H.Amdt. 209House111th Congress (2009-2011)
An amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in part B of House Report to fully fund the administration's request for non-military assistance to Pakistan ($1.5 billion) for FY 2010 and provides "such sums" as may be necessary through 2013. It also requires that the administration submit a comprehensive interagency strategy and implementation plan; requires quarterly briefings on developments in Pakistan; as well as written notification to the Congress of adjustments in strategy and related changes in allocations and expenditures.
Sponsored by 
Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL)
Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL)Submitted June 11, 2009
Description
Amendment in the nature of a substitute sought to fully fund the administration's request for non-military assistance to Pakistan ($1.5 billion) for FY 2010 by providing "such sums" as may be necessary through 2013. It also sought to require that the administration submit a comprehensive interagency strategy and implementation plan; require quarterly briefings on developments in Pakistan; and written notification to the Congress of adjustments in strategy and related changes in allocations and expenditures.
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House amendment offered
June 11, 2009
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House amendment offered
June 11, 2009
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House amendment not agreed to: On agreeing to the Ros-Lehtinen amendment (A001) Failed by the Yeas and Nays: 173 - 246 (Roll no. 331).
June 11, 2009 • 2:53 PM
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Amendment failed by House: On agreeing to the Ros-Lehtinen amendment (A001) Failed by the Yeas and Nays: 173 - 246 (Roll no. 331).
June 11, 2009 • 2:53 PM
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House amendment offered/reported by : Amendment (A001) in the nature of a substitute offered by Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.(conideration: CR H6574-6580; text: CR H6574-6575)
June 11, 2009 • 1:54 PM
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Roll call votes on amendments in House
June 11, 2009 • 2:53 PM
Floor
Amendment (A001) in the nature of a substitute offered by Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. (conideration: CR H6574-6580; text: CR H6574-6575)
June 11, 2009 • 1:54 PM
Floor
On agreeing to the Ros-Lehtinen amendment (A001) Failed by the Yeas and Nays: 173 - 246 (Roll no. 331).
June 11, 2009 • 2:53 PM
Votes
1 roll call on this amendment
Text
Offered
PAKISTAN ENDURING ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2009
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 522, I call up
the bill (H.R. 1886) to authorize democratic, economic, and social
development assistance for Pakistan, to authorize security assistance
for Pakistan, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 522, the
amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill, modified
by the amendment printed in part A of House report 111-143, is adopted
and the bill, as amended, is considered read.
The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:
H.R. 1886
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Pakistan
Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2009''
or the ``PEACE Act of 2009''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Findings.
Sec. 4. Declaration of principles.
TITLE I--DEMOCRATIC, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR
PAKISTAN
Sec. 101. Purposes of assistance.
Sec. 102. Authorization of assistance.
Sec. 103. Multilateral support for Pakistan.
Sec. 104. Pakistan Democracy and Prosperity Fund.
Sec. 105. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE II--SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN
Sec. 201. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 202. Purposes of assistance.
Sec. 203. Authorization of assistance.
Sec. 204. Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund.
[[Page H6552]]
Sec. 205. Exchange program between military and civilian personnel of
Pakistan and certain other countries.
Sec. 206. Limitation on United States military assistance to Pakistan.
Sec. 207. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Comprehensive regional security strategy.
Sec. 302. Monitoring and evaluation of assistance.
Sec. 303. Auditing.
Sec. 304. Requirements for civilian control of United States assistance
for Pakistan.
Sec. 305. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 306. Reports.
Sec. 307. Sunset.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--Except as
otherwise provided in this Act, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means the Committees on
Appropriations and Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committees on Appropriations and
Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(2) Counterinsurgency.--The term ``counterinsurgency''
means efforts to defeat organized movements that seek to
overthrow the duly constituted Governments of Pakistan and
Afghanistan through the use of subversion and armed conflict.
(3) Counterterrorism.--The term ``counterterrorism'' means
efforts to combat--
(A) al Qaeda; and
(B) other terrorist organizations, as such term is defined
in section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)).
(4) FATA.--The term ``FATA'' means the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.
(5) FCR.--The term ``FCR'' means the Frontier Crimes
Regulation, codified under British law in 1901, and
applicable to the FATA.
(6) NWFP.--The term ``NWFP'' means the North West Frontier
Province of Pakistan, which has Peshawar as its provincial
capital.
SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The Islamic Republic of Pakistan has been a critical
ally of the United States for more than 4 decades.
(2) With the free and fair election of February 18, 2008,
Pakistan returned to civilian rule after almost 9 years under
a military dictatorship.
(3) After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against
the United States, Pakistan chose to partner with the United
States in the fight against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other
extremist and terrorist groups.
(4) Since 2001, the United States has contributed more than
$12,000,000,000 to Pakistan to strengthen Pakistan's
governance, economy, education system, healthcare services,
and military, so as to bring freedom and opportunities to the
people of Pakistan while helping to combat terrorism and to
counter a domestic insurgency.
(5) The United States requires a balanced, integrated,
countrywide strategy that provides assistance throughout
Pakistan and does not disproportionately focus on military
assistance or one particular area or province.
(6) Despite killing or capturing hundreds of al Qaeda
operatives and other terrorists--including major al Qaeda
leaders, such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, Ramzi bin al-Shibh,
and Abu Faraj al-Libi--Pakistan's FATA, parts of the NWFP,
Quetta in Balochistan, and Muridke in Punjab remain a
sanctuary for al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and affiliated
groups from which these groups organize terrorist actions
against Pakistan and other countries.
(7) Pakistan's security forces have recently begun taking
concerted action against those who threaten Pakistan's
security and stability, with military operations in the
Bajour agency in the FATA and in the Swat, Buner, and Dir
districts in the NWFP.
(8) The displacement of over 1,000,000 Pakistanis poses a
grave humanitarian crisis and requires the immediate
attention of the United Nations, and the strong support of
donor nations, to provide food, water, shelter, medicine,
sanitation and other emergency services and supplies to the
displaced, along with longer-term development assistance.
The humanitarian crisis highlights the need for Pakistan to
develop an effective national counterinsurgency strategy, in
order to mitigate such displacement.
SEC. 4. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES.
Congress declares that the relationship between the United
States and Pakistan should be based on the following
principles:
(1) Pakistan is a critical friend and ally to the United
States, both in times of strife and in times of peace, and
the two countries share many common goals, including
combating terrorism and violent radicalism, solidifying
democracy and rule of law in Pakistan, and promoting the
social and material well-being of the people of Pakistan.
(2) United States assistance to Pakistan is intended to
supplement, not supplant, Pakistan's own efforts in building
a stable, secure, and prosperous Pakistan, and United States
assistance will be wholly ineffective without Pakistan's own
serious efforts to improve the health, education, and living
standards of its population, including maintaining or
increasing the financial resources devoted to such efforts.
(3) The United States supports Pakistan's struggle against
extremist elements and recognizes the profound sacrifice made
by Pakistan in the fight against terrorism, including the
loss of more than 1,600 soldiers since 2001 in combat with al
Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups.
(4) The United States intends to work with the Government
of Pakistan--
(A) to build mutual trust and confidence by actively and
consistently pursuing a sustained, long-term, multifaceted
relationship between the two countries, devoted to
strengthening the mutual security, stability, and prosperity
of both countries;
(B) to support the people of Pakistan and their democratic
government in their efforts to consolidate democracy, through
strengthening Pakistan's parliament, helping Pakistan
reestablish an independent and transparent judicial system,
and working to extend the rule of law in all areas in
Pakistan;
(C) to promote long-term development and infrastructure
projects, including in healthcare, water management, and
energy programs, in all areas of Pakistan, that are sustained
and supported by each successive democratic government in
Pakistan;
(D) to encourage sustainable economic development in
Pakistan and the integration of Pakistan into the global
economy in order to improve the living conditions of the
people of Pakistan;
(E) to ensure that the people of Pakistan, including those
living in areas governed by the FCR, have access to public,
modernized education and vocational training to enable them
to provide for themselves, for their families, and for a more
prosperous future for their children;
(F) to expand people-to-people engagement between the two
countries, through increased educational, technical, and
cultural exchanges and other methods;
(G) to ensure transparency of and provide effective
accountability for all United States assistance and
reimbursements provided to Pakistan;
(H) to take steps to improve Pakistan's counterterrorism
financing and anti-money laundering laws to comply with
international standards, to include applying for ``Financial
Action Task Force'' observer status and adhering to the
United Nations International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism;
(I) to establish a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
strategy to prevent any territory of Pakistan from being used
as a base or conduit for terrorist attacks in Pakistan, or
elsewhere, and ensure that madrasas in Pakistan are not used
to incite terrorism;
(J) to ensure that Pakistan has strong and effective law
enforcement and national defense forces, under civilian
leadership, with sufficient and appropriate security
equipment and training to effectively defend Pakistan against
internal and external threats;
(K) to ensure access of United States investigators to
individuals suspected of engaging in worldwide proliferation
of nuclear materials, as necessary, and restrict such
individuals from travel or any other activity that could
result in further proliferation;
(L) to help Pakistan meet its commitment to not support any
person or group that conducts violence, sabotage, or other
activities meant to instill fear or terror in Pakistan's
neighboring countries; and
(M) to help Pakistan gain control of its under-governed
areas and stop any support, direction, guidance to, or
acquiescence in the activities of, any person or group that
engages in acts of violence or intimidation against
civilians, civilian groups, or governmental entities.
TITLE I--DEMOCRATIC, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR
PAKISTAN
SEC. 101. PURPOSES OF ASSISTANCE.
The purposes of assistance under this title are--
(1) to demonstrate unequivocally the long-term commitment
of the United States to the people of Pakistan and Pakistan's
democratic institutions;
(2) to support the consolidation of democracy, good
governance, and the rule of law in Pakistan;
(3) to help build the capacity of law enforcement forces in
Pakistan to combat terrorism and violent militancy and
expeditiously investigate, arrest, and prosecute alleged
criminals, consistent with the rule of law and due process;
(4) to further the sustainable and effective economic and
social development of Pakistan and the improvement of the
living conditions of the people of Pakistan, especially in
areas of direct interest and importance to their daily lives;
(5) to strengthen regional ties between Pakistan and its
neighbors by offering concrete nonmilitary assistance for
issues of mutual economic and social concern;
(6) to strengthen Pakistan's public education system,
increase literacy, expand opportunities for vocational
training, and help create an appropriate national curriculum
for all schools in Pakistan;
(7) to expand people-to-people engagement between the
United States and Pakistan, through increased educational,
technical, and cultural exchanges and other methods;
(8) to strengthen respect for internationally recognized
human rights in efforts to stabilize the security environment
in Pakistan; and
(9) to promote the rights and empowerment of women and
girls in Pakistan, including efforts to increase access to
basic healthcare services to address Pakistan's high maternal
mortality rate and to increase girls' and women's access to
education.
SEC. 102. AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.
(a) In General.--To carry out the purposes of section 101,
the President is authorized to provide assistance for
Pakistan to support the activities described in subsection
(b).
(b) Activities Supported.--Activities that may be supported
by assistance under subsection (a) include the following:
(1) Fortifying democratic institutions.--To support,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, democratic
institutions in Pakistan in order to strengthen civilian rule
and long-term stability, including assistance such as--
[[Page H6553]]
(A) support for efforts to strengthen the National
Parliament of Pakistan, including--
(i) assistance to parliamentary committees to enhance the
capacity to conduct public hearings and oversee government
activities, including national security issues and the
military budget, to solicit input on key public policy
issues, and to oversee the conduct of elections;
(ii) support for the establishment of constituency offices
and otherwise promote the responsibility of members of
parliament to respond to constituents; and
(iii) strengthening of the role of parliamentary
leadership;
(B) support for voter education and civil society training,
including training with grassroots organizations to enhance
the capacity of the organizations to advocate for the
development of public policy;
(C) support for political parties, including increasing
their capacity and protecting their right to carry out
political activities without restriction (other than
reasonable administrative requirements commonly applied in
democratic countries) and fostering the responsiveness of
such parties to the needs of the people of Pakistan;
(D) support for strengthening the capacity of the civilian
Government of Pakistan to carry out its responsibilities,
including supporting the establishment of frameworks that
promote government transparency and criminalize corruption in
both the government and private sector, audit offices,
inspectors general offices, third party monitoring of
government procurement processes, whistle-blower protections,
and anti-corruption agencies; and
(E) in particular, support for efforts by the Government of
Pakistan to promote governance reforms in the FATA,
including--
(i) extension of the Political Parties Act;
(ii) local experimentation with methods to transition from
the FCR; and
(iii) long-term development of durable and responsive
political institutions.
(2) Enhancement and strengthening of the judicial system
and law enforcement.--To support, notwithstanding any other
provision of law, Pakistan's efforts to expand the rule of
law and build the capacity, transparency, and trust in
government institutions, at the national, provincial, and
local levels, including assistance such as--
(A) support for the rule of law and systemic improvement of
judicial and criminal justice institutions, including--
(i) management of courts;
(ii) enhanced career opportunities and professional
training for judges, public defenders, and prosecutors; and
(iii) efforts to enhance the rule of law to all areas in
Pakistan where the writ of the government is under heightened
challenge by terrorists and militants, including through
innovations in the delivery of judicial services that enhance
the legitimacy of state institutions;
(B) support for professionalization of the police,
including--
(i) training regarding use of force;
(ii) education and training regarding human rights;
(iii) training regarding evidence preservation and chain of
custody; and
(iv) training regarding community policing;
(C) support for independent law enforcement agencies, such
as the Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of Interior,
responsive to civilian control, including--
(i) enhanced coordination with judicial processes;
(ii) enhancement of forensics capabilities;
(iii) data collection and analyses;
(iv) case tracking and management;
(v) financial intelligence functions; and
(vi) maintenance of data systems to track terrorist of
criminal activity; and
(D) strengthening the capacity of the police and other
civilian law enforcement agencies to provide a robust
response to threats from extremists and terrorists along the
frontier and elsewhere in Pakistan, including--
(i) the development of an elite rapid reaction force which
could be deployed on short notice to secure areas that are
threatened by militancy; and
(ii) facilitating improved counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency coordination between local government
officials, the police, paramilitary, and military leaders.
(3) Support for broad-based and sustainable economic
development.--To support economic development in Pakistan
by--
(A) promoting energy sector reform and development;
(B) expanding assistance for agricultural and rural
development, including farm-to-market roads, systems to
prevent spoilage and waste, and other small-scale
infrastructure improvements that will enhance supply and
distribution networks;
(C) increasing employment opportunities, including support
to small and medium enterprises, microfinance and
microenterprise activities, and in particular programs to
improve the lives of women and girls;
(D) preventing youth from turning to extremism and
militancy, and promoting the renunciation of such tactics and
extremist ideologies, by providing economic, social,
educational, and vocational opportunities and life-skills
training to at-risk youth; and
(E) increasing investment in infrastructure, including
construction of roads, water resource management systems,
irrigation channels, and continued development of a national
aviation industry and aviation infrastructure.
(4) Support to increase local capacity.--To increase the
capacity and improve the sustainability of Pakistan's
national, provincial, and local governmental and
nongovernmental institutions, including assistance to--
(A) increase and improve the capacity of Pakistan's
national, provincial, and local governmental institutions
by--
(i) providing technical assistance to all ministries to
improve transparency and ability to respond to the needs of
the people of Pakistan; and
(ii) promoting the implementation of fiscal and personnel
management, including revenue tracking and expenditure
systems; and
(B) enhance the capacity of Pakistan's nongovernmental and
civil society organizations to respond to the needs of the
people of Pakistan by--
(i) increasing support for local nongovernmental
organizations with demonstrated experience in delivering
services to the people of Pakistan, particularly to women,
children, and other vulnerable populations in Pakistan;
(ii) providing training and education to local
nongovernmental and civil society organizations on ways to
identify and improve the delivery of services to the people
of Pakistan; and
(iii) promoting local ownership and participation,
including encouraging communities to contribute a percentage
of the value of United States projects or activities carried
out under this title in the form of labor, in-kind materials,
or other provisions.
(5) Support for public education system.--To support
Pakistan's public education system, including--
(A) implementation of a national education strategy, to
include both primary and secondary education, focused on
literacy and civic education, including--
(i) programs to assist development of modern, nationwide
school curriculums for public, private, and religious schools
that incorporate relevant subjects, such as math, science,
literature, and human rights awareness, in addition to
agricultural education and training;
(ii) enhancement of civic education programs focused on
political participation, democratic institutions, and
tolerance of diverse ethnic and religious groups; and
(iii) support for the proper oversight of all educational
institutions, including madrasas, as required by Pakistani
law, including registration with the Ministry of Education
and regular monitoring of curriculum by the Ministry of
Education to ensure students in Pakistan receive a
comprehensive education;
(B) initiatives to enhance the access to education for
women and girls, and to increase women's literacy, with
special emphasis on helping girls stay in school;
(C) funding to the Government of Pakistan to use to
increase immediately teacher salaries and to recruit and
train teachers and administrators, as well as develop
formalized salary scales with merit-based pay increases;
(D) establishment of vocational and technical programs to
enhance employment opportunities;
(E) encouragement of United States and Pakistani public-
private partnerships to increase investment in higher
education and technical training opportunities;
(F) construction and maintenance of libraries and public
schools, including water sanitation, perimeter walls, and
recreation areas;
(G) provision of textbooks and other learning materials and
food assistance for student meals; and
(H) provision of software to educational institutions and
students at the lowest possible cost, specifically targeting
universities that specialize in information technology, and
women's colleges and women's secondary schools.
(6) Support for human rights.--To promote respect for and
compliance with internationally recognized human rights,
including assistance such as--
(A) programs to strengthen civil society organizations that
promote internationally recognized human rights, including
religious freedom, freedom of expression, and freedom of
association, and that support human rights monitoring;
(B) promotion of education regarding internationally
recognized human rights;
(C) programs designed to end traditional practices and
punishments that are inconsistent with internationally
recognized human rights norms and protections, such as honor
killings and other forms of cruel and unusual punishments;
(D) promotion of freedom of religion and religious
tolerance, protection of religious minorities, and promotion
of freedom of expression and association, including support
for responsible independent media;
(E) promotion of nongovernmental organizations that focus
on the protection of women and girls, including women-led
organizations and programs that support the participation of
women in the national, provincial, and local political
process, and programs to end violence against women,
including rape;
(F) technical, legal, and law enforcement assistance for
the investigation of past disappearances of individuals in
Pakistan and the development of a national data base of such
individuals; and
(G) programs in support and protection of the rights of
ethnic minorities in Pakistan, including Baluchis, Sindhis,
and Pashtuns, to preserve their language, culture,
traditional areas of inhabitancy, and to fight any direct or
indirect discrimination.
(7) Support for refugees and internally displaced
persons.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) counterinsurgency operations being carried out by the
Government of Pakistan should be designed to minimize
civilian casualties and collateral damage to the people of
Pakistan and to provide security for the delivery of
humanitarian assistance to the affected civilian population;
(B) the United States should continue to provide robust
assistance to the people of Pakistan who have been displaced
as a result of ongoing conflict and violence;
[[Page H6554]]
(C) the United States should support international efforts
to coordinate assistance to refugees and internally displaced
persons in Pakistan, including by providing support to
international and nongovernmental organizations for this
purpose;
(D) the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development should support the development
objectives of the Refugee Affected and Host Areas (RAHA)
Initiative in Pakistan to address livelihoods, heath,
education, infrastructure development, and environmental
restoration in identified parts of the country where Afghan
refugees have lived; and
(E) the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development should evaluate the effectiveness
of the livelihoods projects in the FATA in order to determine
whether systems need to be put into place to improve
programming in this key sector.
(8) Support for healthcare efforts.--To provide urgently
needed healthcare assistance to the people of Pakistan,
including assistance to supplement the Government of
Pakistan's efforts to eliminate diseases, including
hepatitis, and to reduce the nation's high maternal and
under-five mortality rates, including--
(A) support for repairing and building healthcare
infrastructure, including purchase of equipment and training
of health professionals, to ensure adequate access to
healthcare for Pakistan's population, especially among its
rural, poor, marginalized and disadvantaged segments; and
(B) promotion of efforts by the Government of Pakistan to
reduce maternal mortality, including through the provision of
maternal and newborn health services and development of
community-based skilled birth attendants.
(9) Support for public diplomacy.--To implement a more
effective public diplomacy strategy in Pakistan in order to
ensure that the Pakistani public recognizes that it is in
Pakistan's own interest to partner with the United States and
other like-minded countries to combat militant extremism, as
well as to promote a better understanding of the United
States, including through the following:
(A) Partnering with the Government of Pakistan to highlight
the negative behavior of insurgent groups and to encourage
civil society, respected scholars, and other leaders to speak
out against militancy and violence.
(B) Providing technical assistance to the Government of
Pakistan to both disrupt and provide alternatives to the
illegal FM radio stations used by insurgent groups in the
FATA and adjacent districts of the NWFP.
(C) Expanded exchange activities under the Fulbright
Program, the International Visitor Leadership Program, the
Youth Exchange and Study Program, and related programs
administered by the Department of State designed to promote
mutual understanding and interfaith dialogue.
(D) Expansion of sister institution programs between United
States and Pakistani schools and universities, towns and
cities, and other organizations in such fields as medicine
and healthcare, business management, environmental
protection, information technology, and agriculture.
(E) Additional scholarships to enable students to study in
the United States.
SEC. 103. MULTILATERAL SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN.
To the extent that Pakistan continues to evolve toward
civilian control of the government and to develop and
implement comprehensive economic reform programs, the
President should do the following:
(1) Multilateral support.--Take the lead in mobilizing
international financial institutions, in particular the
International Monetary Fund and affiliated institutions in
the World Bank group, to provide timely and appropriate
resources to help Pakistan.
(2) Stabilization assistance.--In conjunction with other
governments and international financial institutions
(including the International Monetary Fund), support the
implementation of a plan of the Government of Pakistan to
attack structural economic problems, address pressing social
problems, carry out comprehensive economic reform, and
relieve immediate and urgent balance of payments requirements
in Pakistan.
(3) Currency stabilization loans.--Provide leadership in
supporting multilateral agreements to provide government-to-
government loans for currency stabilization in Pakistan if
the loans can reduce inflation and thereby foster conditions
necessary for the effective implementation of economic
reforms.
SEC. 104. PAKISTAN DEMOCRACY AND PROSPERITY FUND.
(a) Establishment of Fund.--There is established in the
Treasury of the United States a fund to be known as the
``Pakistan Democracy and Prosperity Fund'' (hereinafter in
this section referred to as the ``Fund''), consisting of such
amounts as may be appropriated or transferred to the Fund as
provided in this section and which may be used for purposes
of this title.
(b) Transfers to Fund.--The Fund shall consist of the
following:
(1) Amounts appropriated to carry out this title.
(2) Amounts appropriated on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act for ``Development Assistance'',
``Global Health and Child Survival'', and the ``Economic
Support Fund'' for assistance for Pakistan under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) that are
transferred by the President to the Fund pursuant to
subsection (d).
(3) To the extent or in the amounts provided in advance in
appropriations Acts, amounts accepted by the President under
subsection (c) that are transferred by the President to the
Fund pursuant to subsection (d).
(c) Acceptance of Amounts From Outside Sources.--The
President may accept funds from non-United States Government
sources, including foreign governments, nongovernmental
organizations, private business entities, and private
individuals, for purposes of carrying out this title.
(d) Status of Availability of Amounts in Fund.--The
President is authorized to transfer to the Fund amounts under
paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b). Such amounts shall
be merged with and shall be available for any purpose for
which any of the amounts so transferred are available.
(e) Report.--The President shall transmit to the
appropriate congressional committees not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180
days thereafter until September 30, 2018, a report on
programs, projects, and activities carried out using amounts
obligated and expended from the Fund.
SEC. 105. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated to
the President to carry out this title $1,500,000,000 for each
of the fiscal years 2010 through 2013.
(b) Availability.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated to
carry out this title for a fiscal year are--
(1) authorized to remain available until September 30 of
the succeeding fiscal year; and
(2) in addition to amounts otherwise available for such
purposes.
(c) Sense of the Congress.--It is the sense of Congress
that United States assistance provided under this title
should be made available on a proportional and equitable
basis between the FATA and other regions of Pakistan.
TITLE II--SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN
SEC. 201. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) United States security assistance for Pakistan should
be used to improve relationships between United States
military and Pakistani military personnel, including outreach
to the ``lost generation'' of Pakistan's officers who did not
attend United States-sponsored training as a result of
restrictions placed on United States assistance for Pakistan
due to Pakistan's possession of a nuclear device; and
(2) United States security assistance for Pakistan should
be fully accountable, should be contingent on Pakistan ending
support for terrorist groups, and should meet the national
security needs of Pakistan.
SEC. 202. PURPOSES OF ASSISTANCE.
The purposes of assistance under this title are--
(1) to support Pakistan's paramount national security need
to fight and win the ongoing counterinsurgency within its
borders;
(2) to work with the Government of Pakistan to protect and
secure Pakistan's borders and prevent any Pakistani territory
from being used as a base or conduit for terrorist attacks in
Pakistan, or elsewhere;
(3) to work in close cooperation with the Government of
Pakistan to coordinate action against extremist and terrorist
targets; and
(4) to develop knowledge of and appreciation for democratic
governance and a military that is controlled by and
responsible to democratically elected civilian leadership.
SEC. 203. AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.
(a) International Military Education and Training.--
(1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be
appropriated to carry out this title not less than $4,000,000
for fiscal year 2010 and such sums as may be necessary for
each of the fiscal years 2011 through 2013 are authorized to
be made available for assistance under chapter 5 of part II
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et
seq.; relating to international military education and
training) for Pakistan, including expanded international
military education and training (commonly known as ``E-
IMET'').
(2) Use of funds.--Not less than 30 percent of the amount
made available to carry out this subsection for a fiscal year
may be used to pay for courses of study and training in
counterinsurgency and civil-military relations.
(b) Foreign Military Financing Program.--
(1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be
appropriated to carry out this title, not less than
$300,000,000 for fiscal year 2010 and such sums as may be
necessary for each of the fiscal years 2011 through 2013 are
authorized to be made available for grant assistance under
section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763;
relating to the Foreign Military Financing program) for the
purchase of defense articles, defense services, and military
education and training for Pakistan.
(2) Use of funds.--Not less than 75 percent of the amount
made available to carry out this subsection for a fiscal year
may be used for the purchase of defense articles, defense
services, and military education and training for activities
relating to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations
in Pakistan. Such articles, services, and military education
and training may include the following:
(A) Aviation maintenance and logistics support for United
States-origin and United States-supported rotary wing
aircraft and upgrades to such aircraft to include modern
night vision and targeting capabilities.
(B) Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
ground and air manned and unmanned platforms, including
sustainment.
(C) Command and control capabilities.
(D) Force protection and counter improvised explosive
device capabilities, including protection of vehicles.
(E) Protective equipment, such as body armor and helmets,
night vision goggles, and other individual equipment,
including load-bearing equipment, individual and unit level
first aid
[[Page H6555]]
equipment, ballistic eye protection, and cold weather
equipment.
(F) Appropriate individual and unit level medical services
and articles for the Pakistan Army, the Pakistan Frontier
Corps, and other appropriate security forces.
(G) Assistance to enable the Pakistani military to
distribute humanitarian assistance and establish a tactical
civil-military operations capability, including a civil
affairs directorate.
(3) Restriction relating to f-16 program.--
(A) Congressional finding.--In accordance with the Letters
of Offer and Acceptance signed between the United States and
Pakistan in 2006, Congress finds that the Government of
Pakistan is responsible for making the remaining payments on
the 2006 sales relating to F-16 fighter aircraft and
associated equipment with its own national funds, including
the mid-life updates and munitions for such aircraft included
in such Letters of Offer and Acceptance.
(B) Restriction.--Subject to subparagraph (C), amounts
authorized to be made available under this subsection for a
fiscal year may not be used for the purchase of, or upgrade
to, F-16 fighter aircraft or munitions for such aircraft.
(C) Exception.--Amounts authorized to be made available
under this subsection for a fiscal year are authorized to be
used for military construction pursuant to the security plan
contained in the Letters of Offer and Acceptance signed
between the United States and Pakistan in 2006.
(D) Waiver.--The President may waive the restriction under
subparagraph (B) with respect to amounts authorized to be
made available under this subsection for a fiscal year, other
than amounts authorized to be made available under paragraph
(2) of this subsection, if the President certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days
prior to exercising the authority of this subparagraph that
the waiver is important to the national security interests of
the United States.
(4) Security assistance plan.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a
plan for the proposed use of amounts authorized to be made
available under this subsection for each of the fiscal years
2010 through 2013. Such plan shall include an assessment of
how the use of such amounts complements or otherwise is
related to amounts described in section 204.
