their duties as prescribed?
Mrs. McCASKILL. I believe that what happened was in an unprecedented
fashion, we engaged in contracting--I know the Senator is a student of
history, and if he looks back at the history of the Seabees and where
the Seabees came from in terms of the idea that you are going to put
people in the middle of a conflict who are not military personnel, in
terms of doing ancillary activities apart from the direct military
mission, it is unprecedented what we have done in this conflict in
terms of the contracting.
I don't think the active military was prepared for this kind of scope
in terms of the types of contracts that were entered into, many of them
not definitized, many of them not with the kind of oversight that one
would expect for contracts that run into $15 billion, $20 billion per
contract, in some instances. I think this was a matter of we need it
now, we don't have the end strength to get everything done we need to
get done; if we contract it, it is going to be cheaper in terms of
legacy costs to get a worker to peel potatoes than to recruit a soldier
to peel potatoes or to cook.
I understand that was done long term because it had the potential for
efficiencies, it had a potential to preserve our ground strength for
the military mission and to allow us to not incur the legacy costs of
another member of the active military.
In reality, because they were not prepared in terms of their systems
for this level of contracting and oversight, bad things happened--very
bad things happened.
If we are going to continue to contract at this level, why not at
this fork in the road embark upon a limited 2-year exercise in a
nonpartisan way to get concrete suggestions with expertise and not
creating a new bureaucracy, because they can access those 20,000
people, they can access the Army auditor, they can access the
contracting agency within the Army, they can access all the inspectors
general, they can access all the acquisition and procurement
specialists. They can access that information, bring it together for
the State Department and for DOD and say: If moving forward we are
going to continue to contract at this level--and let's be honest, I
think we are--then these are things we need to be doing.

If the military could do this on its own, we wouldn't have the
``lessons learned'' book in Bosnia not even getting to the people in
Iraq until after they entered into most of these contracts. We remember
the testimony from David Walker. He talked about the fact that even
though they had drawn up the book and said these are all the mistakes
we made in Bosnia, guess what. They forgot to look at the book before
they began down the very same road in the Iraq conflict. That is what I
want to prevent in the future.
This is about looking forward and not about looking back. This is
about figuring out a way forward that we can responsibly contract in a
way that protects our military and the strength of our military, and,
boy, would I like the help of the Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for her analysis. As I
read this, they can look backward, forward, sidewise, any way they wish
and have one of the strongest powers Congress can confer on any
commission--subpoena power--compelling persons against their wishes to
come before that committee, take an oath, and provide testimony. That
is something that Congress should consider very carefully before it
confers that on--for the moment we know not who will be on this
commission.
As I say, we will require further deliberation. But I do point out
that the Senator talked about the uniform side. Much of the military
procurement system is performed by very able career civilians. From
time to time, military officers are detailed as a part of their career
and otherwise to work with those civilians. But I feel the Senator is
putting on report an awful lot of people with a broad brush. I want to
think about that. Having had the privilege of serving with those people
in the Department of Defense--perhaps not the ones who are there now
but many. I think at the time I was Secretary of the Navy, I had
700,000 to 800,000 civilians in the Department of the Navy. They are
very conscientious people. I acknowledge there have been a lot of
unfortunate things in the rush to do what we felt was necessary with
respect to Iraq and, to a lesser degree but nevertheless to a degree,
Afghanistan.
Haste makes waste is the old adage. For the moment, I have thoroughly
been informed by the views of the Senator, and I hope to continue to
have a dialog with the Senator as this matter is now before the full
Senate.
I yield the floor.
Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from
Virginia. I don't want to overemphasize his support, but there are few
people around here who can get us past partisanship. I have noticed in
my short time in the Senate he is one of the chosen ones. He can get us
past that partisanship sometimes.
I am very hopeful and remain optimistic that I can convince the
Senator from Virginia this is a measured and appropriate way to provide
some accountability to all those men and women to whom he referred who
are trying to do the right thing. We have not figured this out yet, and
I think we have to try something different to see if we can figure it
out.
I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague from Missouri, the
State in which my mother was born.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I rise to speak about two matters, but I
wish to, first of all, associate myself with the remarks by my
distinguished colleague from the State of Missouri. Our first-year
class of Senators has worked hard on a lot of issues. She and our
colleague from Virginia, Mr. Webb, have worked hard on this issue. I
appreciate her comments today, as well as the enlightening exchange and
as well as Senator Levin's comments.

Amendment No. 2196

Mr. President, I rise to speak first about amendment No. 2196
pertaining to the National Drug Intelligence Center which is located in
Johnstown, PA, in southwestern Pennsylvania. This center was created in
1993 and provides Federal, State, and local law enforcement and
national security agencies with crucial information about the
structure, membership, finances, communications, and activities of
drug-trafficking organizations.
While a number of Federal agencies play different roles in combating
illegal drug use and distribution, the National Drug Intelligence
Center, which some know as NDIC, performs a unique role by providing
independent information about drug use to other Federal, State, and
local agencies.
This center produces an annual national drug assessment report which
is the principal report by which Federal policymakers evaluate trends
in drug use and the overall drug threat faced by this Nation. Given the
role drug trafficking plays in financing international terrorism,
information compiled by the NDIC about drug distribution plays an
important role in combating terrorism worldwide.
Much has been made about the fact that the NDIC is located in
Johnstown, PA. Let me speak for a few moments about the benefits of
locating outside Washington.
All the answers to our Nation's problems do not reside here.
Sometimes there are a lot of good answers outside Washington. To some,
that may be a news bulletin.
First, the Johnstown location translates into reduced overhead and
lower administrative costs.
Second, being outside the beltway allows for greater coordination
with

[[Page S12108]]

State and local law enforcement. The work done by NDIC does not have to
be conducted in Washington and, I would argue, the Johnstown location
offers greater cost savings for the Federal Government.
This amendment comes at an interesting time where recently--
yesterday, actually--the Drug Enforcement Agency, DEA, announced that
this center, in particular, played key roles in an international case
targeting the global underground trade of anabolic steroids, human
growth hormone, and insulin growth factors, in addition to some other
information. The investigation included significant enforcement of
illicit underground trafficking of ancillary and counterfeit
medications.
The investigation represents the largest steroid enforcement action
in U.S. history, and it took place in conjunction with enforcement
operations in nine countries worldwide.
The information provided by this center in Johnstown, PA, played an
important role in this investigation.
I also wish to add my own feelings with regard to this particular
center in Johnstown, PA. I am very proud of the people in Johnstown,
PA. They share a heritage of hard work and sacrifice, they have
overcome a lot, and they have a tremendous work ethic. Any investment
in a city such as Johnstown, PA, is a prudent investment, not just
because of economic activity but principally, and most importantly, the
important work this center provides for law enforcement.
If we want to do comparisons with other places around the country, I
am sure that will be constructive. I rise to speak against this
amendment and urge my colleagues to vote against it and also to
highlight the value of having this center in the State of Pennsylvania
for our Nation.

