S.Amdt. 1053

SA 1053. Mr. WARNER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by
him to the bill S. 2226, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2024 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

DIVISION _--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024

SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This division may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this
division is as follows:

DIVISION _--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.

TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Subtitle A--General Intelligence Community Matters

Sec. 301. Plan to recruit, train, and retain personnel with experience
in financial intelligence and emerging technologies.
Sec. 302. Policy and performance framework for mobility of intelligence
community workforce.
Sec. 303. In-State tuition rates for active duty members of the
intelligence community.
Sec. 304. Standards, criteria, and guidance for counterintelligence
vulnerability assessments and surveys.
Sec. 305. Improving administration of certain post-employment
restrictions for intelligence community.
Sec. 306. Mission of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center.
Sec. 307. Prohibition relating to transport of individuals detained at
United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 308. Department of Energy science and technology risk assessments.
Sec. 309. Congressional oversight of intelligence community risk
assessments.
Sec. 310. Inspector General review of dissemination by Federal Bureau
of Investigation Richmond, Virginia, field office of
certain document.
Sec. 311. Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 321. Change to penalties and increased availability of mental
health treatment for unlawful conduct on Central
Intelligence Agency installations.
Sec. 322. Modifications to procurement authorities of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 323. Establishment of Central Intelligence Agency standard
workplace sexual misconduct complaint investigation
procedure.

TITLE IV--MATTERS CONCERNING FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Subtitle A--People's Republic of China

Sec. 401. Intelligence community coordinator for accountability of
atrocities of the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 402. Interagency working group and report on the malign efforts of
the People's Republic of China in Africa.
Sec. 403. Amendment to requirement for annual assessment by
intelligence community working group for monitoring the
economic and technological capabilities of the People's
Republic of China.
Sec. 404. Assessments of reciprocity in the relationship between the
United States and the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 405. Annual briefing on intelligence community efforts to identify
and mitigate Chinese Communist Party and Russian foreign
malign influence operations against the United States.
Sec. 406. Assessment of threat posed to United States ports by cranes
manufactured by countries of concern.

Subtitle B--Other Foreign Countries

Sec. 411. Report on efforts to capture and detain United States
citizens as hostages.
Sec. 412. Sense of Congress on priority of fentanyl in National
Intelligence Priorities Framework.

[[Page S3629]]

TITLE V--MATTERS PERTAINING TO UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND EMERGING
TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION WITH UNITED STATES ADVERSARIES

Subtitle A--General Matters

Sec. 501. Assignment of detailees from intelligence community to
Department of Commerce.

Subtitle B--Next-generation Energy, Biotechnology, and Artificial
Intelligence

Sec. 511. Expanded annual assessment of economic and technological
capabilities of the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 512. Assessment of using civil nuclear energy for intelligence
community capabilities.
Sec. 513. Policies established by Director of National Intelligence for
artificial intelligence capabilities.

TITLE VI--WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS

Sec. 601. Submittal to Congress of complaints and information by
whistleblowers in the intelligence community.
Sec. 602. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity as
reprisal against whistleblower disclosure by employees
and contractors in intelligence community.
Sec. 603. Establishing process parity for adverse security clearance
and access determinations.
Sec. 604. Elimination of cap on compensatory damages for retaliatory
revocation of security clearances and access
determinations.
Sec. 605. Modification and repeal of reporting requirements.

TITLE VII--CLASSIFICATION REFORM

Subtitle A--Classification Reform Act of 2023

Sec. 701. Short title.
Sec. 702. Definitions.
Sec. 703. Classification and declassification of information.
Sec. 704. Transparency officers.

Subtitle B--Sensible Classification Act of 2023

Sec. 711. Short title.
Sec. 712. Definitions.
Sec. 713. Findings and sense of the Senate.
Sec. 714. Classification authority.
Sec. 715. Promoting efficient declassification review.
Sec. 716. Training to promote sensible classification.
Sec. 717. Improvements to Public Interest Declassification Board.
Sec. 718. Implementation of technology for classification and
declassification.
Sec. 719. Studies and recommendations on necessity of security
clearances.

TITLE VIII--SECURITY CLEARANCE AND TRUSTED WORKFORCE

Sec. 801. Review of shared information technology services for
personnel vetting.
Sec. 802. Timeliness standard for rendering determinations of trust for
personnel vetting.
Sec. 803. Annual report on personnel vetting trust determinations.
Sec. 804. Survey to assess strengths and weaknesses of Trusted
Workforce 2.0.
Sec. 805. Prohibition on denial of eligibility for access to classified
information solely because of past use of cannabis.

TITLE IX--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS

Sec. 901. Improved funding flexibility for payments made by the Central
Intelligence Agency for qualifying injuries to the brain.
Sec. 902. Clarification of requirements to seek certain benefits
relating to injuries to the brain.
Sec. 903. Intelligence community implementation of HAVANA Act of 2021
authorities.
Sec. 904. Report and briefing on Central Intelligence Agency handling
of anomalous health incidents.

TITLE X--ELECTION SECURITY

Sec. 1001. Strengthening Election Cybersecurity to Uphold Respect for
Elections through Independent Testing Act of 2023.

TITLE XI--OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 1101. Modification of reporting requirement for All-domain Anomaly
Resolution Office.
Sec. 1102. Funding limitations relating to unidentified anomalous
phenomena.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning
given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in such section.

TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2024 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the Federal Government.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to
be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the
intelligence activities of the Federal Government are those
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
prepared to accompany this division.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule,
within the executive branch of the Federal Government.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2024 the sum of $658,950,000.
(b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In
addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the
Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a),
there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account for fiscal year 2024 such
additional amounts as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

SEC. 104. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.

TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund
$514,000,000 for fiscal year 2024.

TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Subtitle A--General Intelligence Community Matters

SEC. 301. PLAN TO RECRUIT, TRAIN, AND RETAIN PERSONNEL WITH
EXPERIENCE IN FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES.

(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of human capital
of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives a plan for the
intelligence community to recruit, train, and retain
personnel who have skills and experience in financial
intelligence and emerging technologies in order to improve
analytic tradecraft.
(b) Elements.--The plan required by subsection (a) shall
include the following elements:
(1) An assessment, including measurable benchmarks of
progress, of current initiatives of the intelligence
community to recruit, train, and retain personnel who have
skills and experience in financial intelligence and emerging
technologies.
(2) An assessment of whether personnel in the intelligence
community who have such skills are currently well integrated
into the analytical cadre of the relevant elements of the
intelligence community that produce analyses with respect to
financial intelligence and emerging technologies.
(3) An identification of challenges to hiring or
compensation in the intelligence community that limit
progress toward rapidly increasing the number of personnel
with such skills, and an identification of hiring or other
reforms to resolve such challenges.
(4) A determination of whether the National Intelligence
University has the resources and expertise necessary to train
existing personnel in financial intelligence and emerging
technologies.
(5) A strategy, including measurable benchmarks of
progress, to, by January 1, 2025, increase by 10 percent the
analytical cadre of personnel with expertise and previous
employment in financial intelligence and emerging
technologies.

[[Page S3630]]

SEC. 302. POLICY AND PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK FOR MOBILITY OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE.

(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management as the Director of National Intelligence considers
appropriate, develop and implement a policy and performance
framework to ensure the timely and effective mobility of
employees and contractors of the Federal Government who are
transferring employment between elements of the intelligence
community.
(b) Elements.--The policy and performance framework
required by subsection (a) shall include processes with
respect to the following:
(1) Human resources.
(2) Medical reviews.
(3) Determinations of suitability or eligibility for access
to classified information in accordance with Executive Order
13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to reforming processes
related to suitability for Government employment, fitness for
contractor employees, and eligibility for access to
classified national security information).

SEC. 303. IN-STATE TUITION RATES FOR ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS OF
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) In General.--Section 135(d) of the Higher Education Act
of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1015d(d)), as amended by section
6206(a)(4) of the Foreign Service Families Act of 2021
(Public Law 117-81), is further amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or'' after the
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) a member of the intelligence community (as defined in
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3003)) (other than a member of the Armed Forces of the United
States) who is on active duty for a period of more than 30
days.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a)
shall take effect at each public institution of higher
education in a State that receives assistance under the
Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.) for the
first period of enrollment at such institution that begins
after July 1, 2026.

SEC. 304. STANDARDS, CRITERIA, AND GUIDANCE FOR
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS
AND SURVEYS.

Section 904(d)(7)(A) of the Counterintelligence Enhancement
Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3383(d)(7)(A)) is amended to read as
follows:
``(A) Counterintelligence vulnerability assessments and
surveys.--To develop standards, criteria, and guidance for
counterintelligence risk assessments and surveys of the
vulnerability of the United States to intelligence threats,
including with respect to critical infrastructure and
critical technologies, in order to identify the areas,
programs, and activities that require protection from such
threats.''.

SEC. 305. IMPROVING ADMINISTRATION OF CERTAIN POST-EMPLOYMENT
RESTRICTIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Section 304 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3073a) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)(1)--
(A) by striking ``A former'' and inserting the following:
``(A) In general.--A former''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) Prior disclosure to director of national
intelligence.--
``(i) In general.--In the case of a former employee who
occupies a covered post-service position in violation of
subsection (a), whether the former employee voluntarily
notified the Director of National Intelligence of the intent
of the former employee to occupy such covered post-service
position before occupying such post-service position may be
used in determining whether the violation was knowing and
willful for purposes of subparagraph (A).
``(ii) Procedures and guidance.--The Director of National
Intelligence may establish procedures and guidance relating
to the submittal of notice for purposes of clause (i).''; and
(2) in subsection (d)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the restrictions under
subsection (a) and'' before ``the report requirements'';
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``ceases to occupy'' and
inserting ``occupies''; and
(C) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``before the person
ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position'' and
inserting ``when the person occupies a covered intelligence
position''.

SEC. 306. MISSION OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND
SECURITY CENTER.

(a) In General.--Section 904 of the Counterintelligence
Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3383) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (d) through (i) as
subsections (e) through (j), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d) Mission.--The mission of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center shall include
organizing and leading strategic planning for
counterintelligence activities of the United States
Government by integrating instruments of national power as
needed to counter foreign intelligence activities.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Counterintelligence enhancement act of 2002.--Section
904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50
U.S.C. 3383) is amended--
(A) in subsection (e), as redesignated by subsection
(a)(1), by striking ``Subject to subsection (e)'' both places
it appears and inserting ``Subject to subsection (f)''; and
(B) in subsection (f), as so redesignated--
(i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (d)(1)'' and
inserting ``subsection (e)(1)''; and
(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (d)(2)''
and inserting ``subsection (e)(2)''.
(2) Counterintelligence and security enhancements act of
1994.--Section 811(d)(1)(B)(ii) of the Counterintelligence
and Security Enhancements Act of 1994 (50 U.S.C.
3381(d)(1)(B)(ii)) is amended by striking ``section 904(d)(2)
of that Act (50 U.S.C. 3383(d)(2))'' and inserting ``section
904(e)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 3383(e)(2))''.

SEC. 307. PROHIBITION RELATING TO TRANSPORT OF INDIVIDUALS
DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION,
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

(a) Definition of Individual Detained at Guantanamo.--In
this section, the term ``individual detained at Guantanamo''
has the meaning given that term in section 1034(f)(2) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016
(Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 971; 10 U.S.C. 801 note).
(b) Prohibition on Chartering Private or Commercial
Aircraft to Transport Individuals Detained at United States
Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.--No head of an element
of the intelligence community may charter any private or
commercial aircraft to transport an individual who is or was
an individual detained at Guantanamo.