(5) Additional authority.--Except as provided in section
3(a)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act and except as
otherwise provided in this title, amounts authorized to be
made available to carry out paragraph (2) for fiscal years
2010 and 2011 are authorized to be made available
notwithstanding any other provision of law.
(6) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``defense
articles'', ``defense services'', and ``military education
and training'' have the meaning given such terms in section
644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2403).
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should facilitate Pakistan's establishment
of a program to enable the Pakistani military to provide
reconstruction assistance in areas damaged by combat
operations.
SEC. 204. PAKISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITY FUND.
(a) For Fiscal Year 2010.--
(1) In general.--For fiscal year 2010, the Department of
State's Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund,
hereinafter in this section referred to as the ``Fund'',
shall consist of the following:
(A) Amounts appropriated to carry out this subsection.
(B) Amounts otherwise available to the Secretary of State
to carry out this subsection.
(2) Purposes of fund.--Amounts in the Fund made available
to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year are
authorized to be used by the Secretary of State, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, to build and
maintain the counterinsurgency capability of Pakistan under
the same terms and conditions (except as otherwise provided
in this subsection) that are applicable to amounts made
available under the Fund for fiscal year 2009.
(3) Transfer authority.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of State is authorized to
transfer amounts in the Fund made available to carry out this
subsection for any fiscal year to the Department of Defense's
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund.
(B) Treatment of transferred funds.--Subject to the
requirements of paragraph (4), transfers from the Fund under
the authority of subparagraph (A) shall be merged with and be
available for the same purposes and for the same time period
as amounts in the Department of Defense's Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Fund.
(C) Relation to other authorities.--The authority to make
transfers from the Fund under subparagraph (A) is in addition
to any other transfer of funds authority of the Department of
State. The authority to provide assistance under this
subsection is in addition to any other authority to provide
assistance to foreign countries.
(D) Notification.--The Secretary of State shall, not less
than 15 days prior to making transfers from the Fund under
subparagraph (A), notify the appropriate congressional
committees in writing of the details of any such transfer.
(4) Restriction.--
(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), amounts in
the Fund made available to carry out this subsection for any
fiscal year may not be used to purchase F-16 fighter
aircraft, to purchase mid-life updates for such aircraft, or
to make payments on the sales of F-16 fighter aircraft and
associated equipment described in section 203(b)(3)(A).
(B) Exception.--Amounts in the Fund made available to carry
out this subsection for any fiscal year are authorized to be
used for military construction activities.
(C) Waiver.--The President may waive the restriction under
subparagraph (A) with respect to amounts described in
subparagraph (A) if the President certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days
prior to exercising the authority of this subparagraph that
the waiver is important to the national security interests of
the United States.
(5) Authorization of appropriations.--For fiscal year 2010,
$300,000,000 is hereby authorized to be appropriated to carry
out this subsection.
(b) Submission of Notifications.--Any notification required
by this section shall be submitted in classified form, but
may include a unclassified annex if necessary.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed
Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed
Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
SEC. 205. EXCHANGE PROGRAM BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN
PERSONNEL OF PAKISTAN AND CERTAIN OTHER
COUNTRIES.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State is authorized to
establish an exchange program between--
(1) military and civilian personnel of Pakistan, and
(2)(A) military and civilian personnel of countries
determined by the Secretary of State to be in transition to
democracy, or
(B) military and civilian personnel of North Atlantic
Treaty Organization member countries,
in order to foster greater respect for and understanding of
the principle of civilian rule of Pakistan's military. The
program established under this subsection shall be known as
the ``Pakistan Military Transition Program''.
(b) Elements of Program.--The program authorized under
subsection (a) may include--
(1) conferences, seminars, and other events;
(2) distribution of publications; and
(3) reimbursement of expenses of foreign military personnel
participating in the program, including transportation
expenses, translation services expenses, and administrative
expenses relating to the program.
(c) Role of Nongovernmental Organizations.--Amounts
authorized to be appropriated to carry out this title for a
fiscal year are authorized to be made available for
nongovernmental organizations to facilitate the
implementation of the program authorized under subsection
(a).
SEC. 206. LIMITATION ON UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
PAKISTAN.
(a) Prohibition on Use of Funds.--None of the funds
authorized to be appropriated for military assistance to
Pakistan for fiscal year 2011 and each fiscal year thereafter
may be obligated or expended if the President has not made
the determinations described in subsection (b) for such
fiscal year.
(b) Determinations Regarding Enhanced Cooperation Between
the United States and Pakistan.--The determinations referred
to in subsection (a) are--
(1) a determination by the President at the beginning of
each fiscal year that the Government of Pakistan is
continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to
dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of
nuclear weapons-related materials, including, as necessary,
providing direct access to Pakistani nationals associated
with such networks; and
(2) a determination by the President at the beginning of
each fiscal year that the Government of Pakistan during the
preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment
to and making progress towards combating terrorist groups,
including taking into account the progress the Government of
Pakistan has made with regard to--
(A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the
Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist
and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has
conducted attacks against United States or coalition forces
in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of
neighboring countries;
(B) closing terrorist camps in the FATA, dismantling
terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country,
including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided
with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets;
(C) preventing cross-border attacks into neighboring
countries; and
(D) strengthening counter-terrorism and anti-money
laundering laws.
(c) Waiver.--The President may waive the restriction under
subsection (a) for any fiscal year if the President certifies
to the appropriate congressional committees 15 days before
the President exercises the authority of this subsection that
the provision of military assistance to Pakistan is important
to the national security interests of the United States.
(d) Consultation and Written Justification.--Not later than
5 days prior to making a determination described in
subsection (b), the President shall consult with the
appropriate congressional committees and, upon making such
determination, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a written justification that specifies the basis
upon which the President made such a determination, including
an acknowledgment of the extent to which the Government of
Pakistan has made progress with regard to subsection (b)(2).
The justification shall be unclassified but may include a
classified annex.
(e) GAO Analysis and Report.--Not later than 120 days after
the President makes the determinations described in
subsection (b), the
[[Page H6556]]
Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct an
independent analysis of each of the determinations under
subsection (b) and written justifications for such
determinations under subsection (d) and shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report containing the
results of the independent analysis.
(f) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
(1) the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate; and
(2) the term ``military assistance''--
(A) means assistance authorized under section 23 of the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763; relating to the
Foreign Military Financing program), including assistance
authorized under section 203(b) of this Act and assistance
authorized under part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.), other than assistance
authorized under chapter 5 of part II of such Act (22 U.S.C.
2347 et seq.); but
(B) does not include assistance authorized under any
provision of law that is funded from accounts within budget
function 050 (National Defense).
SEC. 207. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated to
the President to carry out this title, other than section
204, $400,000,000 for fiscal year 2010 and such sums as may
be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2011 through 2013.
(b) Relation to Other Available Funds.--Amounts authorized
to be appropriated to carry out this title for a fiscal year
are in addition to amounts otherwise available for such
purposes.
TITLE III--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the achievement of United States national security goals to
eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan
requires the development of a comprehensive plan that
utilizes all elements of national power, including in
coordination and cooperation with other concerned
governments, and that it is critical to Pakistan's long-term
prosperity and security to strengthen regional relationships
among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
(b) Comprehensive Regional Security Strategy.--The
President shall develop a comprehensive regional security
strategy to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens
in Pakistan, including by working with the Government of
Pakistan and other relevant governments and organizations in
the region and elsewhere, as appropriate, to best implement
effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts in
and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan,
including the FATA, NWFP, parts of Balochistan, and parts of
Punjab.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report on the
comprehensive regional security strategy required under
subsection (b).
(2) Contents.--The report shall include a copy of the
comprehensive regional security strategy, including
specifications of goals, and proposed timelines and budgets
for implementation of the strategy.
(d) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committees
on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations and
Armed Services of the Senate.
SEC. 302. MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF ASSISTANCE.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Impact evaluation research.--The term ``impact
evaluation research'' means the application of research
methods and statistical analysis to measure the extent to
which change in a population-based outcome can be attributed
to program intervention instead of other environmental
factors.
(2) Operations research.--The term ``operations research''
means the application of social science research methods,
statistical analysis, and other appropriate scientific
methods to judge, compare, and improve policies and program
outcomes, from the earliest stages of defining and designing
programs through their development and implementation, with
the objective of the rapid dissemination of conclusions and
concrete impact on programming.
(3) Program monitoring.--The term ``program monitoring''
means the collection, analysis, and use of routine program
data to determine how well a program is carried out and how
much the program costs.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) to successfully enhance democracy and the rule of law
in Pakistan, defeat extremist elements, and ensure the
protection of human rights, the President should establish a
program to conduct impact evaluation research, operations
research, and program monitoring to ensure effectiveness of
assistance provided under title I of this Act;
(2) long-term solutions to Pakistan's security problems
depend on increasing the effectiveness and responsiveness of
civilian institutions in Pakistan, including the parliament
and judicial system;
(3) a specific program of impact evaluation research,
operations research, and program monitoring, established at
the inception of the program, is required to permit
assessment of the operational effectiveness of impact of
United States assistance towards these goals; and
(4) the President, in developing performance measurement
methods under the impact evaluation research, operations
research, and program monitoring, should consult with the
appropriate congressional committees as well as the
Government of Pakistan.
(c) Impact Evaluation Research, Operations Research and
Program Monitoring of Assistance.--The President shall
establish and implement a program to assess the effectiveness
of assistance provided under title I of this Act through
impact evaluation research on a selected set of programmatic
interventions, operations research in areas to ensure
efficiency and effectiveness of program implementation, and
monitoring to ensure timely and transparent delivery of
assistance.
(d) Requirements.--The program required under subsection
(c) shall include--
(1) a delineation of key impact evaluation research and
operations research questions for main components of
assistance provided under title I of this Act;
(2) an identification of measurable performance goals for
each of the main components of assistance provided under
title I of this Act to be expressed in an objective and
quantifiable form at the inception of the program;
(3) the use of appropriate methods, based on rigorous
social science tools, to measure program impact and
operational efficiency; and
(4) adherence to a high standard of evidence in developing
recommendations for adjustments to the assistance to enhance
the impact of the assistance.
(e) Assistance To Enhance the Capacity of Pakistan.--In
carrying out the program required under subsection (c), the
President is authorized to provide assistance to enhance the
capacity of the Government of Pakistan to monitor and
evaluate programs carried out by the national, provincial,
and local governments in Pakistan in order to maximize the
long-term sustainable development impact of such programs.
(f) Consultation With Congress.--Not later than 120 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall brief and consult with the appropriate congressional
committees regarding the progress in establishing and
implementing the program required under subsection (c).
(g) Authorization of Appropriations.--Of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 105 for each of
the fiscal years 2010 through 2013, up to 5 percent of such
amounts for such fiscal year is authorized to be made
available to carry out this section for the fiscal year.
SEC. 303. AUDITING.
(a) Assistance Authorized.--The Inspector General of the
Department of State and the Inspector General of the United
States Agency for International Development shall audit,
investigate, and oversee the obligation and expenditure of
funds to carry out title I of this Act.
(b) Requirement for In-Country Presence.--The Inspector
General of the Department of State and the Inspector General
of the United States Agency for International Development,
after consultation with the Secretary of State and the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, are authorized to establish field offices in
Pakistan with sufficient staff from each of the Offices of
the Inspector General in Pakistan respectively to carry out
subsection (a).
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be
appropriated under section 105 for each of the fiscal years
2010 through 2013, not less than $2,000,000 for each fiscal
year is authorized to be made available to the Office of the
Inspector General of the Department of State and not less
than $2,000,000 for each fiscal year is authorized to be made
available to the Office of the Inspector General of the
United States Agency for International Development to carry
out this section.
(2) Relation to other available funds.--Amounts made
available under paragraph (1) are in addition to amounts
otherwise available for such purposes.
SEC. 304. REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL OF UNITED STATES
ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN.
(a) Requirements.--Any direct assistance provided or
payments made on or after January 1, 2010, by the United
States to the Government of Pakistan, and any information
required by the United States prior to providing the
assistance or making the payments, may only be provided or
made to, or received from, civilian authorities of a
government of Pakistan constituted through a free and fair
election. For purposes of this subsection, a government of
Pakistan constituted through a free and fair election is a
government that is determined by the President to have been
elected in a free and fair manner, taking into account the
laws and constitution of Pakistan and internationally
recognized standards.
(b) Waiver.--The President may waive--
(1) the requirements under subsection (a), or
(2) the requirements under any other provision of law that
restricts assistance to the government of any country whose
duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup
or decree, as such provision of law applies with respect to
the Government of Pakistan,
if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional
committees that the waiver is important to the national
security interests of the United States.
(c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall
apply with respect to any activities subject to reporting
requirements under title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.).
(d) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means
[[Page H6557]]
the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees on
Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the
Secretary of Defense, should establish a coordinated,
strategic communications strategy to engage the people of
Pakistan--one that is fully funded, staffed, and
implemented--to help ensure the success of the measures
authorized by this Act; and
(2) the strategy should have clear and achievable
objectives, based on available resources, and should be
overseen by the United States Chief of Mission in Pakistan.
SEC. 306. REPORTS.
(a) Report by President.--
(1) In general.--The President shall transmit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on assistance
provided under titles I and II of this Act during the
preceding fiscal year. The first report shall be transmitted
not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act and subsequent reports shall be transmitted not
later than December 31 of each year thereafter.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report required under
subsection (a) shall include the following:
(A) A detailed description of the assistance by program,
project, and activity, as well as by geographic area.
(B) A general description of the performance goals
established under section 302 and the progress made in
meeting the goals.
(C) An evaluation of efforts undertaken by the Government
of Pakistan to--
(i) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, the Taliban,
and other extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and
settled areas;
(ii) close terrorist camps, including those of Jamaat-ud-
Dawa, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammed;
(iii) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups;
(iv) prevent cross-border attacks;
(v) increase oversight over curriculum in madrasas,
including closing madrasas with direct links to the Taliban
or other extremist and terrorist groups; and
(vi) improve counter-terrorism financing and anti-money
laundering laws, apply for observer status for the Financial
Action Task Force, and steps taken to adhere to the United
Nations International Convention for the Suppression of
Financing of Terrorism.
(D) A detailed description of Pakistan's efforts to prevent
proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise.
(E) An assessment of whether assistance provided to
Pakistan pursuant to this Act has directly or indirectly
aided the expansion of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program,
whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the
reallocation of Pakistan financial resources that would
otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to
its nuclear weapons program.
(F) A description of the transfer or purchase of military
equipment pursuant to title II of this Act, including--
(i) a list of equipment provided; and
(ii) a detailed description of the extent to which funds
obligated and expended pursuant to section 203(b) meet the
requirements of such section.
(G) An analysis of a suitable replacement for the AH-1F and
AH-1S Cobra attack helicopters, which includes
recommendations for sustainment, training, and any other
matters determined to be appropriate.
(H) An assessment of the extent to which the Government of
Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the
military, including a description of the extent to which
civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight
and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the
process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian
involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military
involvement in civil administration.
(b) Report by Comptroller General.--
(1) In general.--Not later than April 1, 2011, the
Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report evaluating the
effectiveness of security assistance provided to Pakistan
under title II of this Act during fiscal years 2010 and 2011.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report required under
subsection (a) shall include the following:
(A) A detailed description of the expenditures made by
Pakistan pursuant to grant assistance under section 23 of the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763; relating to the
Foreign Military Financing program).
(B) An assessment of the impact of the assistance on the
security and stability of Pakistan.
(C) An evaluation of any issues of financial impropriety on
behalf of personnel implementing the assistance.
(D) An assessment of the extent to which civilian
authorities are involved in administration of the assistance
provided by the United States.
SEC. 307. SUNSET.
The authority of this Act, other than section 104 and title
IV of this Act, shall expire after September 30, 2013.
TITLE IV--DUTY-FREE TREATMENT FOR CERTAIN GOODS FROM RECONSTRUCTION
OPPORTUNITY ZONES IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
SEC. 401. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Afghanistan-Pakistan
Security and Prosperity Enhancement Act''.
SEC. 402. DEFINITIONS; PURPOSES.
(a) Definitions.--In this title:
(1) Agreement on textiles and clothing.--The term
``Agreement on Textiles and Clothing'' means the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing referred to in section 101(d)(4) of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(4)).
(2) Category; textile and apparel category number.--The
terms ``category'' and ``textile and apparel category
number'' mean the number assigned under the U.S. Textile and
Apparel Category System of the Office of Textiles and Apparel
of the Department of Commerce, as listed in the HTS under the
applicable heading or subheading (as in effect on September
1, 2007).
(3) Core labor standards.--The term ``core labor
standards'' means--
(A) freedom of association;
(B) the effective recognition of the right to bargain
collectively;
(C) the elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced
labor;
(D) the effective abolition of child labor and a
prohibition on the worst forms of child labor; and
(E) the elimination of discrimination in respect of
employment and occupation.
(4) Entered.--The term ``entered'' means entered, or
withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, in the customs
territory of the United States.
(5) Entity.--The term ``entity'' means--
(A) a natural person, corporation, company, business
association, partnership, society, trust, any other
nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, whether or
not for profit;
(B) any governmental entity or instrumentality of a
government; and
(C) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any entity
described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
(6) HTS.--The term ``HTS'' means the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States.
(7) NAFTA.--The term ``NAFTA'' means the North American
Free Trade Agreement concluded between the United States,
Mexico, and Canada on December 17, 1992.
(8) Reconstruction opportunity zone.--The term
``Reconstruction Opportunity Zone'' means any area that--
(A) solely encompasses portions of the territory of--
(i) Afghanistan; or
(ii) 1 or more of the following areas of Pakistan:
(I) the Federally Administered Tribal Areas;
(II) areas of Pakistan-administered Kashmir that the
President determines were harmed by the earthquake of October
8, 2005;
(III) areas of Baluchistan that are within 100 miles of
Pakistan's border with Afghanistan; and
(IV) the North West Frontier Province;
(B) has been designated by the competent authorities in
Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be, as an area in
which merchandise may be introduced without payment of duty
or excise tax; and
(C) has been designated by the President as a
Reconstruction Opportunity Zone pursuant to section 403(a).
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of this title are--
(1) to stimulate economic activity and development in
Afghanistan and the border region of Pakistan, critical
fronts in the struggle against violent extremism;
(2) to reflect the strong support that the United States
has pledged to Afghanistan and Pakistan for their sustained
commitment in the global war on terrorism;
(3) to support the 3-pronged United States strategy in
Afghanistan and the border region of Pakistan that leverages
political, military, and economic tools, with Reconstruction
Opportunity Zones as a critical part of the economic
component of that strategy; and
(4) to offer a vital opportunity to improve livelihoods of
indigenous populations of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones,
promote good governance, improve economic and commercial ties
between the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and
strengthen the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
SEC. 403. DESIGNATION OF RECONSTRUCTION OPPORTUNITY ZONES.
(a) Authority To Designate.--The President is authorized to
designate an area within Afghanistan or Pakistan described in
section 402(a)(8) (A) and (B) as a Reconstruction Opportunity
Zone if the President determines that--
(1) Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be, meets the
eligibility criteria set forth in subsection (b);
(2) Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be, meets the
eligibility criteria set forth in subsection (c) of section
502 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2462(c)) for
designation as a beneficiary developing country under that
section and is not ineligible under subsection (b) of such
section; and
(3) designation of the area as a Reconstruction Opportunity
Zone is appropriate taking into account the factors listed in
subsection (c).
(b) Eligibility Criteria.--Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the
case may be, meets the eligibility criteria set forth in this
subsection if that country--
(1) has established, or is making continual progress toward
establishing--
(A) a market-based economy that protects private property
rights, incorporates an open rules-based trading system, and
minimizes government interference in the economy through
measures such as price controls, subsidies, and government
ownership of economic assets;
(B) the rule of law, political pluralism, and the right to
due process, a fair trial, and equal protection under the
law;
(C) economic policies to--
(i) reduce poverty;
(ii) increase the availability of health care and
educational opportunities;
[[Page H6558]]
(iii) expand physical infrastructure;
(iv) promote the development of private enterprise; and
(v) encourage the formation of capital markets through
microcredit or other programs;
(D) a system to combat corruption and bribery, such as
ratifying and implementing the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption; and
(E) protection of core labor standards and acceptable
conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of
work, and occupational health and safety;
(2) is eliminating or has eliminated barriers to trade and
investment, including by--
(A) providing national treatment and measures to create an
environment conducive to domestic and foreign investment;
(B) protecting intellectual property; and
(C) resolving bilateral trade and investment disputes;
(3) does not engage in activities that undermine United
States national security or foreign policy interests;
(4) does not engage in gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights;
(5) does not provide support for acts of international
terrorism; and
(6) cooperates in international efforts to eliminate human
rights violations and terrorist activities.
(c) Additional Factors.--In determining whether to
designate an area in Afghanistan or Pakistan as a
Reconstruction Opportunity Zone, the President shall take
into account--
(1) an expression by the government of the country of its
desire to have a particular area designated as a
Reconstruction Opportunity Zone under this title;
(2) the capability of the country to establish a program in
the area meeting the requirements of section 407(d)(3) based
on assessments undertaken by the Secretary of Labor and the
government of the country of such factors as--
(A) the geographical suitability of the area for such a
program;
(B) the nature of the labor market in the area;
(C) skills requirements and infrastructure needs for
operation of such a program in the area; and
(D) all other relevant information;
(3) whether the government of the country has provided the
United States with a monitoring and enforcement plan
outlining specific steps the country will take to cooperate
with the United States to--
(A) facilitate legitimate cross-border commerce;
(B) ensure that articles for which duty-free treatment is
sought pursuant to this title satisfy the applicable rules of
origin described in section 404 (c) and (d) or section 405
(c) and (d), whichever is applicable; and
(C) prevent unlawful transshipment, as described in section
406(b)(4);
(4) the potential for such designation to create local
employment and to promote local and regional economic
development;
(5) the physical security of the proposed Reconstruction
Opportunity Zone;
(6) the economic viability of the proposed Reconstruction
Opportunity Zone, including--
(A) whether there are commitments to finance economic
activity proposed for the Reconstruction Opportunity Zone;
and
(B) whether there is existing or planned infrastructure for
power, water, transportation, and communications in the area;
(7) whether such designation would be compatible with and
contribute to the foreign policy and national security
objectives of the United States, taking into account the
information provided under subsection (d); and
(8) the views of interested persons submitted pursuant to
subsection (e).
(d) Information Relating to Compatibility With and
Contribution to Foreign Policy and National Security
Objectives of the United States.--In determining whether
designation of a Reconstruction Opportunity Zone would be
compatible with and contribute to the foreign policy and
national security objectives of the United States in
accordance with subsection (c)(7), the President shall take
into account whether Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may
be, has provided the United States with a plan outlining
specific steps it will take to verify the ownership and
nature of the activities of entities to be located in the
proposed Reconstruction Opportunity Zone. The specific steps
outlined in a country's plan shall include a mechanism to
annually register each entity by a competent authority of the
country and--
(1) to collect from each entity operating in, or proposing
to operate in, a Reconstruction Opportunity Zone, information
including--
(A) the name and address of the entity;
(B) the name and location of all facilities owned or
operated by the entity that are operating in or proposed to
be operating in a Reconstruction Opportunity Zone;
(C) the name, nationality, date and place of birth, and
position title of each person who is an owner, director, or
officer of the entity; and
(D) the nature of the activities of each entity;
(2) to update the information required under paragraph (1)
as changes occur; and
(3) to provide such information promptly to the Secretary
of State.
(e) Opportunity for Public Comment.--Before the President
designates an area as a Reconstruction Opportunity Zone
pursuant to subsection (a), the President shall afford an
opportunity for interested persons to submit their views
concerning the designation.
(f) Notification to Congress.--Before the President
designates an area as a Reconstruction Opportunity Zone
pursuant to subsection (a), the President shall notify
Congress of the President's intention to make the
designation, together with the reasons for making the
designation.
SEC. 404. DUTY-FREE TREATMENT FOR CERTAIN NONTEXTILE AND
NONAPPAREL ARTICLES.
(a) In General.--The President is authorized to proclaim
duty-free treatment for--
(1) any article from a Reconstruction Opportunity Zone that
the President has designated as an eligible article under
section 503(a)(1)(A) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C.
2463(a)(1)(A));
(2) any article from a Reconstruction Opportunity Zone
located in Afghanistan that the President has designated as
an eligible article under section 503(a)(1)(B) of the Trade
Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2463(a)(1)(B)); or
(3) any article from a Reconstruction Opportunity Zone that
is not a textile or apparel article, regardless of whether
the article has been designated as an eligible article under
section 503(a)(1)(A) or (B) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19
U.S.C. 2463(a)(1) (A) or (B)), if, after receiving the advice
of the International Trade Commission pursuant to subsection
(b), the President determines that such article is not
import-sensitive in the context of imports from a
Reconstruction Opportunity Zone.
(b) Advice Concerning Certain Eligible Articles.--Before
proclaiming duty-free treatment for an article pursuant to
subsection (a)(3), the President shall publish in the Federal
Register and provide the International Trade Commission a
list of articles which may be considered for such treatment.
The provisions of sections 131 through 134 of the Trade Act
of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2151 through 2154) shall apply to any
designation under subsection (a)(3) in the same manner as
such sections apply to action taken under section 123 of the
Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2133) regarding a proposed trade
agreement.
(c) General Rules of Origin.--
(1) In general.--The duty-free treatment proclaimed with
respect to an article described in paragraph (1) or (3) of
subsection (a) shall apply to any article subject to such
proclamation which is the growth, product, or manufacture of
1 or more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones if--
(A) that article is imported directly from a Reconstruction
Opportunity Zone into the customs territory of the United
States; and
(B)(i) with respect to an article that is an article of a
Reconstruction Opportunity Zone in Pakistan, the sum of--
(I) the cost or value of the materials produced in 1 or
more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Pakistan or
Afghanistan,
(II) the direct costs of processing operations performed in
1 or more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Pakistan or
Afghanistan, and
(III) the cost or value of materials produced in the United
States, determined in accordance with paragraph (2),
is not less than 35 percent of the appraised value of the
article at the time it is entered into the United States; or
(ii) with respect to an article that is an article of a
Reconstruction Opportunity Zone in Afghanistan, the sum of--
(I) the cost or value of the materials produced in 1 or
more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Pakistan or
Afghanistan,
(II) the cost or value of the materials produced in 1 or
more countries that are members of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation,
(III) the direct costs of processing operations performed
in 1 or more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Pakistan or
Afghanistan, and
(IV) the cost or value of materials produced in the United
States, determined in accordance with paragraph (2),
is not less than 35 percent of the appraised value of the
article at the time it is entered into the United States.
(2) Determination of 35 percent for articles from
reconstruction opportunity zones in pakistan and
afghanistan.--If the cost or value of materials produced in
the customs territory of the United States is included with
respect to an article described in paragraph (1)(B), for
purposes of determining the 35-percent appraised value
requirement under clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(B), not
more than 15 percent of the appraised value of the article at
the time the article is entered into the United States may be
attributable to the cost or value of such United States
materials.
(d) Rules of Origin for Certain Articles of Reconstruction
Opportunity Zones in Afghanistan.--
(1) In general.--The duty-free treatment proclaimed with
respect to an article described in paragraph (2) of
subsection (a) shall apply to any article subject to such
proclamation which is the growth, product, or manufacture of
1 or more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Afghanistan
if--
(A) that article is imported directly from a Reconstruction
Opportunity Zone in Afghanistan into the customs territory of
the United States; and
(B) with respect to that article, the sum of--
(i) the cost or value of the materials produced in 1 or
more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Afghanistan,
(ii) the cost or value of the materials produced in 1 or
more countries that are members of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation,
(iii) the direct costs of processing operations performed
in 1 or more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Afghanistan,
and
(iv) the cost or value of materials produced in the United
States, determined in accordance with paragraph (2),
is not less than 35 percent of the appraised value of the
product at the time it is entered into the United States.
(2) Determination of 35 percent for articles from
reconstruction opportunity
[[Page H6559]]
zones in pakistan and afghanistan.--If the cost or value of
materials produced in the customs territory of the United
States is included with respect to an article described in
paragraph (1)(B), for purposes of determining the 35-percent
appraised value requirement under paragraph (1)(B), not more
than 15 percent of the appraised value of the article at the
time the article is entered into the United States may be
attributable to the cost or value of such United States
materials.
(e) Exclusions.--An article shall not be treated as the
growth, product, or manufacture of 1 or more Reconstruction
Opportunity Zones, and no material shall be included for
purposes of determining the 35-percent appraised value
requirement under subsection (c)(1) or (d)(1), by virtue of
having merely undergone--
(1) simple combining or packaging operations; or
(2) mere dilution with water or with another substance that
does not materially alter the characteristics of the article
or material.