Amendment No. 3035

I wish to change subjects. I have a second set of remarks which I
wish to take the time to deliver.
We are contemplating voting on legislation that pertains to hate
crimes. The Hate Crimes Prevention Act at long last may be voted on in
the Senate. There are a lot of reasons for me to stand up not only as a
supporter of this legislation but a cosponsor; one of, at last count,
43 bipartisan cosponsors. In the other body, there are more than 170, I
am told.
This act is simple but profoundly important. First of all, the Hate
Crimes Prevention Act will strengthen--strengthen law enforcement's
ability to crack down on these kinds of crimes by providing grants to
local and State agencies to fight the particular evil that resides in
the hearts of those who want to commit crimes based upon this kind of
motivation--a motivation of hate, pure and simple. Secondly, in terms
of the mechanics of how this will work, this legislation will help the
Department of Justice work with local and State law enforcement
agencies to assist in the prosecution of these crimes.
But beyond the program and beyond the details of a government program
lie some very personal stories. One story that all of America knows,
but we need to be reminded sometimes about these stories, is one we saw
play out in the 1990s.
His name was Matthew Shepard. He was born on December 1, 1976, to
Judy and Dennis Shepard in Casper, WY. He went to the University of
Wyoming and had a great interest in politics and a great interest in
the environment. In October of 1998, two men tied him to a split rail
fence, tortured and beat him, and left him to die in freezing
temperatures. He was found 18 hours later, and he died several days
later in October of 1998 at the age of 21.
I had the opportunity in September 2005 to meet Matthew Shepard's
mother. We had a private meeting where she expressed her deep concern
about this crime we see play out across the country. She, obviously,
will probably never fully recover from the loss of her son and the way
he died, but when I rise to speak about this, I think we have to
consider who speaks for that mother if the Senate doesn't stand up and
speak with one voice on an issue such as this.
This is about combating hate, hate in the hearts of men and women
across this country. We talk all the time about people from other parts
of the world and how evil they can be, especially the terrorists, but
there are examples in our country of real hate. If we do not stamp them
out and prosecute vigorously these kinds of crimes, we cannot fully
appreciate nor can we fully expect others to appreciate the feeling in
our hearts about making sure we treat people with dignity, with
respect, and acceptance, but that we do it in the spirit of brotherhood
and sisterhood.
When such a crime as this happens, I would hope the Senate would do
everything possible to fully and vigorously prosecute and sanction
anyone who engages in this activity. This legislation, the Hate Crimes
Prevention Act, is one important step to achieving that goal, and I
speak in support of that legislation.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, would the Senator from Pennsylvania mind
answering a couple of questions before he leaves?
No. 1, I would note, just on the hate crimes legislation, that the
perpetrators of the heinous crimes against Matthew Shepard had full
justice carried out against them. That is true, is it not?
Mr. CASEY. Well, there are a lot of ways to prosecute someone.
Mr. COBURN. Were they prosecuted, I guess, and did they receive
significant punishment?
Mr. CASEY. Let me finish my thought. There are a lot of ways to
prosecute a crime like that. But when you have legislation that is
supported broadly across the country, including by law enforcement
agencies, district attorneys, and police organizations across the
country, I rely upon their judgment when it comes to what are the tools
we need for law enforcement.

Amendment No. 2196

Mr. COBURN. The second question--and I want to make sure you
understand as the author of this that it doesn't say anything about
Johnstown, PA, which has great folks. This amendment isn't about the
people of Johnstown, PA, and what they can offer. They offer great
things to our country, and it is not meant to degrade or delineate
anything other than the utmost respect for them.
What this amendment is about is, are we getting the value for what we
are spending? And all you have to do is look at what the Department of
Justice says, which is running this program, and what the DEA says, and
what every other intelligence-run enforcement center is saying: that,
in fact, there is not added value for the dollars that are spent there,
and anything that is a positive contribution could be more effectively
utilized at some other center.
So it is not about the people of Pennsylvania and it is not about who
did it or whether we all shouldn't try to get a Federal facility to
help areas that are economically depressed across the country. That is
not a bad idea. There is nothing wrong with that. The purpose of this
amendment is to delineate that there is not good value for the half a
billion dollars we have already spent and that taxpayers could get more
value out of less money if, in fact, we did what the professionals and
everyone else has said, including former directors of that center.
Mr. CASEY. Let me just respond to my colleague, the distinguished
Senator from Oklahoma, who has been on this floor for many years
holding public agencies accountable, and we appreciate that and I share
that concern. I only raised the question about Johnstown, I guess,
because as a Senator from Pennsylvania, I want to make sure we are
fighting for an important community. I am not saying that is the intent
of the legislation. I just wanted to reiterate how much I appreciate
the work ethic of that community.
Every program that is funded with taxpayer dollars has to be
accountable, and I appreciate that. We have an opportunity on this
floor to debate programs where we spend significant sums of public
dollars. When I was in State government, as Senator Coburn knows, my
job for the better part of a decade was to do just that, and it is
close to my heart, the kind of accountability I know the Senator is
concerned about. But I would hope, in pursuing that, we don't
unjustifiably have an impact on a facility that is providing a great
benefit for law enforcement well beyond Pennsylvania and, secondly,
that we work to be equitable about it. I know that is the intent, but I
think we have

[[Page S12109]]

an honest disagreement about this particular center.
Mr. COBURN. I thank the Senator for answering my question. I guess my
debatable point is the offering of the value, in the judgment of the
professionals who are running all of the Department, including the
Department of Justice and the DEA, which says it doesn't measure up.
That is my point. That is why I brought the amendment. It doesn't
denigrate the work of the people there.
The fact is, if we are really going to continue to send $30 million
to $40 million a year, let's find them something that will give us
better value. If we choose not to support this amendment, let's give
them direction so that the $30 million or $40 million we do invest
actually brings us something that is worth $30 million or $40 million.
And it is not the employees there who are at fault. In fact, the
direction and the mission has been one that hasn't been accomplished
because it wasn't needed in the first place.
Mr. CASEY. Quickly, by way of a response, I have to say that when I
was the auditor general of Pennsylvania, our office authored lots of
reports about waste, fraud, and abuse and about problems in spending.
What we tried to do as well was not just point out where the problems
were but also to point out and to list, actually in reports, a series
of recommendations and corrective actions.
I think there is ample reason in a lot of public programs to make
changes and to have corrective action. I don't think that always should
result in the defunding or the elimination of an entire program. But we
might have a disagreement on this issue, and I respectfully submit
that.
Mr. COBURN. I thank the Senator for his words and his courtesy in
answering my questions.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sanders). The Senator from Montana.

Amendment No. 2999

Mr. TESTER. Mr. President, I am proud to join with my Democratic
colleagues in the freshmen class who are offering amendment No. 2999
today. I wish to give my thanks in particular to Senator McCaskill,
Senator Webb, as well as the other six freshmen Senators in the
Democratic caucus in offering this amendment that deals with
accountability as it applies to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The nine of us were elected last fall in large measure because the
people in this country were tired of the war in Iraq and tired of a
lack of accountability for how our tax dollars have been spent in the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The fact is, people in Montana and around
the country work way too hard to have their tax dollars stolen from
them by people who think they can take advantage of an environment
where there is little or no oversight or accountability. This amendment
will bring some much needed accountability in the way our tax dollars
are spent in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we will do it in a way that
takes this issue out of the political spotlight.
This amendment will establish a bipartisan commission to review the
contracts we have entered into in fighting the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The Commission will be outside of Congress and will be
outside of the Bush administration. The amendment will also direct this
new Commission to review the way new contracts are awarded and
overseen. This will give us a chance to prevent future waste, fraud,
and abuse.
The Commission will work in consultation with the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction, which currently oversees only
reconstruction contracts in Iraq, to review and investigate logistics,
security, and intelligence work that has been contracted out by the
Defense Department.
According to the nonpartisan Government Accountability Office, we
have squandered $10 billion in Iraq reconstruction funds due to
contract overcharges and unsupported expenses. That means 1 out of
every 6 reconstruction dollars spent in Iraq is not accounted for, and
only now, after 5 years of war in Iraq, the Army is looking back at
nearly $100 million in contracts to determine how these funds have been
spent.
I think it is important for folks to understand we are not coming at
this with the idea that every contract is a bad one. There are many
contractors who are doing a good job and who are being responsible with
our tax dollars. But there are others who are not. At a time when we
are struggling to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi and Afghani
people, those who are deliberately overeating at the taxpayer trough,
while our troops are fighting and dying in Iraq, are nothing short of
treasonous.
Many Americans have questioned how their tax dollars are being spent
in Iraq and Afghanistan. They have wondered why it is that there are
more contractors than troops in Iraq. They have wondered why some
companies are enjoying record profits even though so many projects
remain incomplete. For too long, the answer from the Government has
been a deafening silence. This amendment is a long-overdue response to
the cries for accountability and transparency in our contracting
process. It should not be and is not a partisan issue. It is about good
government. I urge my colleagues to support it.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, first, let me concur with my colleague,
Senator Tester, in support of the amendment being offered by Senators
Webb and McCaskill and which Senator Levin also spoke on a little
earlier, and that is the need for us to have this independent
Commission look at what has happened in Iraq as far as the U.S.
taxpayer dollars. I am proud that our new Members of the Senate have
made this a priority. I think it is important that the taxpayers have
confidence that the money we appropriate will be spent appropriately,
and that has not been the case in the reconstruction of Iraq.