SEC. 308. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RISK
ASSESSMENTS.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Country of risk.--
(A) In general.--The term ``country of risk'' means a
foreign country determined by the Secretary, in accordance
with subparagraph (B), to present a risk of theft of United
States intellectual property or a threat to the national
security of the United States if nationals of the country, or
entities owned or controlled by the country or nationals of
the country, participate in any research, development,
demonstration, or deployment activity authorized under this
Act or an amendment made by this Act.
(B) Determination.--In making a determination under
subparagraph (A), the Secretary, in coordination with the
Director of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, shall take into consideration--
(i) the most recent World Wide Threat Assessment of the
United States Intelligence Community, prepared by the
Director of National Intelligence; and
(ii) the most recent National Counterintelligence Strategy
of the United States.
(2) Covered support.--The term ``covered support'' means
any grant, contract, subcontract, award, loan, program,
support, or other activity authorized under this Act or an
amendment made by this Act.
(3) Entity of concern.--The term ``entity of concern''
means any entity, including a national, that is--
(A) identified under section 1237(b) of the Strom Thurmond
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (50
U.S.C. 1701 note; Public Law 105-261);
(B) identified under section 1260H of the William M. (Mac)
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021 (10 U.S.C. 113 note; Public Law 116-283);
(C) on the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry
and Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in
Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 15, Code of Federal
Regulations;
(D) included in the list required by section 9(b)(3) of the
Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145;
134 Stat. 656); or
(E) identified by the Secretary, in coordination with the
Director of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence and the applicable office that would
provide, or is providing, covered support, as posing an
unmanageable threat--
(i) to the national security of the United States; or
(ii) of theft or loss of United States intellectual
property.
(4) National.--The term ``national'' has the meaning given
the term in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
(5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Energy.
(b) Science and Technology Risk Assessment.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall develop and maintain
tools and processes to manage and mitigate research security
risks, such as a science and technology risk matrix, informed
by threats identified by the Director of the Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, to facilitate
determinations of the risk of loss of United States
intellectual property or threat to the national security of
the United States posed by activities carried out under any
covered support.
(2) Content and implementation.--In developing and using
the tools and processes developed under paragraph (1), the
Secretary shall--

[[Page S3631]]

(A) deploy risk-based approaches to evaluating, awarding,
and managing certain research, development, demonstration,
and deployment activities, including designations that will
indicate the relative risk of activities;
(B) assess, to the extent practicable, ongoing high-risk
activities;
(C) designate an officer or employee of the Department of
Energy to be responsible for tracking and notifying
recipients of any covered support of unmanageable threats to
United States national security or of theft or loss of United
States intellectual property posed by an entity of concern;
(D) consider requiring recipients of covered support to
implement additional research security mitigations for
higher-risk activities if appropriate; and
(E) support the development of research security training
for recipients of covered support on the risks posed by
entities of concern.
(3) Annual updates.--The tools and processes developed
under paragraph (1) shall be evaluated annually and updated
as needed, with threat-informed input from the Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, to reflect changes in
the risk designation under paragraph (2)(A) of research,
development, demonstration, and deployment activities
conducted by the Department of Energy.
(c) Entity of Concern.--
(1) Prohibition.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), no
entity of concern, or individual that owns or controls, is
owned or controlled by, or is under common ownership or
control with an entity of concern, may receive, or perform
work under, any covered support.
(2) Waiver of prohibition.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary may waive the prohibition
under paragraph (1) if determined by the Secretary to be in
the national interest.
(B) Notification to congress.--Not less than 2 weeks prior
to issuing a waiver under subparagraph (A), the Secretary
shall notify Congress of the intent to issue the waiver,
including a justification for the waiver.
(3) Penalty.--
(A) Termination of support.--On finding that any entity of
concern or individual described in paragraph (1) has received
covered support and has not received a waiver under paragraph
(2), the Secretary shall terminate all covered support to
that entity of concern or individual, as applicable.
(B) Penalties.--An entity of concern or individual
identified under subparagraph (A) shall be--
(i) prohibited from receiving or participating in covered
support for a period of not less than 1 year but not more
than 10 years, as determined by the Secretary; or
(ii) instead of the penalty described in clause (i),
subject to any other penalties authorized under applicable
law or regulations that the Secretary determines to be in the
national interest.
(C) Notification to congress.--Prior to imposing a penalty
under subparagraph (B), the Secretary shall notify Congress
of the intent to impose the penalty, including a description
of and justification for the penalty.
(4) Coordination.--The Secretary shall--
(A) share information about the unmanageable threats
described in subsection (a)(3)(E) with other Federal
agencies; and
(B) develop consistent approaches to identifying entities
of concern.
(d) International Agreements.--This section shall be
applied in a manner consistent with the obligations of the
United States under international agreements.
(e) Report Required.--Not later than 240 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to
Congress a report that--
(1) describes--
(A) the tools and processes developed under subsection
(b)(1) and any updates to those tools and processes; and
(B) if applicable, the science and technology risk matrix
developed under that subsection and how that matrix has been
applied;
(2) includes a mitigation plan for managing risks posed by
countries of risk with respect to future or ongoing research
and development activities of the Department of Energy; and
(3) defines critical research areas, designated by risk, as
determined by the Secretary.

SEC. 309. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
RISK ASSESSMENTS.

(a) Risk Assessment Documents and Materials.--Except as
provided in subsection (b), whenever an element of the
intelligence community conducts a risk assessment arising
from the mishandling or improper disclosure of classified
information, the Director of National Intelligence shall, not
later than 30 days after the date of the commencement of such
risk assessment--
(1) submit to the congressional intelligence committees
copies of such documents and materials as are--
(A) within the jurisdiction of such committees; and
(B) subject to the risk assessment; and
(2) provide such committees a briefing on such documents,
materials, and risk assessment.
(b) Exception.--If the Director determines, with respect to
a risk assessment described in subsection (a), that the
documents and other materials otherwise subject to paragraph
(1) of such subsection (a) are of such a volume that
submittal pursuant to such paragraph would be impracticable,
the Director shall--
(1) in lieu of submitting copies of such documents and
materials, submit a log of such documents and materials; and
(2) pursuant to a request by the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate or the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives for a copy of
a document or material included in such log, submit to such
committee such copy.

SEC. 310. INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW OF DISSEMINATION BY
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RICHMOND,
VIRGINIA, FIELD OFFICE OF CERTAIN DOCUMENT.

(a) Review Required.--Not later than 120 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of
the Department of Justice shall conduct a review of the
actions and events, including any underlying policy
direction, that served as a basis for the January 23, 2023,
dissemination by the field office of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation located in Richmond, Virginia, of a document
titled ``Interest of Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent
Extremists in Radical-Traditionalist Catholic Ideology Almost
Certainly Presents New Mitigation Opportunities.''.
(b) Submittal to Congress.--The Inspector General of the
Department of Justice shall submit the findings of the
Inspector General with respect to the review required by
subsection (a) to the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.
(3) The Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on
Oversight and Accountability, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 311. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS.

Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
121) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(h) Prohibition.--
``(1) Definition.--In this subsection, the term `United
States person' means a United States citizen, an alien known
by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to be a permanent
resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially
composed of United States citizens or permanent resident
aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States,
except for a corporation directed and controlled by 1 or more
foreign governments.
``(2) Collection of information from united states
persons.--
``(A) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis may not engage
in the collection of information or intelligence targeting
any United States person except as provided in subparagraph
(B).
``(B) Exception.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any
employee, officer, or contractor of the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis who is responsible for collecting
information from individuals working for a State, local, or
Tribal territory government or a private employer.''.

Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

SEC. 321. CHANGE TO PENALTIES AND INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF
MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT FOR UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INSTALLATIONS.

Section 15(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(b)) is amended, in the second sentence,
by striking ``those specified in section 1315(c)(2) of title
40, United States Code'' and inserting ``the maximum penalty
authorized for a Class B misdemeanor under section 3559 of
title 18, United States Code''.

SEC. 322. MODIFICATIONS TO PROCUREMENT AUTHORITIES OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

Section 3 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 3503) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ``sections'' and all
that follows through ``session)'' and inserting ``sections
3201, 3203, 3204, 3206, 3207, 3302 through 3306, 3321 through
3323, 3801 through 3808, 3069, 3134, 3841, and 4752 of title
10, United States Code'' and
(2) in subsection (d), by striking ``in paragraphs'' and
all that follows through ``1947'' and inserting ``in sections
3201 through 3204 of title 10, United States Code, shall not
be delegable. Each determination or decision required by
sections 3201 through 3204, 3321 through 3323, and 3841 of
title 10, United States Code''.

SEC. 323. ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
STANDARD WORKPLACE SEXUAL MISCONDUCT COMPLAINT
INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE.

(a) Workplace Sexual Misconduct Defined.--The term
``workplace sexual misconduct''--
(1) means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature when--
(A) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or
implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment;
(B) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual; or
(C) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment;
and

[[Page S3632]]

(2) includes sexual harassment and sexual assault.
(b) Standard Complaint Investigation Procedure.--Not later
than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall--
(1) establish a standard workplace sexual misconduct
complaint investigation procedure;
(2) implement the standard workplace sexual misconduct
complaint investigation procedure through clear workforce
communication and education on the procedure; and
(3) submit the standard workplace sexual misconduct
complaint investigation procedure to the congressional
intelligence committees.
(c) Minimum Requirements.--The procedure established
pursuant to subsection (b)(1) shall, at a minimum--
(1) identify the individuals and offices of the Central
Intelligence Agency to which an employee of the Agency may
bring a complaint of workplace sexual misconduct;
(2) detail the steps each individual or office identified
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall take upon receipt of a
complaint of workplace sexual misconduct and the timeframes
within which those steps shall be taken, including--
(A) documentation of the complaint;
(B) referral or notification to another individual or
office;
(C) measures to document or preserve witness statements or
other evidence; and
(D) preliminary investigation of the complaint;
(3) set forth standard criteria for determining whether a
complaint of workplace sexual misconduct will be referred to
law enforcement and the timeframe within which such a
referral shall occur; and
(4) for any complaint not referred to law enforcement, set
forth standard criteria for determining--
(A) whether a complaint has been substantiated; and
(B) for any substantiated complaint, the appropriate
disciplinary action.
(d) Annual Reports.--On or before April 30 of each year,
the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense
of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives an annual report that includes, for the
preceding calendar year, the following:
(1) The number of workplace sexual misconduct complaints
brought to each individual or office of the Central
Intelligence Agency identified pursuant to subsection (c)(1),
disaggregated by--
(A) complaints referred to law enforcement; and
(B) complaints substantiated.
(2) For each complaint described in paragraph (1) that is
substantiated, a description of the disciplinary action taken
by the Director.