(f) Direct Costs of Processing Operations.--
(1) In general.--As used in subsections (c)(1)(B)(i)(II),
(c)(1)(B)(ii)(III), and (d)(1)(B)(iii), the term ``direct
costs of processing operations'' includes, but is not limited
to--
(A) all actual labor costs involved in the growth,
production, manufacture, or assembly of the article,
including--
(i) fringe benefits;
(ii) on-the-job training; and
(iii) costs of engineering, supervisory, quality control,
and similar personnel; and
(B) dies, molds, tooling, and depreciation on machinery and
equipment which are allocable to the article.
(2) Excluded costs.--As used in subsections
(c)(1)(B)(i)(II), (c)(1)(B)(ii)(III), and (d)(1)(B)(iii), the
term ``direct costs of processing operations'' does not
include costs which are not directly attributable to the
article or are not costs of manufacturing the article, such
as--
(A) profit; and
(B) general expenses of doing business which are either not
allocable to the article or are not related to the growth,
production, manufacture, or assembly of the article, such as
administrative salaries, casualty and liability insurance,
advertising, and salesmen's salaries, commissions, or
expenses.
(g) Regulations.--The Secretary of the Treasury, after
consultation with the United States Trade Representative,
shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry
out this section. The regulations may provide that, in order
for an article to be eligible for duty-free treatment under
this section, the article--
(1) shall be wholly the growth, product, or manufacture of
1 or more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones; or
(2) shall be a new or different article of commerce which
has been grown, produced, or manufactured in 1 or more
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones.
SEC. 405. DUTY-FREE TREATMENT FOR CERTAIN TEXTILE AND APPAREL
ARTICLES.
(a) Duty-Free Treatment.--The President is authorized to
proclaim duty-free treatment for any textile or apparel
article described in subsection (b), if--
(1) the article is a covered article described in
subsection (b); and
(2) the President determines that the country in which the
Reconstruction Opportunity Zone is located has satisfied the
requirements set forth in section 406.
(b) Covered Articles.--A covered article described in this
subsection is an article in 1 of the following categories:
(1) Articles of reconstruction opportunity zones.--An
article that is the product of 1 or more Reconstruction
Opportunity Zones and falls within the scope of 1 of the
following textile and apparel category numbers, as set forth
in the HTS (as in effect on September 1, 2007):
237................................... 641..................... 751
330................................... 642..................... 752
331................................... 643..................... 758
333................................... 644..................... 759
334................................... 650..................... 831
335.................................. 651.................... 832
336.................................. 653..................... 833
341................................... 654..................... 834
342................................... 665..................... 835
350................................... 669..................... 836
351................................... 733..................... 838
353................................... 734..................... 839
354................................... 735..................... 840
360................................... 736..................... 842
361................................... 738..................... 843
362................................... 739..................... 844
363................................... 740..................... 845
369................................... 741..................... 846
465................................... 742..................... 850
469................................... 743..................... 851
630................................... 744..................... 852
631................................... 745..................... 858
633................................... 746..................... 859
634................................... 747..................... 863
635................................... 748..................... 899
636................................... 750
(2) Articles of reconstruction opportunity zones in
afghanistan.--The article is the product of 1 or more
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Afghanistan and falls
within the scope of 1 of the following textile and apparel
category numbers, as set forth in the HTS (as in effect on
September 1, 2007):
201................................... 439..................... 459
414................................... 440..................... 464
431................................... 442..................... 670
433................................... 444..................... 800
434................................... 445..................... 810
435................................... 446..................... 870
436................................... 448..................... 871
438
(3) Certain other textile and apparel articles.--The
article is the product of 1 or more Reconstruction
Opportunity Zones and falls within the scope of 1 of the
following textile and apparel category numbers as set forth
in the HTS (as in effect on September 1, 2007) and is covered
by the corresponding description for such category:
(A) Category 239.--An article in category 239 (relating to
cotton and man-made fiber babies' garments) except for baby
socks and baby booties described in subheading 6111.20.6050,
6111.30.5050, or 6111.90.5050 of the HTS.
(B) Category 338.--An article in category 338 (relating to
men's and boys' cotton knit shirts) if the article is a
certain knit-to-shape garment that meets the definition
included in Statistical Note 6 to Chapter 61 of the HTS, and
is provided for in subheading 6110.20.1026, 6110.20.2067 or
6110.90.9067 of the HTS.
(C) Category 339.--An article in category 339 (relating to
women's and girls' cotton knit shirts and blouses) if the
article is a knit-to-shape garment that meets the definition
included in Statistical Note 6 to Chapter 61 of the HTS, and
is provided for in subheading 6110.20.1031, 6110.20.2077, or
6110.90.9071 of the HTS.
(D) Category 359.--An article in category 359 (relating to
other cotton apparel) except swimwear provided for in
subheading 6112.39.0010, 6112.49.0010, 6211.11.8010,
6211.11.8020, 6211.12.8010, or 6211.12.8020 of the HTS.
(E) Category 632.--An article in category 632 (relating to
man-made fiber hosiery) if the article is panty hose provided
for in subheading 6115.21.0020 of the HTS.
(F) Category 638.--An article in category 638 (relating to
men's and boys' man-made fiber knit shirts) if the article is
a knit-to-shape garment that meets the definition included in
Statistical Note 6 to Chapter 61 of the HTS, and is provided
for in subheading 6110.30.2051, 6110.30.3051, or 6110.90.9079
of the HTS.
(G) Category 639.--An article in category 639 (relating to
women's and girls' man-made fiber knit shirts and blouses) if
the article is a knit-to-shape garment that meets the
definition included in Statistical Note 6 to Chapter 61 of
the HTS, and is provided for in subheading 6110.30.2061,
6110.30.3057, or 6110.90.9081 of the HTS.
(H) Category 647.--An article in category 647 (relating to
men's and boys' man-made fiber trousers) if the article is
ski/snowboard pants that meets the definition included in
Statistical Note 4 to Chapter 62 of the HTS, and is provided
for in subheading 6203.43.3510, 6210.40.5031, or 6211.20.1525
of the HTS.
(I) Category 648.--An article in category 648 (relating to
women's and girls' man-made fiber trousers) if the article is
ski/snowboard pants that meets the definition included in
Statistical Note 4 to Chapter 62 of the HTS, and is provided
for in subheading 6204.63.3010, 6210.50.5031, or 6211.20.1555
of the HTS.
(J) Category 659.--An article in category 659 (relating to
other man-made fiber apparel) except for swimwear provided
for in subheading 6112.31.0010, 6112.31.0020, 6112.41.0010,
6112.41.0020, 6112.41.0030, 6112.41.0040, 6211.11.1010,
6211.11.1020, 6211.12.1010, or 6211.12.1020 of the HTS.
(K) Category 666.--An article in category 666 (relating to
other man-made fiber furnishings) except for window shades
and window blinds provided for in subheading 6303.12.0010 or
6303.92.2030 of the HTS.
(4) Certain other articles.--The article is the product of
1 or more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones and falls within
the scope of 1 of the following statistical reporting numbers
of the HTS (as in effect on September 1, 2007):
4202.12.8010...................... 6210.20.3000........ 6304.99.1000
4202.12.8050...................... 6210.20.7000........ 6304.99.2500
4202.22.4010...................... 6210.30.3000........ 6304.99.4000
4202.22.7000...................... 6210.30.7000........ 6304.99.6030
4202.22.8070...................... 6210.40.3000........ 6306.22.9010
4202.92.3010...................... 6210.40.7000........ 6306.29.1100
4202.92.6010...................... 6210.50.3000........ 6306.29.2100
4202.92.9010...................... 6210.50.7000........ 6306.40.4100
4202.92.9015...................... 6211.20.0810........ 6306.40.4900
5601.29.0010...................... 6211.20.0820........ 6306.91.0000
5702.39.2090...................... 6211.32.0003........ 6306.99.0000
5702.49.2000...................... 6211.33.0003........ 6307.10.2030
5702.50.5900...................... 6211.42.0003........ 6307.20.0000
5702.99.2000...................... 6211.43.0003........ 6307.90.7200
5703.90.0000...................... 6212.10.3000........ 6307.90.7500
5705.00.2090...................... 6212.10.7000........ 6307.90.8500
6108.22.1000...................... 6212.90.0050........ 6307.90.8950
6111.90.7000...................... 6213.90.0500........ 6307.90.8985
6113.00.1005...................... 6214.10.1000........ 6310.90.1000
6113.00.1010...................... 6216.00.0800........ 6406.99.1580
6113.00.1012...................... 6216.00.1300........ 6501.00.6000
6115.29.4000...................... 6216.00.1900........ 6502.00.2000
6115.30.1000...................... 6216.00.2600........ 6502.00.4000
6115.99.4000...................... 6216.00.3100........ 6502.00.9060
6116.10.0800...................... 6216.00.3500........ 6504.00.3000
6116.10.1300...................... 6216.00.4600........ 6504.00.6000
6116.10.4400...................... 6217.10.1010........ 6504.00.9045
6116.10.6500...................... 6217.10.8500........ 6504.00.9075
6116.10.9500...................... 6301.90.0020........ 6505.10.0000
6116.92.0800...................... 6302.29.0010........ 6505.90.8015
6116.93.0800...................... 6302.39.0020........ 6505.90.9050
6116.99.3500...................... 6302.59.3010........ 6505.90.9076
6117.10.4000...................... 6302.99.1000........ 9404.90.2000
6117.80.3010...................... 6303.99.0030........ 9404.90.8523
6117.80.8500...................... 6304.19.3030........ 9404.90.9523
6210.10.2000...................... 6304.91.0060........ 9404.90.9570
6210.10.7000
(c) Rules of Origin for Certain Covered Articles.--
(1) General rules.--Except with respect to an article
listed in paragraph (2) of subsection (b), duty-free
treatment may be proclaimed for an article listed in
subsection (b) only if the article is imported directly into
the customs territory of the United States from a
Reconstruction Opportunity Zone and--
(A) the article is wholly the growth, product, or
manufacture of 1 or more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones;
[[Page H6560]]
(B) the article is a yarn, thread, twine, cordage, rope,
cable, or braiding, and--
(i) the constituent staple fibers are spun in, or
(ii) the continuous filament fiber is extruded in,
1 or more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones;
(C) the article is a fabric, including a fabric
classifiable under chapter 59 of the HTS, and the constituent
fibers, filaments, or yarns are woven, knitted, needled,
tufted, felted, entangled, or transformed by any other
fabric-making process in 1 or more Reconstruction Opportunity
Zones; or
(D) the article is any other textile or apparel article
that is cut (or knit-to-shape) and sewn or otherwise
assembled in 1 or more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones from
its component pieces.
(2) Special rules.--
(A) Certain made-up articles, textile articles in the
piece, and certain other textiles and textile articles.--
Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(D) and except as provided in
subparagraphs (C) and (D) of this paragraph, subparagraph
(A), (B), or (C) of paragraph (1), as appropriate, shall
determine whether a good that is classifiable under 1 of the
following headings or subheadings of the HTS shall be
considered to meet the rules of origin of this subsection:
5609, 5807, 5811, 6209.20.50.40, 6213, 6214, 6301, 6302,
6303, 6304, 6305, 6306, 6307.10, 6307.90, 6308, and 9404.90.
(B) Certain knit-to-shape textiles and textile articles.--
Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(D) and except as provided in
subparagraphs (C) and (D) of this paragraph, a textile or
apparel article that is wholly formed on seamless knitting
machines or by hand-knitting in 1 or more Reconstruction
Opportunity Zones shall be considered to meet the rules of
origin of this subsection.
(C) Certain dyed and printed textiles and textile
articles.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(D), an article
classifiable under subheading 6117.10, 6213.00, 6214.00,
6302.22, 6302.29, 6302.52, 6302.53, 6302.59, 6302.92,
6302.93, 6302.99, 6303.92, 6303.99, 6304.19, 6304.93,
6304.99, 9404.90.85, or 9404.90.95 of the HTS, except for an
article classifiable under 1 of such subheadings as of cotton
or of wool or consisting of fiber blends containing 16
percent or more by weight of cotton, shall be considered to
meet the rules of origin of this subsection if the fabric in
the article is both dyed and printed in 1 or more
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, and such dyeing and
printing is accompanied by 2 or more of the following
finishing operations: bleaching, shrinking, fulling, napping,
decating, permanent stiffening, weighting, permanent
embossing, or moireing.
(D) Fabrics of silk, cotton, man-made fiber, or vegetable
fiber.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(C), a fabric
classifiable under the HTS as of silk, cotton, man-made
fiber, or vegetable fiber shall be considered to meet the
rules of origin of this subsection if the fabric is both dyed
and printed in 1 or more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones,
and such dyeing and printing is accompanied by 2 or more of
the following finishing operations: bleaching, shrinking,
fulling, napping, decating, permanent stiffening, weighting,
permanent embossing, or moireing.
(d) Rules of Origin for Covered Articles That Are Products
of 1 or More Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in
Afghanistan.--
(1) General rules.--Duty-free treatment may be proclaimed
for an article listed in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) only
if the article is imported directly into the customs
territory of the United States from a Reconstruction
Opportunity Zone in Afghanistan and--
(A) the article is wholly the growth, product, or
manufacture of 1 or more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in
Afghanistan,
(B) the article is a yarn, thread, twine, cordage, rope,
cable, or braiding, and--
(i) the constituent staple fibers are spun in, or
(ii) the continuous filament fiber is extruded in,
1 or more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Afghanistan;
(C) the article is a fabric, including a fabric
classifiable under chapter 59 of the HTS, and the constituent
fibers, filaments, or yarns are woven, knitted, needled,
tufted, felted, entangled, or transformed by any other
fabric-making process in 1 or more Reconstruction Opportunity
Zones in Afghanistan; or
(D) the article is any other textile or apparel article
that is cut (or knit-to-shape) and sewn or otherwise
assembled in 1 or more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in
Afghanistan from its component pieces.
(2) Special rules.--
(A) Certain made-up articles, textile articles in the
piece, and certain other textiles and textile articles.--
Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(D) and except as provided in
subparagraphs (C) and (D) of this paragraph, subparagraph
(A), (B), or (C) of paragraph (1), as appropriate, shall
determine whether a good that is classifiable under 1 of the
following headings or subheadings of the HTS shall be
considered to meet the rules of origin of this subsection:
5609, 5807, 5811, 6209.20.50.40, 6213, 6214, 6301, 6302,
6303, 6304, 6305, 6306, 6307.10, 6307.90, 6308, and 9404.90.
(B) Certain knit-to-shape textiles and textile articles.--
Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(D) and except as provided in
subparagraphs (C) and (D) of this paragraph, a textile or
apparel article that is wholly formed on seamless knitting
machines or by hand-knitting in 1 or more Reconstruction
Opportunity Zones in Afghanistan shall be considered to meet
the rules of origin of this subsection.
(C) Certain dyed and printed textiles and textile
articles.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(D), an article
classifiable under subheading 6117.10, 6213.00, 6214.00,
6302.22, 6302.29, 6302.52, 6302.53, 6302.59, 6302.92,
6302.93, 6302.99, 6303.92, 6303.99, 6304.19, 6304.93,
6304.99, 9404.90.85, or 9404.90.95 of the HTS, except for an
article classifiable under 1 of such subheadings as of cotton
or of wool or consisting of fiber blends containing 16
percent or more by weight of cotton, shall be considered to
meet the rules of origin of this subsection if the fabric in
the article is both dyed and printed in 1 or more
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Afghanistan, and such
dyeing and printing is accompanied by 2 or more of the
following finishing operations: bleaching, shrinking,
fulling, napping, decating, permanent stiffening, weighting,
permanent embossing, or moireing.
(D) Fabrics of silk, cotton, man-made fiber or vegetable
fiber.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(C), a fabric
classifiable under the HTS as of silk, cotton, man-made
fiber, or vegetable fiber shall be considered to meet the
rules of origin of this subsection if the fabric is both dyed
and printed in 1 or more Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in
Afghanistan, and such dyeing and printing is accompanied by 2
or more of the following finishing operations: bleaching,
shrinking, fulling, napping, decating, permanent stiffening,
weighting, permanent embossing, or moireing.
(e) Regulations.--The Secretary of the Treasury, after
consultation with the United States Trade Representative,
shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry
out this section.
SEC. 406. PROTECTIONS AGAINST UNLAWFUL TRANSSHIPMENT.
(a) Duty-Free Treatment Conditioned on Enforcement
Measures.--
(1) In general.--The duty-free treatment described in
section 405 shall not be provided to covered articles that
are imported from a Reconstruction Opportunity Zone in a
country unless the President determines that country meets
the following criteria:
(A) The country has adopted--
(i) an effective visa or electronic certification system;
and
(ii) domestic laws and enforcement procedures applicable to
covered articles to prevent unlawful transshipment of the
articles and the use of false documents relating to the
importation of the articles into the United States.
(B) The country has enacted legislation or promulgated
regulations that would permit U.S. Customs and Border
Protection verification teams to have the access necessary to
investigate thoroughly allegations of unlawful transshipment
through such country.
(C) The country agrees to provide U.S. Customs and Border
Protection with a monthly report on shipments of covered
articles from each producer of those articles in a
Reconstruction Opportunity Zone in that country.
(D) The country will cooperate fully with the United States
to address and take action necessary to prevent
circumvention, as described in Article 5 of the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing.
(E) The country agrees to require each producer of a
covered article in a Reconstruction Opportunity Zone in that
country to register with the competent government authority,
to provide that authority with the following information, and
to update that information as changes occur:
(i) The name and address of the producer, including the
location of all textile or apparel facilities owned or
operated by that producer in Afghanistan or Pakistan.
(ii) The telephone number, facsimile number, and electronic
mail address of the producer.
(iii) The names and nationalities of the producer's owners,
directors, and corporate officers, and their positions.
(iv) The number of employees the producer employs and their
occupations.
(v) A general description of the covered articles of the
producer and the producer's production capacity.
(vi) The number and type of machines the producer uses to
produce textile or apparel articles at each facility.
(vii) The approximate number of hours the machines operate
per week.
(viii) The identity of any supplier to the producer of
textile or apparel goods, or fabrics, yarns, or fibers used
in the production of textile or apparel goods.
(ix) The name of, and contact information for, each of the
producer's customers in the United States.
(F) The country agrees to provide to U.S. Customs and
Border Protection on a timely basis all of the information
received by the competent government authority in accordance
with subparagraph (E) and to provide U.S. Customs and Border
Protection with an annual update of that information.
(G) The country agrees to require that all producers and
exporters of covered articles in a Reconstruction Opportunity
Zone in that country maintain complete records of the
production and the export of covered articles, including
materials used in the production, for at least 5 years after
the production or export (as the case may be).
(H) The country agrees to provide, on a timely basis, at
the request of U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
documentation establishing the eligibility of covered
articles for duty-free treatment under section 405.
(2) Documentation establishing eligibility of articles for
duty-free treatment.--For purposes of paragraph (1)(H),
documentation establishing the eligibility of a covered
article for duty-free treatment under section 405 includes
documentation such as production records, information
relating to the place of production, the number and
identification of the types of machinery used in production,
the number of workers employed in production, and
certification from both the producer and the exporter.
[[Page H6561]]
(b) Customs Procedures and Enforcement.--
(1) In general.--
(A) Regulations.--The Secretary of the Treasury, after
consultation with the United States Trade Representative,
shall promulgate regulations setting forth customs procedures
similar in all material respects to the requirements of
article 502(1) of the NAFTA as implemented pursuant to United
States law, which shall apply to any importer that claims
duty-free treatment for an article under section 405.
(B) Determination.--In order for articles produced in a
Reconstruction Opportunity Zone to qualify for the duty-free
treatment under section 405, there shall be in effect a
determination by the President that Afghanistan or Pakistan,
as the case may be--
(i) has implemented and follows, or
(ii) is making substantial progress toward implementing and
following,
procedures and requirements similar in all material respects
to the relevant procedures and requirements under chapter 5
of the NAFTA.
(2) Certificate of origin.--A certificate of origin that
otherwise would be required pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph (1) shall not be required in the case of an article
imported under section 405 if such certificate of origin
would not be required under article 503 of the NAFTA, as
implemented pursuant to United States law, if the article
were imported from Mexico.
(3) Penalties.--If the President determines, based on
sufficient evidence, that an entity has engaged in unlawful
transshipment described in paragraph (4), the President shall
deny for a period of 5 years beginning on the date of the
determination all benefits under section 405 to the entity,
any successor of the entity, and any other entity owned,
operated, or controlled by the principals of the entity.
(4) Unlawful transshipment described.--For purposes of this
section, unlawful transshipment occurs when duty-free
treatment for a covered article has been claimed on the basis
of material false information concerning the country of
origin, manufacture, processing, or assembly of the article
or any of its components. For purposes of the preceding
sentence, false information is material if disclosure of the
true information would mean or would have meant that the
article is or was ineligible for duty-free treatment under
section 405.
(5) Monitoring and reports to congress.--U.S. Customs and
Border Protection shall monitor and the Commissioner
responsible for U.S. Customs and Border Protection shall
submit to Congress, not later than March 31 of each year, a
report on the effectiveness of the visa or electronic
certification systems and the implementation of legislation
and regulations described in subsection (a) and on measures
taken by Afghanistan and Pakistan to prevent circumvention as
described in article 5 of the Agreement on Textile and
Clothing.
(c) Additional Customs Enforcement.--U.S. Customs and
Border Protection shall--
(1) make available technical assistance to Afghanistan and
Pakistan--
(A) in the development and implementation of visa or
electronic certification systems, legislation, and
regulations described in subsection (a)(1)(A) and (B); and
(B) to train their officials in anti-transshipment
enforcement;
(2) send production verification teams to Afghanistan and
Pakistan as necessary; and
(3) to the extent feasible, place Afghanistan and Pakistan
on a relevant e-certification program.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--To carry out
subsection (c), there are authorized to be appropriated to
U.S. Customs and Border Protection $10,000,000 for each of
the fiscal years 2010 through 2023.
SEC. 407. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, CAPACITY BUILDING, COMPLIANCE
ASSESSMENT, AND REMEDIATION PROGRAM.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Armed
Services of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
(2) Textile or apparel producer.--The term ``textile or
apparel producer'' means a producer of a covered article
described in section 405(b) that is located in a
Reconstruction Opportunity Zone.
(b) Eligibility.--
(1) Presidential certification of compliance by afghanistan
or pakistan with requirements.--Upon the expiration of the
16-month period beginning on the date on which the President
designates an area within Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the
case may be, as a Reconstruction Opportunity Zone under
section 403(a), duty-free treatment proclaimed under section
404(a) or 405(a) for articles from such Reconstruction
Opportunity Zone may remain in effect only if the President
determines and certifies to Congress that Afghanistan or
Pakistan, as the case may be--
(A) has implemented the requirements set forth in
subsections (c) and (d) with respect to such Reconstruction
Opportunity Zone; and
(B) has agreed to require textile or apparel producers in
such Reconstruction Opportunity Zone to participate in the
program described in subsection (d) and has developed a
system to ensure participation in such program by such
producers, including by developing and maintaining the
registry described in subsection (c)(2)(A).
(2) Extension.--
(A) Initial extension.--The President may extend the period
for compliance by Afghanistan or Pakistan under paragraph (1)
for an initial 6-month period if the President--
(i) determines that Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case
may be, has made a good faith effort toward implementing the
requirements set forth in paragraph (1) (A) and (B) and has
agreed to take additional steps towards implementing such
requirements that are satisfactory to the President; and
(ii) provides to the appropriate congressional committees,
not later than 30 days before the last day of the 16-month
period specified in paragraph (1), a report identifying the
additional steps that Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case
may be, has agreed to take as described in clause (i).
(B) Subsequent extensions.--The President may extend the
period for compliance by Afghanistan or Pakistan under
paragraph (1) for subsequent 6-month periods if, with respect
to each such extension, the President--
(i) provides an opportunity for public comment and a public
hearing on the possible extension not later than 45 days
before the last day of the existing 6-month extension;
(ii) consults with the Secretary of Labor and the
appropriate congressional committees with respect to the
possible extension not later than 45 days before the last day
of the existing 6-month extension;
(iii) determines, taking into account any public comments
and input received during the public hearing described in
clause (i) and the consultations described in clause (ii),
that extraordinary circumstances exist that preclude
Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be, from meeting the
requirements set forth in paragraph (1) (A) and (B); and
(iv) publishes in the Federal Register a notice that
describes--
(I) the extraordinary circumstances described in clause
(iii);
(II) the reasons why the extraordinary circumstances
preclude Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be, from
meeting the requirements set forth in paragraph (1) (A) and
(B); and
(III) the steps Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may
be, will take during the 6-month period of the extension to
implement the requirements set forth in paragraph (1) (A) and
(B).
(3) Continuing compliance.--
(A) Termination of duty-free treatment.--If, after making a
certification under paragraph (1), the President determines
that Afghanistan or Pakistan is no longer meeting the
requirements set forth in paragraph (1) (A) and (B), the
President shall terminate the duty-free treatment proclaimed
under section 404(a) or 405(a).
(B) Continuation of duty-free treatment notwithstanding
noncompliance.--
(i) Initial 6-month continuation.--Notwithstanding
subparagraph (A), if, after making a certification under
paragraph (1), the President determines that Afghanistan or
Pakistan is no longer meeting the requirements set forth in
paragraph (1) (A) and (B), the President may extend the duty-
free treatment proclaimed under section 404(a) or 405(a) for
an initial 6-month period if the President--
(I) determines, after consultation with the Secretary of
Labor and the appropriate congressional committees, that
extraordinary circumstances exist that preclude Afghanistan
or Pakistan, as the case may be, from continuing to meet the
requirements set forth in paragraph (1) (A) and (B); and
(II) publishes in the Federal Register a notice, not later
than 30 days after making the determination under subclause
(I), that describes--
(aa) the extraordinary circumstances described in subclause
(I); and
(bb) the reasons why the extraordinary circumstances
preclude Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be, from
continuing to meet the requirements set forth in paragraph
(1) (A) and (B).
(ii) Subsequent 6-month continuation.--The President may
extend the duty-free treatment proclaimed under section
404(a) or 405(a) for a subsequent 6-month period if, with
respect to such extension, the President makes a
determination that meets the requirements of clause (i)(I)
and publishes in the Federal Register a notice that meets the
requirements of clause (i)(II).
(C) Subsequent compliance.--If the President, after
terminating duty-free treatment under subparagraph (A),
determines that Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be,
is implementing the requirements set forth in paragraph (1)
(A) and (B) and meets the requirements of section 403, the
President shall reinstate the application of duty-free
treatment proclaimed under section 404(a) or 405(a).
(c) Labor Official.--
(1) In general.--The requirement under this subsection is
that Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be, has
designated a labor official within the national government
that--
(A) reports directly to the President of Afghanistan or
Pakistan, as the case may be;
(B) is chosen by the President of Afghanistan or Pakistan,
as the case may be, in consultation with labor unions and
industry associations; and
(C) is vested with the authority to perform the functions
described in paragraph (2).
(2) Functions.--The functions of the labor official shall
include--
(A) developing and maintaining a registry of textile or
apparel producers, and developing, in consultation and
coordination with any other appropriate officials of the
Government of Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be, a
system to ensure participation by such producers in the
program described in subsection (d);
(B) overseeing the implementation of the program described
in subsection (d);
(C) receiving and investigating comments from any
interested party regarding the conditions
[[Page H6562]]
described in subsection (d)(2) in facilities of textile or
apparel producers listed in the registry described in
subparagraph (A) and, where appropriate, referring such
comments or the result of such investigations to the
appropriate authorities of Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the
case may be, and to the entity operating the program
described in subsection (d);
(D) assisting, in consultation and coordination with any
other appropriate authorities of Afghanistan or Pakistan, as
the case may be, textile or apparel producers listed in the
registry described in subparagraph (A) in meeting the
conditions set forth in subsection (d)(2); and
(E) coordinating, with the assistance of the entity
operating the program described in subsection (d), a
tripartite committee comprised of appropriate representatives
of government agencies, employers, and workers, as well as
other relevant interested parties, for the purposes of
evaluating progress in implementing the program described in
subsection (d), and consulting on improving core labor
standards and working conditions in the textile and apparel
sector in Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be, and on
other matters of common concern relating to such core labor
standards and working conditions.
(d) Technical Assistance, Capacity Building, Compliance
Assessment, and Remediation Program.--
(1) In general.--The requirement under this subsection is
that Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be, in
cooperation with the entity designated by the Secretary of
Labor under paragraph (3)(A)(i), has established a program
meeting the requirements under paragraph (3)--
(A) to assess compliance by textile or apparel producers
listed in the registry described in subsection (c)(2)(A) with
the conditions set forth in paragraph (2) and to assist such
producers in meeting such conditions; and
(B) to provide assistance to improve the capacity of the
Government of Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be--
(i) to inspect facilities of textile or apparel producers
listed in the registry described in subsection (c)(2)(A); and
(ii) to enforce national labor laws and resolve labor
disputes, including through measures described in paragraph
(5).