Amendment No. 3035

I also take the floor to speak about an amendment offered by Senator
Kennedy that will be voted on later. I spoke last week about hate
crimes in America, and I talked about what is happening in our own
communities. I spoke about an episode in College Park, MD, and we are
all familiar with what happened in Jena, LA. The FBI has indicated that
the number of hate crimes reported is unacceptably high in all
communities in America today.
Today, we are going to have an opportunity to do something about
that. We are going to have an opportunity to support S. 1105, the
Matthew Shepard Act. I am proud to be a cosponsor of that bill, and I
thank the senior Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Kennedy, for bringing
forward this issue. We will have a chance on this very important bill
to speak about the moral commitment of our own country and what we
stand for as a nation. This is an issue which we need to deal with
because it speaks to what type of people we are in this country, that
we will not tolerate hate crime activities.
This legislation gives the Department of Justice jurisdiction over
violent crimes where a perpetrator picks the victim on the basis of
race, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender
identity, or disability.
Now, why do we give the Department of Justice jurisdiction in these
areas? Well, we all know, first, that it will make it clear this is a
national priority. Secondly, the Department of Justice is in a far
better position, in many cases, than local law enforcement working by
itself to successfully complete an investigation.
This legislation gives additional tools to local law enforcement so
they can get their job done. It gives them training dollars. It gives
them other resources and assistance so that, in many cases, they can
get the type of information necessary to pursue these cases
successfully.
It is what is needed in partnership with local government. But there
are some States that are unable or unwilling to move forward with hate
crime activities. Only 31 States and the District of Columbia include
sexual orientation or disability as a basis for hate crimes
prosecution. So we have voids in the Nation and this gives us an
opportunity to move forward.
This legislation is bipartisan. We have had support from both sides
of the aisle to make it clear that in America we will not tolerate hate
crimes activities. It strengthens the current law. It removes the
limitation in the current law, the Federal law, that says you

[[Page S12110]]

only can move forward if it would involve a protected activity such as
voting or attending school. That restriction is removed, so that we
have more opportunities for the Federal Government to be of assistance
in prosecuting hate crime activities. As I have indicated before, it
includes sexual orientation, gender, gender identity or disability as
categories of hate crime activities.
I am very pleased it has broad support from many organizations and
groups around the Nation, including the Federal Law Enforcement
Officers Association, the International Association of Chiefs of
Police, the National District Attorneys Association, and the National
Sheriffs' Association. It also enjoys support from civil rights groups
including the Anti-Defamation League, Human Rights Campaign, Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights, and the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People. The U.S. Conference of Mayors also
supports this legislation. It is also supported by the Consortium for
Citizens with Disabilities, including the Maryland Disability Law
Center.
There is a broad group that supports this legislation because they
know it is needed. They know we need to do a better job, and they know
it is time for this Congress to act. Hate crimes are un-American. When
they happen, we are all diminished and we have a responsibility to do
something about it. It is time for the Senate to act.
I thank Senator Kennedy for bringing this forward. I urge my
colleagues to support it. The House has already taken similar action.
It is time this legislation be submitted to the President.
I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendments Nos. 3016, 3010, 3043, 3009, as Modified; 3046, 3008, as
Modified; 3006, as Modified; 2251, and 2172 En Bloc

Mrs. McCASKILL. I send a series of amendments to the desk which have
been cleared by Chairman Levin and the ranking member. Therefore, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate consider those amendments en bloc,
the amendments be agreed to and the motions to reconsider be laid upon
the table. Finally, I ask that any statements relating to these
individual amendments be printed in the Record.
Mr. WARNER. No objection on this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendments were agreed to, as follows:

Amendment no. 3016

(Purpose: To require a report on the solid rocket motor industrial
base)

At the end of title X, add the following:

SEC. 1070. REPORT ON SOLID ROCKET MOTOR INDUSTRIAL BASE.

(a) Report.--Not later than 190 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit
to the congressional defense committees a report on the
status, capability, viability, and capacity of the solid
rocket motor industrial base in the United States.
(b) Content.--The report required under subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) An assessment of the ability to maintain the Minuteman
III intercontinental ballistic missile through its planned
operational life.
(2) An assessment of the ability to maintain the Trident II
D-5 submarine launched ballistic missile through its planned
operational life.
(3) An assessment of the ability to maintain all other
space launch, missile defense, and other vehicles with solid
rocket motors, through their planned operational lifetimes.
(4) An assessment of the ability to support any future
requirements for vehicles with solid rocket motors to support
space launch, missile defense, or any range of ballistic
missiles determined to be necessary to meet defense needs or
other requirements of the United States Government.
(5) An assessment of the required materials, the supplier
base, the production facilities, and the production workforce
needed to ensure that current and future requirements could
be met.
(6) An assessment of the adequacy of the current and
anticipated programs to support an industrial base that would
be needed to support the range of future requirements.
(c) Comptroller General Review.--Not later than 60 days
after submittal under subsection (a) of the report required
by that subsection, the Comptroller General of the United
States shall submit to the congressional defense committees a
report setting forth the Comptroller General's assessment of
the matters contained in the report under subsection (a),
including an assessment of the consistency of the budget of
the President for fiscal year 2009, as submitted to Congress
pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code,
with the matters contained in the report under subsection
(a).

AMENDMENT NO. 3010

(Purpose: To require a report on the size and mix of the Air Force
intertheater airlift force)

At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following:

SEC. 1044. REPORT ON SIZE AND MIX OF AIR FORCE INTERTHEATER
AIRLIFT FORCE.

(a) Study Required.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a
study on various alternatives for the size and mix of assets
for the Air Force intertheater airlift force, with a
particular focus on current and planned capabilities and
costs of the C-5 aircraft and C-17 aircraft fleets.
(2) Conduct of study.--
(A) Use of ffrdc.--The Secretary shall select to conduct
the study required by subsection (a) a federally funded
research and development center (FFRDC) that has experience
and expertise in conducting studies similar to the study
required by subsection (a).
(B) Development of study methodology.--Not later than 90
days after the date of enactment of this Act, the federally
funded research and development center selected for the
conduct of the study shall--
(i) develop the methodology for the study; and
(ii) submit the methodology to the Comptroller General of
the United States for review.
(C) Comptroller general review.--Not later than 30 days
after receipt of the methodology under subparagraph (B), the
Comptroller General shall--
(i) review the methodology for purposes of identifying any
flaws or weaknesses in the methodology; and
(ii) submit to the federally funded research and
development center a report that--

(I) sets forth any flaws or weaknesses in the methodology
identified by the Comptroller General in the review; and
(II) makes any recommendations the Comptroller General
considers advisable for improvements to the methodology.

