S.Amdt. 197

1. Adds SEC. 6. REQUIREMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AS CONDITION OF ENTERING INTO CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES PURSUANT TO SECTION 123 OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 at the end of the resolution

   Adds a section

   In S.J.Res. 7 · Introduced in Senate

   Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this joint resolution, the President shall submit to Congress a report assessing the increased risk of terrorist attacks on United States Armed Forces abroad, allies, and to the continental United States if the Government of Saudi Arabia were to cease Yemen-related intelligence sharing with the United States.

   Inserted: SEC. 6. REQUIREMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AS CONDITION OF ENTERING INTO CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES PURSUANT TO SECTION 123 OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954.

   Inserted: (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:

   Inserted: (1) In 1971, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) established the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), which non-nuclear weapons states party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington July 1, 1968 (commonly known as the "NPT"), are obligated to bring into force to verify compliance with their nonproliferation obligations under the treaty.

   Inserted: (2) In 1997, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) established the model Additional Protocol to CSAs, which grants the IAEA expanded rights of access to information and sites related to a state's peaceful nuclear program.

   Inserted: (3) The IAEA and international nonproliferation community established the Additional Protocol as a response to major shocks to the nonproliferation regime, most notably revelations that the IAEA's existing safeguards system had failed to detect the Government of Iraq's covert, undeclared nuclear program for non-peaceful purposes prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

   Inserted: (4) The Additional Protocol strengthens the IAEA's ability not only to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material but also to provide assurances as to the absence of undeclared nuclear material activities in a state by--

   Inserted: (A) applying IAEA safeguards to a state's entire nuclear program, including uranium mining and milling sites, fuel fabrication, enrichment, and nuclear waste sites, as well as to any other location where nuclear is or may be present;

   Inserted: (B) expanding the amount and type of information a state is obligated to report to the IAEA regarding its nuclear program and related activities;

   Inserted: (C) expanding the IAEA's inspection access at declared--and undeclared--locations to verify the absence of undeclared material or to resolve questions or inconsistencies in the information a state has provided about its nuclear activities; and

   Inserted: (D) specifying the IAEA's right to use additional safeguards methods and equipment, including environmental sampling at both declared and undeclared sites.

   Inserted: (5) Universalizing the Additional Protocol and establishing it as the international standard for IAEA safeguards has been a bipartisan objective of United States nonproliferation policy since the Additional Protocol's adoption.

   Inserted: (6) During the 2000 NPT Review Conference at the United Nations, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright endorsed the "IAEA's new strengthened safeguards to deter and detect cheating" and urged "all states to adopt them".

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   Inserted: (7) During the 2005 NPT Review Conference at the United Nations, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen G. Rademaker stated that President George W. Bush's nonproliferation policy included "universalizing adherence to the Additional Protocol and making it a condition of nuclear supply".

   Inserted: (8) During the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Secretary of State John Kerry emphasized that the "United States is working to bring the Additional Protocol into force globally and to make it the global standard for safeguards compliance".

   Inserted: (9) During the 2018 IAEA General Conference, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry delivered a letter on behalf of President Donald J. Trump, announcing that the United States "will continue promoting high standards of safety, security, safeguards, and nonproliferation, including an Additional Protocol as the international standard, and call on other nations to do the same".

   Inserted: (10) At the same conference, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Christopher Ashley Ford stressed that the Additional Protocol "should be universalized, and all supplier states should make adherence to the AP by recipient states a condition for nuclear supply".

   Inserted: (11) As of December 2018, 134 states have brought in force the Additional Protocol with the IAEA while another 16 states have signed the Additional Protocol but have yet to bring it into force.

   Inserted: (12) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has not brought into force an Additional Protocol. It currently has a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) with the IAEA, a safeguards agreement that suspends the application of many provisions of a CSA for countries with minimal nuclear material and activities on its territory or under its jurisdiction.

   Inserted: (13) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has expressed its intent to build an extensive civilian nuclear program, including two large-scale nuclear power reactors and multiple small modular reactors.

   Inserted: (14) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will no longer be eligible for a SQP and will be obligated to implement a CSA with the IAEA without exemptions if it either has nuclear material in quantities exceeding minimal limits or constructs nuclear facilities on its territory or under its jurisdiction, including a nuclear reactor.

   Inserted: (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--

   Inserted: (1) the Additional Protocol represents the international safeguards standard;

   Inserted: (2) Saudi Arabia should, at a minimum, bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA as a requirement under any nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States made pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153); and

   Inserted: (3) any future civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with other nations pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) should require that the proposed recipient has in force an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

   Inserted: (c) Requirements for Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreements With Other Nations.--Section 123a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(a)) is amended--

   Inserted: (1) in paragraph (8), by striking "; and" and inserting a semicolon;

   Inserted: (2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and inserting "; and"; and

   Inserted: (3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following new paragraph:

   Inserted: "(10) the cooperating party has in force an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.".

   Original wording

   At the end, add the following:

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As printed