(2) Conditions described.--The conditions referred to in
paragraph (1) are--
(A) compliance with core labor standards; and
(B) compliance with the labor laws of Afghanistan or
Pakistan, as the case may be, that relate directly to core
labor standards and to ensuring acceptable conditions of work
with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and
occupational health and safety.
(3) Requirements.--The requirements for the program are
that the program--
(A) is operated by an entity that--
(i) is designated by the Secretary of Labor, in
consultation with appropriate officials of the Government of
Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be;
(ii) operates independently of the Government of
Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be;
(iii) has expertise relating to monitoring of core labor
standards;
(iv) if the entity designated under clause (i) is an entity
other than the International Labor Organization, is subject
to evaluation by the International Labor Organization at the
request of the Secretary of Labor, including--
(I) annual review of the operation of the program; and
(II) annual recommendations to the entity operating the
program, the Government of Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the
case may be, and the Secretary of Labor to improve the
operation of the program;
(v) prepares the annual report described in paragraph (4);
(B) is developed through a participatory process that
includes the labor official described in subsection (c) of
Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be, and appropriate
representatives of government agencies, employers, and
workers;
(C) assess compliance by each textile or apparel producer
listed in the registry described in subsection (c)(2)(A) with
the conditions set forth in paragraph (2) and identify any
deficiencies by such producer with respect to meeting such
conditions, including by--
(i) conducting site visits to facilities of the producer;
(ii) conducting confidential interviews with workers and
management of the facilities of the producer; and
(iii) providing to management and workers, and where
applicable, worker organizations of the producer, on a
confidential basis--
(I) the results of the assessment carried out under this
subparagraph; and
(II) specific suggestions for remediating any such
deficiencies;
(D) assist the textile or apparel producer in remediating
any deficiencies identified under subparagraph (C);
(E) conduct prompt follow-up site visits to the facilities
of the textile or apparel producer to assess progress on
remediation of any deficiencies identified under subparagraph
(C); and
(F) provide training to workers and management of the
textile or apparel producer, and where appropriate, to other
persons or entities, to promote compliance with paragraph
(2).
(4) Annual report.--The annual report referred to in
paragraph (3)(A)(v) is a report, by the entity operating the
program, that is published (and available to the public in a
readily accessible manner) on an annual basis, beginning 1
year after Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be, has
implemented a program under this subsection, covering the
preceding 1-year period, and that includes the following:
(A) The name of each textile or apparel producer listed in
the registry described in subsection (c)(2)(A) that has been
in operation in the Reconstruction Opportunity Zone for at
least 1 year and has been identified as having met the
conditions under paragraph (2).
(B) The name of each textile or apparel producer listed in
the registry described in subsection (c)(2)(A) that has been
in operation in the Reconstruction Opportunity Zone for at
least 1 year and has been identified as having deficiencies
with respect to the conditions under paragraph (2), and has
failed to remedy such deficiencies.
(C) For each textile or apparel producer listed under
subparagraph (B)--
(i) a description of the deficiencies found to exist and
the specific suggestions for remediating such deficiencies
made by the entity operating the program;
(ii) a description of the efforts by the producer to
remediate the deficiencies, including a description of
assistance provided by any entity to assist in such
remediation; and
(iii) with respect to deficiencies that have not been
remediated, the amount of time that has elapsed since the
deficiencies were first identified in a report under this
subparagraph.
(D) For each textile or apparel producer identified as
having deficiencies with respect to the conditions described
under paragraph (2) in a prior report under this paragraph, a
description of the progress made in remediating such
deficiencies since the submission of the prior report, and an
assessment of whether any aspect of such deficiencies
persists.
(5) Capacity building.--The assistance to the Government of
Afghanistan or Pakistan referred to in paragraph (1)(B) shall
include programs--
(A) to review the labor laws and regulations of Afghanistan
or Pakistan, as the case may be, and to develop and implement
strategies for improving such labor laws and regulations;
(B) to develop additional strategies for protecting core
labor standards and providing acceptable conditions of work
with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and
occupational safety and health, including through legal,
regulatory, and institutional reform;
(C) to increase awareness of core labor standards and
national labor laws;
(D) to promote consultation and cooperation between
government representatives, employers, worker
representatives, and United States importers on matters
relating to core labor standards and national labor laws;
(E) to assist the labor official of Afghanistan or
Pakistan, as the case may be, designated pursuant to
subsection (c) in establishing and coordinating operation of
the committee described in subsection (c)(2)(E);
(F) to assist worker representatives in more fully and
effectively advocating on behalf of their members; and
(G) to provide on-the-job training and technical assistance
to labor inspectors, judicial officers, and other relevant
personnel to build their capacity to enforce national labor
laws and resolve labor disputes.
(e) Compliance With Eligibility Criteria.--
(1) Country compliance with core labor standards
eligibility criteria.--In making a determination of whether
Afghanistan or Pakistan is meeting the eligibility
requirement set forth in section 403(b)(1)(E) relating to
core labor standards, the President shall consider any
reports produced under subsection (d)(4) and acceptable
conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of
work, and occupational health and safety.
(2) Producer eligibility.--
(A) Identification of producers.--
(i) In general.--Except as provided in clause (ii),
beginning 2 years after the President makes the certification
under subsection (b)(1), the President shall identify on a
biennial basis whether a textile or apparel producer listed
in the registry described in subsection (c)(2)(A) and in
operation for at least 1 year has failed to comply with core
labor standards and with the labor laws of Afghanistan or
Pakistan, as the case may be, that directly relate to and are
consistent with core labor standards.
(ii) Exception.-- The President may identify a textile or
apparel producer at any time under clause (i) if the evidence
warrants such a review.
(B) Assistance to producers; withdrawal, etc., of duty-free
treatment.--For each textile or apparel producer that the
President identifies under subparagraph (A), the President
shall seek to assist such producer in coming into compliance
with core labor standards and with the labor laws of
Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be, that directly
relate to and are consistent with core labor standards. If,
within a reasonable period of time, such efforts fail, the
President shall withdraw, suspend, or limit the application
of duty-free treatment to textile and apparel covered
articles of such producer.
(C) Reinstating duty-free treatment.--If the President,
after withdrawing, suspending, or limiting the application of
duty-free treatment under subparagraph (B) to articles of a
textile or apparel producer, determines that such producer is
complying with core labor standards and with the labor laws
of Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be, that directly
relate to and are consistent with core labor standards, the
President shall reinstate the application of duty-free
treatment under section 405 to the textile and apparel
covered articles of such producer.
(D) Consideration of reports.--In making the identification
under subparagraph (A) and the determination under
subparagraph (C), the President shall consider the reports
made available under subsection (d)(4).
(f) Reports by the President.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the implementation of this section
during the preceding 1-year period.
[[Page H6563]]
(2) Matters to be included.--Each report required by
paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) An explanation of the efforts of Afghanistan and
Pakistan, the President, and entity designated by the
Secretary of Labor to carry out this section.
(B) A summary of each report produced under subsection
(d)(4) during the preceding 1-year period and a summary of
the findings contained in such report.
(C) Identifications made under subsection (e)(2)(A) and
determinations made under subsection (e)(2)(C).
(g) Evaluation and Report by Secretary of Labor.--
(1) Evaluation.--The Secretary of Labor shall evaluate the
monitoring program established under this section to
determine ways to improve adoption and adherence to core
labor standards and acceptable conditions of work with
respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational
health and safety. To the extent that producers of nontextile
or nonapparel articles described in section 404 have
established operations in Reconstruction Opportunity Zones,
the report shall also evaluate options for expanding the
program to include such producers.
(2) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date on which
Afghanistan or Pakistan, as the case may be, has implemented
a program under this section, the Secretary of Labor shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
that contains the results of the evaluation required under
paragraph (1) and recommendations to improve the program
under this section and, if applicable, to expand the program
to include producers of nontextile or nonapparel articles.
(3) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary of Labor such sums as may
be necessary to carry out this subsection.
(h) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to carry out this section (other than
subsection (g)) $20,000,000 for the period beginning on
October 1, 2009, and ending on September 30, 2023.
SEC. 408. PETITION PROCESS.
Any interested party may file a request to have the status
of Afghanistan or Pakistan reviewed with respect to the
eligibility requirements listed in this title, and the
President shall provide for this purpose the same procedures
as those that are provided for reviewing the status of
eligible beneficiary developing countries with respect to the
designation criteria listed in subsections (b) and (c) of
section 502 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2462 (b) and
(c)).
SEC. 409. LIMITATIONS ON PROVIDING DUTY-FREE TREATMENT.
(a) In General.--
(1) Proclamation.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), and
subject to subsection (b) and the conditions described in
sections 403 through 407, the President shall exercise the
President's authority under this title, and the President
shall proclaim any duty-free treatment pursuant to that
authority.
(2) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of
this title if the President determines that providing such
treatment is inconsistent with the national interests of the
United States. In making such determination, the President
shall consider--
(A) obligations of the United States under international
agreements;
(B) the national economic interests of the United States;
and
(C) the foreign policy interests of the United States,
including the economic development of Afghanistan and the
border region of Pakistan.
(b) Withdrawal, Suspension, or Limitation of Duty-Free
Treatment.--The President may withdraw, suspend, or limit the
application of the duty-free treatment proclaimed under this
title upon consideration of the factors set forth in section
403 (b) and (c) of this Act, and section 502 (b) and (c) of
the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2462 (b) and (c)). In taking
any action to withdraw, suspend, or limit duty-free treatment
with respect to producers receiving benefits under section
404 or 405, the President shall consider the information
described in section 403(d) relating to verification of the
ownership and nature of the activities of such producers and
any other relevant information the President determines to be
appropriate.
(c) Notice to Congress.--The President shall advise
Congress--
(1) of any action the President takes to waive, withdraw,
suspend, or limit the application of duty-free treatment with
respect to Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Afghanistan or
Pakistan or enterprises receiving benefits under section 404
or 405; and
(2) if either Afghanistan or Pakistan fails to adequately
take the actions described in section 403 (b) and (c) of this
Act or section 502 (b) and (c) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19
U.S.C. 2462 (b) and (c)).
SEC. 410. TERMINATION OF BENEFITS.
Duty-free treatment provided under this title shall remain
in effect through September 30, 2024.
SEC. 411. CUSTOMS USER FEES.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall
increase the amount of fees charged and collected under
section 13031(a) of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985 (19 U.S.C. 58c(a)) for the
provision of customs services in connection with imports and
travel from Afghanistan and Pakistan as necessary to meet the
requirements of subsection (b).
(b) Minimum Amount.--The amount of the increase in fees
charged and collected under the authority of subsection (a)--
(1) shall not be less than $12,000,000 for the period
beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending
at the close of September 30, 2014; and
(2) shall not be less than $105,000,000 for the period
beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending
at the close of September 30, 2019.
(c) Rule of Construction.--The amount of the increase in
fees charged and collected under the authority of subsection
(a) shall be in addition to the amount of fees that would
otherwise be charged and collected under section 13031(a) of
the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
(19 U.S.C. 58c(a)) for the provision of customs services in
connection with imports and travel from Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
(d) Termination of Authority.--The authority provided under
subsection (a) terminates at the close of the date on which
the aggregate amount of the increase in fees charged and
collected under the authority of subsection (a) equals
$105,000,000.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. After 1 hour of debate on the bill, as
amended, it shall be in order to consider the amendment in the nature
of a substitute printed in part B of the report, if offered by the
gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) or her designee, which
shall be considered read, and shall be debatable for 30 minutes,
equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent.
The gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) and the gentlewoman from
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
General Leave
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include
extraneous material on H.R. 1886.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, at this time I would like, for purposes of
opening general debate, to yield to the chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee, whom we have worked very closely with in putting
together a bill that we can now bring to the floor, a very good bill.
His help and the help of his staff, working with our staff, has really
been just indispensable to the progress of this effort.
I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the
chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.
Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, this measure before the House today is very well one of
the most important pieces of legislation that we will pass regarding
national security.
I first must compliment the chairman, compliment his staff, as well
as the staff of the Armed Services Committee, who worked diligently to
craft this piece of legislation. It's very important because Pakistan
is very important. Pakistan is important to the Middle East and our
intentions there. Their cooperation, of course, is so very, very
important. This legislation gives economic and democratic development
assistance to that country.
What is, of course, of great interest to me is the security
assistance that we have given Pakistan, some $400 million. I will leave
it to the chairman, the very able chairman, to go into the details, but
I must say that it not only provides for training and financing, one
part that seems to be overlooked so often is the part that deals with
the international military education, which has for a period of time
missed out with this country of Pakistan, which again is back on our
radar, and hopefully will be of great benefit to them as well as to us.
It requires certain milestones to be met.
Under the able leadership of this chairman, this is an excellent
bill. I wholly endorse it. I certainly hope that we will get a very,
very strong vote because the future of Pakistan is a centerpiece that
we need to be successful for our efforts in that part of the world.
With that, I again thank the chairman and compliment him, as well as
all those who worked on it.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Missouri, the
chairman of the committee, for his kind comments, and I yield myself 3
minutes.
Mr. Speaker, the United States has an enormous stake in the security
and stability of Pakistan. We can't allow al Qaeda or any other
terrorist group that threatens our national security to operate with
impunity in the tribal regions or any other part of Pakistan.
[[Page H6564]]
Nor can we permit the Pakistani state and its nuclear arsenal to be
taken over by the Taliban.
To help prevent this nightmare scenario, we need to forge a true
strategic partnership with Pakistan and its people, strengthen
Pakistan's democrat government, and work to make Pakistan a source of
stability in a volatile region. H.R. 1886 is designed to help achieve
these critical goals.
This legislation would significantly expand democratic, economic, and
social development assistance to help lay the foundation for a
stronger, more stable Pakistan. The bill provides funding to strengthen
the capacity of Pakistan's democratic institutions including its
Parliament, judicial system, and law enforcement agencies. It calls for
increased assistance for Pakistan's public education system, emphasis
on access for women and girls. To help ensure that U.S. assistance
actually reaches the Pakistani people, it requires increased auditing,
greater monitoring, and better evaluation.
H.R. 1886 also provides critical security assistance to help the
government of Pakistan in its fight against the extremists that
threaten the national security of both Pakistan and the United States.
To strengthen civilian control of the military, H.R. 1886 requires that
all assistance flow through the Pakistan's elected civilian government.
And to support the administration's request for additional flexibility
to address Pakistan's urgent security needs, the bill authorizes funds
for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, or PCCF. The
legislation includes some important accountability provisions to ensure
that Pakistan is using our security assistance in a manner consistent
with U.S. national security interests. An annual Presidential
determination is required that determines whether or not Pakistan is
cooperating with the United States on nonproliferation, is meeting its
commitment to combat terrorist groups, and has made progress towards
that end.
Contrary to what some have suggested, these are not rigid or
inflexible conditions that severely constrain the military. We
appreciate the urgency of the situation in Pakistan and the need for
appropriate flexibility. We are simply asking Pakistan to follow
through with the commitments it has already made. If their President is
unable to make these determinations, then we should be asking ourselves
much deeper questions about what we really hope to achieve in Pakistan.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. BERMAN. I yield myself 1 additional minute.
If their President is unable to make these determinations, as I
mentioned, we should be asking the deeper question of why are we doing
this. By including these accountability provisions in this bill, we lay
down an important marker that Congress will no longer provide a blank
check. We've had extensive conversation with the administration, with
the Armed Services Committee, as I mentioned earlier, and have made a
number of changes to make this legislation and this effort work better.
I want to re-enforce the notion this is not a partisan product. This
is a bipartisan bill. We are honored to have two of the most thoughtful
and experienced Members from the minority side, Mr. Royce and Mr. Kirk,
as original cosponsors of this legislation, and we hope that their
actions and this debate will persuade a majority of both parties that
this is an effort worth supporting.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 1886, the
Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2009,
and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, at the beginning of this debate, it's important to
emphasize that Congress and the administration are united in our goals
toward Pakistan. We want a long-term partnership with a modern, a
prosperous, a democratic Pakistan that is at peace with itself and at
peace with its neighbors. And we want a Pakistan that does not provide
safe haven to al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other militant extremist
groups.
{time} 1245
Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the hard work that has gone into my good
friend Chairman Berman's bill. I also recognize that both amendments in
committee, as well as the manager's amendment, have made this a
somewhat less objectionable instrument than it was at the outset, but
it is still worthy of being objected to.
However, concerns remain, and these are not just my concerns, but
they are concerns that, I understand, the White House, the Defense
Department and our own intelligence agencies continue to have with H.R.
1886. These concerns are particularly acute in light of the current
Pakistani military offensive against the Taliban and against other
extremists in the North-West Frontier Province as well as the fact that
the new policy is still evolving.
Rather than a forward-looking bill that addresses the current
leadership and the current dynamics in Pakistan, this bill before us,
H.R. 1886, focuses on past actions and failures attributed to the
Pakistani Government, punishing the new leadership for the sins of its
predecessors. That is why I will be offering a comprehensive substitute
which parallels the results of the administration's strategic review
and which fully funds its request for critical nonmilitary and certain
military assistance to Pakistan.
Unlike the underlying bill, our measure provides the necessary
flexibility for all U.S. agencies to respond quickly and to respond
effectively to rapidly unfolding developments on the ground while still
retaining robust accountability and congressional oversight of these
programs.
As Members will recall, on March 27, the President announced a new
strategy to guide U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This
strategy focused our efforts, the U.S. efforts, toward meeting a core
goal: to disrupt, to dismantle and to defeat al Qaeda and its safe
havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Afghanistan or
Pakistan.
As our intelligence agencies have made clear, the threats emanating
from al Qaeda and from their allies in Pakistan directly endanger our
homeland security, the survival of Pakistan as a modern nation-state
and the security of our friends and allies around the world.
The President as well as all of his top advisers, including Secretary
of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates, insist that this new
strategy is intended to be a framework, not a straitjacket, for U.S.
policy. That is why Secretary Clinton has emphasized that the
democratically-elected government in Pakistan shares our goals with
respect to tackling militancy, and that is why she urged that Congress
not legislate onerous conditionality that might undercut our efforts to
work with Pakistanis who share the interests of the United States. That
is also why Ambassador Holbrooke noted before our committee this May
that certain legislative conditionality could prove seriously
counterproductive.
While the authors of H.R. 1886 may have sought to empower our
Pakistani partners to undertake the formidable task of fighting and
winning against violent extremists, it does the opposite. Further,
accountability measures for Afghanistan and Pakistan must be tightly
linked to the new U.S. strategy for the region rather than outdated
assessments of the situation in Pakistan and preconceived notions about
the response from our Pakistani partners.
Mr. Speaker, we have gone down this road before. I recall during the
Iraq debate in the last Congress Members expressed great distrust for
the judgment of General Petraeus, and they sought to prejudge the surge
strategy before it could even be implemented. Let us hope that this
will not be repeated with respect to Pakistan and Afghanistan, as
General Petraeus is now the chief of Central Command, leading the
efforts of the Department of Defense in these countries and, in fact,
in the broader theater.
Why does the executive branch need great flexibility in trying to
execute a strategy in Pakistan? Look what is happening on the ground
right now. Six weeks of fighting between the Pakistani troops and the
Taliban insurgencies have forced 2 million people from their homes in
the Swat Valley and in other northwestern areas.
[[Page H6565]]
According to Islamabad, since the operation began on April 26, 1,305
militants have been killed; 120 have been arrested; 105 soldiers have
died; and 306 have been injured. In response, the extremists have
launched a wave of suicide bombings and other attacks in Lahore and
elsewhere across the country.
As one Pakistani writer noted, ``The terrorist backlash is
principally aimed at draining public support from the army's offensive
in Swat and to rattle the political and military establishments, weaken
national resolve and erode public support for the anti-militancy
campaign.''
Fortunately, Pakistan's democratic government has responded with
firmness and with new resolve to persevere and to succeed in our
mission. Perhaps even more importantly, anti-Taliban sentiment among
the Pakistani people appears to be increasing in response to the mayhem
that has been unleashed by the militants. But these gains are fragile,
Mr. Speaker. Winning the peace could yet prove elusive. There could be
little doubt that the political and military challenges ahead for the
government and for the people of Pakistan are, indeed, profound.
That is why it is so important to provide this administration with
flexible authorities to carry out its new strategy for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, focusing on the strategic importance of Pakistan to the
United States and to the world and focusing on the need for increased
security, for increased governance and for development assistance to
help us meet these vitally important goals.
Finally, the rule for this bill made in order a self-executing
mechanism whereby House Resolution 1318, a bill to provide duty-free
treatment for certain goods from designated Reconstruction Opportunity
Zones, ROZs, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, will be incorporated into the
text of H.R. 1886 even though that legislation has never even been
marked up in committee.
While I support the concept of ROZs, this highly irregular maneuver
is not the appropriate approach to take on this serious matter.
Although we share the majority's goal, we believe that the Republican
substitute that I will offer later in this debate affords the best
means for the United States Congress and for the U.S. administration to
work together to develop an integrated and effective assistance plan to
advance our mutual interests in a democratic, stable and prosperous
Pakistan that is a strong partner in the struggle against extremism and
that maintains responsible controls over its nuclear weapons
technology.
With that, Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of our time.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee, the gentleman
with whom I just traveled to Pakistan, the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Ackerman).
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the
legislation before us. I want to thank Chairman Berman for allowing me
to work closely with him on this bill and, more importantly, for his
producing such an excellent piece of legislation.
Some may be surprised that I am an enthusiastic supporter of this
bill to assist Pakistan. Over the years, I have been, unashamedly, one
of the most persistent and aggressive critics of Pakistan's government
and of the previous administration's policies for dealing with it. I
remain deeply concerned about much of Islamabad's behavior, ranging
from its cozy relations with native terrorist groups to its obsessive
belief that India intends to devour Pakistan. None of Pakistan's
governments have demonstrated a persuasive commitment to internal
political or economic reform or to anything approaching real acceptance
of the rule of law.
Pakistan has been, at best, an obstreperous partner on the subject of
proliferation, and like many, I fail to understand what possible reason
they could have that could justify the stonewalling we've faced
regarding the A.Q. Khan proliferation network. I continue to believe
that Pakistan's interest in F-16 aircraft is akin to a fetish.
Nevertheless, I am a strong supporter of the bill. Why? Very simply,
it is time our partnership with Pakistan connects directly to the
Pakistani people. Our previous strategy of depending wholly upon the
government of Pakistan to fight a war most of its people detest is not
sustainable, and I believe it has contributed significantly to the
political instability in that country.
This bill sets the stage for the United States to work with Pakistan
to promote long-term development and infrastructure projects in all
areas of Pakistan, to establish a real counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism strategy and to ensure U.S. access to individuals
suspected of engaging in nuclear proliferation. This legislation will
help Pakistan gain control of its under-governed areas, and it will
ensure accountability for all U.S. assistance to Pakistan.
In addition to requiring the President to develop a real security
strategy and to regularly report back to Congress on the effectiveness
of our military assistance, the act prohibits such assistance until
Pakistan demonstrates its commitment to shared security goals. There
are also strong oversight and audit requirements for the State
Department and for USAID, and there is a requirement for the U.S.
Comptroller General to report independently on the effectiveness of our
security assistance.
This bill is a tremendous step forward for us in our efforts to bring
peace and stability to South Asia. I would hope that every Member would
support this legislation. I thank the chairman.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, at this time, I am pleased to yield 5
minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton), the ranking member
of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia.
(Mr. BURTON of Indiana asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, first of all, let me congratulate
our chairman on crafting a bill that, in large part, is very good. It
increases aid to Pakistan by triple in some areas, and I think it's
very positive. It deals with economic and humanitarian assistance that
will help Pakistan build schools, roads and hospitals, and it will help
Pakistan's economic infrastructure. All of that is good. I know that
the President and the administration support that as well.
But unfortunately--here comes the ``but'' part--unfortunately, the
chairman and our Democrat colleagues decided to load this bill up with
ill-conceived provisions to micromanage U.S. security assistance to
Pakistan, as the ranking member just said. This is not just my opinion.
The Secretary of Defense, Mr. Gates, and the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Mullen, wrote the Armed Services Committee last
month. Here is what they said:
``The degree of conditionality and limitations on security assistance
to Pakistan'' in H.R. 1886 ``severely constrains the flexibility
necessary for the executive branch and the Department of Defense given
the fluid and dynamic environment that exists in Pakistan.''
Mr. BERMAN. Will the gentleman yield? After yesterday, why wouldn't
you?
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I will in a minute. Do you remember last night
when I asked you to yield? But that's okay. I will yield to you in a
minute just to show you what kind of a guy I am.
Anyhow, this is a very difficult time over there. I would like to say
to my chairman, if he could see this--Mr. Chairman, I hope that you can
see this. It's very important that we look at the situation on the
ground in Pakistan right now.
The green area is the area that the government controls. The brown
area is the area that the Taliban controls. The tan area is where there
is a strong Taliban presence. The yellow is where there are federally
supported tribal areas. Of course, up here in the north is the blue
North-West Frontier Province.
If we lose this, if we lose this here, you've got a heck of a problem
in Afghanistan. That's the entire border with Afghanistan. If you lose
that, then the President's goal to stabilize and to win the war in
Afghanistan is going to go right down the tubes, and this micromanaging
that you're doing in this bill is not going to be helpful.
Now, in the past, I have not agreed with Senator Kerry. In fact, I
can't remember ever agreeing with Senator Kerry. But just to let you
know that there is some bipartisan opposition, I want to read to you
what he said. Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John
[[Page H6566]]
Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts, the author of similar Senate
legislation, Senate bill 962, said, it's ``overly restrictive'' and
``counterproductive.''
``It sends a message in the Pakistani body politic that the people of
Pakistan say, `Well . . . we're just doing their (U.S.) bidding, we're
their lackeys, we're not in control.' ''
I think that's counter to the kind of message that we want to send to
Pakistan right now.
{time} 1300
This is a very difficult time. This is not just a debate between the
chairman and the ranking member and me. This is war and peace. It's the
survivability of Pakistan as an independent country. It's winning or
losing the war in Afghanistan. And we have to remember that Pakistan is
a nuclear power. If the Taliban is successful in this area, not only
will Afghanistan go down the tubes, but in likelihood, they will have
control of some nuclear weapons. I know we've got precautions that are
being taken to stop that. But in the event this takes place and we lose
control of those nuclear weapons, we've got a real possible
conflagration for the whole area in that part of the world.
So I would like to say to the chairman, and I hope in conference
committee this is changed, that this micromanaging that you're doing to
try the tell the Pakistani Government how to conduct its military
operations in Pakistan, that that is limited or stopped.
Mr. BERMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I will be happy to yield.
Mr. BERMAN. This isn't for a polemic. It's really just to take what
you said.
Number one, I agree completely with the urgency of it. If I didn't--
we don't have a lot of money--we would not be authorizing these sums.
We share your sense of the urgency of the situation.
Secondly, the letter you cite is correct. The letter is not correct,
but the existence of the letter is correct. But it was addressed to a
bill that had been introduced. Since the introduction of the bill, we
have gone through elaborate negotiations with the House Armed Services
Committee. To deal with some of the issues that letter was concerned
about, we have worked through, both in the supplemental and in the
authorizing committee----
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I will give the gentleman an additional 1 minute
because we do want to clarify Senator Kerry's statements.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Let me just say to my colleague that there is
an unnecessary limitation relating to Pakistan's F-16 program that
could be dealt with by nonlegislative means, which you're dealing with
that in this bill. It shows that there is no trust: a limitation on
State Department-funded assistance unless Pakistan meets certain
conditions relating to nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and other
issues.
Mr. BERMAN. Good things.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I don't understand you.
Mr. BERMAN. Ensuring that the mission that we are equipping and
training for is committed to a counterinsurgency, not an arms race in
South Asia.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. All I can say, if you read the bill and you
listen to the debate and listen to even what Senator Kerry says, with
whom I don't agree with very much, you see that there is too much
micromanaging in this bill.
This is a war over there, and we should be supporting our ally in
every way possible so the Taliban isn't victorious.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield to someone who,
like the previous speaker, the gentleman from Indiana, has spent a
great deal of time in Pakistan looking at the situation. She chairs the
Pakistan Caucus. She joined our congressional delegation in Pakistan in
the month of April and speaks with great knowledge and experience on
this subject, the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson-Lee, for 3
minutes.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. I thank very much the distinguished
chairman of the full committee for both his insight and his leadership,
and my good friend, the subcommittee chairman, Mr. Ackerman, and my
doubly good friend, Mr. Burton, who was just on the floor of the House
who shares with me this commitment to Pakistan.
Mr. Speaker, the reason why we must go forward today is for the very
reason that our colleagues have been addressing themselves to our
colleagues, if you will. We have a crisis, a dire crisis in Pakistan.