TITLE IV--MATTERS CONCERNING FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Subtitle A--People's Republic of China

SEC. 401. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COORDINATOR FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY OF ATROCITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Atrocity.--The term ``atrocity'' means a crime against
humanity, genocide, or a war crime.
(2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means--
(A) any person or entity that is not a United States
person; or
(B) any entity not organized under the laws of the United
States or of any jurisdiction within the United States.
(3) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' has the meaning given that term in section 105A(c)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3039).
(b) Intelligence Community Coordinator for Accountability
of Atrocities of the People's Republic of China.--
(1) Designation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall designate a senior official of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence to serve as the
intelligence community coordinator for accountability of
atrocities of the People's Republic of China (in this section
referred to as the ``Coordinator'').
(2) Duties.--The Coordinator shall lead the efforts of and
coordinate and collaborate with the intelligence community
with respect to the following:
(A) Identifying and addressing any gaps in intelligence
collection relating to atrocities of the People's Republic of
China, including by recommending the modification of the
priorities of the intelligence community with respect to
intelligence collection and by utilizing informal processes
and collaborative mechanisms with key elements of the
intelligence community to increase collection on atrocities
of the People's Republic of China.
(B) Prioritizing and expanding the intelligence analysis
with respect to ongoing atrocities of the People's Republic
of China and disseminating within the United States
Government intelligence relating to the identification and
activities of foreign persons suspected of being involved
with or providing support to atrocities of the People's
Republic of China, including genocide and forced labor
practices in Xinjiang, in order to support the efforts of
other Federal agencies, including the Department of State,
the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury,
the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the Department of
Commerce, the Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, and the National Security Council, to
hold the People's Republic of China accountable for such
atrocities.
(C) Increasing efforts to declassify and share with the
people of the United States and the international community
information regarding atrocities of the People's Republic of
China in order to expose such atrocities and counter the
disinformation and misinformation campaign by the People's
Republic of China to deny such atrocities.
(D) Documenting and storing intelligence and other
unclassified information that may be relevant to preserve as
evidence of atrocities of the People's Republic of China for
future accountability, and ensuring that other relevant
Federal agencies receive appropriate support from the
intelligence community with respect to the collection,
analysis, preservation, and, as appropriate, dissemination,
of intelligence related to atrocities of the People's
Republic of China, which may include the information from the
annual report required by section 6504 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263).
(E) Sharing information with the Forced Labor Enforcement
Task Force, established under section 741 of the United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C.
4681), the Department of Commerce, and the Department of the
Treasury for the purposes of entity listings and sanctions.
(3) Plan required.--Not later than 120 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to
the appropriate committees of Congress--
(A) the name of the official designated as the Coordinator
pursuant to paragraph (1); and
(B) the strategy of the intelligence community for the
collection and dissemination of intelligence relating to
ongoing atrocities of the People's Republic of China,
including a detailed description of how the Coordinator shall
support, and assist in facilitating the implementation of,
such strategy.
(4) Annual report to congress.--
(A) Reports required.--Not later than May 1, 2024, and
annually thereafter until May 1, 2034, the Director shall
submit to Congress a report detailing, for the year covered
by the report--
(i) the analytical findings, changes in collection, and
other activities of the intelligence community with respect
to ongoing atrocities of the People's Republic of China;
(ii) the recipients of information shared pursuant to this
section for the purpose of--

(I) providing support to Federal agencies to hold the
People's Republic of China accountable for such atrocities;
and
(II) sharing information with the people of the United
States to counter the disinformation and misinformation
campaign by the People's Republic of China to deny such
atrocities; and

(iii) with respect to clause (ii), the date of any such
sharing.
(B) Form.--Each report submitted under subparagraph (A) may
be submitted in classified form, consistent with the
protection of intelligence sources and methods.
(c) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have effect on the
date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this
Act.

SEC. 402. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP AND REPORT ON THE MALIGN
EFFORTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN
AFRICA.

(a) Establishment.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with such heads of elements of the intelligence
community as the Director considers appropriate, shall
establish an interagency working group within the
intelligence community to analyze the tactics and
capabilities of the People's Republic of China in Africa.
(2) Establishment flexibility.--The working group
established under paragraph (1) may be--
(A) independently established; or
(B) to avoid redundancy, incorporated into existing working
groups or cross-intelligence efforts within the intelligence
community.
(b) Report.--
(1) Definition of appropriate committees of congress.--In
this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of
Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee
on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee
on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and twice annually thereafter, the
working group established under subsection (a) shall submit
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the
specific tactics and capabilities of the People's Republic of
China in Africa.
(3) Elements.--Each report required by paragraph (2) shall
include the following elements:

[[Page S3633]]

(A) An assessment of efforts by the Government of the
People's Republic of China to exploit mining and reprocessing
operations in Africa.
(B) An assessment of efforts by the Government of the
People's Republic of China to provide or fund technologies in
Africa, including--
(i) telecommunications and energy technologies, such as
advanced reactors, transportation, and other commercial
products; and
(ii) by requiring that the People's Republic of China be
the sole provider of such technologies.
(C) An assessment of efforts by the Government of the
People's Republic of China to expand intelligence
capabilities in Africa.
(D) A description of actions taken by the intelligence
community to counter such efforts.
(E) An assessment of additional resources needed by the
intelligence community to better counter such efforts.
(4) Form.--Each report required by paragraph (2) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex if necessary.
(c) Sunset.--The requirements of this section shall
terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act.

SEC. 403. AMENDMENT TO REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL ASSESSMENT BY
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKING GROUP FOR
MONITORING THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CAPABILITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

Section 6503(c)(3)(D) of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2023 (division F of Public Law 117-263) is
amended by striking ``the top 200'' and inserting ``all the
known''.

SEC. 404. ASSESSMENTS OF RECIPROCITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of State
for Intelligence and Research, in consultation with the
Director of National Intelligence and such other heads of
elements of the intelligence community as the Assistant
Secretary considers relevant, shall submit to Congress the
following:
(1) A comprehensive assessment that identifies critical
areas in the security, diplomatic, economic, financial,
technological, scientific, commercial, academic, and cultural
spheres in which the United States does not enjoy a
reciprocal relationship with the People's Republic of China.
(2) A comprehensive assessment that describes how the lack
of reciprocity between the People's Republic of China and the
United States in the areas identified in the assessment
required by paragraph (1) provides advantages to the People's
Republic of China.
(b) Form of Assessments.--
(1) Critical areas.--The assessment required by subsection
(a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.
(2) Advantages.--The assessment required by subsection
(a)(2) shall be submitted in classified form.

SEC. 405. ANNUAL BRIEFING ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFORTS
TO IDENTIFY AND MITIGATE CHINESE COMMUNIST
PARTY AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE
OPERATIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Chinese entities engaged in foreign malign influence
operations.--The term ``hinese entities engaged in foreign
malign influence operations'' means all of the elements of
the Government of the People's Republic of China and the
Chinese Communist Party involved in foreign malign influence,
such as--
(A) the Ministry of State Security;
(B) other security services of the People's Republic of
China;
(C) the intelligence services of the People's Republic of
China;
(D) the United Front Work Department and other united front
organs;
(E) state-controlled media systems, such as the China
Global Television Network (CGTN); and
(F) any entity involved in foreign malign influence
operations that demonstrably and intentionally disseminate
false information and propaganda of the Government of the
People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party.
(2) Russian malign influence actors.--The term ``Russian
malign influence actors'' refers to entities or individuals
engaged in foreign malign influence operations against the
United States who are affiliated with--
(A) the intelligence and security services of the Russian
Federation
(B) the Presidential Administration;
(C) any other entity of the Government of the Russian
Federation; or
(D) Russian mercenary or proxy groups such as the Wagner
Group.
(3) Foreign malign influence operation.--The term ``foreign
malign influence operation'' means a coordinated and often
concealed activity that is covered by the definition of the
term ``foreign malign influence'' in section 119C of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059) and uses
disinformation, press manipulation, economic coercion,
targeted investments, corruption, or academic censorship,
which are often intended--
(A) to coerce and corrupt United States interests, values,
institutions, or individuals; and
(B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or outcomes
in the United States that support the interests of the
Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese
Communist Party.
(b) Briefing Required.--Not later than 120 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter
until the date that is 5 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Foreign Malign
Influence Center shall, in collaboration with the heads of
the elements of the intelligence community, provide Congress
a classified briefing on the ways in which the relevant
elements of the intelligence community are working internally
and coordinating across the intelligence community to
identify and mitigate the actions of Chinese and Russian
entities engaged in foreign malign influence operations
against the United States, including against United States
persons.
(c) Elements.--The classified briefing required by
subsection (b) shall cover the following:
(1) The Government of the Russian Federation, the
Government of the People's Republic of China, and the Chinese
Communist Party tactics, tools, and entities that spread
disinformation, misinformation, and malign information and
conduct influence operations, information campaigns, or other
propaganda efforts.
(2) A description of ongoing foreign malign influence
operations and campaigns of the Russian Federation against
the United States and an assessment of their objectives and
effectiveness in meeting those objectives.
(3) A description of ongoing foreign malign influence
operations and campaigns of the People's Republic of China
against the United States and an assessment of their
objectives and effectiveness in meeting those objectives.
(4) A description of any cooperation, information-sharing,
amplification, or other coordination between the Russian
Federation and the People's Republic of China in developing
or carrying out foreign malign influence operations against
the United States.
(5) A description of front organizations, proxies, cut-
outs, aligned third-party countries, or organizations used by
the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of China to
carry out foreign malign influence operations against the
United States.
(6) An assessment of the loopholes or vulnerabilities in
United States law that Russia and the People's Republic of
China exploit to carry out foreign malign influence
operations.
(7) The actions of the Foreign Malign Influence Center, in
coordination with the Global Engagement Center, relating to
early-warning, information sharing, and proactive risk
mitigation systems, based on the list of entities identified
in subsection (a)(1), to detect, expose, deter, and counter
foreign malign influence operations of the Government of the
People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party
against the United States.
(8) The actions of the Foreign Malign Influence Center to
conduct outreach, to identify and counter tactics, tools, and
entities described in paragraph (1) by sharing information
with allies and partners of the United States, in
coordination with the Global Engagement Center, as well as
State and local governments, the business community, and
civil society in order to expose the political influence
operations and information operations of the Government of
the Russian Federation and the Government of the People's
Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party carried out
against individuals and entities in the United States.

SEC. 406. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT POSED TO UNITED STATES PORTS
BY CRANES MANUFACTURED BY COUNTRIES OF CONCERN.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Oversight and Accountability, the Committee on Financial
Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Country of concern.--The term ``country of concern''
has the meaning given that term in section 1(m)(1) of the
State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C.
2651a(m)(1)).
(b) Assessment.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with such other heads of the elements of the
intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate
and the Secretary of Defense, shall conduct an assessment of
the threat posed to United States ports by cranes
manufactured by countries of concern and commercial entities
of those countries, including the Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy
Industries Co. (ZPMC).
(c) Report and Briefing.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall

[[Page S3634]]

submit a report and provide a briefing to the appropriate
committees of Congress on the findings of the assessment
required by subsection (b).
(2) Elements.--The report and briefing required by
paragraph (1) shall outline the potential for the cranes
described in subsection (b) to collect intelligence, disrupt
operations at United States ports, and impact the national
security of the United States.
(3) Form of report.--The report required by paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.

Subtitle B--Other Foreign Countries

SEC. 411. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO CAPTURE AND DETAIN UNITED
STATES CITIZENS AS HOSTAGES.