(D) Modification of methodology.--Not later than 30 days
after receipt of the report under subparagraph (C), the
federally funded research and development center shall--
(i) modify the methodology in order to address flaws or
weaknesses identified by the Comptroller General in the
report and to improve the methodology in accordance with the
recommendations, if any, made by the Comptroller General; and
(ii) submit to the congressional defense committees a
report that--

(I) describes the modifications of the methodology made by
the federally funded research and development center; and
(II) if the federally funded research and development
center does not improve the methodology in accordance with
any particular recommendation of the Comptroller General,
sets forth a description and explanation of the reasons for
such action.

(3) Utilization of other studies.--The study shall build
upon the results of the recent Mobility Capabilities Studies
of the Department of Defense, the on-going Intratheater
Airlift Fleet Mix Analysis, and other appropriate studies and
analyses. The study should also include any results reached
on the modified C-5A aircraft configured as part of the
Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP)
configuration, as specified in section 132 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law
108-136; 117 Stat. 1411).
(b) Elements.--The study under subsection (a) shall address
the following:
(1) The state of the current intertheater airlift fleet of
the Air Force, including the extent to which the increased
use of heavy airlift aircraft in Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Operation Enduring Freedom, and other ongoing operations is
affecting the aging of the aircraft of that fleet.
(2) The adequacy of the current intertheater airlift force,
including whether or not the current target number of 301
airframes for the Air Force heavy lift aircraft fleet will be
sufficient to support future expeditionary combat and non-
combat missions as well as domestic and training mission
demands consistent with the requirements of the National
Military Strategy.
(3) The optimal mix of C-5 aircraft and C-17 aircraft for
the intertheater airlift fleet of the Air Force, and any
appropriate mix of C-5 aircraft and C-17 aircraft for
intratheater airlift missions, including an assessment of the
following:
(A) The cost advantages and disadvantages of modernizing
the C-5 aircraft fleet when compared with procuring new C-17
aircraft, which assessment shall be performed in concert with
the Cost Analysis Improvement Group and be based on program
life cycle cost estimates for the respective aircraft.
(B) The military capability of the C-5 aircraft and the C-
17 aircraft, including number of lifetime flight hours, cargo
and passenger carrying capabilities, and mission capable
rates for such airframes. In the case of assumptions for the
C-5 aircraft, and any assumptions made for the mission
capable

[[Page S12111]]

rates of the C-17 aircraft, sensitivity analyses shall also
be conducted to test assumptions. The military capability
study for the C-5 aircraft shall also include an assessment
of the mission capable rates after each of the following:
(i) Successful completion of the Avionics Modernization
Program (AMP) and the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining
Program (RERP).
(ii) Partially successful completion of the Avionics
Modernization Program and the Reliability Enhancement and Re-
engining Program, with partially successful completion of
either such program being considered the point at which the
continued execution of such program is no longer supported by
cost-benefit analysis.
(C) The tactical capabilities of strategic airlift
aircraft, the potential increase in use of strategic airlift
aircraft for tactical missions, and the value of such
capabilities to tactical operations.
(D) The value of having more than one type of aircraft in
the strategic airlift fleet, and the potential need to pursue
a replacement aircraft for the C-5 aircraft that is larger
than the C-17 aircraft.
(4) The means by which the Air Force was able to restart
the production line for the C-5 aircraft after having closed
the line for several years, and the actions to be taken to
ensure the production line for the C-17 aircraft could be
restarted if necessary, including--
(A) an analysis of the costs of closing and re-opening the
production line for the C-5 aircraft; and
(B) an assessment of the costs of closing and re-opening
the production line for the C-17 aircraft on a similar basis.
(5) The financial effects of retiring, upgrading and
maintaining, or continuing current operations of the C-5A
aircraft fleet on procurement decisions relating to the C-17
aircraft.
(6) The impact that increasing the role and use of
strategic airlift aircraft in intratheater operations will
have on the current target number for strategic airlift
aircraft of 301 airframes, including an analysis of the
following:
(A) The appropriateness of using C-5 aircraft and C-17
aircraft for intratheater missions, as well as the efficacy
of these aircraft to perform current and projected future
intratheater missions.
(B) The interplay of existing doctrinal intratheater
airlift aircraft (such as the C-130 aircraft and the future
Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)) with an increasing role for C-5
aircraft and C-17 aircraft in intratheater missions.
(C) The most appropriate and likely missions for C-5
aircraft and C-17 aircraft in intratheater operations and the
potential for increased requirements in these mission areas.
(D) Any intratheater mission sets best performed by
strategic airlift aircraft as opposed to traditional
intratheater airlift aircraft.
(E) Any requirements for increased production or longevity
of C-5 aircraft and C-17 aircraft, or for a new strategic
airlift aircraft, in light of the matters analyzed under this
paragraph.
(7) Taking into consideration all applicable factors,
whether or not the replacement of C-5 aircraft with C-17
aircraft on a one-for-one basis will result in the retention
of a comparable strategic airlift capability.
(c) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to exclude from the study under subsection (a)
consideration of airlift assets other than the C-5 aircraft
or C-17 aircraft that do or may provide intratheater and
intertheater airlift, including the potential that such
current or future assets may reduce requirements for C-5
aircraft or C-17 aircraft.
(d) Collaboration With Transcom.--The federally funded
research and development center selected under subsection (a)
shall conduct the study required by that subsection and make
the report required by subsection (e) in concert with the
United States Transportation Command.
(e) Report by FFRDC.--
(1) In general.--Not later than January 10, 2009, the
federally funded research and development center selected
under subsection (a) shall submit to the Secretary of
Defense, the congressional defense committees, and the
Comptroller General of the United States a report on the
study required by subsection (a).
(2) Review by gao.--Not later than 90 days after receipt of
the report under paragraph (1), the Comptroller General shall
submit to the congressional defense committee a report on the
study conducted under subsection (a) and the report under
paragraph (1). The report under this subsection shall include
an analysis of the study under subsection (a) and the report
under paragraph (1), including an assessment by the
Comptroller General of the strengths and weaknesses of the
study and report.
(f) Report by Secretary of Defense.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after receipt of
the report under paragraph 1, 2009, the Secretary of Defense
shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate
and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives a report on the study required by subsection
(a).
(2) Elements.--The report shall include a comprehensive
discussion of the findings of the study, including a
particular focus on the following:
(A) A description of lift requirements and operating
profiles for intertheater airlift aircraft required to meet
the National Military Strategy, including assumptions
regarding:
(i) Current and future military combat and support
missions.
(ii) The planned force structure growth of the Army and the
Marine Corps.
(iii) Potential changes in lift requirements, including the
deployment of the Future Combat Systems by the Army.
(iv) New capability in strategic airlift to be provided by
the KC(X) aircraft and the expected utilization of such
capability, including its use in intratheater lift.
(v) The utilization of the heavy lift aircraft in
intratheater combat missions.
(vi) The availability and application of Civil Reserve Air
Fleet assets in future military scenarios.
(vii) Air mobility requirements associated with the Global
Rebasing Initiative of the Department of Defense.
(viii) Air mobility requirements in support of peacekeeping
and humanitarian missions around the globe.
(ix) Potential changes in lift requirements based on
equipment procured for Iraq and Afghanistan.
(B) A description of the assumptions utilized in the study
regarding aircraft performances and loading factors.
(C) A comprehensive statement of the data and assumptions
utilized in making program life cycle cost estimates.
(D) A comparison of cost and risk associated with optimal
mix airlift fleet versus program of record airlift fleet.
(3) Form.--The report shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may include a classified annex.

amendment no. 3043

(Purpose: To strengthen the nuclear forensics capabilities of the
United States)

On page 530, between lines 10 and 11, insert the following:

SEC. 3126. AGREEMENTS AND REPORTS ON NUCLEAR FORENSICS
CAPABILITIES.