There is no time for us to quarrel over what really are minimal
differences, if you will. Right now, as we speak, 2\1/2\ million people
are homeless. They are fleeing the conflicts in the Swat area that has
been initiated by the Pakistani Government that is standing not for
America, but is standing for the freedom of her people. And we must
applaud these actions.
We must look to the leadership of the President, the leadership of
the Secretary of State, who has a strong commitment to Pakistan, the
policies of this new government. Our government is to recognize
Pakistan as an ally. And so 1886 is a bill that recognizes
comprehensively that we have an equal ally that is fighting against
terrorism within their borders.
I have been to Peshawar, Islamabad, and any number of the sites
visiting with leaders around the Nation. I have been to the schools
that are trying to replace the madrasas. And in this legislation, we
have, for example, a Pakistan development and prosperity fund.
Just 3 weeks ago, a hundred-plus members of the Pakistani community
met in New York to talk about how they can provide social services to
that nation. As we speak, there are medical doctors from the Pakistani-
American community that are leaving their homes here in the United
States to go to Pakistan to help these refugees.
So let us look at the big picture that this legislation provides. The
prosperity fund, yes, there are conditionalities, but I would suggest
that they are refrained from the issues that the distinguished Member
in the other body spoke to, and we're going to work even further.
But if our colleagues appreciate the fact that there are dire
conditions that the Pakistan military is fighting the terrorists, they
will help us pass 1886. This bill refers, itself, to the nuclear
materials and requires the protecting of those materials. Do we want to
leave that willy-nilly?
This particular legislation also, in essence, helps to protect women
and girls, to provide more resources for women and girls. It helps to
deradicalize the youth. This legislation is a stopgap to the crisis and
the emergency.
I ask my colleagues to read it. This bill should be passed.
I urge you to support H.R. 1886, The Pakistan Enduring Assistance and
Cooperation Enhancement Act. H.R. 1886 establishes a new, more positive
framework for U.S.-Pakistan relations. The legislation establishes a
set of principles that should govern the U.S.-Pakistan relationship,
including the actions that the two countries should take to maintain a
robust, relevant and lasting relationship. The bill is comprised of
three titles.
The first title provides Economic, Social and Democratic Development
Assistance for Pakistan; the second title provides Security Assistance
for Pakistan; and the third title requires the President to develop a
regional security strategy; provides for enhanced monitoring,
evaluation, and auditing of U.S. assistance; requires a Presidential
report on Pakistan, including an evaluation on Pakistan's progress in
counterterrorism and an assessment of whether assistance provided to
Pakistan is in any way facilitating the expansion of Pakistan's nuclear
weapons program; and requires that all assistance to Pakistan be
provided through a civilian government in Pakistan established by free
and fair elections.
Pakistan is a critical ally of the United States. For too long,
however, our relationship with Pakistan has been one of fits and
starts, depending on events in the region and who happens to be in
power in Pakistan. It is time for us the United States to forge a truly
strategic partnership with Pakistan, one that goes beyond our mutual
interest today in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism and speaks to
the everyday needs of the average Pakistani.
H.R. 1886 accomplishes these objectives. The legislation would
significantly expand economic, social and democracy assistance to help
lay the foundation for a stronger, more stable Pakistan. In particular,
the bill authorizes a Pakistan Democracy and Prosperity Fund, a
permanent fund in the U.S. Treasury for which the United States, along
with other interested nations, nongovernmental organizations and even
private citizens, can contribute
[[Page H6567]]
to the prosperous future of Pakistan. The fund also provides additional
flexibility to the State Department in order to provide such
assistance, thereby responding to the ever dynamic situation Pakistan
faces with its on going efforts to counter a domestic insurgency and
provide humanitarian care for its displaced people.
As much as we must focus on the internal conflicts in Pakistan, we
must not forget the external issues affecting the region as a whole and
the need for stabilization.
Over the years, U.S. assistance to Pakistan has fluctuate with
political events, sending mixed messages and leading most Pakistanis to
question both our intentions and our staying power. Today, many
Pakistanis believe the United States will cut and run when it serves
our purpose, a belief which undermines our longterm efforts to defeat
extremists, foster democratic change, and support transparent and
accountable institutions that promote security and stability in
Pakistan.
However, the status quo is not working: many in the United States
believe we are paying too much and getting too little--and most
Pakistanis believe exactly the opposite. Without changing this
baseline, there is little likelihood of drying up popular tolerance for
anti-U.S. terrorist groups or persuading Pakistani leaders to devote
the political capital necessary to deny such groups sanctuary and
covert material support.
The bill helps bridge a sustainable U.S.-Pakistan partnership through
an increased focus on public diplomacy and engagement. H.R. 1886
authorizes a new exchange program for Pakistani civil servants and
military officers in order to foster greater respect for and
understanding of the principle of civilian rule in Pakistan's military.
By building bridges to Pakistan and its people, the legislation is
intended to provide a new, more positive framework for U.S.-Pakistan
relations. Finally, the bill authorizes an extensive increase in
military assistance to help Pakistan wage an effective
counterinsurgency campaign against those forces that threaten
Pakistan's national security.
This legislation establishes a new, more positive framework for U.S.-
Pakistan relations. The legislation establishes a set of principles
that should govern the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, including the
actions that the two countries should take to maintain a robust,
relevant and lasting relationship.
RECONSTRUCTION OPPORTUNITY ZONES
It is important to note that the rule incorporated into this bill a
modified version of H.R. 1318, Afghanistan-Pakistan Security and
Prosperity Enhancement Act. These provisions create Reconstruction
Opportunity Zones (ROZs) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where non-trade-
sensitve exports would be permitted to enter the U.S. duty-free.
From a broader foreign policy perspective, the ROZ initiative
constitutes an affirmation of the importance of the United States
attaches to Pakistan and Afghanistan via a long term effective economic
program that is directly aimed at improving the lives of its people.
ROZs work toward achieving counterinsurgency policy goals, as job
creation in these areas would counter al-Qaeda and Taliban recruitment
efforts by offering alternatives to joining the insurgency. Such job
creation and will serve as positive reinforcement for young people on a
path toward building a solid future in Pakistan where these young
people would otherwise turn to extremism as their way of life.
Moreover, it should be noted that the AFL-CIO does not oppose ROZs,
as these zones assist in achieving the delicate balance of helping
Pakistan establish a better economy, while simultaneously respecting
trade restrictions here in the United States. On the premise of a new
friendship between the United States and Pakistan, we need to support
H.R. 1886. The ROZ initiative open avenues for employment and job
growth in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and its impact will help shut down
paths that lead to terrorism, warlords and the drug trade.
Additionally, I was a co-sponsor of the original ROZ bill and maintain
its importance.
AMENDMENT LANGUAGE
I have worked tirelessly with Chairman Berman to include several key
provisions in this important legislation. First, I am pleased that the
Chairman has included language from my past amendments in the
legislation which states that the United States recognizes the recent
major efforts that Pakistan has taken in the SWAT area. Second, my
language included in the former manager's amendment includes language
on page 40 in section 206 which states that any limitations on the
dispensation of military funds to Pakistan should be modified or
reconsidered if Pakistan has made rapid compliance with the objectives
contained in the section (i.e., those objectives that lead to
cooperation with the United States). Additionally, the legislation
includes important language on page 19 that funding for education must
be used for the education of school girls between the ages of 10-20 and
that the money should be used to make sure that these girls stay in
school.
I have also worked closely on the Manager's Amendment to H.R. 1886,
which includes important language that funding for rehabilitation
programs is designed to deter military insurgence. It is imperative
that United States security assistance for Pakistan should be used for
the creation of militant rehabilitation programs designed to
rehabilitate insurgents and to prevent youth from turning to militancy
from the onset. Such militant rehabilitation programs shall be
implemented by moderate Islamic clerics, in keeping with Islamic
tradition. United States security assistance for Pakistan should
further be used to create incentives for steering insurgents away from
militancy by providing financial support and job assistance for those
militants who effectively renounce their subscription to militancy. I
would urge that my colleagues support the Manager's Amendment. I
believe that it contains language that would be of benefit to the
Pakistani people.
CODELS to PAKISTAN
I have been to Pakistan many times. My belief in this country and its
relationship with the United States drove me to co-chair the Pakistan
Caucus. This year alone, I have participated in two Congressional
Delegation Trips to Pakistan, and I am very passionate about diplomatic
relations between our two countries.
Benazir Bhutto, shortly before her death, said that ``The next few
months are critical to Pakistan's future direction as a democratic
state committed to promoting peace, fighting terrorism and working for
social justice. Democracy is necessary to peace and to undermining the
forces of terrorism.'' I had the pleasure of knowing the late Benazir
Bhutto and losing her in death was truly a tragedy felt beyond
Pakistan. She made this statement over two years ago, yet is relevant
today more than ever.
On May 19, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced $110
million in emergency assistance for the South Asia nation of Pakistan,
including aid for civilians fleeing a military offensive against
Taliban militants in the northwest. The United Nations refugee agency
issued a report stating that more than 1.4 million people in the North
West Frontier Province (NWFP) have been registered as displaced since
May 2, describing the flood as the largest and swiftest to take place
anywhere in the world in recent years.
The newly-registered internally displaced persons (IDP) took the
total number of those who have fled their homes in the SWAT valley and
surrounding areas to 2 million.
I am hopeful that the $110 million in emergency assistance will get
to the people on the ground and will be of assistance to them. It is
important that the people of Pakistan see that the aid is coming from
America to give a face to this aid. It is essential t global security
and the security of the United States.
The surge of IDPs followed the launch of a military offensive in late
April. President Asif Ali Zardari acted after U.S. officials stepped up
warnings that Islamabad's willingness to tolerate and negotiate peace
deals with the militants was endangering both Pakistan and the wider
region. The Taliban fighting spread to NWFP districts and SWAT.
President Obama's new approach to Pakistan is different than anything
that has been tried before. America has expressed that it will support
the democratically-elected government and it will have a clear and
transparent relationship.
In conclusion, I urge you to support H.R. 1886, the Pakistan Enduring
Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act, which seeks to and
effectively establishes a new, more positive and enduring framework for
U.S.-Pakistan relations.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Before yielding time to my distinguished friend
from Florida, I would like to clarify that Senator Kerry was indeed
referring to the bill as amended to the text we're considering today.
And further, much reference has been made to the Armed Services
Committee, as the gentleman knows from Florida, but the Armed Services
minority did not sign off on the bill before us due to pending
concerns.
And with that, I am proud to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Miller), the ranking member on the Armed Services
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats.
Mr. MILLER of Florida. I thank the ranking member, and I appreciate
you bringing up the fact that our friends on the majority are, again,
talking about the bipartisan efforts that have been made with the Armed
Services Committee, all of the extensive negotiations that have taken
place. I serve on the Armed Services Committee. I am the ranking
member, as Ms. Ros-
[[Page H6568]]
Lehtinen just said. There has been absolutely no negotiation with any
member of the minority side of the House Armed Services Committee.
You know, it sounds like a great thing to support when you look at
the bill, at least the title of the bill, but when you start looking at
it, reading it, listening to the people who it actually is going to
affect, like General David Petraeus who I met at CENTCOM last week and
had an opportunity to talk to him about these specific issues, he said
it is going to tie their hands, not allow us to do what we need to do
and the military needs to do to train and assist in this very important
issue.
Nobody, I think, has any qualms or quarrels with the majority side
saying this is something that needs to be done. The issue is a
jurisdictional problem with regards to whether State or DOD has input
or actually controls what goes on in this program.
Look, I've been to Pakistan and Afghanistan three times in the last
year. I understand what's going on there. I know how hard the
Pakistanis are fighting to control what's going on in their country. We
need to do what we can do to help with the counterinsurgency problem.
But it's my understanding that the President does not support this
particular piece of legislation and, as has already been said on the
floor today, that Senator Kerry does not support this particular piece
of legislation.
So those are the facts. Others may not want to necessarily address
those facts and say that they are, in fact, true, but they are. And I
heard a Member on the floor of the House yesterday trying desperately
to get Members to understand and believe that Foreign Service members,
as a whole, are actually on the front lines.
Look, the State Department cannot compel any State Department
employee to go into a combat zone. This is a DOD issue. This is a
counterinsurgency issue. It needs to be in the basket, if you will, of
the Department of Defense. The majority's tendency to use diplomacy for
every single thing should not result in a career State Department
bureaucrat running a military counterinsurgency operation. It just
shouldn't be so.
Look, as I said, they can't legally compel their people to go into a
combat zone, but what they do is they use money for programs to fly
Muslim people from the United States of America to Sweden to talk about
issues in regards to Islamic outreach, which I have serious concerns
with that particular program, but that's the State Department and
that's what they want to do. I think they probably would have thought
that the diplomatic efforts that Pakistan made in the Swat Valley was
the thing that we should have done. It was not something that should
have been done, and we know the Taliban broke the truce real quickly
after that was done.
But look, the Department of State should not be taking the lead in
this vital issue. It should be the Department of Defense. And I think
that, ultimately, Members of this body on both sides of the aisle
understand that.
So I urge a defeat of this flawed particular piece of legislation.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Ackerman) may control the time of the gentleman from
California (Mr. Berman).
There was no objection.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentlelady from California (Ms. Watson.)
Ms. WATSON. I rise today in support of H.R. 1886, the Pakistan
Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act, called PEACE, of
2009.
Since President Barack Obama took the reins of our Nation, he has
begun to lead us in a new era of foreign policy based on the theme:
listen, learn, then lead.
This bill introduced by Chairman Berman is the beginning of this new
era of American foreign policy which will give the President the tools
he needs to bring peace and long-lasting stability to Pakistan. The
PEACE Act authorizes the President to provide assistance for Pakistan
to enhance economic development, human rights, cultural and educational
programs, the judicial system, and democratic institutions in order to
strengthen civilian rule and long-term stability.
This bill does not allow Pakistan to use any of this assistance to
upgrade or buy new F-16s or upgrade its nuclear arsenal. The reporting
requirements in the PEACE Act provide the necessary oversight
provisions which require Pakistan's government and the Obama
administration to inform Congress on the progress and uses of our
assistance.
I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 1886.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I reserve the balance of our time.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased at this time to yield 2
minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Connolly).
Mr. CONNOLLY of Virginia. I thank my colleague, Mr. Speaker, and I
rise in support of H.R. 1886, the Pakistan Enduring Assistance
Cooperation Act, and I congratulate our chairman, Mr. Berman, for his
leadership.
This bill is a national security bill. It authorizes military
assistance to help Pakistan disrupt and defeat al Qaeda and insurgent
elements, including the Taliban, and requires that the majority of such
assistance be focused on critical counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism efforts.
{time} 1315
Additionally, the bill requires that all military assistance flow
through the democratically elected Government of Pakistan.
The legislation includes accountability measures for military
assistance, including a requirement that the Government of Pakistan
demonstrate a sustained commitment to combating terrorism. The bill
aligns Pakistan's defense goals with ours by conditioning military aid.
Specifically, the bill provides $400 million a year in military aid on
the condition that Pakistan cooperate in dismantling nuclear supply
networks and fighting terrorist groups. The bill will not provide
funding for Pakistan to build its forces on the eastern border with
India, as the real threat lies on the western border. To this end, the
bill would bar the use of foreign military financing to buy or upgrade
F-16 fighter jets with the exception of money to finish a 2006 deal.
I understand the concerns about Pakistan's commitment to fighting
terrorism. I myself have concerns about Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and
its past history of proliferation. This is why, at my request, the
report language accompanying this bill specifically mentions the A.Q.
Khan proliferation network as a source of concern in the United States
and that representatives of the United States must have access to him
because they have not interviewed him.
Pakistan, Mr. Speaker, is a key partner in South Asian security.
Clearly, recent events in the Swat Valley demonstrate that stability in
the region is not just an American concern. We must move ahead with
clear expectations and goals, as this bill enumerates, to ensure that
U.S. aid is being used in the most effective manner possible.
Ultimately, this will benefit both the Pakistani people and U.S.
strategic interests. This bill, H.R. 1886, does that; and I urge my
colleagues to support it.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, before yielding to my good friend from
Texas, I would like to point out, as the previous speaker noted, this
is supposed to be a national security bill, yet the majority tagged on
a trade bill to it, and then, under the rule, attaches it to the State
bill.
I am proud to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Brady), the ranking member on the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade.
Mr. BRADY of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this bill
due to the last-minute addition of the Pakistan Afghanistan Recovery
Opportunity Zone bill.
While I commend Congressman Van Hollen for his hard work and his
strong commitment to this very important legislation, I am concerned
the bill fails to encourage significant investment in the Afghan and
Pakistan regions under the new trade program. And I say that as someone
who believes that trade can be a powerful tool to help developing
countries lift themselves up out of poverty. Unfortunately, I believe
this bill will discourage economic development and investment because
it includes some dangerous eligibility criteria that will drive away
investment and require each firm, including U.S. firms, there
[[Page H6569]]
to meet labor standards that could exceed U.S. law in such a way that
will create a dangerous precedent that could be applied to our own
free-trade agreements, making U.S. labor laws vulnerable to challenge
from foreign countries.
And the scope of the eligible products in the bill, unfortunately,
have been whittled down--I know there have been difficult negotiations
to try and broaden that--and it imposes fees on certain Pakistan
products in return for sales of others; again, sort of, I think, a
tradeoff that has been difficult to swallow.
I am concerned that this measure, despite its excellent intentions--
and again, very hard work from Congressman Van Hollen--will fall short
of its objectives to bring economic stability to this very difficult
region.
I would point out, too, we are doing a lot to open up America to
foreign countries. We've had six votes to open up America to foreign
sales, but no votes to open up other countries to what we sell. It's
not enough to buy American; we need to sell American products
throughout the world. And in this economic recession, we have three
pending trade agreements that would allow us to sell $11 billion of
American products around the world to create jobs here in the United
States that are being held up, not brought to a vote on the floor. We
need to get our priorities right. As we help lift countries up, let's
lift American jobs up as well.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Berman) reclaims his time from the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Ackerman).
There was no objection.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
ranking member of the Terrorism Nonproliferation and Trade Subcommittee
of the Foreign Affairs Committee, a cosponsor of the legislation and
another member of the congressional delegation that went to Pakistan
last month. In fact, everybody who went to Pakistan with me is
supporting this bill. I should have taken more people. But I yield to
the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce).
Mr. ROYCE. I rise in support of this very important legislation, and
I think there are a few points that we should keep in mind.
The first is that Pakistan is a tinderbox; its government is very
weak, and social and economic trends are moving in the wrong direction
and that is fostering extremism. The Pakistan Government has killed
many militants over the last few weeks, but the insurgency remains
potent. And, clearly, Pakistan is going to be troubled for some time.
Second, this region is the center of international terrorism. And
most importantly, Pakistan has a growing nuclear arsenal. Now, we can
either stay engaged and try to shape events, or go to the sidelines and
see a bad situation become a possible disaster.
Third, to date, Pakistan has taken us for a ride. Since 9/11, we have
provided Pakistan with some $12.3 billion. We spent billions before
that. I've been to Pakistan a number of times; I have seen what has
happened without conditions. I have also seen the need there. A school
that I visited in the North-West Frontier has now been blown up, and
madrasas now educate kids there in jihad. I have been to Peshawar. I've
been to the regions where this militancy has to be confronted.
Little has improved without conditions, and there has been
significant waste and corruption. So this legislation is the proposal
we have with the best conditions. It best conditions that aid. It takes
the position that while we must work with the Pakistani Government, our
experience demands greater accountability from that government. No
blank checks. That the Pakistan Government denounces this bill's
conditions, frankly, should be a selling point.
I do, however, have one significant reservation. The trade provision
that the Rules Committee majority added to this bill is sheer window
dressing. As this bill goes to conference with the Senate, as the
process continues, this trade provision must be liberalized. Increasing
trade should be an important goal.
In short, the situation in Pakistan is dire, and with its nuclear
arsenal, the stakes could not be any higher. We need all the
accountability we can get. And that's why I support this bill.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am so proud to yield 3 minutes to
the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Camp), the ranking member on the
Committee on Ways and Means.
Mr. CAMP. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
I strongly oppose H.R. 1886, in particular, language inserted at the
Rules Committee to create a new, but poorly designed, trade preference
program for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
While I would support a well-designed program to create jobs and spur
economic development, this legislation is deeply flawed. First, it
brings virtually no economic benefit because the product mix is
stingy--an economic fig leaf that should fool no one.
My second objection is even more fundamental. While the bill is light
on commercial benefits, it is heavy on intrusive, impractical labor
requirements that could exceed U.S. law. Now, I very much support
improving labor conditions; but these new, unnecessarily onerous labor
criteria would impede investment and won't improve labor conditions.
Specifically, this legislation requires the Secretary of Labor to
designate any entity to conduct firm-level inspections in Afghanistan
and Pakistan to ensure compliance with ``core labor standards,'' even
an NGO hostile to trade. This vague language subjects firms to
arbitrary standards that could exceed U.S. law--I repeat, that could
exceed U.S. law. Given the dire security situation there, having
inspectors go from door to door, even cottage to cottage, to enforce
such standards strains credibility.
Moreover, this standard exceeds the labor provisions in other
preference programs and even our trade agreements negotiated under the
bipartisan May 10 standard for FTAs both lauded by the Speaker and
Chairman Rangel. It could be viewed as a precedent to justify the
inclusion of similar language, not only in new trade agreements, but
perhaps even in efforts to revise existing ones, which would, of
course, apply to us as well, leaving the United States vulnerable to
challenges that our labor laws don't meet this standard.
I am also concerned about the pay-for. For every dollar of duty
relief that reconstruction opportunity zone exports from these
countries receive, other Pakistani and Afghan exports have to pay at
least that amount in increased fees, making these countries potentially
worse off than they are right now.
Lastly, I am disappointed that this is my first opportunity to
explain my concerns. This bill was not even considered by the Ways and
Means Committee, which, again, it's not about the committee but again
this denies the American people their voice. This is not the return to
regular order we were promised by the Speaker. And I fear this is not
the last time this month I will be on the floor raising that concern.
The provision also subverts the prerogatives out of the House by
turning an aid bill into a revenue measure, ripe for mischief when it
gets to the other side of the Capitol.
Because of all of this, I strongly oppose the legislation in its
current form. I urge my colleagues to vote against the measure.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
principal cosponsor of the legislation, the gentleman from Illinois
(Mr. Kirk).
Mr. KIRK. I thank the chairman.
I want to praise the chairman and his team for putting together a
bipartisan bill regarding our assistance to Pakistan. This is a very
critical region for the United States and assistance is authorized
under this legislation, and necessary. But as was stated before, when
Colin Powell called the President of Pakistan right after September 11,
he offered a choice: you're either with us or against us. And President
Musharraf picked well. Under that arrangement, we did provide $12
billion to Pakistan but largely without strings attached. And the
Pakistani effort against the militants, especially in the frontier
autonomous region, was initially aggressive but then petered out. The
United States was providing $16 million a month to the Pakistani
military but after 2005 was receiving little benefit.
[[Page H6570]]
Under the new government, that is, unquestionably, a democratic
government, I think we have a more stable partner to deal with in the
war on terror, specifically in what the Pentagon would call the ``al
Qaeda core.'' With this new government really representing the essence
of the Pakistani middle class, we now take on their true aspirations in
which the central issue for the long term is not nuclear competition
with India, but how quickly Pakistan is falling behind India's rising
economic growth.
In that view, then, a bunch of radicals ruining the economic and
business climate of Pakistan is a mortal danger to the future income of
Pakistanis. On that basis, a war on terror is solidly grounded in
democracy, in the Pakistani middle class, and the joint interest to the
United States. But this bill reflects what we have learned over the
last 5 years, that strings should be attached, that benchmarks should
be established, that we should have accountability in that very
difficult part of the world.
I will also praise this bill because it is probably the only free
trade bill this Congress will adopt, and it represents a true
bipartisan will that will help add to the employment of Pakistan and
stability of that country.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
vice Chair of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nuclear Nonproliferation,
and International Trade of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the gentleman
from Georgia (Mr. Scott).
Mr. SCOTT of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
This is really the most critical, the most important piece of
legislation facing us right now. The situation in Pakistan is very
tenuous; it is very critical. We have before us a very significant
piece of legislation that has been expertly crafted. Yes, trade is a
part of it because trade is important at this time to make sure that we
are able to help sustain the economy of Pakistan at this very critical
time.
Pakistan is in a fragile situation. Military aid is in here, yes,
because Pakistan needs this. But we have the safeguards here because,
let me just say, the other side mentioned something a little while back
about the Department of Defense and their role. Let us go back for an
example in Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan, we do not want another repeat of the very significant
problem that the Department of Defense had in Afghanistan with losing--
yes, losing--significant military equipment to the Taliban.
{time} 1330
The U.S. taxpayers deserve better, and in this bill we are giving
them better. We are giving the oversight. In essence, we are making
sure that aid that we give to Pakistan is properly used, that oversight
is in place, that benchmarks are in place. We're making sure that any
entity that is being used, whether it's military or certainly their
nuclear weapons, do not fall into terrorists' hands or into other
hands. We've made sure, under the leadership of Ms. Lee, who's on this
committee, with the chairman's manager's amendment, that we have
safeguards in here to make sure that none of these funds are used to
even expand their nuclear capacity.
This is an extraordinary bill at an extraordinary time. It is heavily
bipartisan, and I commend the chairman on an excellent piece of
legislation.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 7\1/2\
minutes remaining. The gentlewoman from Florida has 6\1/2\ minutes
remaining.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I yield myself as much time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, as we have noted here on the floor, too often the
relationship between the United States and Pakistan has been
characterized by mutual frustration engendered by a growing trust gap.
And while the leaderships of the two countries place a high value on
our relationship, their publics and their legislatures have viewed each
other with suspicion and depicted each other as unreliable allies. But
with the advent of a new administration, both in Pakistan and in the
United States, we're offered a window of opportunity to redefine, to
recalibrate relations.
Both sides need to guard against unrealistic expectations but be
prepared to engage in an honest dialogue; and therein lies the rub, Mr.
Speaker. As a Pakistani civil society leader and a close confidant of
the late Benazir Bhutto has said, ``Conditioning aid turns on its head
the very rationale for assistance to stabilize Pakistan and empower it
to deal more effectively with security challenges. An approach that
treats Pakistan from the paradigm of `hired help' rather than `valued
ally' is deeply counterproductive. It only reinforces the transactional
nature of ties that are so resented by Pakistanis.''
Mr. Speaker, our overarching goal should and, indeed, must be--do no
harm. Unfortunately, the bill before us could hamper, rather than help,
vital U.S. security and strategic objectives regarding Pakistan and
Afghanistan.
With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to a
member of the committee, my friend from California, the gentlewoman
Barbara Lee.
Ms. LEE of California. Mr. Speaker, first let me thank the chairman
for his very effective work on this bill and for your leadership and
for really bringing this forward to the committee so that all of us
could have an opportunity to weigh in, and talk about, and amend, and
include many of the provisions that we believe allowed us to come to
this floor today to support this bill.
I believe, like many believe, that addressing Pakistan, rather than
an escalation of the war in Afghanistan, is a much more effective way
to address terrorism and our national security. I'm greatly encouraged
by the goals of this legislation, which aims to put United States
``smart power'' to work, which many of us have been talking about for
many years. The smart power. This helps to reshape our relationship
with Pakistan based on a long-term commitment to social, economic and
political development. The legislation integrates key benchmarks and
limitations absent in previous aid packages which resulted in really
$10 billion in United States aid since 2001, yielding little or no
results or progress on many fronts in Pakistan. So you can imagine why
some of us initially were very skeptical of this.
This legislation also seeks to reshape the U.S.-Pakistan relationship
by shifting unconditional United States military assistance away from
this historical trend of exclusively unconditional military assistance.
I want to make that point very clear. This is not unconditional. This
is conditional. And it also provides a two-to-one ratio in terms of the
development assistance, economic assistance, social and democratic
priorities, which we all believe we should support.
Simply put, this bill really reflects the sentiments shared by many
of my colleagues, that the national security of our Nation hinges upon
much more than military might. Instead, it hinges upon the success of
diplomatic and development efforts around the globe.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Mr. BERMAN. I yield the gentlewoman 30 additional seconds.
Ms. LEE of California. Let me just say that as a supporter of
nonproliferation efforts all of my life, I am very pleased and want to
thank Chairman Berman for working with myself and other members of the
committee to address the concerns regarding the potential expansion of
Pakistan's nuclear program. I wanted to make sure that the possible
fungibility of these funds was not a factor. In President Obama's bold
and brilliant speech in Cairo last week, he strongly reaffirmed
America's commitment to seek a world in which no nation holds nuclear
weapons. So we wanted to make sure that that was the case here with
Pakistan in this bill and that we minimized any type of fungibility of
funds.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher), the ranking member of the
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and
Oversight.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I rise in opposition to this effort to send billions
of more dollars to Pakistan. I have reached my threshold with Pakistan.