(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In
this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
the Judiciary, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the
Judiciary, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report on efforts by the Maduro regime in
Venezuela to detain United States citizens and lawful
permanent residents.
(c) Elements.--The report required by subsection (b) shall
include, regarding the arrest, capture, detainment, or
imprisonment of United States citizens and lawful permanent
residents, the following:
(1) The names, positions, and institutional affiliation of
Venezuelan individuals, or those acting on their behalf, who
have engaged in such activities.
(2) A description of any role played by transnational
criminal organizations, and an identification of such
organizations.
(3) Where relevant, an assessment of whether and how United
States citizens and lawful permanent residents have been
lured to Venezuela.
(4) An analysis of the motive for the arrest, capture,
detainment, or imprisonment of United States citizens and
lawful permanent residents.
(5) The total number of United States citizens and lawful
permanent residents detained or imprisoned in Venezuela as of
the date on which the report is submitted.
(d) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.

SEC. 412. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PRIORITY OF FENTANYL IN
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIES FRAMEWORK.

It is the sense of Congress that the trafficking of illicit
fentanyl, including precursor chemicals and manufacturing
equipment associated with illicit fentanyl production and
organizations that traffic or finance the trafficking of
illicit fentanyl, originating from the People's Republic of
China and Mexico should be among the highest priorities in
the National Intelligence Priorities Framework of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence.

TITLE V--MATTERS PERTAINING TO UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND EMERGING
TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION WITH UNITED STATES ADVERSARIES

Subtitle A--General Matters

SEC. 501. ASSIGNMENT OF DETAILEES FROM INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
TO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

(a) Authority.--In order to better facilitate the sharing
of actionable intelligence on foreign adversary intent,
capabilities, threats, and operations that pose a threat to
the interests or security of the United States, particularly
as they relate to the procurement, development, and use of
dual-use and emerging technologies, the Director of National
Intelligence may assign or facilitate the assignment of
members from across the intelligence community to serve as
detailees to the Bureau of Industry and Security of the
Department of Commerce.
(b) Assignment.--Detailees assigned pursuant to subsection
(a) shall be drawn from such elements of the intelligence
community as the Director considers appropriate, in
consultation with the Secretary of Commerce.
(c) Expertise.--The Director shall ensure that detailees
assigned pursuant to subsection (a) have subject matter
expertise on countries of concern, including China, Iran,
North Korea, and Russia, as well as functional areas such as
illicit procurement, counterproliferation, emerging and
foundational technology, economic and financial intelligence,
information and communications technology systems, supply
chain vulnerability, and counterintelligence.
(d) Duty Credit.--The detail of an employee of the
intelligence community to the Department of Commerce under
subsection (a) shall be without interruption or loss of civil
service status or privilege.

Subtitle B--Next-generation Energy, Biotechnology, and Artificial
Intelligence

SEC. 511. EXPANDED ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC AND
TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

Section 6503(c)(3) of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(I) A detailed assessment, prepared in consultation with
all elements of the working group--
``(i) of the investments made by the People's Republic of
China in--

``(I) artificial intelligence;
``(II) next-generation energy technologies, especially
small modular reactors and advanced batteries; and
``(III) biotechnology; and

``(ii) that identifies--

``(I) competitive practices of the People's Republic of
China relating to the technologies described in clause (i);
``(II) opportunities to counter the practices described in
subclause (I);
``(III) countries the People's Republic of China is
targeting for exports of civil nuclear technology;
``(IV) countries best positioned to utilize civil nuclear
technologies from the United States in order to facilitate
the commercial export of those technologies;
``(V) United States vulnerabilities in the supply chain of
these technologies; and
``(VI) opportunities to counter the export by the People's
Republic of China of civil nuclear technologies globally.

``(J) An identification and assessment of any unmet
resource or authority needs of the working group that affect
the ability of the working group to carry out this
section.''.

SEC. 512. ASSESSMENT OF USING CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CAPABILITIES.

(a) Assessment Required.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of such
other elements of the intelligence community as the Director
considers appropriate, conduct an assessment of capabilities
identified by the Intelligence Community Continuity Program
established pursuant to section E(3) of Intelligence
Community Directive 118, or any successor directive, or such
other intelligence community facilities or intelligence
community capabilities as may be determined by the Director
to be critical to United States national security, that have
unique energy needs--
(1) to ascertain the feasibility and advisability of using
civil nuclear reactors to meet such needs; and
(2) to identify such additional resources, technologies,
infrastructure, or authorities needed, or other potential
obstacles, to commence use of a nuclear reactor to meet such
needs.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on
Oversight and Accountability and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report,
which may be in classified form, on the findings of the
Director with respect to the assessment conducted pursuant to
subsection (a).

SEC. 513. POLICIES ESTABLISHED BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
CAPABILITIES.

(a) In General.--Section 6702 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (a), in the matter preceding paragraph
(1), by striking ``subsection (b)'' and inserting
``subsection (c)'';
(2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b) Policies.--
``(1) In general.--In carrying out subsection (a)(1), not
later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, the
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the
heads of the elements of the intelligence community, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and such
other officials as the Director of National Intelligence
determines appropriate, shall establish the policies
described in paragraph (2).
``(2) Policies described.--The policies described in this
paragraph are policies for the acquisition, adoption,
development, use, coordination, and maintenance of artificial
intelligence capabilities that--
``(A) establish a lexicon relating to the use of machine
learning and artificial intelligence developed or acquired by
elements of the intelligence community;
``(B) establish guidelines for evaluating the performance
of models developed or acquired by elements of the
intelligence community, such as by--
``(i) specifying conditions for the continuous monitoring
of artificial intelligence capabilities for performance,
including the conditions for retraining or retiring models
based on performance;
``(ii) documenting performance objectives, including
specifying how performance objectives shall be developed and
contractually enforced for capabilities procured from third
parties;

[[Page S3635]]

``(iii) specifying the manner in which models should be
audited, as necessary, including the types of documentation
that should be provided to any auditor; and
``(iv) specifying conditions under which models used by
elements of the intelligence community should be subject to
testing and evaluation for vulnerabilities to techniques
meant to undermine the availability, integrity, or privacy of
an artificial intelligence capability;
``(C) establish guidelines for tracking dependencies in
adjacent systems, capabilities, or processes impacted by the
retraining or sunsetting of any model described in
subparagraph (B);
``(D) establish documentation requirements for capabilities
procured from third parties, aligning such requirements, as
necessary, with existing documentation requirements
applicable to capabilities developed by elements of the
intelligence community;
``(E) establish standards for the documentation of imputed,
augmented, or synthetic data used to train any model
developed, procured, or used by an element of the
intelligence community; and
``(F) provide guidance on the acquisition and usage of
models that have previously been trained by a third party for
subsequent modification and usage by such an element.
``(3) Policy review and revision.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall periodically review and revise each policy
established under paragraph (1).''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 6712(b)(1) of such Act
(50 U.S.C. 3024 note) is amended by striking ``section
6702(b)'' and inserting ``section 6702(c)''.

TITLE VI--WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS

SEC. 601. SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS OF COMPLAINTS AND INFORMATION
BY WHISTLEBLOWERS IN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.

(a) Amendments to Chapter 4 of Title 5.--
(1) Appointment of security officers.--Section 416 of title
5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(i) Appointment of Security Officers.--Each Inspector
General under this section, including the designees of the
Inspector General of the Department of Defense pursuant to
subsection (b)(3), shall appoint within their offices
security officers to provide, on a permanent basis,
confidential, security-related guidance and direction to
employees and contractors described in subsection (b)(1) who
intend to report to Congress complaints or information, so
that such employees and contractors can obtain direction on
how to report to Congress in accordance with appropriate
security practices.''.
(2) Procedures.--Subsection (e) of such section is
amended--
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``or any other committee
of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of
Representatives'' after ``either or both of the intelligence
committees'';
(B) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:
``(2) Limitation.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
the employee may contact an intelligence committee or another
committee of jurisdiction directly as described in paragraph
(1) of this subsection or in subsection (b)(4) only if the
employee--
``(i) before making such a contact, furnishes to the head
of the establishment, through the Inspector General (or
designee), a statement of the employee's complaint or
information and notice of the employee's intent to contact an
intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction
of the Senate or the House of Representatives directly; and
``(ii)(I) obtains and follows, from the head of the
establishment, through the Inspector General (or designee),
procedural direction on how to contact an intelligence
committee or another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate
or the House of Representatives in accordance with
appropriate security practices; or
``(II) obtains and follows such procedural direction from
the applicable security officer appointed under subsection
(i).
``(B) Lack of procedural direction.--If an employee seeks
procedural direction under subparagraph (A)(ii) and does not
receive such procedural direction within 30 days, or receives
insufficient direction to report to Congress a complaint or
information, the employee may contact an intelligence
committee or any other committee of jurisdiction of the
Senate or the House of Representatives directly without
obtaining or following the procedural direction otherwise
required under such subparagraph.''; and
(C) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
(D) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) Committee members and staff.--An employee of an
element of the intelligence community who intends to report
to Congress a complaint or information may report such
complaint or information to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or
Ranking Member, as the case may be, of an intelligence
committee or another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, a nonpartisan member of the
committee staff designated for purposes of receiving
complaints or information under this section, or a member of
the majority staff and a member of the minority staff of the
committee.''.
(3) Clarification of right to report directly to
congress.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(4) Clarification of right to report directly to
congress.--Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection
(e), an employee of an element of the intelligence community
who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information
may report such complaint or information directly to
Congress.''.
(b) Amendments to National Security Act of 1947.--
(1) Appointment of security officers.--Section 103H(j) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(j)) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(5) The Inspector General shall appoint within the Office
of the Inspector General security officers as required by
section 416(i) of title 5, United States Code.''.
(2) Procedures.--Subparagraph (D) of section 103H(k)(5) of
such Act (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)) is amended--
(A) in clause (i), by inserting ``or any other committee of
jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives''
after ``either or both of the congressional intelligence
committees'';
(B) by amending clause (ii) to read as follows:
``(ii)(I) Except as provided in subclause (II), an employee
may contact a congressional intelligence committee or another
committee of jurisdiction directly as described in clause (i)
only if the employee--
``(aa) before making such a contact, furnishes to the
Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the
employee's complaint or information and notice of the
employee's intent to contact a congressional intelligence
committee or another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate
or the House of Representatives directly; and
``(bb)(AA) obtains and follows, from the Director, through
the Inspector General, procedural direction on how to contact
a congressional intelligence committee or another committee
of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives
in accordance with appropriate security practices; or
``(BB) obtains and follows such procedural direction from
the applicable security officer appointed under section
416(i) of title 5, United States Code.
``(II) If an employee seeks procedural direction under
subclause (I)(bb) and does not receive such procedural
direction within 30 days, or receives insufficient direction
to report to Congress a complaint or information, the
employee may contact a congressional intelligence committee
or any other committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the
House of Representatives directly without obtaining or
following the procedural direction otherwise required under
such subclause.'';
(C) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (iv); and
(D) by inserting after clause (ii) the following:
``(iii) An employee of an element of the intelligence
community who intends to report to Congress a complaint or
information may report such complaint or information to the
Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member, as the case may
be, of a congressional intelligence committee or another
committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, a nonpartisan member of the committee staff
designated for purposes of receiving complaints or
information under this section, or a member of the majority
staff and a member of the minority staff of the committee.''.
(3) Clarification of right to report directly to
congress.--Subparagraph (A) of such section is amended--
(A) by inserting ``(i)'' before ``An employee of''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(ii) Subject to clauses (ii) and (iii) of subparagraph
(D), an employee of an element of the intelligence community
who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information
may report such complaint or information directly to
Congress, regardless of whether the complaint or information
is with respect to an urgent concern--
``(I) in lieu of reporting such complaint or information
under clause (i); or
``(II) in addition to reporting such complaint or
information under clause (i).''.
(c) Amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949.--
(1) Appointment of security officers.--Section 17(d)(5) of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
3517(d)(5)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(I) The Inspector General shall appoint within the Office
of the Inspector General security officers as required by
section 416(i) of title 5, United States Code.''.
(2) Procedures.--Subparagraph (D) of such section is
amended--
(A) in clause (i), by inserting ``or any other committee of
jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives''
after ``either or both of the intelligence committees'';
(B) by amending clause (ii) to read as follows:
``(ii)(I) Except as provided in subclause (II), an employee
may contact an intelligence committee or another committee of
jurisdiction directly as described in clause (i) only if the
employee--
``(aa) before making such a contact, furnishes to the
Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the
employee's complaint or information and notice of the
employee's intent to contact an intelligence committee or
another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House
of Representatives directly; and