(a) International Agreements on Nuclear Weapons Data.--The
Secretary of Energy may, with the concurrence of the
Secretary of State and in coordination with the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director
of National Intelligence, enter into agreements with
countries or international organizations to conduct data
collection and analysis to determine accurately and in a
timely manner the source of any components of, or fissile
material used or attempted to be used in, a nuclear device or
weapon.
(b) International Agreements on Information on Radioactive
Materials.--The Secretary of Energy may, with the concurrence
of the Secretary of State and in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and
the Director of National Intelligence, enter into agreements
with countries or international organizations--
(1) to acquire for the materials information program of the
Department of Energy validated information on the physical
characteristics of radioactive material produced, used, or
stored at various locations, in order to facilitate the
ability to determine accurately and in a timely manner the
source of any components of, or fissile material used or
attempted to be used in, a nuclear device or weapon; and
(2) to obtain access to information described in paragraph
(1) in the event of--
(A) a nuclear detonation; or
(B) the interdiction or discovery of a nuclear device or
weapon or nuclear material.
(c) Report on Agreements.--Not later than one year after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Energy shall, in coordination with the Secretary of State,
submit to Congress a report identifying--
(1) the countries or international organizations with which
the Secretary has sought to make agreements pursuant to
subsections (a) and (b);
(2) any countries or international organizations with which
such agreements have been finalized and the measures included
in such agreements; and
(3) any major obstacles to completing such agreements with
other countries and international organizations.
(d) Report on Standards and Capabilities.--Not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
President shall submit to Congress a report--
(1) setting forth standards and procedures to be used in
determining accurately and in a timely manner any country or
group that knowingly or negligently provides to another
country or group--
(A) a nuclear device or weapon;
(B) a major component of a nuclear device or weapon; or
(C) fissile material that could be used in a nuclear device
or weapon;
(2) assessing the capability of the United States to
collect and analyze nuclear material or debris in a manner
consistent with the standards and procedures described in
paragraph (1); and
(3) including a plan and proposed funding for rectifying
any shortfalls in the nuclear forensics capabilities of the
United States by September 30, 2010.

AMENDMENT NO. 3009, as modified

At the end of title XXII, add the following:

SEC. 2206. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT CERTAIN
FISCAL YEAR 2005 PROJECT.

(a) Modification.--The table in section 2201(a) of the
Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005
(division B of

[[Page S12112]]

Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 2105), as amended by section
2206 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006 (division B of Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat.
3493) and section 2205 of the Military Construction
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (division B of Public
Law 109-364; 120 Stat. 2452) is amended--
(1) in the item relating to Strategic Weapons Facility
Pacific, Bangor, Washington, by striking ``$147,760,000'' in
the amount column and inserting ``$295,000,000''; and
(2) by striking the amount identified as the total in the
amount column and inserting ``$972,719,000''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 2204 of the Military
Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (division
B of Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 2107), as amended by
section 2206 of the Military Construction Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2006 (division B of Public Law 109-163; 119
Stat. 3493) and section 2205 of the Military Construction
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (division B of Public
Law 109-364; 120 Stat. 2453) is amended--(2) in subsection
(b)(6), by striking ``$95,320,000'' and inserting
``$259,320,000''.

amendment no. 3046

(Purpose: To improve and streamline the security clearance process)

After section 1064, insert the following:

SEC. 1065. IMPROVEMENTS IN THE PROCESS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
SECURITY CLEARANCES.

(a) Demonstration Project.--Not later than 6 months after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of National Intelligence shall
implement a demonstration project that applies new and
innovative approaches to improve the processing of requests
for security clearances.
(b) Evaluation.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of National Intelligence shall carry out an
evaluation of the process for issuing security clearances and
develop a specific plan and schedule for replacing such
process with an improved process.
(c) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
completion of the evaluation required by subsection (b), the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on--
(1) the results of the demonstration project carried out
pursuant to subsection (a);
(2) the results of the evaluation carried out under
subsection (b); and
(3) the specific plan and schedule for replacing the
existing process for issuing security clearances with an
improved process.

AMENDMENT NO. 3008, as modified

On page 445, in the table preceding line 1, in the item
relating to Naval Station, Bremerton, Washington, strike
``$119,760,000'' and insert ``$190,960,000''.
On page 447, line 5, strike ``Funds'' and insert ``(a)
Authorization of Appropriations.--Funds''.
On page 449, between lines 16 and 17, insert the following:
(b) Limitation on Total Cost of Construction Projects.--
Notwithstanding the cost variations authorized by section
2853 of title 10, United States Code, and any other cost
variation authorized by law, the total cost of all projects
carried out under section 2201 of this Act may not exceed the
sum of the following:
(1) The total amount authorized to be appropriated under
paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of subsection (a).
(2) $71,200,000 (the balance of the amount authorized under
section 2201(a) for a nuclear aircraft carrier maintenance
pier at Naval Station Bremerton, Washington).

AMENDMENT NO. 3006, as modified

At the end of subtitle E of title XXVIII, add the
following:

SEC. 2854. TRANSFER OF JURISDICTION, FORMER NIKE MISSILE
SITE, GROSSE ILE, MICHIGAN.

(a) Transfer.--Administrative jurisdiction over the
property described in subsection (b) is hereby transferred
from the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
to the Secretary of the Interior.
(b) Property Described.--The property referred to in
subsection (a) is the former Nike missile site, consisting of
approximately 50 acres located at the southern end of Grosse
Ile, Michigan, as depicted on the map entitled ``07-CE'' on
file with the Environmental Protection Agency and dated May
16, 1984.
(c) Administration of Property.--Subject to subsection (d),
the Secretary of the Interior shall administer the property
described in subsection (b)--
(1) acting through the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service;
(2) as part of the Detroit River International Wildlife
Refuge; and
(3) for use as a habitat for fish and wildlife and as a
recreational property for outdoor education and environmental
appreciation.
(d) Management Response.--The Secretary of Defense shall
manage and carry out environmental response activities with
respect to the property described in subsection (b) as
expeditiously as possible, consistent with the Department's
prioritization of Formerly Used Defense Sites based on risk
and the requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liabiity Act of 1980 and the
Solid Waste Disposal Act, using amounts made available from
the account established by section 2703(a)(5) of title 10,
United States Code.
(e) Savings Provision.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to affect or limit the application of, or any
obligation to comply with, any environmental law, including
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) and the Solid
Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.).

AMENDMENT NO. 2251

(Purpose: To provide justice for victims of state-sponsored terrorism)

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. __. JUSTICE FOR MARINES AND OTHER VICTIMS OF STATE-
SPONSORED TERRORISM ACT.