We have sent them billions upon billions of dollars, and we still have
an anti-American sentiment all the way through that government. They
were
[[Page H6571]]
our friends during the Cold War. Yes, they sided with us against the
Soviet Union. The Cold War is over. It is long over. And since that
time, the leaders of Pakistan have allied themselves with the most
radical elements of Islam who hate the United States; and the Pakistani
officials and the ISI, their CIA, have been working in conjunction with
these radical Islamicists in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere ever since. We
should not be sending them billions and billions of more dollars. We
should be seeking, instead, to start relying on relationships with
India, Russia and other countries that will be more reliable allies.
I'm sorry that I'm having to say that we should be writing off a
country like this. Let's focus on Afghanistan and quit sending billions
of dollars to Pakistanis.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds.
Just remember, a decision at this point to give up on Pakistan, it is
Pakistan that is providing sanctuary for the people who are fighting us
in Afghanistan. It is Pakistan who has nuclear weapons.
I now yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Al Green).
Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm supporting this legislation because it addresses both war and
peace. And if I may, I'd like to focus on the peace initiative because,
truth be told, the great issue of our time is not whether a superpower
can police the world. A superpower can police the world. The great
issue of our time is whether a superpower can bring peace to the world.
This piece of legislation helps us not only with war but also with
peace because it helps us with economic development. It helps us to
give people the opportunity to take care of themselves and sustain
themselves, but it also helps us with education. The wealth of a nation
is the education of its people. It helps us to bring the peace and
stability that will be needed when the war is over. War can help us to
provide a certain degree of security, but it won't provide the
salvation that we need to have the peace.
I support this bill because it helps us when the war is over to have
the peace and stability that Pakistan will need. I thank you, Mr.
Chairman. It's a great piece of legislation.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Florida has 3\1/2\
minutes remaining.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. At this point I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes
to Mr. Hunter of California.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, let me say this: I have served in Iraq two
times as a United States Marine, and I served in Afghanistan once. When
I was over there in 2007, I was fighting, and in October of 2007, word
came across from here in the States that said several hundred State
Department employees expressed their resentment over a policy that
could force them to serve in Iraq or they might lose their jobs. They
actually called going over to Iraq and Afghanistan a potential death
sentence. So these are State Department employees, diplomats--the same
ones we're asking to go to Pakistan and Afghanistan, which is arguably
the most dangerous area right now in the entire world. We're asking
them to go over, the exact same people who called going over to Iraq a
potential death sentence.
I would equate this to sending diplomats to Katrina-destroyed New
Orleans in 2005 instead of the National Guard. We're going to send
diplomats to Louisiana. We aren't going to send the National Guard. We
aren't going to send emergency services. We're going to send diplomats.
So as opposed to giving General Petraeus, as the President asked for,
funding to help out in Pakistan and Afghanistan, we're going to send
diplomats so they can talk to the Taliban and they can talk to al
Qaeda. They can talk to the mad men who cut off people's heads. That's
what the State Department is going to do.
This is the wrong move. The Republicans have it right this time. Give
the President full authority, Let him come up with a plan, and let
General Petraeus implement that. The Republican substitute is the right
way to go. We need to make sure that Pakistan is fighting for Pakistan
and that Pakistan doesn't think it's only fighting for American
dollars. That's what we need to do.
Once more, as a United States Marine that saw State Department
ineptness and cowardice while I was in Afghanistan, it's almost
personally insulting that we're going to pull the funding from General
Petraeus and give it to those State Department cronies.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Florida has 1\1/2\
minutes remaining. The gentleman from California has 3\1/4\ minutes
remaining.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentlewoman who has made a significant contribution to this legislative
effort, the gentlewoman from Wisconsin (Ms. Moore).
Ms. MOORE of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank Chairman Berman
for working with me so closely to include provisions in H.R. 1886 to
ensure that the empowerment, protection and human rights of women are
an important purpose for our aid to Pakistan and to help address the
high rate of maternal mortality in Pakistan.
As Secretary of State Clinton noted earlier this year, the status of
women and girls is a key indicator of whether or not progress is even
possible in a society. We simply can't solve the global problems
confronting us--from the worldwide financial crisis to the risk of
climate change, chronic hunger, disease, poverty--when the energies and
talents of hundreds of millions of people, half the world's population
is left behind.
According to the World Health Organization, maternal mortality is an
indicator of disparity and inequity between men and women and reflects
a woman's so-called place in society and their ultimate access to
social health, nutritional services and to economic opportunities. In
this case, Pakistan's maternal mortality rate speaks of the great
challenges facing Pakistani women.
{time} 1345
Over 400 women die per 100,000 live births in Pakistan, and, for
comparison, that is compared to 11 per 100,000 in the United States.
It is the aim of my amendment to make clear that the U.S. aid
authorized in this bill addresses this challenge. We need to make it
unmistakably clear, Mr. Speaker, that addressing that nation's high
child and maternal mortality rates is a key part of our assistance to
Pakistan. We know that these interventions will save these women's
lives and ultimately save the nation.
Again, I thank the chairman for his support.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Berman)
has 1\1/4\ minutes remaining and the right to close, and the
gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) has 1\1/2\ minutes
remaining.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I feel like I am experiencing deja vu. The seemingly
same arguments that opponents of General Petraeus and his Iraq surge
strategy used just under 2 years ago about Iraqis and the Iraqi
government and their commitment to fighting extremist groups, they are
making an appearance today in this Chamber with respect to Pakistan.
U.S. commanders have just begun to assess the situation on the ground
to determine the need to implement that new strategy, and some of the
speakers today are already tying the U.S.' hands while prejudging the
response of Pakistan. We should be focusing on success, on prevailing
against al Qaeda, prevailing against the Taliban, not anticipating
failure.
While the authors of this bill seek to empower our Pakistani partners
to confront insurgency and militarism, I feel that this bill will
actually inadvertently have a counterproductive impact by potentially
making the Pakistani government appear subservient to the United
States, as Senator Kerry suggested. This bill could weaken Pakistani
democracy as well as could potentially fuel paranoia, wild conspiracy
theories that help give rise to that country's visceral and deep-seated
anti-American feelings.
So I urge my colleagues to look at this bill, examine carefully what
we are doing to our military, what we are doing to this new
administration, and come to the correct conclusion that they should
oppose this bill.
[[Page H6572]]
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, just a few points. There was reference here to the F-
16s. There is nothing in this bill that prohibits the Pakistanis from
deciding to buy more F-16s. Two years ago they signed a contract
indicating that that is what they were going to do. What this
legislation does is say other than some specific adjustments
particularly to deal with utilizing the F-16s they already have, in the
counterinsurgency, we are not going to give our taxpayer dollars for a
weapons system, an airplane, whose counterinsurgency interests are far
less important than other equipment or training we could be providing.
Secondly, Admiral Mullen came to see me about the problems of
utilizing the traditional security assistance program for providing the
kind of equipment that is needed for the counterinsurgency in Pakistan.
As a result of the case he made, we have created and worked with the
Armed Services Committee to create an entire fund that waives every
provision of law in the foreign military financing program so that we
can get this equipment and training to the Pakistanis.
Pakistan is an urgent problem, but doing it right, not just doing it
carelessly, is the way to go. I urge that this bill be supported.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, thank you for affording me
this opportunity to address the Rules Committee and explain my
amendment to H.R. 1886, the ``Pakistan Enduring Assistance and
Cooperation Act''.
My amendment is a simple but important addition to this important
legislation, which I believe can be supported by every member of this
Committee.
My amendment would foster counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan with
the creation of militant rehabilitation programs designed to
rehabilitate insurgents and to prevent youth from turning to militancy
from the onset. Financial support and job opportunities will be
provided to graduates of the rehabilitation programs as incentives for
steering insurgents away from militancy.
H.R. 1886 establishes a new, more positive framework for U.S.-
Pakistan relations. The legislation establishes a set of principles
that should govern the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, including the
actions that the two countries should take to maintain a robust,
relevant and lasting relationship. The bill is comprised of three
titles.
The first Title provides Economic, Social and Democratic Development
Assistance for Pakistan; the second Title provides Security Assistance
for Pakistan; and the third Title requires the President to develop a
regional security strategy; provides for enhanced monitoring,
evaluation, and auditing of U.S. assistance; requires a Presidential
report on Pakistan, including an evaluation on Pakistan's progress in
counterterrorism and an assessment of whether assistance provided to
Pakistan is in any way facilitating the expansion of Pakistan's nuclear
weapons program; and requires that all assistance to Pakistan be
provided through a civilian government in Pakistan established by free
and fair elections.
I urge you to support my amendment.
Mr. DRIER. Mr. Speaker, this week we are considering a number of
foreign policy bills that affect critically important issues. Yesterday
we considered H.R. 2410, the State Department Reauthorization Act.
Today we are considering two proposals, which have been joined together
in one bill, H.R. 1886, to provide assistance to Pakistan. The first
proposal provides funding to help Pakistan develop its institutions and
provide economic development for its people, in order to help combat
the growing terrorist threat that is within its borders and that fuels
the conflict in Afghanistan. The second proposal also seeks to bolster
development in Pakistan, as well as Afghanistan, by creating duty-free
zones along their shared border to encourage new investment and provide
access to the U.S. market.
These are all very worthy ideas. Foreign assistance, particularly
capacity building, plays a critical role in bolstering our national
security, when it is done right. By helping our partners in the
developing world to strengthen the rule of law, build transparent and
accountable institutions, and spur the kind of economic development
that improves standards of living, we help to tear down the foundations
of terrorism and tyranny and combat the radicalism that threatens the
safety of all Americans.
Our efforts in Pakistan are particularly important, not only because
of the implications for the war in Afghanistan, where our troops are in
harm's way, but because it is a nuclear-armed state. The stakes
couldn't be higher. If Pakistan's democratically elected government
were to be taken over by the terrorists in their midst, the
consequences would be almost unthinkable. Creating economic opportunity
and real alternatives to terrorism in Pakistan and elsewhere in the
developing world is a vital national security concern. Unfortunately,
the bills that we are considering this week are fundamentally flawed.
The State Department Reauthorization bill, rather than pursuing
meaningful reform to make our foreign assistance more effective, simply
expanded government spending and bureaucracy at an untenable rate. It
also included a number of highly controversial provisions, yet the rule
did not provide for debate or consideration of amendments on those
issues. As a result, I could not support this bill.
The two proposals on Pakistan before us today are even more
problematic. The first, while providing vital funding in a key region,
ties the hands of our military and attempts to micromanage interagency
efforts from 7000 miles away. This is a counterproductive and
potentially fatal error to make. The second proposal, which proposes
new duty-free zones for textile and household products, is
counterproductive as well.
While the idea behind it is a very good one, the actual program
proposed has three key flaws--it excludes the top products that are
made in Pakistan, rendering the program ineffective; it imposes such
restrictive and unworkable labor provisions that it undermines the
proposed program and sets a very bad precedent for future trade
preference bills; and finally, it imposes new tariffs on the very
Pakistani businesses that we are trying to help, in order to pay for
the elimination of tariffs in other categories of products. This bill
would take with one hand while it attempts to appear to give with the
other. This is not a workable proposal. It will not spur development in
Pakistan, and could actually hurt those companies that are currently
creating the only economic opportunity that exists in Pakistan. It
would also set a very dangerous precedent for future attempts to spur
development and poison our efforts to create opportunity elsewhere in
the developing world.
All three foreign policy proposals before us this week represent
nothing more than three very unfortunate missed opportunities. I am
truly disappointed that we have not had the opportunity to get these
bills right, as they deal with such critically important issues. I hope
very much that in the future, we can have an open, bipartisan process
that allows us to effectively and appropriately deal with the key
national security issue of foreign assistance.
Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the
Afghanistan-Pakistan Security and Prosperity Enhancement Act. The
legislation, originally introduced as H.R. 1318, was subsequently
incorporated into H.R. 1886, to authorize Democratic, Economic and
Social Development Assistance for Pakistan, introduced by Congressman
Berman, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. This
legislation is aimed at protecting our homeland and those of our allies
in the fight against Al-Qa'ida and the Taliban in Afghanistan and
Pakistan by providing tools for economic development.
We worked with the Bush Administration to craft the framework of this
legislation. This initiative was subsequently embraced by President
Obama who specifically incorporated it into his counterinsurgency
strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan. This bill authorizes the
President of the United States to designate specific trade zones, known
as Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs), in Afghanistan and in
certain regions of Pakistan to create economic opportunities.
These ROZs will allow qualified businesses duty-free access into U.S.
markets for designated products, thereby providing significant
employment opportunities where few currently exist. A ROZ program could
go a long way to bolster economic development in this critical region
of the world where extremists have tried to exploit the lack of
economic opportunities to gain recruits for their radical agenda.
Enhanced security efforts by the United States, as well as a strong
foreign and military assistance program, are needed to disrupt and
weaken Al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. These extremist groups exploit the
poor socio-economic conditions, such as high unemployment, in the
border areas, to gain adherents to their nefarious causes. With no
meaningful alternatives, young men in particular are vulnerable to
their entreaties.
This legislation was endorsed by the Washington Post in an editorial
on March 22, 2009. Moreover, in a letter to the Speaker this week,
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the State Department, Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, reiterated the
Administration's support and noted that ``ROZs are an important
component of the President's comprehensive national security strategy
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we need enactment of ROZ legislation
as quickly as possible to help facilitate success.''
I urge all Members of the House to support this valuable program and
vote for this bill today. I ask unanimous consent to insert, into the
Record, the speech of President Obama, the letter of Ambassador
Holbrooke and the Washington Post editorial with my statement.
[[Page H6573]]
Department of State,
Washington, DC, June 10, 2009.
Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker, House of Representatives.
Dear Madam Speaker: Thank you for giving me the opportunity
on Monday to discuss legislation creating Reconstruction
Opportunity Zones (ROZs) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to
reiterate the Administration's support. As you know, the
House version (H.R. 1318) of this bipartisan legislation is
sponsored by Representative Chris Van Hollen. Allow me to
reaffirm, in writing, the key points, in the hope they will
be useful as you proceed.
First, let me emphasize that ROZs are a vital component of
our policy toward Pakistan in a moment of great challenge,
indeed crisis, for that critically important nation.
Pakistan's stability and security are directly related to our
own national security and the ROZ legislation addresses
issues central to the very area in which, at present, there
are well over 2 million internal refugees and in which the
Taliban and al-Qaeda are operating.
Military power alone cannot bring peace to Afghanistan and
Pakistan. ROZs are an important component of the President's
comprehensive national security strategy in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and we need enactment of ROZ legislation as quickly
as possible to help facilitate success. As the President put
it earlier this year in calling for Congress to enact this
bipartisan bill, ROZs will ``develop the economy [in the
border regions] and bring hope to places plagued by
violence.''
By spurring economic growth and job creation, ROZs will
provide legitimate job opportunities in high-unemployment,
high-poverty areas in Pakistan and Afghanistan where
livelihood choices are extremely limited. We need ROZs now--
economic opportunities must be expanded to quickly follow up
military operations with economic development to prove to
populations in critical targeted areas that there are
benefits to defeating the militants. Simply put, ROZs are
crucial to the ``build'' part of our ``clear-hold-build''
counterinsurgency efforts and will help us to assist the
Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan to create conditions
on the ground that will help marginalize the insurgents.
ROZs will enhance our ``whole of government'' strategy and
will be a highly visible example of U.S. commitment to the
long-term prosperity of the Afghan and Pakistani peoples. On
my trips to Pakistan and Afghanistan, I hear a constant
refrain from all quarters in these societies about the
importance of this legislation, including the signal its
passage would send about the strength of the long-term
relationships between our peoples.
Thank you again for your leadership. I am committed to
working with you and other Congressional leaders to quickly
enact Pakistan and Afghanistan ROZs into law.
Sincerely,
Richard C. Holbrooke,
Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
____
[From the Washington Post, Mar. 22, 2009]
Plowshares for Peace
As the Obama administration formulates its strategy for
Pakistan and Afghanistan, pretty much everyone agrees that
spurring the economy in both countries--creating jobs--is key
to defusing militancy. The usual prescription is more foreign
aid, which is sure to figure in any new plan. But what
doesn't always get acknowledged in these discussions is that
such aid often doesn't do much good. The United States wasted
billions of dollars in Iraqi reconstruction aid, and given
the dangerous environment--which discourages inspection and
monitoring--you can expect a rerun in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. A more effective way to boost both economies would
be to allow them to export their products tariff-free into
the United States. But that idea arouses the enmity of U.S.
labor unions, which means that it's not going to get far in a
Democratic Congress.
Enter Rep. Chris Van Hollen, Montgomery County Democrat and
member of the House leadership, with a practical alternative.
Mr. Van Hollen, with co-sponsors, has introduced legislation
to create ``reconstruction opportunity zones'' within both
countries. Certain products, including some (not all)
textiles, produced within the zones would enjoy duty-free
access to the U.S. market for 15 years. This would encourage
investment by local businessmen, who best know the terrain,
and create jobs. There's no better formula for discouraging
Taliban recruitment.
It's not a magic formula, of course. The investment areas
have to be drawn widely enough to make the prospect of
investment realistic; if you limit them to the most intense
battle zones, you're not going to see many jobs created. The
bigger they are, though, the likelier the bill will arouse
union opposition, so the politics are tricky. Mr. Van Hollen
and his co-sponsors--including Reps. Sander M. Levin (D-
Mich), Peter Hoekstra (R-Mich.) and Mark Steven Kirk (R-
Ill.)--have tried to find the sweet spot, and their bill also
insists that any factories in the zones meet core
international standards in their treatment of workers.
Maybe the strongest argument for the opportunity zones is
that there is no down side; the worst that could possibly
happen is they don't trigger much investment. But they would
immediately provide a signal of U.S. commitment--the
governments of both countries strongly support the idea--and
they could have a substantial positive effect reasonably
quickly, at almost no cost to the U.S. Treasury. Congress and
the administration should get behind this idea.
____
Obama Announces New Afghanistan, Pakistan Strategies
President Barack Obama. Good morning. Please be seated.
Before I begin today, let me acknowledge, first of all,
Your Excellencies, all the ambassadors who are in attendance.
I also want to acknowledge both the civilians and our
military personnel that are about to be deployed to the
region. And I am very grateful to all of you for your
extraordinary work.
I want to acknowledge General David Petraeus, who's here,
and has been doing an outstanding job at CENTCOM. We
appreciate him. I want to thank Bruce Riedel. Bruce is down
at the end here, who has worked extensively on our strategic
review.
I want to acknowledge Carl Eikenberry, who's here, and is
our ambassador designate to Afghanistan, and to my national
security team. Thanks for their outstanding work.
Today, I'm announcing a comprehensive new strategy for
Afghanistan Pakistan. And this marks the conclusion of
careful policy review led by Bruce that I ordered as soon as
I took office. My administration has heard from our military
commanders as well as our diplomats. We consulted with the
Afghan and Pakistani governments, with our partners, and our
NATO allies and with other donors and international
organizations. We've also worked closely with members of
Congress here at home.
And now I'd like to speak clearly and candidly to the
American people. The situation is increasingly perilous. It's
been more than seven years since the Taliban was removed from
power yet war rages on and insurgents control parts of
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Attacks against our troops, our
NATO allies, and the Afghanistan government has risen
steadily.
And, most painfully, 2008 was the deadliest year of the war
for American forces. Many people in the United States and
many in partner country that have sacrifices so much have a
simple question. What is our purpose in Afghanistan? Of so
many years, they ask why do our men and women still fight and
die there? They deserve a straightforward answer.
So let me be clear. Al Qaida and its allies, the terrorists
who planned and supported the 9/11 attacks are in Pakistan
and Afghanistan. Multiple intelligence estimates have warned
that Al Qaida is actively planning attacks on the United
States homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan. And if the
Afghan government falls to the Taliban or allows Al Qaida to
go unchallenged, that country will again be a base for
terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they
possibly can.
The future of Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the
future of its neighbor Pakistan. In the nearly eight years
since 9/11, Al Qaida and its extremist allies have moved
across the border to remote areas of the Pakistani frontier.
This almost certainly includes Al Qaida's leadership, Osama
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. They have used this
mountainous terrain as a safe haven to hide, to train
terrorists, and communicate with followers, to plot attacks,
and to send fighters to support the insurgency in
Afghanistan.
For the American people, this border region has become the
most dangerous place in the world. But this is not simply an
American problem, far from it. It is, instead, international
security challenge of the highest order.
Terrorist attacks in London, in Bali were tied to Al Qaida
and its allies in Pakistan as were attacks in North Africa
and the Middle East, in Islamabad and in Kabul. If there is a
major attack on an Asian, European, or African city it, too,
is likely to have ties to Al Qaida leadership in Pakistan.
The safety of people around the world is at stake. For the
Afghan people, the return to Taliban rule would condemn their
country to brutal governance, international isolation, a
paralyzed economy, and the denial of basic human rights to
the Afghan people, especially, women and girls.
A return in force of Al Qaida terrorists who would
accompany the core Taliban leadership would cast Afghanistan
under the shadow of perpetual violence.
Obama: As president, my greatest responsibility is to
protect the American people. We are not in Afghanistan to
control that country or to dictate its future. We are in
Afghanistan to confront a common enemy that threatens the
United States, our friends, and our allies and the people of
Afghanistan and Pakistan who have suffered the most at the
hands of violent extremists.
So I want the American people to understand that we have a
clear and focused goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al
Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return
to either country in the future. That's the goal that must be
achieved. That is a cause that could not be more just.
And to the terrorists who oppose us, my message is the
same. We will defeat you.
To achieve our goals, we need a stronger, smarter, and
comprehensive strategy. To focus on the greatest threat to
our people, America must no longer deny resources to
Afghanistan because of the war in Iraq. To enhance the
military, governance, and economic capacity of Afghanistan
and Pakistan,
[[Page H6574]]
we have to marshal international support. And to defeat an
enemy that heeds no border or laws of war, we must recognize
the fundamental connection between of future of Afghanistan
and Pakistan which is why I've appointed Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke, who is here, to serve as special representative
from both countries and work closely with General Petraeus to
integrate our civilian and military efforts.
Let me start by addressing the way forward in Pakistan. The
United States has great respect for the Pakistani people.
They have a rich history and have struggled against long odds
to sustain their democracy. The people of Pakistan want the
same things that we want. An end to terror, access to basic
services, the opportunity to live their dreams and the
security that can only come with the rule of law. The single
greatest threat to that future comes from Al Qaida and their
extremist allies. And that is why we must stand together.
The terrorist within Pakistan's border are not simply
enemies of America or Afghanistan. They are a grave and
urgent danger to the people of Pakistan. Al Qaida and other
violent extremists have killed several thousand Pakistanis
since 9/11. They've killed many Pakistani soldiers and
police. They assassinated Benazir Bhutto. They've blown up
buildings, derailed foreign investment, and threatened the
stability of the state.
So make no mistake, Al Qaida and its extremist allies are a
cancer that risks killing Pakistan from within.
It's important for the American people to understand that
Pakistan needs our help in going after Al Qaida. This is no
simple task. The tribal regions are vast, they are rugged,
and they are often ungoverned. And that's why we must focus
on military assistance on the tools, training, and support
that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists.
And after years of mixed results, we will not and cannot
provide a blank check. Pakistan must demonstrate its
commitment to rooting out Al Qaida and the violent extremists
within its borders.
We will insist that action be taken, one way or another,
when we have intelligence about high-level terrorist targets.
The government's ability to destroy these safe havens is tied
to its own strength and security. To help Pakistan weather
the economic crisis, we must continue to work with the IMF,
the World Bank, and other international partners.
To lessen tensions between two nuclear-armed nations that
too often teeter on the edge of escalation and confrontation,
we must pursue constructive diplomacy with both India and
Pakistan. To avoid the mistakes of the past, we must make
clear that our relationship with Pakistan is grounded in
support for Pakistan's democratic institutions and the
Pakistani people.
And to demonstrate through deeds as well as words a
commitment that is enduring, we must stand for lasting
opportunity.
Now a campaign against extremism will not succeed with
bullets or bombs alone. Al Qaida offers the people of
Pakistan nothing but destruction. We stand for something from
the time.
So, today, I'm calling upon Congress to pass a bipartisan
bill co-sponsored by John Kerry and Richard Lugar that
authorizes $1.5 billion in direct support to the Pakistani
people every year over the next five years, resources that
will build schools, roads, and hospitals, and strengthen
Pakistan's democracy.
I'm also calling on Congress to pass a bipartisan bill co-
sponsored by Maria Cantwell and Chris Van Hollen and Peter
Hoekstra that creates opportunity zones in the border regions
to develop the economy and bring hope to places plagued with
violence.
And we will ask our friends and allies to do their part,
including, at the donors' conference in Tokyo next month.
Obama: I don't ask for this support lightly. These are
challenging times. Resources are stretched. But the American
people must understand that this is a down payment on our own
future because the security of American and Pakistan is
shared. Pakistan's government must be a stronger partner in
destroying these safe havens, and we must isolate Al Qaida
from the Pakistani people.
These steps in Pakistan are also indispensable to our
efforts in Afghanistan which will see no end to violence if
insurgents move freely back and forth across the border.
Security demands a new sense of shared responsibility, and
that's why we will launch a standing, trilateral dialogue
among the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
Our nations will meet regularly with Secretaries Clinton
and Secretary Gates leading our effort. Together, we must
enhance intelligence sharing and military cooperation along
the border while addressing issues of common certain like
trade, energy, and economic development.
This is just one part of a comprehensive strategy to
prevent Afghanistan from becoming the Al Qaida safe haven
that it was before 9/11. To succeed, we and our friends and
allies must reverse the Taliban's gains and promote a more
capable and accountable Afghan government.
Our troops have fought bravely against a ruthless enemy.
Our civilians have made great sacrifices. Our allies have
born a heavy burden. Afghans have suffered and sacrifices for
their future. But for six years, Afghanistan has been denied
the resources that it demands because of the war in Iraq.
Now, we must make a commitment that can accomplish our
goals. I've already ordered the deployment of 17,000 troops
that have been requested by General McKiernan for many
months. These soldiers and Marines will take the fight to the
Taliban in the south and the east and give us a great
capacity to partner with Afghan security forces and to go
after insurgents along the border.
This push will also help provide security in advance of the
important presidential elections in Afghanistan in August. At
the same time, we will shift the emphasis of our mission to
training and increasing the size of Afghan security forces so
that they can eventually take the lead in securing their
country.
Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to the Pakistan
Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act (H.R. 1886). I do
commend the strong funding levels for development assistance,
education, and health care contained in the legislation and if the bill
consisted only of this type of humanitarian support I would gladly vote
for it. I cannot, however, support authorizing over $1 billion per year
in military aid to a nation that has already suffered under a military
dictatorship and continues to experience daily violence.
The people of Pakistan do need our help to strengthen their
democratic institutions, educate their citizens, and provide social and
economic opportunity. What they do not need is an influx of guns,
tanks, and other weapons that will lead to further destabilization and
violence.
I urge all of my colleagues to stand for peace and vote against this
legislation.
Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, today we will vote on a
historic piece of legislation that will refocus American foreign policy
and forge a true partnership with Pakistan and its people. H.R. 1886,
the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act of
2009, will triple U.S. economic assistance to Pakistan, with a focus on
the rights of women and religious minorities, strengthening democratic
institutions, and improving Pakistan's public education system.
I am especially proud to pass this bill because of its focus on
public education. The Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement
Act will help Pakistan develop a national curriculum for public,
private and religious schools and will expand educational opportunities
for women and girls. I recently read a very important book; Three Cups
of Tea is an inspirational story about a journey to Pakistan and the
feats of one of the most inspirational people of our generation: Greg
Mortenson. Upon my visit to Afghanistan several months ago, I saw the
truth in Mortenson's message: that the poverty and lack of opportunity
in countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan can incite hatred against
the United States and lead to acts of terrorism. That is why I am proud
of my colleagues for realizing that sticks, alone, will not fight
terrorism. We can also fight terrorism by building schools, buying
books, and helping children--especially girls--increase life's
prospects through education. I commend Chairman Berman for introducing
this important bill and urge my colleagues to join me in passing it and
helping bring peace, stability, and opportunity to Pakistan's people.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate on the bill has expired.
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute Offered by Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I have a substitute amendment at the
desk.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Ms. Ros-
Lehtinen:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``United States-Pakistan
Security and Stability Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Congress supports the following elements outlined in
the President's White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's
Report on United States Policy Toward Afghanistan and
Pakistan:
(A) The core goal of the United States must be to disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliated networks
and their safe havens in Pakistan.
(B) The threat that al Qaeda poses to the United States and
its allies in Pakistan--including the possibility of
extremists obtaining fissile material--is all too real.
(C) The United States must overcome its trust deficit with
Pakistan and demonstrate that it is a reliable, long-term
partner.