[[Page S3636]]

``(bb)(AA) obtains and follows, from the Director, through
the Inspector General, procedural direction on how to contact
an intelligence committee or another committee of
jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives in
accordance with appropriate security practices; or
``(BB) obtains and follows such procedural direction from
the applicable security officer appointed under section
416(i) of title 5, United States Code.
``(II) If an employee seeks procedural direction under
subclause (I)(bb) and does not receive such procedural
direction within 30 days, or receives insufficient direction
to report to Congress a complaint or information, the
employee may contact an intelligence committee or another
committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of
Representatives directly without obtaining or following the
procedural direction otherwise required under such
subclause.'';
(C) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (iv); and
(D) by inserting after clause (ii) the following:
``(iii) An employee of the Agency who intends to report to
Congress a complaint or information may report such complaint
or information to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking
Member, as the case may be, of an intelligence committee or
another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, a nonpartisan member of the committee
staff designated for purposes of receiving complaints or
information under this section, or a member of the majority
staff and a member of the minority staff of the committee.''.
(3) Clarification of right to report directly to
congress.--Subparagraph (A) of such section is amended--
(A) by inserting ``(i)'' before ``An employee of''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(ii) Subject to clauses (ii) and (iii) of subparagraph
(D), an employee of the Agency who intends to report to
Congress a complaint or information may report such complaint
or information directly to Congress, regardless of whether
the complaint or information is with respect to an urgent
concern--
``(I) in lieu of reporting such complaint or information
under clause (i); or
``(II) in addition to reporting such complaint or
information under clause (i).''.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section or an
amendment made by this section shall be construed to revoke
or diminish any right of an individual provided by section
2303 of title 5, United States Code.

SEC. 602. PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCLOSURE OF WHISTLEBLOWER
IDENTITY AS REPRISAL AGAINST WHISTLEBLOWER
DISCLOSURE BY EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS IN
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) In General.--Section 1104 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(3) of such section--
(A) in subparagraph (I), by striking ``; or'' and inserting
a semicolon;
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (J) as subparagraph (K);
and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (I) the following:
``(J) a knowing and willful disclosure revealing the
identity or other personally identifiable information of an
employee or contractor employee so as to identify the
employee or contractor employee as an employee or contractor
employee who has made a lawful disclosure described in
subsection (b) or (c); or'';
(2) by redesignating subsections (f) and (g) as subsections
(g) and (h), respectively; and
(3) by inserting after subsection (e) the following:
``(f) Personnel Actions Involving Disclosure of
Whistleblower Identity.--A personnel action described in
subsection (a)(3)(J) shall not be considered to be in
violation of subsection (b) or (c) under the following
circumstances:
``(1) The personnel action was taken with the express
consent of the employee or contractor employee.
``(2) An Inspector General with oversight responsibility
for a covered intelligence community element determines
that--
``(A) the personnel action was unavoidable under section
103H(g)(3)(A) of this Act (50 U.S.C. 3033(g)(3)(A)), section
17(e)(3)(A) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 3517(e)(3)(A)), section 407(b) of title 5, United
States Code, or section 420(b)(2)(B) of such title;
``(B) the personnel action was made to an official of the
Department of Justice responsible for determining whether a
prosecution should be undertaken; or
``(C) the personnel action was required by statute or an
order from a court of competent jurisdiction.''.
(b) Applicability to Detailees.--Subsection (a) of section
1104 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3234) is amended by adding at the
end the following:
``(5) Employee.--The term `employee', with respect to an
agency or a covered intelligence community element, includes
an individual who has been detailed to such agency or covered
intelligence community element.''.
(c) Harmonization of Enforcement.--Subsection (g) of such
section, as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) of this
section, is amended to read as follows:
``(g) Enforcement.--
``(1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, the President shall provide for the enforcement
of this section.
``(2) Harmonization with other enforcement.--To the fullest
extent possible, the President shall provide for enforcement
of this section in a manner that is consistent with the
enforcement of section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States
Code, especially with respect to policies and procedures used
to adjudicate alleged violations of such section.''.

SEC. 603. ESTABLISHING PROCESS PARITY FOR ADVERSE SECURITY
CLEARANCE AND ACCESS DETERMINATIONS.

Subparagraph (C) of section 3001(j)(4) of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C.
3341(j)(4)) is amended to read as follows:
``(C) Contributing factor.--
``(i) In general.--Subject to clause (iii), in determining
whether the adverse security clearance or access
determination violated paragraph (1), the agency shall find
that paragraph (1) was violated if the individual has
demonstrated that a disclosure described in paragraph (1) was
a contributing factor in the adverse security clearance or
access determination taken against the individual.
``(ii) Circumstantial evidence.--An individual under clause
(i) may demonstrate that the disclosure was a contributing
factor in the adverse security clearance or access
determination taken against the individual through
circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that--

``(I) the official making the determination knew of the
disclosure; and
``(II) the determination occurred within a period such that
a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure was a
contributing factor in the determination.

``(iii) Defense.--In determining whether the adverse
security clearance or access determination violated paragraph
(1), the agency shall not find that paragraph (1) was
violated if, after a finding that a disclosure was a
contributing factor, the agency demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have made the same security
clearance or access determination in the absence of such
disclosure.''.

SEC. 604. ELIMINATION OF CAP ON COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR
RETALIATORY REVOCATION OF SECURITY CLEARANCES
AND ACCESS DETERMINATIONS.

Section 3001(j)(4)(B) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(4)(B)) is
amended, in the second sentence, by striking ``not to exceed
$300,000''.

SEC. 605. MODIFICATION AND REPEAL OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) Modification of Frequency of Whistleblower
Notifications to Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community.--Section 5334(a) of the Damon Paul Nelson and
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (Public Law 116-92; 50
U.S.C. 3033 note) is amended by striking ``in real time'' and
inserting ``monthly''.
(b) Repeal of Requirement for Inspectors General Reviews of
Enhanced Personnel Security Programs.--
(1) In general.--Section 11001 of title 5, United States
Code, is amended--
(A) by striking subsection (d); and
(B) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (d).
(2) Technical corrections.--Subsection (d) of section 11001
of such title, as redesignated by paragraph (1)(B), is
amended--
(A) in paragraph (3), by adding ``and'' after the semicolon
at the end; and
(B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
period.

TITLE VII--CLASSIFICATION REFORM

Subtitle A--Classification Reform Act of 2023

SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Classification Reform
Act of 2023''.

SEC. 702. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means any Executive agency
as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code, any
military department as defined in section 102 of such title,
and any other entity in the executive branch of the Federal
Government that comes into the possession of classified
information.
(2) Classify, classified, classification.--The terms
``classify'', ``classified'', and ``classification'' refer to
the process by which information is determined to require
protection from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to Executive
Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified
national security information), or previous and successor
executive orders or similar directives, or section 703 in
order to protect the national security of the United States.
(3) Classified information.--The term ``classified
information'' means information that has been classified
under Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to
classified national security information), or previous and
successor executive orders or similar directives, or section
703.
(4) Declassify, declassified, declassification.--The terms
``declassify'', ``declassified'', and ``declassification''
refer to the process by which information that has been
classified is determined to no longer require protection from
unauthorized disclosure pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (50
U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national security
information), or previous and successor executive orders or
similar directives, or section 703.

[[Page S3637]]

(5) Information.--The term ``information'' means any
knowledge that can be communicated, or documentary material,
regardless of its physical form or characteristics, that is
owned by, is produced by or for, or is under the control of
the United States Government.

SEC. 703. CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION.

(a) In General.--The President may, in accordance with this
section, protect from unauthorized disclosure any information
owned by, produced by or for, or under the control of the
executive branch of the Federal Government when there is a
demonstrable need to do so in order to protect the national
security of the United States.
(b) Establishment of Standards and Procedures for
Classification and Declassification.--
(1) Governmentwide procedures.--
(A) Classification.--The President shall, to the extent
necessary, establish categories of information that may be
classified and procedures for classifying information under
subsection (a).
(B) Declassification.--At the same time the President
establishes categories and procedures under subparagraph (A),
the President shall establish procedures for declassifying
information that was previously classified.
(C) Minimum requirements.--The procedures established
pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall--
(i) provide that information may be classified under this
section, and may remain classified under this section, only
if the harm to national security that might reasonably be
expected from disclosure of such information outweighs the
public interest in disclosure of such information;
(ii) establish standards and criteria for the
classification of information;
(iii) establish standards, criteria, and timelines for the
declassification of information classified under this
section;
(iv) provide for the automatic declassification of
classified records with permanent historical value;
(v) provide for the timely review of materials submitted
for pre-publication;
(vi) narrow the criteria for classification set forth under
section 1.4 of Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note;
relating to classified national security information), as in
effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this
Act;
(vii) narrow the exemptions from automatic declassification
set forth under section 3.3(b) of Executive Order 13526 (50
U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national security
information), as in effect on the day before the date of the
enactment of this Act;
(viii) provide a clear and specific definition of ``harm to
national security'' as it pertains to clause (i); and
(ix) provide a clear and specific definition of
``intelligence sources and methods'' as it pertains to the
categories and procedures under subparagraph (A).
(2) Agency standards and procedures.--
(A) In general.--The head of each agency shall establish a
single set of consolidated standards and procedures to permit
such agency to classify and declassify information created by
such agency in accordance with the categories and procedures
established by the President under this section and otherwise
to carry out this section.
(B) Submittal to congress.--Each agency head shall submit
to Congress the standards and procedures established by such
agency head under subparagraph (A).
(c) Conforming Amendment to FOIA.--Section 552(b)(1) of
title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(1)(A) specifically authorized to be classified under
section 703 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2024, or specifically authorized under criteria
established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national security; and
``(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to that
section or Executive order;''.
(d) Effective Date.--
(1) In general.--Subsections (a) and (b) shall take effect
on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act.
(2) Relation to presidential directives.--Presidential
directives regarding classifying, safeguarding, and
declassifying national security information, including
Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to
classified national security information), or successor
order, in effect on the day before the date of the enactment
of this Act, as well as procedures issued pursuant to such
Presidential directives, shall remain in effect until
superseded by procedures issues pursuant to subsection (b).

SEC. 704. TRANSPARENCY OFFICERS.

