S.Amdt. 595

SA 595. Mr. MARKEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by
him to the bill S. 2226, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2024 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place in title XV, insert the following:

SEC. ___. INVESTING IN CURES BEFORE MISSILES ACT OF 2023.

(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the
``Investing in Cures Before Missiles Act of 2023'' or the
``ICBM Act''.
(b) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) According to the Congressional Budget Office, the
projected cost to sustain and modernize the United States
nuclear arsenal, as of 2017, ``is $1.2 trillion in 2017
dollars over the 2017-2046 period: more than $800 billion to
operate and sustain (that is, incrementally upgrade) nuclear
forces and about $400 billion to modernize them''. With
inflation, the cost rises to $1,700,000,000,000 and does not
include the cost of the additional nuclear capabilities
proposed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.
(2) The Government Accountability Office found in July 2020
that the Department of Defense and the National Nuclear
Security Administration have still not taken meaningful steps
to address affordability concerns or heeded the Government
Accountability Office's recommendation to consider
``deferring the start of or cancelling specific modernization
programs'', including the W87-1 warhead modification program,
to address increases in the weapons activities budget
requests of the National Nuclear Security Administration.
(3) The LGM-35A Sentinel weapon system (formerly known as
the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent) is expected to cost
between $93,100,000,000 and $95,800,000,000, which does not
include the cost of the W87-1 warhead modification program or
the cost to produce new plutonium pits for the warhead. The
total estimated life cycle cost of the LGM-35A Sentinel
weapon system is $264,000,000,000, and the program is
intended to replace 400 deployed Minuteman III missiles with
more than 600 new missiles, to allow for test flights and
spares.
(4) The Air Force awarded a sole-source contract to
Northrop Grumman for the engineering and manufacturing
component of the LGM-35A Sentinel weapon system in September
2020, raising concerns that the absence of competition for
the award may result in higher than projected costs to United
States taxpayers.
(5) The National Nuclear Security Administration is also in
the early stages of developing a replacement intercontinental
ballistic missile warhead, the W87-1, and expanding plutonium
pit production to build new warhead cores, costing at least
$12,000,000,000 and $9,000,000,000, respectively, to meet the
modernization needs of the LGM-35A Sentinel weapon system.
(6) Maintaining and updating the current Minuteman III
missiles is possible for multiple decades and, according to
the Congressional Budget Office, through 2036, this would
cost $37,000,000,000 less in 2017 dollars than developing and
deploying the LGM-35A Sentinel weapon system. The
Congressional Budget Office estimates that between 2021 and
2030, the United States has budgeted $82,000,000,000 for
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
(7) A public opinion poll conducted from October 12 to 28,
2020, by ReThink Media and the Federation of American
Scientists found that only 26 percent of registered voters in
the United States preferred replacing the Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missile with the LGM-35A Sentinel
weapon system, as compared to 60 percent of registered voters
who opposed replacing the Minuteman III missile.
(8) On April 3, 2019, Lieutenant General Richard M. Clark,
then-Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence
and Nuclear Integration, noted in testimony before the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives
that we have ``one more opportunity'' to conduct life
extension on the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic
missile, indicating the technical feasibility of extending
the Minuteman III missile despite his stated preference for
the LGM-35A Sentinel weapon system.
(9) Even in the absence of an intercontinental ballistic
missile leg of the triad, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
signaled that the United States would have an assured
retaliatory capability in the form of several ballistic
missile submarines, which are, ``at present, virtually
undetectable, and there are no known, near-term credible
threats to

[[Page S2708]]