(2) The Government of Pakistan is facing significant
security and socio-economic challenges that set the
conditions for greater radicalization and may threaten
Pakistan's viability. Such challenges include the following:
(A) Al Qaeda's and other extremist groups' campaign of
violent attacks throughout Pakistan, including the Red Mosque
incident, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, and the
bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad.
[[Page H6575]]
(B) Pakistan's population growth at a rate of approximately
2 percent a year, with nearly half of its 172 million
residents illiterate, under the age of 20, and living near or
below the poverty line.
(3) Security and stability to Pakistan is further
complicated given the prevalence of ungoverned spaces between
Pakistan and Afghanistan in which state control has not been
fully exercised given ethnic and tribal affiliations.
(4) The security and stability of Pakistan is vital to the
national security of the United States, and the consequences
of failure poses a grave threat to the security of the
American people, the region, and United States allies.
(5) The objectives of United States policy toward Pakistan
are to empower and enable Pakistan to--
(A) develop into a prosperous and democratic state that is
at peace with itself and with its neighbors;
(B) actively confront, and deny safe haven to, al Qaeda,
the Taliban, and other extremists;
(C) implement the economic, legal, and social reforms
required to create an environment that discourages violent
Islamic extremism; and
(D) maintain robust command and control over its nuclear
weapons technology.
SEC. 3. COMPREHENSIVE INTERAGENCY STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN FOR PAKISTAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009,
the President shall develop and transmit to the appropriate
congressional committees a comprehensive interagency strategy
and implementation plan for long-term security and stability
in Pakistan which shall be composed of the elements specified
in subsection (b).
(b) Elements.--The comprehensive interagency strategy and
implementation plan required by subsection (a) shall contain
at least the following elements:
(1) A description of how United States assistance described
in section 4 will be used to achieve the objectives of United
States policy toward Pakistan.
(2) Progress toward the following:
(A) Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and a
stable constitutional government in Pakistan and promote
bilateral and regional trade and economic growth.
(B) Developing and operationally enabling Pakistani
security forces so they are capable of succeeding in
sustained counter-insurgency and counter-terror operations.
(C) Shutting down Pakistani safe havens for extremists.
(D) Improving Pakistan's capacity and capability to
``hold'' and ``build'' areas cleared of insurgents to prevent
their return.
(E) Developing and strengthening mechanisms for Pakistan-
Afghanistan cooperation.
(3) A financial plan and description of the resources,
programming, and management of United States foreign
assistance to Pakistan, including the criteria used to
determine their prioritization.
(4) A complete description of both the evaluation process
for reviewing and adjusting the strategy and implementation
as necessary, and measures of effectiveness for the
implementation of the strategy.
(c) Intelligence Support.--The President, after
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence,
shall provide intelligence support to the development of the
comprehensive interagency strategy and implementation plan
required by subsection (a).
(d) Updates of Strategy.--The President shall transmit in
writing to the appropriate congressional committees any
updates of the comprehensive interagency strategy and
implementation plan required by subsection (a), as necessary.
SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN.
(a) Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.--There is authorized to
be appropriated to the President, for the purposes of
providing assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), $1,500,000,000 or such
sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2010
through 2013.
(b) Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund.--There is
authorized to be appropriated to the President, for the
purposes of building a more effective counterinsurgency
capability in Pakistan's security forces, up to $700,000,000
for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, for
fiscal year 2010.
(c) Use of Funds.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated
under this section or otherwise made available to carry out
this Act shall be used to the maximum extent practicable as
direct expenditures for programs, projects, and activities,
subject to existing reporting and notification requirements.
SEC. 5. CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING AND NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Briefing.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
transmission of the comprehensive interagency strategy and
implementation plan required by section 3, and quarterly
thereafter through December 1, 2013, the President, acting
through the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense,
shall brief the appropriate congressional committees on the
status of the comprehensive interagency strategy and
implementation plan.
(b) Notification.--The President shall notify the
appropriate congressional committees not later than 30 days
prior to obligating any assistance described in section 4 as
budgetary support to the Government of Pakistan or to any
persons, agencies, instrumentalities, or elements of the
Government of Pakistan and shall describe the purpose and
conditions attached to any such budgetary support assistance.
The President shall notify the appropriate congressional
committees not later than 30 days prior to obligating any
other type of assistance described in section 4.
SEC. 6. DEFINITION.
In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional
committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
Amend the title so as to read: ``A bill to require the
President to develop a comprehensive interagency strategy and
implementation plan for long-term security and stability in
Pakistan, and for other purposes.''.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 522, the
gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and a Member opposed each
will control 15 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, the substitute amendment reflects input from, and was
drafted in coordination with, the ranking members of the Committees on
Appropriations, on Armed Services, on Homeland Security and
Intelligence. In so doing, this approach emulated to some degree the
administration's interagency strategic review.
The substitute recognizes that of all the foreign policy challenges
facing the United States, stabilizing and reforming Pakistan may be one
of the most daunting. Given the enormous complexities and the ever-
changing nature of the situation in Pakistan, we believe that it is
critical at this stage that the administration retain the necessary
flexibility to craft policies that offer the best chance of
successfully partnering with the people of Pakistan, with the
government of Pakistan, and with the military of Pakistan to defeat
violent extremism.
At the same time, the substitute requires an ongoing policy dialogue
between the administration and the Congress regarding U.S. policy
toward Pakistan, as well as robust legislative oversight of our
strategy, of our implementation plan, as well as allocation and
expenditure of U.S. assistance.
The Republican substitute requires that not later than 30 days after
the enactment of the Supplemental Appropriations Act for 2009, the
President submit to Congress a comprehensive interagency strategy and
implementation plan for U.S. efforts to eliminate safe havens and help
toward the long-term security and stability in Pakistan.
Let me repeat that again, Mr. Speaker. Thirty days after enactment of
the current supplemental under discussion, the President is required to
produce a comprehensive interagency strategy and implementation plan.
This is more timely than what is in the underlying bill, and it seeks
to address immediate as well as evolving dynamics.
The Republican substitute relies on the President's leadership and
his commitment in providing the strategy and implementation plan to the
Congress, but does require that plan to include a description of how
the U.S. assistance will be used in order to achieve our U.S. foreign
policy objectives.
What does that include? Enhancing stable democratic governments,
making sure that we have economic growth, developing Pakistani
counterinsurgency capabilities, success in shutting down safe havens
for extremists, improving the capacity and capability of Pakistan to
hold and build areas cleared of insurgents to prevent their return, and
developing and strengthening mechanisms for Pakistan-Afghanistan
cooperation, for they cannot be separated.
The substitute also requires that the report include a detailed
financial plan of the resources, of the programming and of the
management of U.S. assistance to Pakistan and the criteria used to
determine their need and value in advancing our U.S. objectives.
[[Page H6576]]
This substitute seeks to ensure that congressional oversight and
notification keeps pace with changing conditions on the ground, and in
turn, changes in strategy and their implementation.
The Republican substitute also fully funds the administration's
request for the critically important new Pakistan counterinsurgency
capability fund.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I claim the time in opposition to the
amendment.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California is recognized
for 15 minutes.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to yield 2 minutes to the
gentlewoman from California, the author of her own legislation on
security assistance and the question of the proliferation network in
Pakistan.
Ms. HARMAN. I thank the chairman for yielding to me and I rise in
strong opposition to this Republican substitute, and in strong support
of the underlying bill, H.R. 1886, to provide long-term nonmilitary aid
to a country in the crosshairs of the effort by the Taliban to expand
its reach in South Asia.
H.R. 1886 will help persuade the Pakistani people that their future
lies with a stable and moderate democratic government and not with an
authoritarian, theocratic terrorist organization. But a key to doing
this is important language in the bill ensuring access of U.S.
investigators to persons suspected of engaging in nuclear
proliferation. This issue is critical, this language must become law,
and I disagree strongly with some in this House and in the other
Chamber who say these requirements are overly restrictive and
counterproductive.
Pakistan's history of nuclear weapons development has contributed to
instability in South Asia and paved the way for A.Q. Khan's insidious
and highly profitable proliferation network. Additional and substantial
nonmilitary support provided by the U.S. must assure that the security
threat to the U.S., which is represented by this network, is minimized.
For at least a decade, A.Q. Khan's illicit network was the most
attractive shortcut for nations and rogue organizations interested in
acquiring the materials and know-how to build a nuclear device. After
illegally securing the capability for Pakistan, which made him a hero
at home and a pariah abroad, Khan and his network sold it to Iran,
Libya and North Korea. Despite billions of U.S. dollars in aid, former
Pakistani President Musharraf pardoned Khan, and earlier this year the
Islamabad High Court released him from house arrest.
H.R. 1886, but not the Republican substitute, declares that the U.S.
will work with Pakistan to ensure our investigators access to suspected
proliferators and to restrict proliferators from travel or other
activity that could result in further proliferation. It also
incorporates, as the chairman said, language from a bill introduced by
several of us to require a presidential assessment and restrict
military aid in the future.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Mr. BERMAN. I yield the gentlewoman 30 additional seconds.
Ms. HARMAN. I thank the gentleman.
It will restrict military aid in the future unless Pakistan
cooperates in efforts to dismantle its nuclear weapons supplier
networks.
It is the right thing to do, and I thank the committee for doing it.
The world cannot afford another Libya, Iran or North Korea, and we
certainly don't want a new nuclear power called al Qaeda.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, the Republican substitute, as I was saying, also fully
funds the administration's request for the critically important new
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, PCCF. Forging an effective
partnership with Pakistan's military and intelligence apparatus has not
been a straightforward affair. Although the United States has enjoyed
some success, our efforts have also been hampered by a series of
exceptionally difficult problems.
One is a matter of a threat perception and divergent strategic
priorities, with Pakistan almost obsessively focused on their
traditional rival in India.
Another problem is the legacy of mistrust on both sides, a trust
deficit, as I discussed earlier, that continues to greatly complicate
our bilateral relations.
A third problem is a limited Pakistani ability to conduct modern
counterinsurgency, and to some degree counterterrorism operations,
against al Qaeda and their allies in the tribal areas. There is no
question, for example, that Pakistan needs to fully cooperate with New
Delhi in holding accountable all of those responsible for the brutal
assault in Mumbai as well as work with the U.S. and others on critical
nonproliferation concerns.
We do not disagree with the overarching goals and the strategic
priorities that we want to achieve in relation to Pakistan. Our
disagreement is that at this juncture we believe that the best way to
achieve critical interests is to give the administration the scope to
develop intensive, multiple approaches to rebuild, to strengthen
relationships with Pakistan, and address threats common to both of our
nations.
We believe the Republican substitute is a more workable basis than
the underlying bill for being a partner with Pakistan at this critical
time.
{time} 1400
The substitute heeds the concerns raised by Secretary Gates and the
Joint Chiefs Chairman, Admiral Mullen, who wrote about this underlying
bill.
The Department is concerned about aspects of this bill, in
particular, those provisions that impose conditions on the furnishing
of military assistance that may undermine current administration
authorities such as the Global Train and Equip authority. And
furthermore, this will allow the Department to use the funds
expeditiously and effectively without these purse strings, as evolving
circumstance may warrant, in an effort to implement the President's
strategy for the region most effectively.
And I think that this Republican substitute gets to what the
Department of Defense wishes to do, what the Obama administration wants
to achieve, what our democratic allies in Pakistan and here, our strong
military in the U.S., wants to achieve; a robust, free and democratic
Pakistan upon which we can build that level of trust again.
I hope our colleagues support our Republican substitute.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran), very knowledgeable on issues
affecting Pakistan and U.S.-Pakistan relations.
Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the
underlying bill proposed by the International Relations Committee, and
in opposition to the Republican substitute because, however you spin
it, it's basically a continuation of the Republicans' blank check
policy towards Pakistan. And what has that gotten us after 8 years of
that policy?
Well, it's time to assess it. Twelve billion dollars of taxpayers'
money has been spent, and we have nearly half a million Pakistani
troops on the border with India, our ally, and one brigade fighting the
Taliban and al Qaeda, our enemy. Their principal defense priority is F-
16s, which is a combat aircraft. Our enemy doesn't have combat
aircraft.
We don't want to be funding a nation to fight against another ally.
We want them to fight with us against our enemy.
What this bill does is to enable the children of Pakistan to have a
decent public education and not be forced to go to the madrasas where
they learn violent extremism against India and against modernity. This
enables the women of Pakistan, particularly the young girls, to grow up
to be women of influence and power and consequence.
This enables Pakistan to develop economically, not to use its
resources into a military posture against India, but to use its
resources to become a full-fledged, first world nation.
Pakistan is our ally, and this bill will enable it to stand on its
own two feet, not to be able to fight India, not to be able to engage
in nuclear proliferation, but to help us fight against the forces of
violent extremism.
[[Page H6577]]
Pakistan is a valued ally. This will give them the resources so that
we can count on that ally to do the right thing.
And to continue the same blank check policy which has made matters
worse rather than better, I think, is a terrible mistake.
I urge defeat of the amendment.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to yield 5 minutes to the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), the ranking member on the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my colleague for
yielding the time.
You know, Pakistan and Afghanistan are very difficult parts of the
world. As we develop the strategies, I think many of us have the same
goals and objectives in mind, but we need to take a look at exactly
what we're doing today.
I'm proud to support the Republican amendment to the Pakistan
Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2009.
Interestingly, I believe that this substitute supports our current
President's direction that he has outlined for Pakistan and
Afghanistan. It supports President Obama's strategy to address the
situation in Pakistan, to restore peace and stability to that region.
Maybe, once again, this is another foreign policy initiative where
President Obama has decided that perhaps following some of the
direction outlined under the Bush administration may not be a bad idea.
I'm one of many Republican ranking members to come forward today to
express concern about the majority's bill and to urge support for the
Republican substitute. The Democratic bill places too many restrictions
on the ability of the President's advisors and the U.S. military to
conduct diplomacy and military operations in the region.
In a letter to the Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense
Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mullen raised their
concern about the majority's bill, noting that ``The degree of
conditionality and limitations on security assistance to Pakistan'' in
H.R. 1886 ``severely constrains the flexibility necessary for the
executive branch and the Department of Defense given the fluid and
dynamic environment that exists in Pakistan.''
But obviously, they're saying, our troops in Afghanistan and the
military in Pakistan and our support of the military efforts in
Pakistan require more flexibility than what this bill will allow.
From intelligence briefings, I understand how volatile the situation
is in Pakistan. Just on Tuesday, there was a hotel bombing, 18 people
killed. The Pakistan Army has been engaged in a battle in the Swat
Valley against Taliban militants. Any legislation on Pakistan must give
the administration both flexibility to react to the fast-paced
developments and the opportunity to develop a plan on how it will
implement its strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Instead of flexibility, this bill is full of restrictive and
intrusive provisions that I'm not sure we'd even apply to the United
States, where the Democrat majority is trying to dictate and
micromanage the President's administration's Pakistan policy. Their
bill even includes language to increase Pakistani teacher salaries. It
goes into the detail of the level of assistance for student meals.
Wow. That doesn't sound like we're giving the Paks a whole lot of
flexibility to even run their own country. This down-in-the-weeds
language may represent a new low for congressional micromanagement, not
to mention a distraction from the crucial issue of bringing peace and
stability to the region.
We need to defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan. That is our
goal. That is our mission. This Congress shouldn't be dictating to the
Pakistanis teacher salaries and the level of assistance that it needs
to provide students for meals in Pakistan.
Republicans have been unfairly criticized in the press as being the
party of ``no.'' Not only are the Republicans being the party of
``yes'' on this bill, we're also being more supportive of the Obama
administration's Pakistan policy than the Democrat majority.
We support President Obama's efforts in the region. We want them to
succeed. I believe the Republican amendment presents the best way
Congress can ensure and move toward success in Pakistan and, at the
same time, make sure that we stay united on foreign policy, because
this amendment, this substitute supports the President's Pakistan
strategy.
So let's stand with the President. Let's move forward. Let's make
sure that we're united, Republicans and Democrats, House, Senate and
the administration, in supporting this President's direction for
Pakistan.
I ask my colleagues to support the Republican substitute.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds.
The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) just spoke in behalf of
the Republican substitute, but he's a major cosponsor of the
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones. Unlike the bill in front of us, the
Republican substitute does not contain the ROZs, the reconstruction
zones. I'm wondering how the gentleman squares that with his position.
I now yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
Tierney), who has done remarkable work on the issue of how the $12
billion given to Pakistan over the past 7 years has been spent.
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, I sometimes wonder, listening to this
particular substitute, whether some people here, whether it's the
administration or whether it's our friends on the other side of the
aisle, have been sleepwalking through history. If you want to see a
repeat of the last 8 years then, fine, let's get rid of all the
accountability.
A billion and a half dollars now for the next 5 years is going to be
given to the Pakistanis on the civil side of things. In the past,
there's been tens of billions of dollars since their independence. We
have maybe a structure that's supposed to be a school or a structure
that's supposed to be a clinic standing somewhere but no teachers, no
nurses, no doctors, no systems that actually work because there's been
a total lack of accountability. This substitute amendment would
continue that lack of accountability.
On the security side of things, we have a situation where we have
$6.2 billion given in the coalition support funds which, essentially,
were a blank check to General Musharraf and the military over there.
What we got in return, when we finally started doing some oversight in
January of 2007 and afterwards, was a determination that some 40
percent of that had vaporized, cannot be accounted for. It was supposed
to be going for things that are counterinsurgency, weaponry that would
help fight a common problem of extremists in that country, and
disappeared somewhere else.
This particular bill that the substitute is trying to undermine would
put in place the accountability provisions. They are flexible enough.
They simply say that you have to fight those extremists that are mutual
problems. You have to make sure you stop people from going over the
border to create problems in Afghanistan. You have to cooperate on
nuclear nonproliferation, reasonable things.
The American people have a right to expect that their Representatives
are going to be accountable for the billions of dollars. We are
supposed to be having a partnership and a mature relationship with the
Pakistanis. Then let's get over that notion that we're going to offend
their sensibilities so that they won't actually cooperate with us if we
want to put some conditions to make sure that our mutual problems are
addressed with the billions of dollars of American citizens' money.
We've had 8-plus years of not having accountability on funds to that
country and others. We've had times since 2002 where we had totally no
accountability. Let's stop sleepwalking. Let's get the problem
resolved. Let's make sure we have accountability.
I say vote against the substitute; vote for the underlying bill.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to yield 1 additional
minute to the ranking member on the Intelligence Committee, Mr.
Hoekstra.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I thank my colleague for yielding, but I felt I needed
to respond as my name was brought up from my colleagues on the other
side of the aisle.
[[Page H6578]]
You know, the ROZs in this rule process, regardless of the underlying
bill, will be part of the final package that moves through. What
happens with the Democrat base bill here is they undercut many of the
things and put in a lot of restrictions that, as Congressman Van Hollen
and I tried to craft the bill together, we wanted to make sure that
there was enough freedom for these programs to be successful. And the
important thing here is you can vote for the substitute. The ROZs
become part of the program when the substitute passes on final passage,
after it replaces the underlying Democrat amendment.
So I thank you. I think I understand the rule, but to say that I was
not supportive of the ROZs because I was supporting the substitute I
don't believe is an accurate indication.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds.
The gentleman's point is, I know, inadvertently and unintentionally
incorrect.
The Republican substitute replaces the entire bill and, therefore,
were the Republican substitute to pass, the ROZs the gentleman has
fought for would not be part of the bill that was sent to the Senate.
{time} 1415
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to a member
of the committee, the delegate from American Samoa (Mr. Faleomavaega).
(Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the chairman for yielding me time to speak
on this important issue.
Mr. Speaker, I have tremendous respect for the gentlewoman from
Florida, my dear friend. But on her proposal for this substitute,
however, I must respectfully disagree with her on this issue.
I rise in opposition to the substitute version. While like the
underlying bill, the substitute provides $1.5 billion in nonmilitary
assistance to Pakistan for fiscal year 2010, regrettably the substitute
requires no oversight, no accountability, and no meaningful role for
Congress to play.
Like my colleagues, I'm appreciative that Pakistan has provided some
support for the U.S.-led anti-terror coalition, and I believe Pakistan
should be commended for assisting the U.S. in its efforts to hunt down
al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents and for allowing the U.S. military to
use bases within its country.
However, I do not believe we should provide billions in aid to
Pakistan without some sort of accountability. H.R. 1886 includes robust
monitoring, evaluations, and auditing provisions to ensure that
assistance is actually reaching the Pakistani people and that U.S.
taxpayer dollars are being spent wisely.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Weiner). The time of the gentleman has
expired.
Mr. BERMAN. I yield the gentleman an additional 10 seconds.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I urge my colleagues to oppose the substitute.
Unfortunately, the previous Administration spent the past 8 years
writing blank checks to Pakistan and turned a blind eye, while A.Q.
Khan transferred nuclear technology to rogue nations and while General
Musharraf failed to keep good on his promises to hold free, fair and
transparent elections.
By contrast, this Administration is committed to making Pakistan a
success while holding Pakistan accountable. H.R. 1886 as offered by
Chairman Berman is the way forward to making sure U.S. security
assistance is spent in a manner consistent with our national security
objectives.
I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the Republican substitute and
to vote ``yes'' for H.R. 1886, the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and
Cooperation Act of 2009.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield on the Republican
substitute 2 minutes to the chairman of the Subcommittee of the Middle
East and South Asia, the vice chairman of the committee, Mr. Ackerman.
(Mr. ACKERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, the Ros-Lehtinen substitute is not just a
step back in policy; it's a step back in time. It attempts to reinstate
the failed Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld model for managing the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Under this Congress, it gives the President a massive
blank check and then walks away from its responsibility as a co-equal
branch of government.
The Ros-Lehtinen substitute strips out all policy from the bill and
has no provisions to encourage Pakistan to change its behavior; it has
no provisions to ensure U.S. dollars are being effectively accounted
for; it has no provisions for keeping Congress involved in the process;
and it has no guidance whatsoever for the President about how taxpayer
dollars ought to be spent. This is not legislation; this is abdication.
Is Pakistan cooperating with the U.S. to dismantle nuclear supplier
networks? Apparently it doesn't matter in the Republican substitute. Is
Pakistan ending its support to extremist groups and closing terrorist
camps in the Fatah? Judging by the Republican substitute, who cares? Is
Pakistan working to prevent cross-border attacks on its neighbors and
strengthening its counterterrorism laws? If the Republican substitute
is any guide, in the words of Jackie Mason, ``This is not my
business.''
We have tried the minority approach. It is completely devoid of
policy. It encourages abuse. It doesn't work. But it does have one
advantage: it allows Members of Congress to avoid any responsibility
for the war in Afghanistan.
Mr. Speaker, it's too late to go back to ``strategery.''
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes on the
Republican substitute to the Chair of the Pakistan Caucus, the
gentlewoman from Texas, Sheila Jackson-Lee.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. I thank the distinguished chairman for
yielding.
We cannot wait, and I just suggest to my colleagues that they would
look quickly at these pictures where the Pakistan military is fighting
terrorism, and these are the activities that are happening in that
area. People are fleeing terrorism and the people that are in these
camps are suffering. We cannot wait for this legislation.
I oppose the Republican substitute because I want not an isolation of
Pakistan, I want a regional response, a comprehensive regional
strategy, including the role of countries outside the region in
supporting Pakistan's efforts to combat al Qaeda and the Taliban, a
global effort. The Republican substitute has a one-on-one effort. We
need a global effort.
Let me also suggest that there is important language in this
legislation because if we suggest that the Pentagon is not favorable,
the Pentagon has indicated that they are aware of the counterinsurgency
efforts that the Pakistan military is engaging in and they're satisfied
with the structure of this legislation that would help them continue to
fight terrorism. We can work out some of the kinks, but are we going to
wait while people are suffering?
This legislation also has a recognition that we are establishing a
new relationship with Pakistan and the United States, a friendship
relationship. We are acknowledging the recent efforts of the Pakistan
military in Swat, and we're also suggesting that if there are changes
in Pakistan, we will reconsider some of the requirements or some of the
structures that we put in place.
I would also say to my colleagues that I hope the Republicans who are
so interested in Pakistan would be interested in making sure the
International Monetary Fund is funded like the President would like it
to be and that they will join in that support because they're so
strongly in support of Pakistan, which got money from it in the last
year.
In addition, there are issues dealing with trade, but the AFL-CIO is
supporting it because of the way the structure is. We have an effective
balance of helping them establish a better economy but at the same time
respecting our trade requirements over here in the United States. This
is the way to address this issue. But I can't imagine that my
colleagues want to leave Pakistan and the people of Pakistan in these
dire conditions.
Pakistan Americans recognize we are establishing a new friendship,
and on that new friendship we need to oppose the Republican substitute
and support H.R. 1886.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to yield myself 1 minute.
[[Page H6579]]
We fully agree with the chairman that much of the prior investment in
Pakistan has failed to yield all of the results that we hoped for and
that it is appropriate to require the administration to develop
scientific, specific, meaningful performance-based measures.
Where we differ, Mr. Speaker, is that we do not mandate that the
executive branch follow a specific new congressionally mandated
methodology, which may not even be technically correct, even before the
new administration has had time to operationalize their new South Asia
strategy.
Our substitute, therefore, requires that as part of the comprehensive
interagency strategy and implementation plan mandated by the
legislation that the administration put forth a robust and detailed
financial plan, a description of the resources, of the programming, of
the management of the United States foreign assistance to Pakistan,
including the criteria used to determine this prioritization. We
believe that this is the correct approach.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I
reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take up the balance of
my time.
Mr. Speaker, our Republican substitute will allow for the development
of specific, credible measures of effectiveness that are tightly linked
to the President's strategy for the region and are therefore preferable
to those that stem from the legislation. And I would like to just
briefly address, and I don't have much time, some of the issues raised
in favor of the underlying bill and against my substitute.
First, some of the speakers are seeking to fuel distrust between
Pakistan and India, and they use the Congress' strong support for the
world's largest democracy, India, to create the impression that U.S.
assistance has been and would be used against India. That is
counterproductive. It is not correct. It is dangerous and disingenuous.
I urge my colleagues to adopt the Republican substitute and reject
the underlying bill.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I will include in the Record a letter from
the Premier Pakistani American organization, the Pakistani American
Leadership Center, endorsing H.R. 1886.
Pakistani American Leadership
Center,
Washington, DC, June 6, 2009.
Hon. Howard Berman,
Chair, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Berman: On behalf of the Pakistani American
Leadership Center (PAL-C) and other team members listed
below, I am writing to express our strong support for H.R.
1886, the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation
Enhancement Act of 2009. PAL-C was established in 2004 to
mobilize the Pakistani-American community to be more
conversant with the U.S political process and to promote
greater understanding of Pakistan by building lasting ties
with the U.S.
H.R. 1886 reflects our deep commitment to developing a
strong U.S.-Pakistan relationship and will be instrumental in
strengthening Pakistan's democratic government, promoting
economic and social development for Pakistan's citizens, and
creating the foundation for a stronger, more stable Pakistan.
We are particularly pleased that H.R. 1886 accentuates
investments in Pakistan's healthcare, education, and
infrastructure and includes a requirement that all U.S.
security assistance be provided through the elected civilian
government. PAL-C also applauds the requirements for enhanced
monitoring, evaluation and auditing of U.S. economic
assistance. These aspects of the bill will assure the most
impactful application of the funds, create the greatest long
term leverage from the assistance package, and establish the
needed transparency in distribution of money.
We thank you for your hard work and visionary leadership on
this critical legislation and hope that its passage will
initiate the beginning of a new, more positive and enduring
era in U.S.-Pakistan relations. We also stand ready to
continue doing our part as proud Pakistani Americans in
offering U.S. congress special insights into Pakistan, based
on our deep rooted perspective.
Sincerely,
Pervaiz Lodhie.
Pervaiz Lodhie, Founder/President, LEDtronics; Salim Adaya,
Chairperson. IDS Real Estate Group; Muhammad Adaya, IDS Real
Estate Group; Najeeb Ghauri, Chairman/CEO, Netsol; Dr. Satter
Abbasi, Prof. Clinical Medicine, UCLA; Jamal Khawaja,
Director, JFK Import & Export; Dr. Salman Nagvi, COS, Kindred
Hospital OC; Adnan Khan, President, CIDP Inc.; Fiza Shah,
Founder/CEO, DIL; Ghazala Khan, Principal, GK & Associates;
Shezad Rokerya, Chairman, The Interlink Group; Taha Gaya,
Exec. Dir., PAL-C; Jim Moody, Chairman AFHD/NCHD; Salman
Ahmed, UN Goodwill Ambassador, Artist.
Mr. Speaker, I rise to strongly oppose the Republican substitute. I'm
pleased to see that the substitute does support the President's request
for $1.5 billion a year in nonmilitary assistance for Pakistan, the
same amount as the underlying bill. But that's where the similarity
ends.
With all due respect to my colleagues on the other side of the aisle,
this substitute amounts to nothing more than a blank check. It requires
no real oversight, no serious accountability, no congressional role
beyond getting briefings on what we could ask for without any new law.