(a) Designation.--The Attorney General, the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National
Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the head
of any other department, agency, or element of the executive
branch of the Federal Government determined by the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board established by section
1061 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee) to be appropriate for coverage
under this section, shall each designate at least 1 senior
officer to serve as the principal advisor to assist such head
of a department, agency, or element and other officials of
the department, agency, or element of the head in identifying
records of significant public interest and prioritizing
appropriate review of such records in order to facilitate the
public disclosure of such records in redacted or unredacted
form.
(b) Determining Public Interest in Disclosure.--In
assisting the head of a department, agency, or element and
other officials of such department, agency, or element in
identifying records of significant public interest under
subsection (a), the senior officer designated by the head
under such subsection shall consider whether--
(1) or not disclosure of the information would better
enable United States citizens to hold Federal Government
officials accountable for their actions and policies;
(2) or not disclosure of the information would assist the
United States criminal justice system in holding persons
responsible for criminal acts or acts contrary to the
Constitution;
(3) or not disclosure of the information would assist
Congress or any committee or subcommittee thereof, in
carrying out its oversight responsibilities with regard to
the executive branch of the Federal Government or in
adequately informing itself of executive branch policies and
activities in order to carry out its legislative
responsibilities;
(4) the disclosure of the information would assist Congress
or the public in understanding the interpretation of the
Federal Government of a provision of law, including Federal
regulations, Presidential directives, statutes, case law, and
the Constitution of the United States; or
(5) or not disclosure of the information would bring about
any other significant benefit, including an increase in
public awareness or understanding of Government activities or
an enhancement of Federal Government efficiency.
(c) Periodic Reports.--
(1) In general.--Each senior officer designated under
subsection (a) shall periodically, but not less frequently
than annually, submit a report on the activities of the
officer, including the documents determined to be in the
public interest for disclosure under subsection (b), to--
(A) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives; and
(C) the head of the department, agency, or element of the
senior officer.
(2) Form.--Each report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1)
shall be submitted, to the greatest extent possible, in
unclassified form, with a classified annex as may be
necessary.

Subtitle B--Sensible Classification Act of 2023

SEC. 711. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Sensible Classification
Act of 2023''.

SEC. 712. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given the
term ``Executive agency'' in section 105 of title 5, United
States Code.
(2) Classification.--The term ``classification'' means the
act or process by which information is determined to be
classified information.
(3) Classified information.--The term ``classified
information'' means information that has been determined
pursuant to Executive Order 12958 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note;
relating to classified national security information), or
successor order, to require protection against unauthorized
disclosure and is marked to indicate its classified status
when in documentary form.
(4) Declassification.--The term ``declassification'' means
the authorized change in the status of information from
classified information to unclassified information.
(5) Document.--The term ``document'' means any recorded
information, regardless of the nature of the medium or the
method or circumstances of recording.
(6) Downgrade.--The term ``downgrade'' means a
determination by a declassification authority that
information classified and safeguarded at a specified level
shall be classified and safeguarded at a lower level.
(7) Information.--The term ``information'' means any
knowledge that can be communicated or documentary material,
regardless of its physical form or characteristics, that is
owned by, is produced by or for, or is under the control of
the United States Government.
(8) Originate, originating, and originated.--The term
``originate'', ``originating'', and ``originated'', with
respect to classified information and an authority, means the
authority that classified the information in the first
instance.
(9) Records.--The term ``records'' means the records of an
agency and Presidential papers or Presidential records, as
those terms are defined in title 44, United States Code,
including those created or maintained by a government
contractor, licensee, certificate holder, or grantee that are
subject to the sponsoring agency's control under the terms of
the contract, license, certificate, or grant.
(10) Security clearance.--The term ``security clearance''
means an authorization to access classified information.

[[Page S3638]]

(11) Unauthorized disclosure.--The term ``unauthorized
disclosure'' means a communication or physical transfer of
classified information to an unauthorized recipient.
(12) Unclassified information.--The term ``unclassified
information'' means information that is not classified
information.

SEC. 713. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF THE SENATE.

(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) According to a report released by the Office of the
Director of Intelligence in 2020 titled ``Fiscal Year 2019
Annual Report on Security Clearance Determinations'', more
than 4,000,000 individuals have been granted eligibility for
a security clearance.
(2) At least 1,300,000 of such individuals have been
granted access to information classified at the Top Secret
level.
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that--
(1) the classification system of the Federal Government is
in urgent need of reform;
(2) the number of people with access to classified
information is exceedingly high and must be justified or
reduced;
(3) reforms are necessary to reestablish trust between the
Federal Government and the people of the United States; and
(4) classification should be limited to the minimum
necessary to protect national security while balancing the
public's interest in disclosure.

SEC. 714. CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY.

(a) In General.--The authority to classify information
originally may be exercised only by--
(1) the President and, in the performance of executive
duties, the Vice President;
(2) the head of an agency or an official of any agency
authorized by the President pursuant to a designation of such
authority in the Federal Register; and
(3) an official of the Federal Government to whom authority
to classify information originally has been delegated
pursuant to subsection (c).
(b) Scope of Authority.--An individual authorized by this
section to classify information originally at a specified
level may also classify the information originally at a lower
level.
(c) Delegation of Original Classification Authority.--An
official of the Federal Government may be delegated original
classification authority subject to the following:
(1) Delegation of original classification authority shall
be limited to the minimum required to administer this
section. Agency heads shall be responsible for ensuring that
designated subordinate officials have a demonstrable and
continuing need to exercise this authority.
(2) Authority to originally classify information at the
level designated as ``Top Secret'' may be delegated only by
the President, in the performance of executive duties, the
Vice President, or an agency head or official designated
pursuant to subsection (a)(2).
(3) Authority to originally classify information at the
level designated as ``Secret'' or ``Confidential'' may be
delegated only by the President, in the performance of
executive duties, the Vice President, or an agency head or
official designated pursuant to subsection (a)(2), or the
senior agency official described in section 5.4(d) of
Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to
classified national security information), or successor
order, provided that official has been delegated ``Top
Secret'' original classification authority by the agency
head.
(4) Each delegation of original classification authority
shall be in writing and the authority shall not be
redelegated except as provided by paragraphs (1), (2), and
(3). Each delegation shall identify the official by name or
position title.
(d) Training Required.--
(1) In general.--An individual may not be delegated
original classification authority under this section unless
the individual has first received training described in
paragraph (2).
(2) Training described.--Training described in this
paragraph is training on original classification that
includes instruction on the proper safeguarding of classified
information and of the criminal, civil, and administrative
sanctions that may be brought against an individual who fails
to protect classified information from unauthorized
disclosure.
(e) Exceptional Cases.--
(1) In general.--When an employee, contractor, licensee,
certificate holder, or grantee of an agency who does not have
original classification authority originates information
believed by that employee, contractor, licensee, certificate
holder, or grantee to require classification, the information
shall be protected in a manner consistent with Executive
Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified
national security information), or successor order.
(2) Transmittal.--An employee, contractor, licensee,
certificate holder, or grantee described in paragraph (1),
who originates information described in such paragraph, shall
promptly transmit such information to--
(A) the agency that has appropriate subject matter interest
and classification authority with respect to this
information; or
(B) if it is not clear which agency has appropriate subject
matter interest and classification authority with respect to
the information, the Director of the Information Security
Oversight Office.
(3) Agency decisions.--An agency that receives information
pursuant to paragraph (2)(A) or (4) shall decide within 30
days whether to classify this information.
(4) Information security oversight office action.--If the
Director of the Information Security Oversight Office
receives information under paragraph (2)(B), the Director
shall determine the agency having appropriate subject matter
interest and classification authority and forward the
information, with appropriate recommendations, to that agency
for a classification determination.

SEC. 715. PROMOTING EFFICIENT DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW.

(a) In General.--Whenever an agency is processing a request
pursuant to section 552 of title 5, United States Code
(commonly known as the ``Freedom of Information Act'') or the
mandatory declassification review provisions of Executive
Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified
national security information), or successor order, and
identifies responsive classified records that are more than
25 years of age as of December 31 of the year in which the
request is received, the head of the agency shall review the
record and process the record for declassification and
release by the National Declassification Center of the
National Archives and Records Administration.
(b) Application.--Subsection (a) shall apply--
(1) regardless of whether or not the record described in
such subsection is in the legal custody of the National
Archives and Records Administration; and
(2) without regard for any other provisions of law or
existing agreements or practices between agencies.

SEC. 716. TRAINING TO PROMOTE SENSIBLE CLASSIFICATION.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Over-classification.--The term ``over-classification''
means classification at a level that exceeds the minimum
level of classification that is sufficient to protect the
national security of the United States.
(2) Sensible classification.--The term ``sensible
classification'' means classification at a level that is the
minimum level of classification that is sufficient to protect
the national security of the United States.
(b) Training Required.--Each head of an agency with
classification authority shall conduct training for employees
of the agency with classification authority to discourage
over-classification and to promote sensible classification.

SEC. 717. IMPROVEMENTS TO PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION
BOARD.

Section 703 of the Public Interest Declassification Act of
2000 (50 U.S.C. 3355a) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following:
``(5) A member of the Board whose term has expired may
continue to serve until a successor is appointed and sworn
in.''; and
(2) in subsection (f)--
(A) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``Any employee''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(2)(A) In addition to any employees detailed to the Board
under paragraph (1), the Board may hire not more than 12
staff members.
``(B) There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out
subparagraph (A) such sums as are necessary for fiscal year
2024 and each fiscal year thereafter.''.

SEC. 718. IMPLEMENTATION OF TECHNOLOGY FOR CLASSIFICATION AND
DECLASSIFICATION.

(a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Office of
Electronic Government (in this section referred to as the
``Administrator'') shall, in consultation with the Secretary
of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Director of National Intelligence, the Public Interest
Declassification Board, the Director of the Information
Security Oversight Office, and the head of the National
Declassification Center of the National Archives and Records
Administration--
(1) research a technology-based solution--
(A) utilizing machine learning and artificial intelligence
to support efficient and effective systems for classification
and declassification; and
(B) to be implemented on an interoperable and federated
basis across the Federal Government; and
(2) submit to the President a recommendation regarding a
technology-based solution described in paragraph (1) that
should be adopted by the Federal Government.
(b) Staff.--The Administrator may hire sufficient staff to
carry out subsection (a).
(c) Report.--Not later than 540 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress
a classified report on the technology-based solution
recommended by the Administrator under subsection (a)(2) and
the President's decision regarding its adoption.

SEC. 719. STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON NECESSITY OF
SECURITY CLEARANCES.