the survivability of the [ballistic missile submarine]
force'', a benefit that will be enhanced as the Department of
Defense moves to replace the Ohio class ballistic submarine
fleet with the new Columbia class ballistic missile fleet.
(10) While intercontinental ballistic missiles had
historically been the most responsive leg of the United
States nuclear triad, advances in ballistic missile submarine
communications to allow for the dissemination of emergency
action messages in wartime have negated that advantage.
(11) Intercontinental ballistic missiles cannot be
recalled, leaving decision makers with mere minutes to decide
whether to launch the missiles before they are destroyed,
known as a posture of ``launch on warning'' or ``launch under
attack'' in the face of a perceived nuclear attack, greatly
increasing the risk of a national leader initiating a nuclear
war by mistake.
(12) In 1983, Stanislav Petrov, a former lieutenant colonel
of the Soviet Air Defense Forces correctly identified a false
warning in an early warning system that showed several United
States incoming nuclear missiles, preventing Soviet leaders
from launching a retaliatory response, earning Colonel Petrov
the nickname ``the man who saved the world''.
(13) Former Secretary of Defense William Perry, who once
briefed President Bill Clinton on a suspected Russian first
nuclear strike, wrote that the ground-based leg of the
nuclear triad is ``destabilizing because it invites an
attack'' and intercontinental ballistic missiles are ``some
of the most dangerous weapons in the world'' and ``could even
trigger an accidental nuclear war''.
(14) General James Cartwright, former vice chair of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of the United
States Strategic Command, wrote, with Secretary Perry,
``[T]he greatest danger is not a Russian bolt but a US
blunder--that we might accidentally stumble into nuclear war.
As we make decisions about which weapons to buy, we should
use this simple rule: If a nuclear weapon increases the risk
of accidental war and is not needed to deter an intentional
attack, we should not build it. . . . Certain nuclear
weapons, such as . . . the [intercontinental ballistic
missile], carry higher risks of accidental war that,
fortunately, we no longer need to bear. We are safer without
these expensive weapons, and it would be foolish to replace
them.''.
(15) General George Lee Butler, the former Commander-in-
Chief of the Strategic Air Command and subsequently
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Strategic Command,
said, ``I would have removed land-based missiles from our
arsenal a long time ago. I'd be happy to put that mission on
the submarines. So, with a significant fraction of bombers
having a nuclear weapons capability that can be restored to
alert very quickly, and with even a small component of
Trident submarines--with all those missiles and all those
warheads on patrol--it's hard to imagine we couldn't get
by.''.
(16) While a sudden ``bolt from the blue'' first strike
from a near-peer nuclear adversary is a highly unlikely
scenario, extending the Minuteman III would maintain the
purported role of the intercontinental ballistic missile leg
of the triad to absorb such an attack.
(c) Statement of Policy on Extension of Lifespan of
Minuteman III and Developing a Vaccine of Mass Prevention.--
It is the policy of the United States that--
(1) the operational life of the Minuteman III missiles can
be safely extended until at least 2050; and
(2) investments in developing a universal coronavirus
vaccine and efforts to save lives from other types of
infectious diseases are a better use of United States
taxpayer resources than building a new and unnecessary
intercontinental ballistic missile.
(d) Availability of Funds for Vaccines Instead of
Missiles.--
(1) Transfer from department of defense.--Of the
unobligated balances of appropriations made available for the
Department of Defense for the research, development, test,
and evaluation of the LGM-35A Sentinel weapon system, the
Secretary of Defense shall transfer $1,000,000,000 to the
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases to
conduct or support comprehensive research for the development
of a universal coronavirus vaccine.
(2) Transfer from national nuclear security
administration.--The Secretary of Energy shall transfer all
unobligated balances of appropriations made available for the
National Nuclear Security Administration for the W87-1
warhead modification program to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention to research and combat emerging and
zoonotic infectious diseases.
(e) Prohibition on Use of Funds for LGM-35A Sentinel Weapon
System and W87-1 Warhead Modification Program.--None of the
funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available for fiscal year 2024 may be obligated or expended
for the LGM-35A Sentinel weapon system or the W87-1 warhead
modification program.
(f) Independent Study on Extension of Minuteman III
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.--
(1) Independent study.--Not later than 30 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense
shall seek to enter into a contract with the National Academy
of Sciences to conduct a study on extending the life of
Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles to 2050.
(2) Matters included.--The study under paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A comparison of the costs through 2050 of--
(i) extending the life of Minuteman III intercontinental
ballistic missiles; and
(ii) deploying the LGM-35A Sentinel weapon system.
(B) An analysis of opportunities to incorporate
technologies into the Minuteman III intercontinental
ballistic missile program as part of a service life extension
program that could also be incorporated in the future LGM-35A
Sentinel weapon system, including, at a minimum,
opportunities to increase the resilience against adversary
missile defenses.
(C) An analysis of the benefits and risks of incorporating
sensors and nondestructive testing methods and technologies
to reduce destructive testing requirements and increase the
service life and number of Minuteman III missiles through
2050.
(D) An analysis and validation of the methods used to
estimate the operational service life of Minuteman II and
Minuteman III motors, taking into account the test and launch
experience of motors retired after the operational service
life of such motors in the rocket systems launch program.
(E) An analysis of the risks and benefits of alternative
methods of estimating the operational service life of
Minuteman III motors, such as those methods based on
fundamental physical and chemical processes and
nondestructive measurements of individual motor properties.
(F) An analysis of risks, benefits, and costs of
configuring a Trident II D5 submarine launched ballistic
missile for deployment in a Minuteman III silo.
(G) An analysis of the impacts of the estimated service
life of the Minuteman III force associated with decreasing
the deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles delivery
vehicle force from 400 to 300.
(H) An assessment on the degree to which the Columbia class
ballistic missile submarines will possess features that will
enhance the current invulnerability of ballistic missile
submarines of the United States to future antisubmarine
warfare threats.
(I) An analysis of the degree to which an extension of the
Minuteman III would impact the decision of Russian Federation
to target intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United
States in a crisis, as compared to proceeding with the LGM-
35A Sentinel weapon system.
(J) A best case estimate of what percentage of the
strategic forces of the United States would survive a
counterforce strike from the Russian Federation, broken down
by intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile
submarines, and heavy bomber aircraft.
(K) The benefits, risks, and costs of relying on the W-78
warhead for either the Minuteman III or a new LGM-35A
Sentinel weapon system missile as compared to proceeding with
the W-87 life extension.
(L) The benefits, risks, and costs of adding additional
launchers or uploading submarine-launched ballistic missiles
with additional warheads to compensate for a reduced
deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles of the
United States.
(3) Submission to department of defense.--Not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
National Academy of Sciences shall submit to the Secretary a
report containing the study conducted under paragraph (1).
(4) Submission to congress.--Not later than 210 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall
transmit to the appropriate congressional committees the
report required by paragraph (3), without change.
(5) Form.--The report required by paragraph (3) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(g) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
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