(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the
``Justice for Marines and Other Victims of State-Sponsored
Terrorism Act''.
(b) Terrorism Exception to Immunity.--
(1) In general.--Chapter 97 of title 28, United States
Code, is amended by inserting after section 1605 the
following:

``Sec. 1605A. Terrorism exception to the jurisdictional
immunity of a foreign state

``(a) In General.--
``(1) No immunity.--A foreign state shall not be immune
from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of
the States in any case not otherwise covered by this chapter
in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death that was caused by an act of
torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage
taking, or the provision of material support or resources (as
defined in section 2339A of title 18) for such an act if such
act or provision of material support is engaged in by an
official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while
acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or
agency.
``(2) Claim heard.--The court shall hear a claim under this
section if--
``(A) the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor
of terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405 (j)) or section 620A of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) at the time
the act occurred, unless later designated as a result of such
act;
``(B) the claimant or the victim was--
``(i) a national of the United States (as that term is
defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22));
``(ii) a member of the Armed Forces of the United States
(as that term is defined in section 976 of title 10); or
``(iii) otherwise an employee of the government of the
United States or one of its contractors acting within the
scope of their employment when the act upon which the claim
is based occurred; or
``(C) where the act occurred in the foreign state against
which the claim has been brought, the claimant has afforded
the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the
claim in accordance with the accepted international rules of
arbitration.
``(b) Definition.--For purposes of this section--
``(1) the terms `torture' and `extrajudicial killing' have
the meaning given those terms in section 3 of the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991 (28 U.S.C. 1350 note);
``(2) the term `hostage taking' has the meaning given that
term in Article 1 of the International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages; and
``(3) the term `aircraft sabotage' has the meaning given
that term in Article 1 of the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.
``(c) Time Limit.--An action may be brought under this
section if the action is commenced not later than the latter
of--
``(1) 10 years after April 24, 1996; or
``(2) 10 years from the date on which the cause of action
arose.
``(d) Private Right of Action.--A private cause of action
may be brought against a foreign state designated under
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
U.S.C. 2405(j)), and any official, employee, or agent of said
foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her
office, employment, or agency which shall be liable to a
national of the United States (as that term is defined in
section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)), a member of the Armed Forces of the
United States (as that term is defined in section 976 of
title 10), or an employee of the government of the United
States or one of its contractors acting within the scope of
their employment or the legal representative of such a person
for personal injury or death caused by acts of that foreign
state or its official, employee, or agent for which the
courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under
this section for money damages which may include economic
damages, solatium, pain, and suffering, and punitive damages
if the acts were among those described in this section. A
foreign state shall be vicariously liable for the actions of
its officials, employees, or agents.
``(e) Additional Damages.--After an action has been brought
under subsection (d), actions may also be brought for
reasonably foreseeable property loss, whether insured or
uninsured, third party liability, and life and property
insurance policy loss claims.
``(f) Special Masters.--
``(1) In general.--The Courts of the United States may from
time to time appoint special masters to hear damage claims
brought under this section.
``(2) Transfer of funds.--The Attorney General shall
transfer, from funds available for the program under sections
1404C of the

[[Page S12113]]

Victims Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10603c) to the
Administrator of the United States District Court in which
any case is pending which has been brought pursuant to
section 1605(a)(7) such funds as may be required to carry out
the Orders of that United States District Court appointing
Special Masters in any case under this section. Any amount
paid in compensation to any such Special Master shall
constitute an item of court costs.
``(g) Appeal.--In an action brought under this section,
appeals from orders not conclusively ending the litigation
may only be taken pursuant to section 1292(b) of this title.
``(h) Property Disposition.--
``(1) In general.--In every action filed in a United States
district court in which jurisdiction is alleged under this
section, the filing of a notice of pending action pursuant to
this section, to which is attached a copy of the complaint
filed in the action, shall have the effect of establishing a
lien of lis pendens upon any real property or tangible
personal property located within that judicial district that
is titled in the name of any defendant, or titled in the name
of any entity controlled by any such defendant if such notice
contains a statement listing those controlled entities.
``(2) Notice.--A notice of pending action pursuant to this
section shall be filed by the clerk of the district court in
the same manner as any pending action and shall be indexed by
listing as defendants all named defendants and all entities
listed as controlled by any defendant.
``(3) Enforceability.--Liens established by reason of this
subsection shall be enforceable as provided in chapter 111 of
this title.''.
(2) Amendment to chapter analysis.--The chapter analysis
for chapter 97 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
inserting after the item for section 1605 the following:

``1605A. Terrorism exception to the jurisdictional immunity of a
foreign state.''.

(c) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Property.--Section 1610 of title 28, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(g) Property in Certain Actions.--
``(1) In general.--The property of a foreign state, or
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, against which a
judgment is entered under this section, including property
that is a separate juridical entity, is subject to execution
upon that judgment as provided in this section, regardless
of--
``(A) the level of economic control over the property by
the government of the foreign state;
``(B) whether the profits of the property go to that
government;
``(C) the degree to which officials of that government
manage the property or otherwise control its daily affairs;
``(D) whether that government is the sole beneficiary in
interest of the property; or
``(E) whether establishing the property as a separate
entity would entitle the foreign state to benefits in United
States courts while avoiding its obligations.
``(2) United states sovereign immunity inapplicable.--Any
property of a foreign state, or agency or instrumentality of
a foreign state, to which paragraph (1) applies shall not be
immune from execution upon a judgment entered under this
section because the property is regulated by the United
States Government by reason of action taken against that
foreign state under the Trading With the Enemy Act or the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act.''.
(2) Victims of crime act.--Section 1404C(a)(3) of the
Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10603c(a)(3)) is
amended by striking ``December 21, 1988, with respect to
which an investigation or'' and inserting ``October 23, 1983,
with respect to which an investigation or civil or
criminal''.
(3) General exception.--Section 1605 of title 28, United
States Code, is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)--
(i) in paragraph (5)(B), by inserting ``or'' after the
semicolon;
(ii) in paragraph (6)(D), by striking ``; or'' and
inserting a period; and
(iii) by striking paragraph (7); and
(B) by striking subsections (e) and (f).
(d) Application to Pending Cases.--
(1) In general.--The amendments made by this section shall
apply to any claim arising under section 1605A or 1605(g) of
title 28, United States Code, as added by this section.
(2) Prior actions.--Any judgment or action brought under
section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, or
section 101(c) of Public Law 104-208 after the effective date
of such provisions relying on either of these provisions as
creating a cause of action, which has been adversely affected
on the grounds that either or both of these provisions fail
to create a cause of action opposable against the state, and
which is still before the courts in any form, including
appeal or motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),
shall, on motion made to the Federal District Court where the
judgment or action was initially entered, be given effect as
if it had originally been filed pursuant to section 1605A(d)
of title 28, United States Code. The defenses of res
judicata, collateral estoppel and limitation period are
waived in any re-filed action described in this paragraph and
based on the such claim. Any such motion or re-filing must be
made not later than 60 days after enactment of this Act.

amendment no. 2172

(Purpose: To modify limitations on the retirement of B-52 bomber
aircraft)

At the end of subtitle D of title I, add the following:

SEC. 143. MODIFICATION OF LIMITATIONS ON RETIREMENT OF B-52
BOMBER AIRCRAFT.

(a) Maintenance of Primary and Backup Inventory of
Aircraft.--Subsection (a)(1) of section 131 of the John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007 (Public Law 109-364; 120 Stat. 2111) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph
(C):
``(C) shall maintain in a common configuration a primary
aircraft inventory of not less than 63 such aircraft and a
backup aircraft inventory of not less than 11 such
aircraft.''.
(b) Notice of Retirement.--Subsection (b)(1) of such
section is amended by striking ``45 days'' and inserting ``60
days''.