(a) Agency Studies on Necessity of Security Clearances.--
(1) Studies required.--The head of each agency that grants
security clearances to personnel of such agency shall conduct
a study on the necessity of such clearances.
(2) Reports required.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, each head of an agency that
conducts a study under paragraph (1) shall submit to Congress
a report on the findings of the agency head with respect to
such study,

[[Page S3639]]

which the agency head may classify as appropriate.
(B) Required elements.--Each report submitted by the head
of an agency under subparagraph (A) shall include, for such
agency, the following:
(i) The number of personnel eligible for access to
information up to the ``Top Secret'' level.
(ii) The number of personnel eligible for access to
information up to the ``Secret'' level.
(iii) Information on any reduction in the number of
personnel eligible for access to classified information based
on the study conducted under paragraph (1).
(iv) A description of how the agency head will ensure that
the number of security clearances granted by such agency will
be kept to the minimum required for the conduct of agency
functions, commensurate with the size, needs, and mission of
the agency.
(3) Industry.--This subsection shall apply to the Secretary
of Defense in the Secretary's capacity as the Executive Agent
for the National Industrial Security Program, and the
Secretary shall treat contractors, licensees, and grantees as
personnel of the Department of Defense for purposes of the
studies and reports required by this subsection.
(b) Director of National Intelligence Review of Sensitive
Compartmented Information.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall--
(1) review the number of personnel eligible for access to
sensitive compartmented information; and
(2) submit to Congress a report on how the Director will
ensure that the number of such personnel is limited to the
minimum required.
(c) Agency Review of Special Access Programs.--Each head of
an agency who is authorized to establish a special access
program by Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note;
relating to classified national security information), or
successor order, shall--
(1) review the number of personnel of the agency eligible
for access to such special access programs; and
(2) submit to Congress a report on how the agency head will
ensure that the number of such personnel is limited to the
minimum required.
(d) Secretary of Energy Review of Q and L Clearances.--The
Secretary of Energy shall--
(1) review the number of personnel of the Department of
Energy granted Q and L access; and
(2) submit to Congress a report on how the Secretary will
ensure that the number of such personnel is limited to the
minimum required
(e) Independent Reviews.--Not later than 180 days after the
date on which a study is completed under subsection (a) or a
review is completed under subsections (b) through (d), the
Director of the Information Security Oversight Office of the
National Archives and Records Administration, the Director of
National Intelligence, and the Public Interest
Declassification Board shall each review the study or review,
as the case may be.

TITLE VIII--SECURITY CLEARANCE AND TRUSTED WORKFORCE

SEC. 801. REVIEW OF SHARED INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SERVICES
FOR PERSONNEL VETTING.

(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In
this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(b) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a review of the extent to which the intelligence
community can use information technology services shared
among the intelligence community for purposes of personnel
vetting, including with respect to human resources,
suitability, and security.

SEC. 802. TIMELINESS STANDARD FOR RENDERING DETERMINATIONS OF
TRUST FOR PERSONNEL VETTING.

(a) Timeliness Standard.--
(1) In general.--The President shall, acting through the
Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and
Credentialing Executive Agent, establish and publish in such
public venue as the President considers appropriate, new
timeliness performance standards for processing personnel
vetting trust determinations in accordance with the Federal
personnel vetting performance management standards.
(2) Quinquennial reviews.--Not less frequently than once
every 5 years, the President shall, acting through the
Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and
Credentialing Executive Agent--
(A) review the standards established pursuant to paragraph
(1); and
(B) pursuant to such review--
(i) update such standards as the President considers
appropriate; and
(ii) publish in the Federal Register such updates as may be
made pursuant to clause (i).
(3) Conforming amendment.--Section 3001 of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341)
is amended by striking subsection (g).
(b) Quarterly Reports on Implementation.--
(1) In general.--Not less frequently than quarterly, the
Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and
Credentialing Executive Agent shall jointly make available to
the public a quarterly report on the compliance of Executive
agencies (as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States
Code) with the standards established pursuant to subsection
(a).
(2) Disaggregation.--Each report made available pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall disaggregate, to the greatest extent
practicable, data by appropriate category of personnel risk
and between Government and contractor personnel.
(c) Complementary Standards for Intelligence Community.--
The Director of National Intelligence may, in consultation
with the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance
Accountability Council established pursuant to Executive
Order 13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to reforming
processes related to suitability for Government employment,
fitness for contractor employees, and eligibility for access
to classified national security information) establish for
the intelligence community standards complementary to those
established pursuant to subsection (a).

SEC. 803. ANNUAL REPORT ON PERSONNEL VETTING TRUST
DETERMINATIONS.

(a) Definition of Personnel Vetting Trust Determination.--
In this section, the term ``personnel vetting trust
determination'' means any determination made by an executive
branch agency as to whether an individual can be trusted to
perform job functions or to be granted access necessary for a
position.
(b) Annual Report.--Not later than March 30, 2024, and
annually thereafter for 5 years, the Director of National
Intelligence, acting as the Security Executive Agent, and the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management, acting as the
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent, in
coordination with the Security, Suitability, and
Credentialing Performance Accountability Council, shall
jointly make available to the public a report on specific
types of personnel vetting trust determinations made during
the fiscal year preceding the fiscal year in which the report
is made available, disaggregated, to the greatest extent
possible, by the following:
(1) Determinations of eligibility for national security-
sensitive positions, separately noting--
(A) the number of individuals granted access to national
security information; and
(B) the number of individuals determined to be eligible for
but not granted access to national security information.
(2) Determinations of suitability or fitness for a public
trust position.
(3) Status as a Government employee, a contractor employee,
or other category.
(c) Elimination of Report Requirement.--Section 3001 of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50
U.S.C. 3341) is amended by striking subsection (h).

SEC. 804. SURVEY TO ASSESS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF
TRUSTED WORKFORCE 2.0.

Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and once every 2 years thereafter until 2029, the
Comptroller General of the United States shall administer a
survey to such sample of Federal agencies, Federal
contractors, and other persons that require security
clearances to access classified information as the
Comptroller General considers appropriate to assess--
(1) the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation of
the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative; and
(2) the effectiveness of vetting Federal personnel while
managing risk during the onboarding of such personnel.

SEC. 805. PROHIBITION ON DENIAL OF ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION SOLELY BECAUSE OF PAST
USE OF CANNABIS.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Cannabis.--The term ``cannabis'' has the meaning given
the term ``marihuana'' in section 102 of the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802).
(2) Eligibility for access to classified information.--The
term ``eligibility for access to classified information'' has
the meaning given the term in the procedures established
pursuant to section 801(a) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161(a)).
(b) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the head of an element of the intelligence community may
not make a determination to deny eligibility for access to
classified information to an individual based solely on the
use of cannabis by the individual prior to the submission of
the application for a security clearance by the individual.

TITLE IX--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS

SEC. 901. IMPROVED FUNDING FLEXIBILITY FOR PAYMENTS MADE BY
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR QUALIFYING
INJURIES TO THE BRAIN.

Section 19A(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)) is amended by striking paragraph
(3) and inserting the following new paragraph:
``(3) Funding.--
``(A) In general.--Payment under paragraph (2) in a fiscal
year may be made using any funds--

[[Page S3640]]

``(i) appropriated in advance specifically for payments
under such paragraph; or
``(ii) reprogrammed in accordance with section 504 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3094).
``(B) Budget.--For each fiscal year, the Director shall
include with the budget justification materials submitted to
Congress in support of the budget of the President for that
fiscal year pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United
States Code, an estimate of the funds required in that fiscal
year to make payments under paragraph (2).''.

SEC. 902. CLARIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS TO SEEK CERTAIN
BENEFITS RELATING TO INJURIES TO THE BRAIN.

(a) In General.--Section 19A(d)(5) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)(5)) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``Payments made'' and inserting the
following:
``(A) In general.--Payments made''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) Relation to certain federal workers compensation
laws.--Without regard to the requirements in sections (b) and
(c), covered employees need not first seek benefits provided
under chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, to be
eligible solely for payment authorized under paragraph (2) of
this subsection.''.
(b) Regulations.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall--
(1) revise applicable regulations to conform with the
amendment made by subsection (a); and
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees,
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense
of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives copies of such regulations, as revised
pursuant to paragraph (1).

SEC. 903. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IMPLEMENTATION OF HAVANA ACT
OF 2021 AUTHORITIES.

(a) Regulations.--Except as provided in subsection (c), not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, each head of an element of the intelligence community
that has not already done so shall--
(1) issue regulations and procedures to implement the
authorities provided by section 19A(d) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)) and
section 901(i) of title IX of division J of the Further
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (22 U.S.C. 2680b(i)) to
provide payments under such sections, to the degree that such
authorities are applicable to the head of the element; and
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence, the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives committees
copies of such regulations.
(b) Reporting.--Not later than 210 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, each head of an element of the
intelligence community shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives a report on--
(1) the estimated number of individuals associated with
their element that may be eligible for payment under the
authorities described in subsection (a)(1);
(2) an estimate of the obligation that the head of the
intelligence community element expects to incur in fiscal
year 2025 as a result of establishing the regulations
pursuant to subsection (a)(1); and
(3) any perceived barriers or concerns in implementing such
authorities.
(c) Alternative Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, each head of an
element of the intelligence community (other than the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) who believes
that the authorities described in subsection (a)(1) are not
currently relevant for individuals associated with their
element, or who are not otherwise in position to issue the
regulations and procedures required by subsection (a)(1)
shall provide written and detailed justification to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives to explain
this position.

SEC. 904. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
HANDLING OF ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agency.--The term ``Agency'' means the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(2) Qualifying injury.--The term ``qualifying injury'' has
the meaning given such term in section 19A(d)(1) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
3519b(d)(1)).
(b) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the handling of anomalous
health incidents by the Agency.
(c) Contents.--The report required by subsection (b) shall
include the following:
(1) HAVANA act implementation.--
(A) An explanation of how the Agency determines whether a
reported anomalous health incident resulted in a qualifying
injury or a qualifying injury to the brain.
(B) The number of participants of the Expanded Care Program
of the Central Intelligence Agency who--
(i) have a certified qualifying injury or a certified
qualifying injury to the brain; and
(ii) as of September 30, 2023, applied to the Expanded Care
Program due to a reported anomalous health incident.
(C) A comparison of the number of anomalous health
incidents reported by applicants to the Expanded Care Program
that occurred in the United States and that occurred in a
foreign country.
(D) The specific reason each applicant was approved or
denied for payment under the Expanded Care Program.
(E) The number of applicants who were initially denied
payment but were later approved on appeal.
(F) The average length of time, from the time of
application, for an applicant to receive a determination from
the Expanded Care Program, aggregated by qualifying injuries
and qualifying injuries to the brain.
(2) Priority cases.--
(A) A detailed list of priority cases of anomalous health
incidents, including, for each incident, locations, dates,
times, and circumstances.
(B) For each priority case listed in accordance with
subparagraph (A), a detailed explanation of each credible
alternative explanation that the Agency assigned to the
incident, including--
(i) how the incident was discovered;
(ii) how the incident was assigned within the Agency; and
(iii) whether an individual affected by the incident is
provided an opportunity to appeal the credible alternative
explanation.
(C) For each priority case of an anomalous health incident
determined to be largely consistent with the definition of
``anomalous health incident'' established by the National
Academy of Sciences and for which the Agency does not have a
credible alternative explanation, a detailed description of
such case.
(3) Anomalous health incident sensors.--
(A) A list of all types of sensors that the Agency has
developed or deployed with respect to reports of anomalous
health incidents, including, for each type of sensor, the
deployment location, the date and the duration of the
employment of such type of sensor, and, if applicable, the
reason for removal.
(B) A list of entities to which the Agency has provided
unrestricted access to data associated with anomalous health
incidents.
(C) A list of requests for support the Agency has received
from elements of the Federal Government regarding sensor
development, testing, or deployment, and a description of the
support provided in each case.
(D) A description of all emitter signatures obtained by
sensors associated with anomalous health incidents in Agency
holdings since 2016, including--
(i) the identification of any of such emitters that the
Agency prioritizes as a threat; and
(ii) an explanation of such prioritization.
(d) Additional Submissions.--Concurrent with the submission
of the report required by subsection (b), the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives--
(1) a template of each form required to apply for the
Expanded Care Program, including with respect to payments for
a qualifying injury or a qualifying injury to the brain;
(2) copies of internal guidance used by the Agency to
adjudicate claims for the Expanded Care Program, including
with respect to payments for a qualifying injury to the
brain;
(3) the case file of each applicant to the Expanded Care
Program who applied due to a reported anomalous health
incident, including supporting medical documentation, with
name and other identifying information redacted;
(4) copies of all informational and instructional materials
provided to employees of and other individuals affiliated
with the Agency with respect to applying for the Expanded
Care Program; and
(5) copies of Agency guidance provided to employees of and
other individuals affiliated with the Agency with respect to
reporting and responding to a suspected anomalous health
incident, and the roles and responsibilities of each element
of the Agency tasked with responding to a report of an
anomalous health incident.
(e) Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall brief the congressional
intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives on the report.