Since 9/11, I repeat again, we have poured more than $12 billion into
Pakistan, with very little to show for it. This substitute is simply a
continuation of the same failed policy.
H.R. 1886, on the other hand, expresses our sense of priorities for
democratic, economic, and social development assistance without tying
the President's hands. Unlike the substitute, our bill provides robust
monitoring and evaluation to ensure that the assistance is reaching the
Pakistani people. Why would you support another $1.5 billion in
economic assistance unless you knew it wasn't just going for ghost
schools and to disappear into unspecified budget support? You need the
monitoring and evaluation kinds of provisions that we haven't had in
the past and that our bill provides and the Republican substitute
doesn't.
The Republican substitute treats Pakistan in virtual isolation with a
brief mention of the Afghan-Pakistan cooperation. H.R. 1886 requires a
comprehensive regional strategy, including the role of countries
outside the region in supporting Pakistan's efforts to combat al Qaeda
and the Taliban. A global effort is required to make Pakistan a
success, and the substitute's failure to recognize this salient fact is
another serious flaw.
Read the bill. Please read the bill. Our accountability provisions
are not rigid. They're not inflexible. We state very clearly simply
that we expect Pakistan to make progress in their fight against the
extremists and to sustain their commitment. If the President can't tell
us that Pakistan is meeting with that very minimal standard, we should
be asking ourselves much deeper questions about what we're really
trying to achieve here. The onus is on our minority colleagues to
explain why, given Pakistan's recent history, we should provide more
weapons without making sure the equipment is being used properly.
In this context I find it curious that the substitute is totally
inconsistent with the arguments that my friends made just yesterday
during debate on the State Department authorization bill. Then all the
repeated arguments were more accountability, we need stricter
accountability for critical foreign policy priorities. Here we have the
most critical foreign policy priority and in the Republican substitute
the absence of any provisions regarding accountability, evaluation,
auditing, or monitoring.
This substitute begs the question, why does the minority support
total flexibility for President Obama in Pakistan but everywhere else
in the foreign policy or domestic sphere, they try to constrain him?
This is at the top of our list of national security challenges. Our
approach is the better approach.
I urge defeat of the substitute.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
{time} 1430
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 522, the
previous question is ordered on the bill, as amended, and on the
amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen).
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen).
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
[[Page H6580]]
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 173,
nays 246, not voting 14, as follows:
[Roll No. 331]
YEAS--173
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Austria
Bachmann
Bachus
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Blackburn
Boehner
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Broun (GA)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Cantor
Cao
Capito
Carter
Cassidy
Castle
Chaffetz
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cole
Conaway
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Deal (GA)
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Emerson
Fallin
Flake
Fleming
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Guthrie
Hall (TX)
Harper
Hastings (WA)
Hensarling
Herger
Hoekstra
Hunter
Inglis
Issa
Jenkins
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Jordan (OH)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline (MN)
Lamborn
Lance
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
Lee (NY)
Lewis (CA)
Linder
LoBiondo
Luetkemeyer
Lummis
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Marshall
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul
McClintock
McCotter
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris Rodgers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Olson
Paul
Paulsen
Pence
Petri
Pitts
Platts
Poe (TX)
Posey
Price (GA)
Putnam
Radanovich
Rehberg
Reichert
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Scalise
Schmidt
Schock
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Terry
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walden
Wamp
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NAYS--246
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Adler (NJ)
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boccieri
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Braley (IA)
Bright
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Castor (FL)
Chandler
Childers
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Connolly (VA)
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Dahlkemper
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis (TN)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly (IN)
Doyle
Driehaus
Edwards (MD)
Edwards (TX)
Ellison
Ellsworth
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Foster
Frank (MA)
Fudge
Giffords
Gonzalez
Gordon (TN)
Grayson
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffith
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Halvorson
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Heinrich
Heller
Herseth Sandlin
Higgins
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kildee
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kilroy
Kind
Kirkpatrick (AZ)
Kissell
Klein (FL)
Kosmas
Kratovil
Kucinich
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee (CA)
Levin
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lujan
Lynch
Maffei
Maloney
Markey (CO)
Markey (MA)
Massa
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McMahon
McNerney
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Minnick
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy (NY)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler (NY)
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Nye
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Payne
Perlmutter
Perriello
Peters
Peterson
Pingree (ME)
Polis (CO)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Quigley
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Rohrabacher
Ross
Rothman (NJ)
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schauer
Schiff
Schrader
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Space
Speier
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Teague
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Titus
Tonko
Towns
Tsongas
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--14
Baca
Bishop (UT)
Blunt
Brown, Corrine
Delahunt
Himes
Kagen
Kennedy
Lewis (GA)
Lucas
Oberstar
Richardson
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sullivan
{time} 1453
Messrs. TEAGUE, SCHRADER, MOORE of Kansas, RUSH, SESTAK and Ms. SHEA-
PORTER changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Mr. HALL of Texas changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
Motion to Recommit
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at
the desk.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Yes, I am.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Rogers of Michigan moves to recommit the bill H.R. 1886
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs with instructions to
report the same back to the House forthwith with the
following amendment:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
TITLE I--COMPREHENSIVE INTERAGENCY STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR
LONG-TERM SECURITY AND STABILITY IN PAKISTAN
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``United States-Pakistan
Security and Stability Act''.
SEC. 102. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Congress supports the following elements outlined in
the President's White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's
Report on United States Policy Toward Afghanistan and
Pakistan:
(A) The core goal of the United States must be to disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliated networks
and their safe havens in Pakistan.
(B) The threat that al Qaeda poses to the United States and
its allies in Pakistan--including the possibility of
extremists obtaining fissile material--is all too real.
(C) The United States must overcome its trust deficit with
Pakistan and demonstrate that it is a reliable, long-term
partner.
(2) The Government of Pakistan is facing significant
security and socio-economic challenges that set the
conditions for greater radicalization and may threaten
Pakistan's viability. Such challenges include the following:
(A) Al Qaeda's and other extremist groups' campaign of
violent attacks throughout Pakistan, including the Red Mosque
incident, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, and the
bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad.
(B) Pakistan's population growth at a rate of approximately
2 percent a year, with nearly half of its 172 million
residents illiterate, under the age of 20, and living near or
below the poverty line.
(3) Security and stability to Pakistan is further
complicated given the prevalence of ungoverned spaces between
Pakistan and Afghanistan in which state control has not been
fully exercised given ethnic and tribal affiliations.
(4) The security and stability of Pakistan is vital to the
national security of the United States, and the consequences
of failure poses a grave threat to the security of the
American people, the region, and United States allies.
(5) The objectives of United States policy toward Pakistan
are to empower and enable Pakistan to--
(A) develop into a prosperous and democratic state that is
at peace with itself and with its neighbors;
(B) actively confront, and deny safe haven to, al Qaeda,
the Taliban, and other extremists;
(C) implement the economic, legal, and social reforms
required to create an environment that discourages violent
Islamic extremism; and
(D) maintain robust command and control over its nuclear
weapons technology.
SEC. 103. COMPREHENSIVE INTERAGENCY STRATEGY AND
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR PAKISTAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009,
the President shall develop and transmit to the appropriate
congressional committees a comprehensive interagency strategy
and implementation plan for long-term security and stability
in Pakistan which shall be composed of the elements specified
in subsection (b).
[[Page H6581]]
(b) Elements.--The comprehensive interagency strategy and
implementation plan required by subsection (a) shall contain
at least the following elements:
(1) A description of how United States assistance described
in section 104 will be used to achieve the objectives of
United States policy toward Pakistan.
(2) Progress toward the following:
(A) Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and a
stable constitutional government in Pakistan and promote
bilateral and regional trade and economic growth.
(B) Developing and operationally enabling Pakistani
security forces so they are capable of succeeding in
sustained counter-insurgency and counter-terror operations.
(C) Shutting down Pakistani safe havens for extremists.
(D) Improving Pakistan's capacity and capability to
``hold'' and ``build'' areas cleared of insurgents to prevent
their return.
(E) Developing and strengthening mechanisms for Pakistan-
Afghanistan cooperation.
(3) A financial plan and description of the resources,
programming, and management of United States foreign
assistance to Pakistan, including the criteria used to
determine their prioritization.
(4) A complete description of both the evaluation process
for reviewing and adjusting the strategy and implementation
as necessary, and measures of effectiveness for the
implementation of the strategy.
(c) Intelligence Support.--The President, in developing the
comprehensive interagency strategy and implementation plan
required by subsection (a), shall consult with the Director
of National Intelligence.
(d) Updates of Strategy.--The President shall transmit in
writing to the appropriate congressional committees any
updates of the comprehensive interagency strategy and
implementation plan required by subsection (a), as necessary.
SEC. 104. AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN.
(a) Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.--There is authorized to
be appropriated to the President, for the purposes of
providing assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), $1,500,000,000 or such
sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2010
through 2013.
(b) Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund.--There is
authorized to be appropriated to the President, for the
purposes of building a more effective counterinsurgency
capability in Pakistan's security forces, up to $700,000,000
for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, for
fiscal year 2010.
(c) Use of Funds.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated
under this section or otherwise made available to carry out
this title shall be used to the maximum extent practicable as
direct expenditures for programs, projects, and activities,
subject to existing reporting and notification requirements.
SEC. 105. CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING AND NOTIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Briefing.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
transmission of the comprehensive interagency strategy and
implementation plan required by section 103, and quarterly
thereafter through December 1, 2013, the President, acting
through the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense,
shall brief the appropriate congressional committees on the
status of the comprehensive interagency strategy and
implementation plan.
(b) Notification.--The President shall notify the
appropriate congressional committees not later than 30 days
prior to obligating any assistance described in section 104
as budgetary support to the Government of Pakistan or to any
persons, agencies, instrumentalities, or elements of the
Government of Pakistan and shall describe the purpose and
conditions attached to any such budgetary support assistance.
The President shall notify the appropriate congressional
committees not later than 30 days prior to obligating any
other type of assistance described in section 104.
SEC. 106. DEFINITION.
In this title, the term ``appropriate congressional
committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
TITLE II--COMPREHENSIVE INTERAGENCY STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
FOR LONG-TERM SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN
SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``United States-Afghanistan
Security and Stability Act''.
SEC. 202. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Congress supports the following elements outlined in
the President's White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's
Report on United States Policy Toward Afghanistan and
Pakistan:
(A) The United States has a vital national security
interest in addressing the current and potential security
threats posed by extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
(B) The United States homeland, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
India, Europe, Australia, and United States allies in the
Middle East remain targets of al Qaeda and other extremist
groups.
(C) At the same time, the Taliban and related organizations
seek to reestablish their old sanctuaries in Afghanistan.
(2) Afghanistan is a central front in the global struggle
against al Qaeda and other affiliated networks. A stable
Afghanistan that is free from al Qaeda, the Taliban, and
extremist influence and ideology will require a patient,
long-term, integrated political, military, and economic
strategy that is adequately resourced to accomplish its
objectives.
(3) Allowing Afghanistan to revert to its pre-September 11,
2001, status of control by al Qaeda and the Taliban is not an
option for United States policy.
(4) Security and stability in Afghanistan is further
complicated given the prevalence of ungoverned space between
Afghanistan and Pakistan in which state control has not been
fully exercised given ethnic and tribal affiliations.
(5) The United States will continue to demonstrate its
long-term commitment to the people of Afghanistan by--
(A) sustained civilian assistance and providing United
States commanders with the troops and resources needed to
conduct counterinsurgency operations with the support of the
Government and people of Afghanistan; and
(B) continuing to engage the Afghan people in ways that
demonstrate United States commitment to promoting a
legitimate and capable Afghan government.
(6) The objectives of United States policy toward
Afghanistan are to empower and enable Afghanistan to--
(A) develop into secure and stable state with a government
that exercises full control and authority over all the
country; and
(B) develop increasingly reliable and capable Afghan
security forces that can actively confront, and deny safe
haven to al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremists and
eventually lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
fight with reduced United States assistance.
SEC. 203. COMPREHENSIVE INTERAGENCY STRATEGY AND
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009,
the President shall develop and transmit to the appropriate
congressional committees a comprehensive interagency strategy
and implementation plan for long-term security and stability
in Afghanistan which shall be composed of the elements
specified in subsection (b).
(b) Elements.--The comprehensive interagency strategy and
implementation plan required by subsection (a) shall contain
at least the following elements:
(1) A description of how United States assistance described
in section 204 will be used to achieve the objectives of
United States policy toward Afghanistan.
(2) Progress toward the following:
(A) Executing and resourcing an integrated civilian-
military counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
(B) Disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and
Pakistan to degrade any ability such networks have to plan
and launch international terrorist attacks.
(C) Resourcing and prioritizing civilian assistance in
Afghanistan.
(D) Promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective
government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people.
(E) Expanding the Afghan National Security Forces and
developing self-reliant security forces that can lead the
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced
United States assistance.
(F) Supporting Afghanistan in disrupting and dismantling
narco-traffickers and breaking the narcotics-insurgency
nexus.
(G) Ensuring that nations and various international
organizations that have pledged to provide multilateral and
bilateral assistance to support efforts to rebuild
Afghanistan fulfill their commitment.
(H) Developing and strengthening mechanisms for
Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation.
(3) A financial plan and description of the resources,
programming, and management of United States foreign
assistance to Afghanistan, including the criteria used to
determine their prioritization.
(4) A complete description of both the evaluation process
for reviewing and adjusting the strategy and implementation
as necessary, and measures of effectiveness for the
implementation of the strategy.
(c) Intelligence Support.--The President, in developing the
comprehensive interagency strategy and implementation plan
required by subsection (a), shall consult with the Director
of National Intelligence.
(d) Updates of Strategy.--The President shall transmit in
writing to the appropriate congressional committees any
updates of the comprehensive interagency strategy and
implementation plan required by subsection (a), as necessary.
SEC. 204. AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR AFGHANISTAN.
(a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated to
the President, for the purposes of providing assistance to
Afghanistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), $2,800,000,000 or such sums as may be
necessary for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2013.
(b) Use of Funds.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated
under this section or otherwise made available to carry out
this title
[[Page H6582]]
shall be used to the maximum extent practicable as direct
expenditures for programs, projects, and activities, subject
to existing reporting and notification requirements.
SEC. 205. CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING AND NOTIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Briefing.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
transmission of the comprehensive interagency strategy and
implementation plan required by section 203, and quarterly
thereafter through December 1, 2013, the President, acting
through the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense,
shall brief the appropriate congressional committees on the
status of the comprehensive interagency strategy and
implementation plan.
(b) Notification.--The President shall notify the
appropriate congressional committees not later than 30 days
before obligating any assistance described in section 204 as
budgetary support to the Government of Afghanistan or to any
persons, agencies, instrumentalities, or elements of the
Government of Afghanistan and shall describe the purpose and
conditions attached to any such budgetary support assistance.
The President shall notify the appropriate congressional
committees not later than 30 days before obligating any other
type of assistance described in section 204.
SEC. 206. DEFINITION.
In this title, the term ``appropriate congressional
committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
Mr. BERMAN (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent
that the reading be dispensed with.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his
motion.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I commend my friend, Mr. Berman,
for his efforts on this bill, as I do Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen on her
efforts on what I think is the most pressing national security issue we
face today, Pakistan. And when you look at the troubles that they face
and what a unique country it is, they are a nuclear-armed sovereign
nation that has expressed concern about its eastern neighbors, the
Indians, and all of the effort, both diplomatic, economic, militarily,
intelligence, that they apply to what they view as a problem sect.
And to the west of that country, even in their Constitution, they
treat differently. They give it special autonomy: the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas. And that's the area that has caused
Afghanistan and the United States untold misery, danger, something we
ought to worry about.
And this bill in the most arrogant way says, You know what? We know
better than you, Pakistan. We're going to make you set up a teachers'
pay scale if you want our Federal money, if you want U.S. money to help
us in the fight against terrorism that is ongoing today by people like
Batula Masood, who are trying to kill Americans today and make further
unstable the Pakistani Government, or Fazlullah, who has moved into the
Swat area, the first time somebody from the tribal areas has taken this
effort.
{time} 1508
Fazlullah, for the first time, took some settled areas. It used to be
a great area--as a matter of fact, a tourist area in Pakistan, the Swat
Valley--and the military has had difficulty in trying to extract them
from what is a settled area in Pakistan. That is real trouble.
Many of you have quoted ``The 60 Miles from Islamabad.'' That was the
Swat Valley movement, and it was done by Fazlullah, 30-something years
old, rabid Taliban leader, who was able to, in just a very short period
of time, take over most of the police stations.
You have al Qaeda senior leadership moving freely with the Haqqani
network supporting their abilities in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
Batula Masood, as I said before, has been engaged in terrorist acts not
only against us, but the Pakistanis.
Their government is at risk, their people are dying. This bill
arrogantly says, listen, we want you to help us in terrorism, but let
me tell you what's important, your teacher pay scales. Those are
important.
This is a sovereign nation. As a matter of fact, Senator Kerry--we
don't often agree with Senator Kerry--an interesting quote: ``Well''--I
won't use all of his language--``we're just doing their bidding. We're
their lackeys. We're not in control. You guys (the Pakistani
Government) are an American puppet, blah, blah, blah.'' What he was
saying is, don't put all these arbitrary caveats on this bill.
Let's support President Obama. He hasn't been there that long. He
wants to implement his policy. He says he needs flexibility. I agree
with him. This is one of the most complicated, complex problems we will
face when it comes to national security.
You even, in this bill--and I don't think you're thinking about what
the implications are--through your labor agreements in this bill,
inspectors are to publish reports listing the names and locations of
every firm in the program. This is a nation beleaguered by terrorists.
Why would you give them a list of targets in Pakistan published by the
United States Government? It makes no sense whatsoever.
You often talked about the arrogance of the previous administration
telling people how they ought to live and telling them how they ought
to govern. This is the most intrusive, most arrogant approach to
providing someone assistance that is actually helping us fight
terrorism in the most difficult area I can find in the world today.
I am going to ask you to please take a look at this motion to
recommit. It puts a little common sense back in it and says, you know
what, we'll get to the teacher pay scale and merit-based system that
you would like to get to maybe another day, but today we are worried
about the safety and security of our soldiers in Afghanistan who are
under attack from Taliban leaders, headquartered the Shura Council in
Quetta, Pakistan. We are worried about the Haqqani network, who is
developing the logistical support that they need through arms and other
things to help target our soldiers in Afghanistan. We are worried about
Fazlullah's efforts in his first settled areas of Pakistan. That ought
to be our watch today.
We are getting ready to send thousands and thousands of fresh United
States troops to this region. Our focus has to be national security; it
has to be their security. It has to say, Pakistan, we are a partner,
not your mother. We are not going to hold your hand in this. We are
going to be your equal partner in your fight on terror. Thank you for
your commitment.
We're going to stand up for those folks.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. BERMAN. I made a mistake earlier. I objected to the reading of
the motion to recommit. I should have asked for a reading of the bill.
As much as I admire the gentleman, the one thing that is clear to me
from his comments is he didn't read the bill.
We have absolutely no conditions or restrictions or efforts to
earmark or tie up any of the economic assistance in this bill. Why you
would say that is only because someone told you that. Because when you
look at the bill, we have some principles, we have suggestions, we lay
out things that need to be done to build democratic institutions in
Pakistan, to build a school system.
We know that we are providing up to $12 billion, much of it in
economic assistance for schools that have no teachers. We're providing
money for teachers who have no education and don't know how to teach
science and math. So we suggest in this bill some guidelines and tie no
one's hands. We don't tie the Secretary's hands; we don't tie the
Pakistanis' hands.
Now, the state of play is that when we put together our Pakistan
bill, we went to the minority and said, let's work on a Pakistan/
Afghanistan bill. They weren't interested. The problem with the
minority's way to do a motion to recommit is the leadership meets in
some office--they don't bring in the Republicans from the committee--
and they come up with a motion to recommit, let's join Afghanistan with
Pakistan. We've been trying to do that for 4 months in our committee,
but the minority didn't want to do it that way.
[[Page H6583]]
And by the way, we just had a little vote. We had a vote on a
Republican substitute that, on security assistance, had no monitoring
provisions, no auditing provisions, no evaluation provisions. This is
in the context of $12 billion that's been spent, a huge amount on
reimbursements for which there are no receipts for money, that we
cannot find what it went for. If you like what's been going on there,
you're praising the right of Pakistan to do what it wants to do.
When Musharraf kept making appeasement agreements with different
elements of the Taliban, was that a wise thing to be encouraging? I
don't think so. The only thing we provide any benchmarks on is the
security assistance. And what we say there is, Mr. President, look at
how that money is being spent and make a determination whether or not
Pakistan has a commitment--that they are now, by the way,
demonstrating--to combating the insurgency and fighting the terrorists,
and whether they're making progress. And are they cooperating in the
efforts to dismantle the proliferation regime, and are they doing
things to secure it? And, Mr. President, you make the determination and
you make the decision.
We have worked with the leadership of the Armed Services Committee to
make sure that the security assistance gets to the Pakistani military
as quickly as possible, but not equipment that has nothing to do with
the counterinsurgency. We want the equipment, the helicopters, the
night-vision goggles, the training, the IMET programs to go as fast as
they can. So in our bill, not in yours, but in our bill we waive all
the traditions that now exist on traditional security assistance
programs.
So this is a motion to recommit that includes an Afghan bill that
says, continue as usual, where the lack of end-use monitoring has meant
that we have been arming the Taliban because they steal the guns we
provide and use them against our forces and the Afghan forces, and
repeat in toto the Republican substitute we just rejected.
Let's vote against it. We did it once; let's do it again. Let's try
to reestablish some sense of bipartisan collaboration. These
differences aren't that great. We can work them out if the majority and
the minority cooperate. I say, as the chairman of the committee with
jurisdiction over these issues, I would love to put together a
bipartisan approach. Maybe we can start working on that for the
conference committee.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is
ordered.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair
will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for electronic vote on the
question of passage.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 164,
noes 245, not voting 24, as follows:
[Roll No. 332]
AYES--164
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Austria
Bachmann
Bachus
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Boehner
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Broun (GA)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Cantor
Cao
Capito
Carter
Castle
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cole
Conaway
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Deal (GA)
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dreier
Ehlers
Emerson
Fallin
Flake
Fleming
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Granger
Graves
Griffith
Guthrie
Hall (TX)
Harper
Hastings (WA)
Hensarling
Herger
Hoekstra
Hunter
Inglis
Issa
Jenkins
Johnson, Sam
Jordan (OH)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline (MN)
Lamborn
Lance
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
Lee (NY)
Lewis (CA)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lummis
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul
McClintock
McCotter
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris Rodgers
Melancon
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Olson
Paulsen
Pence
Petri
Pitts
Platts
Poe (TX)
Posey
Price (GA)
Putnam
Radanovich
Rehberg
Reichert
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Scalise
Schock
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Terry
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walden
Wamp
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOES--245
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Adler (NJ)
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bean
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boccieri
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Braley (IA)
Bright
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Castor (FL)
Chaffetz
Chandler
Childers
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Connolly (VA)
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Dahlkemper
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis (TN)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly (IN)
Doyle
Driehaus
Duncan
Edwards (MD)
Edwards (TX)
Ellison
Ellsworth
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Foster
Frank (MA)
Fudge
Giffords
Gonzalez
Gordon (TN)
Grayson
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Halvorson
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Heinrich
Heller
Herseth Sandlin
Higgins
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kildee
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kilroy
Kind
Kirkpatrick (AZ)
Kissell
Klein (FL)
Kosmas
Kratovil
Kucinich
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee (CA)
Levin
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lujan
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Maffei
Maloney
Markey (CO)
Markey (MA)
Marshall
Massa
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McMahon
McNerney
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy (NY)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler (NY)
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Nye
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Paul
Payne
Perlmutter
Perriello
Peters
Pingree (ME)
Polis (CO)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Quigley
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Rohrabacher
Ross
Rothman (NJ)
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schauer
Schiff
Schrader
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Space
Speier
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Teague
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Titus
Towns
Tsongas
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--24
Baca
Becerra
Blunt
Brown, Corrine
Cassidy
Delahunt
Goodlatte
Himes
Kagen
Kennedy
King (IA)
Lewis (GA)
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
McIntyre
Minnick
Peterson
Richardson
Sanchez, Linda T.
Schmidt
Slaughter
Sullivan
Tonko
Visclosky
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised they
now have less than 2 minutes remaining.
{time} 1523
Mr. WESTMORELAND changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 332 I was unavoidably
detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''
Mr. KING of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 332 I was detained in
the Committee on Agriculture during a question and answer exchange with
Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack and was not able to reach the floor
before the
[[Page H6584]]
vote was closed. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''
Mr. CASSIDY. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 332 I was unavoidably
detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''
Mr. TONKO. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 332 I was unable to vote due
to the fact that I was meeting with constituents. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``no.''
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 332 I was unable to vote
due to the fact that I was meeting with constituents. Had I been
present, I would have voted ``no.''
Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Speaker, I was unavoidably detained earlier today
and missed rollcall vote 332. If present, I would have voted ``no.''
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Upton was allowed to speak out of order.)
Announcing the Death of Former Member Carl Pursell of Michigan
Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, as dean of the Michigan Republican
delegation, I have the sad duty to relay the news that our former
colleague Carl Pursell from Michigan passed away this morning. He was
the ranking member on the Labor-HHS appropriations subcommittee for
many years. He retired in 1993.
I would yield to Mr. McCotter who represents Plymouth, Michigan.
Mr. McCOTTER. I thank the gentleman.
I grew up in Carl's district. We watched as he went from a Wayne
County commissioner to a Michigan State Senator and then into this
illustrious body. As a young person growing up getting interested in
politics, Carl's example was an inspiration. It showed that a fine and
decent gentleman could come from the small town of Plymouth, retain his
Main Street truths, and do the people's business in this, the people's
House.
The last several years have not been kind to Carl. He is in a far
better place, and we are all diminished. Our best goes out to his
family, and we would appreciate it if you keep him in your prayers.
Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, I would ask for a moment of silence.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Members will rise for a moment of silence.
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, 5-minute voting will
continue.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 234,
noes 185, not voting 14, as follows:
[Roll No. 333]
AYES--234
Ackerman
Adler (NJ)
Altmire
Andrews
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boccieri
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Braley (IA)
Butterfield
Cao
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Castor (FL)
Chandler
Childers
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Connolly (VA)
Cooper
Costa
Courtney
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Dahlkemper
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis (TN)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Donnelly (IN)
Doyle
Driehaus
Edwards (MD)
Edwards (TX)
Ehlers
Ellison
Ellsworth
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Foster
Frank (MA)
Fudge
Giffords
Gonzalez
Gordon (TN)
Grayson
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffith
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Halvorson
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Heinrich
Herseth Sandlin
Higgins
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Kanjorski
Kildee
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kilroy
Kind
Kirk
Kirkpatrick (AZ)
Klein (FL)
Kosmas
Kratovil
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee (CA)
Levin
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lujan
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Maffei
Maloney
Markey (CO)
Markey (MA)
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McGovern
McHugh
McIntyre
McMahon
McNerney
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (NY)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler (NY)
Neal (MA)
Nye
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Payne
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Pingree (ME)
Polis (CO)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Quigley
Rahall
Rangel
Reichert
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman (NJ)
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schauer
Schiff
Schrader
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Space
Speier
Spratt
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Teague
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Titus
Tonko
Towns
Tsongas
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Yarmuth
NOES--185
Abercrombie
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Arcuri
Austria
Bachmann
Bachus
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Boehner
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Bright
Broun (GA)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Cassidy
Castle
Chaffetz
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cole
Conaway
Conyers
Costello
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Deal (GA)
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doggett
Dreier
Duncan
Emerson
Fallin
Flake
Fleming
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Guthrie
Hall (TX)
Harper
Hastings (WA)
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hoekstra
Hunter
Inglis
Issa
Jenkins
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Jordan (OH)
Kaptur
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kissell
Kline (MN)
Kucinich
Lamborn
Lance
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
Lee (NY)
Lewis (CA)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lummis
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Massa
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul
McClintock
McCotter
McDermott
McHenry
McKeon
McMorris Rodgers
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Minnick
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Olson
Paul
Paulsen
Pence
Perriello
Petri
Pitts
Platts
Poe (TX)
Posey
Price (GA)
Putnam
Radanovich
Rehberg
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ryan (WI)
Scalise
Schmidt
Schock
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stark
Stearns
Terry
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Walden
Wamp
Waters
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--14
Baca
Blunt
Brown, Corrine
Delahunt
Himes
Johnson (IL)
Kagen
Kennedy
Lewis (GA)
Murphy (CT)
Napolitano
Richardson
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sullivan
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). There are less than 2
minutes remaining on this vote.
{time} 1534
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
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