Mr. WARNER. That was a group of how many amendments?
Mrs. McCASKILL. Nine.
Mr. WARNER. We are making progress on this bill, but I strongly urge
other colleagues to bring forward their amendments. We have a lot to do
on this bill. We are dealing with a bill that is absolutely essential
for the men and women of the Armed Forces and their families. We should
move along as best we can to complete this important legislation.
I yield the floor.
Mrs. McCASKILL. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 2196

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to respond to
the amendment offered by the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. Coburn, to
eliminate the National Drug Intelligence Center, which is located in
Johnstown, PA. That center was created in 1992 and performs a very
important function. The National Drug Intelligence Center, commonly
referred to as the NDIC, partners with the Department of Homeland
Security and the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, to provide
intelligence, to identify, track, and sever the nexus between drug
trafficking and terrorism. The NDIC created an entity called
HashKeeper, a company software program which is provided to the Federal
Government for use in Iraq. The cost of this center is about one-third
of what it would be if it were located in the Washington, DC, area.
I think it makes good sense to decentralize Federal functions to the
extent it is possible and practical. Everything does not have to be
located in Washington, DC. Everything does not have to be located in a
big city. Our country is more vulnerable when everything is
concentrated in one area. Johnstown has the advantage of being much
less expensive, being able to provide these vital Federal services for
about one-third of the cost, while being reasonably close to
Washington, DC, which is the location of many of the other entities
with which it cooperates.
The jobs which are provided are very substantial for my constituents
in Pennsylvania; an obvious interest that I have as a Senator
representing the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. These are several
hundred jobs; they are very important. It is a legitimate interest to
want to maintain our industrial base in Pennsylvania and to maintain
governmental activities in Pennsylvania. But there is good value in
having the NDIC function, in general, and there is extra good value in
having it function in Johnstown, PA.
The NDIC has been complimented by a broad number of agencies. In a
November 21, 2001, letter, the FBI praised the NDIC for its work on
financial crimes, saying:

Through the analysis of these documents, over 400 specific
intelligence products have been produced for the FBI, the
Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, and U.S.
Attorney's Offices. The work NDIC produces continues to
initiate actionable leads and identify avenues of
investigation. NDIC has integrated seamlessly with the FBI
investigation and has enhanced the way the FBI will
investigate future financial cases. The participation of NDIC
. . . continues to be invaluable.

[[Page S12114]]

In a June 23, 2006, letter, the Drug Enforcement Agency had this to
say:

The Fort Worth Resident Office--

that is of DEA--

amassed thousands of documents, but was unable to properly
exploit the information they contained. The valuable report--

referring to the NDIC report--

caused several of the principals to negotiate pleas to
pending charges. If not for the willingness of the members of
NDIC to confront these challenges in a cooperative effort,
this investigation would not have reached its current level
of success.

There have been many plaudits given to the NDIC by the special agents
in charge of FBI offices, such as the FBI agent in charge of the Tampa
Field Division, the FBI special agent in charge of the Detroit Field
Division, the DEA special agent in charge of the Dallas Field Division,
the FBI special agent in charge of the Charlotte Division, and the DEA
special agent in charge of the Oklahoma City District Office. This last
is ironic, in a sense. In a March 25, 2006, DEA cable, the DEA Oklahoma
City District Office had this to say.

In support of phases one and two, NDIC deployed two teams
in Oklahoma, each consisting of one special agent, one
computer exploitation and five document exploitation
personnel. Actionable intelligence was generated and passed
to the appropriate DEA offices. The OKCDO thanks all NDIC
personnel--

that is the Oklahoma City District Office thanks all NDIC personnel--

who planned and participated in this operation. The
intelligence and operational knowledge gained was beneficial
to OKCDO, and its law enforcement partners. . . .

President, National High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, HIDTA,
Director's Association Executive Board: May 24, 2007, Letter to the
Attorney General in support of NDIC:

NDIC produced thirty-two HIDTA drug market analyses for the
HIDTA program. Production of the HIDTA drug market analyses
required a full-time effort of twenty-six analysts for
extended periods of time working side-by-side with the HIDTA
Intelligence Center personnel.
NDIC is a very valuable asset in addressing the nation's
drug problem.
This entire effort lead to a valuable working relationship
with not only the HIDTAs but federal, state and local drug
enforcement entities.

FBI Special Agent in Charge--Tampa Field Division: January 16, 2007,
Letter of Appreciation for NDIC assistance.

The purpose of this letter is to recognize the assistance
of the National Drug Intelligence Center's (NDIC) Document
and Computer Exploitation Branch for the superb analytical
support they provided the Violent Crimes/Gang Squad on an
investigation into the Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation.

FBI Special Agent in Charge--Detroit Field Division: December 11,
2006, Letter of Appreciation for NDIC:

The teamwork displayed in working with investigators from
the DEA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a true
measure of what can be accomplished when agencies work
together. NDIC's analysis of the [redacted] Pharmacy evidence
assisted in obtaining a sixty-two count indictment . . .

The FBI characterized NDIC's performance as exemplary in this letter.
DEA Special Agent in Charge--Dallas Field Division: June 23, 2006,
Letter of Commendation for Document Exploitation support to a major
drug investigation:

The Fort Worth Resident Office (DEA) amassed thousands of
documents, but was unable to properly exploit the information
they contained. The valuable [NDIC] report listed the seized
documents and collated them, which created a valuable tool
for Investigators and Prosecutors in this investigation.
In conclusion, this effort caused several of the principals
to negotiate pleas to pending charges.
Subsequently, 19 search warrants and over 100 seizure
warrants were executed, which resulted in the seizure of
approximately $20 million, in assets.
If not for the willingness of the members of NDIC to
confront these challenges in a cooperative effort, this
investigation would not have reached its current level of
success.

FBI Charlotte Division: May 2, 2006, Letter of Commendation for NDIC:

In February 2006, your staff presented to the North
Carolina Law Enforcement Community, the most comprehensive
Intelligence Assessment ever conducted within the state of
North Carolina relating to gangs. I commend NDIC in exceeding
all expectations in providing this valuable assessment.

Executive Office of the President--ONDCP Director: April 17, 2006,
Letter of Commendation regarding drug market collection effort:

I want to express my thanks for NDIC's domestic market
collection effort.
I know that this was a serious, time consuming undertaking
by your agency, and I truly appreciate the efforts of
everyone involved.
Thanks for the hard work.

DEA Oklahoma City District Office: March 25, 2006, DEA cable:

In support of phases one and two, NDIC deployed two teams
to Oklahoma, each consisting of one special agent, one
computer exploitation and five document exploitation
personnel.
Actionable intelligence was generated and passed to the
appropriate DEA offices.
The OKCDO thanks all NDIC personnel who planned and
participated in this operation. The intelligence and
operational knowledge gained was beneficial to the OKCDO and
its law enforcement partners in the state . . .

Executive Office of the President--ONDCP Assistant Deputy Director:
March 13, 2006, E-mail of Appreciation for drug market collection
effort:

Please, convey our thanks to your staff for their
outstanding job on the ONDCP Market Collection Effort.
Once Again, we greatly appreciate the superb support and
please pass on our thanks for a job well done!

U.S. Department of Justice--Assistant Attorney General: March 7,
2006, Letter of Commendation regarding the National Drug Threat
Assessment:

In a letter to the Director of NDIC, the Assistant Attorney
General praised NDIC's National Drug Threat Assessment (NDTA)
stating:
The NDTA report is extremely helpful to me and prosecutors
who are charged with devising new and creative strategies to
achieve that goal.
I know that you and your entire staff have put a tremendous
amount of work into creating the NDTA. I wanted to let you
know that the effort was well worth it.

U.S. Attorney--District of New Mexico: January 18, 2006, Letter of
Praise for NDIC:

I am writing to express my thanks for a job not just well
done, but rather for an extraordinary, and in my career,
unprecedented collaborative effort to support the federal
prosecution of significant drug traffickers and money
launders.
Once again, thank you for allowing your amazing staff to
dedicate their time, skills and NDIC resources to this
important case. The work done in support of this case by NDIC
is invaluable. . .

U.S. Department of Treasury--Under Secretary, Office of Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence: December 28, 2005, Letter of Appreciation for
support in completing the national U.S. Money Laundering Threat
Assessment:

I am very pleased to inform you that the Money Laundering
Threat Assessment is complete.
[I]t is thanks to active and substantial contributions by
the NDIC and the other participants.
I can't thank you enough for the extraordinary
contribution.