TITLE X--ELECTION SECURITY

SEC. 1001. STRENGTHENING ELECTION CYBERSECURITY TO UPHOLD
RESPECT FOR ELECTIONS THROUGH INDEPENDENT
TESTING ACT OF 2023.

(a) Requiring Penetration Testing as Part of the Testing
and Certification of

[[Page S3641]]

Voting Systems.--Section 231 of the Help America Vote Act of
2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(e) Required Penetration Testing.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this subsection, the Commission shall
provide for the conduct of penetration testing as part of the
testing, certification, decertification, and recertification
of voting system hardware and software by accredited
laboratories under this section.
``(2) Accreditation.--The Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology shall recommend to the
Commission entities the Director proposes be accredited to
carry out penetration testing under this subsection and
certify compliance with the penetration testing-related
guidelines required by this subsection. The Commission shall
vote on the accreditation of any entity recommended. The
requirements for such accreditation shall be a subset of the
requirements for accreditation of laboratories under
subsection (b) and shall only be based on consideration of an
entity's competence to conduct penetration testing under this
subsection.''.
(b) Independent Security Testing and Coordinated
Cybersecurity Vulnerability Disclosure Program for Election
Systems.--
(1) In general.--Subtitle D of title II of the Help America
Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15401 et seq.) is amended by
adding at the end the following new part:

``PART 7--INDEPENDENT SECURITY TESTING AND COORDINATED CYBERSECURITY
VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE PILOT PROGRAM FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS

``SEC. 297. INDEPENDENT SECURITY TESTING AND COORDINATED
CYBERSECURITY VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE PILOT
PROGRAM FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS.

``(a) In General.--
``(1) Establishment.--The Commission, in consultation with
the Secretary, shall establish an Independent Security
Testing and Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Pilot
Program for Election Systems (VDP-E) (in this section
referred to as the `program') in order to test for and
disclose cybersecurity vulnerabilities in election systems.
``(2) Duration.--The program shall be conducted for a
period of 5 years.
``(3) Requirements.--In carrying out the program, the
Commission, in consultation with the Secretary, shall--
``(A) establish a mechanism by which an election systems
vendor may make their election system (including voting
machines and source code) available to cybersecurity
researchers participating in the program;
``(B) provide for the vetting of cybersecurity researchers
prior to their participation in the program, including the
conduct of background checks;
``(C) establish terms of participation that--
``(i) describe the scope of testing permitted under the
program;
``(ii) require researchers to--

``(I) notify the vendor, the Commission, and the Secretary
of any cybersecurity vulnerability they identify with respect
to an election system; and
``(II) otherwise keep such vulnerability confidential for
180 days after such notification;

``(iii) require the good faith participation of all
participants in the program;
``(iv) require an election system vendor, within 180 days
after validating notification of a critical or high
vulnerability (as defined by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology) in an election system of the
vendor, to--

``(I) send a patch or propound some other fix or mitigation
for such vulnerability to the appropriate State and local
election officials, in consultation with the researcher who
discovered it; and
``(II) notify the Commission and the Secretary that such
patch has been sent to such officials;

``(D) in the case where a patch or fix to address a
vulnerability disclosed under subparagraph (C)(ii)(I) is
intended to be applied to a system certified by the
Commission, provide--
``(i) for the expedited review of such patch or fix within
90 days after receipt by the Commission; and
``(ii) if such review is not completed by the last day of
such 90 day period, that such patch or fix shall be deemed to
be certified by the Commission, subject to any subsequent
review of such determination by the Commission; and
``(E) 180 days after the disclosure of a vulnerability
under subparagraph (C)(ii)(I), notify the Director of the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the
vulnerability for inclusion in the database of Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures.
``(4) Voluntary participation; safe harbor.--
``(A) Voluntary participation.--Participation in the
program shall be voluntary for election systems vendors and
researchers.
``(B) Safe harbor.--When conducting research under this
program, such research and subsequent publication shall be
considered to be:
``(i) Authorized in accordance with section 1030 of title
18, United States Code (commonly known as the `Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act'), (and similar state laws), and the election
system vendor will not initiate or support legal action
against the researcher for accidental, good faith violations
of the program.
``(ii) Exempt from the anti-circumvention rule of section
1201 of title 17, United States Code (commonly known as the
`Digital Millennium Copyright Act'), and the election system
vendor will not bring a claim against a researcher for
circumvention of technology controls.
``(C) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this paragraph may
be construed to limit or otherwise affect any exception to
the general prohibition against the circumvention of
technological measures under subparagraph (A) of section
1201(a)(1) of title 17, United States Code, including with
respect to any use that is excepted from that general
prohibition by the Librarian of Congress under subparagraphs
(B) through (D) of such section 1201(a)(1).
``(5) Exempt from disclosure.--Cybersecurity
vulnerabilities discovered under the program shall be exempt
from section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly
referred to as the Freedom of Information Act).
``(6) Definitions.--In this subsection:
``(A) Cybersecurity vulnerability.--The term `cybersecurity
vulnerability' means, with respect to an election system, any
security vulnerability that affects the election system.
``(B) Election infrastructure.--The term `election
infrastructure' means--
``(i) storage facilities, polling places, and centralized
vote tabulation locations used to support the administration
of elections for public office; and
``(ii) related information and communications technology,
including--

``(I) voter registration databases;
``(II) election management systems;
``(III) voting machines;
``(IV) electronic mail and other communications systems
(including electronic mail and other systems of vendors who
have entered into contracts with election agencies to support
the administration of elections, manage the election process,
and report and display election results); and
``(V) other systems used to manage the election process and
to report and display election results on behalf of an
election agency.

``(C) Election system.--The term `election system' means
any information system that is part of an election
infrastructure, including any related information and
communications technology described in subparagraph (B)(ii).
``(D) Election system vendor.--The term `election system
vendor' means any person providing, supporting, or
maintaining an election system on behalf of a State or local
election official.
``(E) Information system.--The term `information system'
has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44,
United States Code.
``(F) Secretary.--The term `Secretary' means the Secretary
of Homeland Security.
``(G) Security vulnerability.--The term `security
vulnerability' has the meaning given the term in section 102
of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6
U.S.C. 1501).''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents of such Act
is amended by adding at the end of the items relating to
subtitle D of title II the following:

``PART 7--Independent Security Testing and Coordinated Cybersecurity
Vulnerability Disclosure Program for Election Systems

``Sec. 297. Independent security testing and coordinated cybersecurity
vulnerability disclosure program for election systems.''.

TITLE XI--OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 1101. MODIFICATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENT FOR ALL-
DOMAIN ANOMALY RESOLUTION OFFICE.

Section 1683(k)(1) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373(k)(1)), as amended
by section 6802(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263), is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``Director of national
intelligence and secretary of defense'' and inserting ``All-
domain anomaly resolution office''; and
(2) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``Director of National
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly'' and
inserting ``Director of the Office shall''.

SEC. 1102. FUNDING LIMITATIONS RELATING TO UNIDENTIFIED
ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' means--
(A) the majority leader of the Senate;
(B) the minority leader of the Senate;
(C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
(D) the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

[[Page S3642]]

(3) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of
the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office.
(4) Unidentified anomalous phenomena.--The term
``unidentified anomalous phenomena'' has the meaning given
such term in section 1683(n) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373(n)),
as amended by section 6802(a) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263).
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that,
due to the increasing potential for technology surprise from
foreign adversaries and to ensure sufficient integration
across the United States industrial base and avoid technology
and security stovepipes--
(1) the United States industrial base must retain its
global lead in critical advanced technologies; and
(2) the Federal Government must expand awareness about any
historical exotic technology antecedents previously provided
by the Federal Government for research and development
purposes.
(c) Limitations.--No amount authorized to be appropriated
by this Act may be obligated or expended, directly or
indirectly, in part or in whole, for, on, in relation to, or
in support of activities involving unidentified anomalous
phenomena protected under any form of special access or
restricted access limitations that have not been formally,
officially, explicitly, and specifically described,
explained, and justified to the appropriate committees of
Congress, congressional leadership, and the Director,
including for any activities relating to the following:
(1) Recruiting, employing, training, equipping, and
operations of, and providing security for, government or
contractor personnel with a primary, secondary, or
contingency mission of capturing, recovering, and securing
unidentified anomalous phenomena craft or pieces and
components of such craft.
(2) Analyzing such craft or pieces or components thereof,
including for the purpose of determining properties, material
composition, method of manufacture, origin, characteristics,
usage and application, performance, operational modalities,
or reverse engineering of such craft or component technology.
(3) Managing and providing security for protecting
activities and information relating to unidentified anomalous
phenomena from disclosure or compromise.
(4) Actions relating to reverse engineering or replicating
unidentified anomalous phenomena technology or performance
based on analysis of materials or sensor and observational
information associated with unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(5) The development of propulsion technology, or aerospace
craft that uses propulsion technology, systems, or
subsystems, that is based on or derived from or inspired by
inspection, analysis, or reverse engineering of recovered
unidentified anomalous phenomena craft or materials.
(6) Any aerospace craft that uses propulsion technology
other than chemical propellants, solar power, or electric ion
thrust.
(d) Notification and Reporting.--Any person currently or
formerly under contract with the Federal Government that has
in their possession material or information provided by or
derived from the Federal Government relating to unidentified
anomalous phenomena that formerly or currently is protected
by any form of special access or restricted access shall--
(1) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, notify the Director of such possession; and
(2) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, make available to the Director for assessment,
analysis, and inspection--
(A) all such material and information; and
(B) a comprehensive list of all non-earth origin or exotic
unidentified anomalous phenomena material.
(e) Liability.--No criminal or civil action may lie or be
maintained in any Federal or State court against any person
for receiving material or information described in subsection
(d) if that person complies with the notification and
reporting provisions described in such subsection.
(f) Limitation Regarding Independent Research and
Development.--
(1) In general.--Consistent with Department of Defense
Instruction Number 3204.01 (dated August 20, 2014,
incorporating change 2, dated July 9, 2020; relating to
Department policy for oversight of independent research and
development), independent research and development funding
relating to material or information described in subsection
(c) shall not be allowable as indirect expenses for purposes
of contracts covered by such instruction, unless such
material and information is made available to the Director in
accordance with subsection (d).
(2) Effective date and applicability.--Paragraph (1) shall
take effect on the date that is 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and shall apply with respect to funding
from amounts appropriated before, on, or after such date.
(g) Notice to Congress.--Not later than 30 days after the
date on which the Director has received a notification under
paragraph (1) of subsection (d) or information or material
under paragraph (2) of such subsection, the Director shall
provide written notification of such receipt to the
appropriate committees of Congress, the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the
Committee on Oversight and Accountability of the House of
Representatives, and congressional leadership.
______