S.Amdt. 3621Senate119th Congress (2025-2027)
S.Amdt. 3621
Sponsored by
Sen. James E. Risch (R-ID)
Submitted August 1, 2025
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Senate amendment submitted
August 1, 2025
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SA 3621. Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2296, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2026 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of title XII, add the following: Subtitle F--Artificial Intelligence Diplomacy SEC. 1271. DEFINITIONS. In this subtitle: (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives. (2) Artificial intelligence system.--The term ``artificial intelligence system'' means the set of components and tools that collectively enable the development, deployment, and operation of artificial intelligence, including-- (A) infrastructure; (B) data used for training, validating, and testing artificial intelligence models; (C) data used for inference; (D) artificial intelligence models; (E) artificial intelligence development tools; and (F) artificial intelligence applications. (3) Covered foreign country.--The term ``covered foreign country'' means-- (A) the People's Republic of China; (B) the Russian Federation; (C) the Islamic Republic of Iran; (D) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; (E) the Republic of Cuba; (F) the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela under the regime of Nicolas Maduro; and (G) any other country determined by the President, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Commerce to present a risk of diversion, misuse, or transfer of sensitive technologies as a result of the country's strategic alignment, trade relationships, or technology cooperation with any country specified in any of subparagraphs (A) through (F). (4) Dual-use.--The term ``dual-use'' has the meaning given that term in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801). SEC. 1272. ENHANCEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROTECTIONS. (a) Assessment of Technology Transfer Risks; Strategy Development.-- (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall coordinate with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, and the heads of other relevant agencies-- (A) to assess-- (i) the effectiveness of existing technology transfer protection measures, including initiatives to mitigate the risks of technology transfer in-- (I) basic and applied research; (II) higher education and academic partnerships; (III) collaboration with respect to dual-use technology with, and exports to, foreign entities; and (IV) activities by covered foreign countries; and (ii) the creation of and progress in implementing new technology transfer protection measures; and (B) to develop a plan, to be known as the ``Technology Diplomacy Strategic Plan for an Artificial Intelligence Global Alliance'', that aligns incentives and policy levers across the Federal Government to induce key allies of the United States to adopt artificial intelligence protection systems and export controls across the artificial intelligence supply chain. (2) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the assessment required by subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) and the plan required by subparagraph (B) of that paragraph. (b) Expansion of Export Control Frameworks to Address Technology Transfer Risks.-- (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the heads of other relevant agencies, conduct an assessment of the capacity of existing multilateral and plurilateral export control frameworks to address the risks of technology transfer, including-- (A) the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies; (B) the trilateral agreement between the United States, the Netherlands, and Japan with respect to export controls on advanced artificial intelligence and semiconductor technology; (C) the Missile Technology Control Regime; (D) the Australia Group; and (E) the Multilateral Action on Sensitive Technologies (MAST) dialogues. (2) Elements.--In conducting the assessment required by paragraph (1), the Secretary shall-- (A) identify gaps in coverage of existing frameworks in coordinating export controls for the purpose of limiting artificial intelligence systems from flowing to covered foreign countries; [[Page S5388]] (B) assess diplomatic initiatives and next steps to fill gaps through new or expanded plurilateral export controls; and (C) analyze options for enforcement if nationals of countries that are partners of the United States undermine United States export control objectives. (3) Report on assessment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the assessment conducted under paragraph (1) that includes recommendations with respect to the matters described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of paragraph (2). SEC. 1273. PROMOTION OF EXPORTS OF UNITED STATES ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. (a) Report on Efforts to Promote Artificial Intelligence Exports.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that includes the following: (1) A list of countries or regions in which exports of United States-origin artificial intelligence systems have been promoted. (2) A description of financing mechanisms for such exports. (3) An assessment of challenges encountered in advancing artificial intelligence export diplomacy and financing, including an evaluation of-- (A) the effectiveness of diplomatic activities with foreign governments to promote demand for United States-origin artificial intelligence systems; (B) coordination across United States embassies, including economic officers and cyber and technology diplomats at such embassies, to identify demand for such systems in partner countries and facilitate high-level discussions with respect to the export of such systems; and (C) coordination within the Department of State and with relevant interagency counterparts to facilitate artificial intelligence export diplomacy. (4) Recommendations for additional authorities or funding needed to advance efforts to promote such exports. (5) Promotion activities, where appropriate, with respect to the inclusion of local technical assistance and deployment readiness support as part of artificial intelligence export packages, particularly in developing partner countries, to ensure effective and secure integration of United States technologies. (6) Supporting partner countries in fostering pro- innovation regulatory, data, and infrastructure environments conducive to the deployment of United States-origin artificial intelligence systems. (7) An assessment of-- (A) how security controls and technology protection measures, consistent with the security standards described in subsection (b)(1), have been incorporated into transactions for the export of United States-origin artificial intelligence systems; and (B) actions taken to monitor and evaluate exports of such systems, including-- (i) risks assessments; (ii) validating compliance with security protections; (iii) procedures for suspension or review of exports if national security risks are identified, such as chip diversion or loss of control; and (iv) verification of end-users and intended end-use cases for artificial intelligence export packages, with particular scrutiny for exports involving-- (I) surveillance; (II) cyber threats to the United States and allies of the United States; (III) nefarious information operations; or (IV) other sensitive applications that may be inconsistent with the national security interests of the United States or of countries that are partners of the United States. (b) Report on Interagency Security Standards.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses the activities required to achieve the following security standards for artificial intelligence export packages: (1) Export control harmonization with the governments of countries that are allies of the United States and restrictions on reexports to covered foreign countries. (2) Coordination on outbound investment restrictions and inbound investment screening with the governments of countries importing United States-origin artificial intelligence systems. (3) Requirements that model weights and sensitive components be hosted on cloud infrastructure controlled by the United States or an ally of the United States and with appropriate access controls. (4) Prohibition on integration or interoperability with military infrastructure linked to a covered foreign country. (5) Know-Your-Customer protocols for computer infrastructure recipients, including beneficial ownership disclosure and personnel screening. (6) Enforcement of access control, encryption, and traceability of model development and use. (7) Monitoring, logging, and auditability of administrative and developer access to exported artificial intelligence systems. (8) Provisions allowing revocation of exports of artificial intelligence systems for security violations, including diversion of such systems. (9) Transparency and compliance assurance measures across the life cycle of exports of United States-origin artificial intelligence systems. (10) Any additional security objectives determined appropriate by the Secretary of State. (c) Congressional Oversight.--The Secretary of State shall notify the appropriate committees of Congress of any proposed transactions for the export of artificial intelligence facilitated under this section that-- (1) exceeds $20,000,000 in value; or (2) involves the export of dual-use artificial intelligence systems with potential national security implications. ______