Office of Counter Narcotics Enforcement/U.S. Interdiction
Coordinator--Acting Director: September 7, 2005, Letter of Appreciation
for support to a drug/terror tasking:

As I am sure you are aware, NDIC is actively supporting the
expanded mission of the Office of Counter Narcotics
Enforcement (CNE) by aiding us in the response to the new
drug/terror nexus (DTX) tasking as assigned to my office in
the Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. I
wanted to take this opportunity to let you know how much I
appreciate NDIC's support to this office and to our country's
overall counterdrug interdiction efforts.

FBI--Chief, Terrorist Financing Operations Section, TFOS: March 5,
2003, Letter of Thanks for providing long term assistance to post-911
investigations:

As always, it is a pleasure to write to you, as it affords
those of us within the Terrorist Financing Operations Section
(TFOS) an opportunity to thank you for the continued
exceptional assistance NDIC provides to the Counterterrorism
Division here at FBI Headquarters.

FBI--Chief, Financial Crimes Section: November 21, 2001, Letter of
Appreciation to Deputy Attorney General commending NDIC:

Since 09/20/2001, the NDIC team, consisting of NDIC
Intelligence Analysts and FBI Financial Analysts, has
analyzed over 75,000 subpoenaed financial documents. Through
the analysis of these documents, over 400 specific
intelligence products have been produced for the FBI, the
Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, and U.S.
Attorney's Office. The work NDIC produces continues to
initiate actionable leads and identify avenues of
investigation. NDIC has integrated seamlessly with the FBI
investigation and has enhanced the way the FBI will
investigate future financial cases. The participation NDIC in
this investigation continues to be invaluable.

[[Page S12115]]

In concluding--the two most popular words in any speech--I
acknowledge and respect the work the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. Coburn,
is doing. He and I have worked very closely in his almost 3 years in
the Senate. I observed his work in the House of Representatives, and I
know his work as a medical professional. I understand what he is doing
in subjecting to an analytical eye Federal expenditures. But I do not
believe he should target the NDIC.
I concur that we ought to be holding down Federal expenditures, and I
think that close scrutiny of all such projects is very much in the
national interest. But I believe the facts are very strong in support
of continued operation of the NDIC in Johnstown, PA.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.
Mr. COBURN. Will the Senator yield so I can respond to the Senator
from Pennsylvania and then we can get this off the floor?
Ms. KLOBUCHAR. That is fine.
Mr. COBURN. A couple of points. You should be down here defending
this. This is something in your State and it is appropriate that you
do. The point I raise is the HashKeeper system is ineffective and
doesn't work near to the way every other component works. We know it
doesn't work, and it costs about 18 times what the NARL system does,
plus the NARL system is admissible in court and the HashKeeper system
is not, which is developed by the NDIC.
So there is no question that some of the work they do is valuable.
But every example you cited was the DOCX program, which requires
anybody there to travel somewhere else. So the location doesn't matter
where.
The other point I would make--and the significance of that is we are
not, overall, getting as good a value as we could. The idea is not to
relocate this to Washington, what the Justice Department is
recommending this DOCX portion of it be where it needs to be--which is
all across the country--and the rest of the areas that are deemed
vital, which is about 10 percent of what the NIDC does, be relocated to
El Paso where the drugs come in, where our border is, and where they
need it.
This is not a criticism of the people who work there or everything
they do. What it is, the amendment as made is intended to give us a
perspective about value that we are not getting. I have great respect
and consider a friend the Senator from Pennsylvania. I understand his
defense of this program. I do not believe it meets the scrutiny of any
commonsense objective when you look at it, and what the Department of
Justice, which runs it and manages it, and also the fact that in a time
of war we can spend a whole lot less money and have that money
available to defend this country.
I thank the Senator for listening to me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.

Amendment No. 2999

Ms. KLOBUCHAR. Mr. President, I am here to speak in support of
amendment No. 2999, as amended. This is an amendment that is very
important to me, and I appreciate the leadership of my colleagues
Senator McCaskill and Senator Webb, and in fact all of the freshmen
Democrats who are supporting this legislation, the goal of which is to
bring more public accountability to the way our Government does
business.
I think you and I both know, having spent the last 2 years going
around our State, that people are yearning for more public
accountability from our Government. They are yearning for more
transparency. We heard calls for that--increased transparency. And here
we have, in the area of Armed Services and the area of Government
contracting, a chance to act on it.
This amendment establishes an independent, bipartisan commission to
strengthen Government oversight and examine the true costs of a
contracting culture that the Federal Government relies upon in Iraq.
This idea is not unprecedented.
The legislation is inspired by the work of the Truman Commission and
it is fitting Senator McCaskill is from Missouri, as was Truman. The
Truman Commission, as you know, conducted hundreds of hearings and
investigations into Government waste during World War II, at an
estimated savings of more than $178 billion in today's dollars; $178
billion. Think of what that would mean to the American taxpayer today
at a time when we are spending somewhere between $10 to $12 billion a
month in Iraq.
There is, unfortunately, a natural tendency in this country toward
excess and corporate excess. So when people are given sort of unlimited
contracts, no-bid contracts, I think you can expect excess.
I come from a prosecutor background. We know that when people are
given leeway, and maybe even when they have the best intentions, the
people in charge, the people on the ground, it leads to fraud and the
Government is the one that is on the short end of the stick.
I think it is more than just a cost of doing business when we are
looking at what we have been seeing in Iraq with private contractors
over the last 5 years. The number of contractors in Iraq, the last
estimate I had, was 180,000. It now exceeds the number of American
combat troops in Iraq. We need to look at the effects these logistical
and security contractors have on our military.
Now, I would say this: We are not talking about creating an
additional bureaucracy. We are talking about expanding an
infrastructure that already exists. The Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction, with the excellent performance that we have seen
in uncovering waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq reconstruction projects,
is proof of its ability to conduct more interagency examination of
wartime contracts.
The special inspector general has proven to be a powerful tool in
investigating reconstruction contracts. In 2005 alone, he reported a
loss of $9 billion tax due to a contractor's inefficiency and bad
management.
I can tell you this, in my job as county attorney, when we had a case
in front of us, we would always say: Follow the money and you would
find the bad guy.
Well, we need to do more of that with Iraqi contractors. This motto
could not be more true than it is today as the GAO, the Defense
Contract Audit Agency, and news reports continue to expose gross
mismanagement in defense contracting.
That is why I am so proud to support this amendment. We have heard
that of the $57 billion awarded in contracts for reconstruction in Iraq
that was investigated, approximately $10 billion has been wasted; $4.9
billion was lost through contractor overpricing and waste; $5.1 billion
was lost through unsupported contract charges. Of this $10 billion,
more than $2.7 billion was charged by Halliburton. This means almost 1
in 6 Federal tax dollars sent to rebuild Iraq has been wasted. And
while we have heard in dollars the staggering amount, this waste
amount, $10 billion, the costs of mismanaged contracts extends beyond
that.
For instance, if you look at the electricity in Baghdad, you have
seen the city only enjoying an average of 6.5 hours of electricity a
day. It has actually gone down from where it was a year ago.
Water. Congress has provided nearly $2 billion to provide clean
drinking water and repair sewer systems. But according to the World
Health Organization, 70 percent of Iraqis lack access to clean drinking
water.
With jobs, the Defense Department has estimated that the unemployment
rate is anywhere from 13.6 percent to 60 percent. In a recent survey,
only 16 percent of Iraqis said their current incomes met their basic
needs. These costs in every way are unacceptable. They are unacceptable
to the people of Iraq, and they are unacceptable to the taxpayers of
this country.
My colleagues and I--and you are one of them, Mr. President--came to
Washington demanding accountability. Today I am proud to be part of a
group that supports an important amendment to bring more transparency,
to bring accountability to contracting in Iraq.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to
10 minutes as in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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