S.Amdt. 5935

SA 5935. Mr. BARRASSO (for himself and Mrs. Shaheen) submitted an
amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities
of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for
defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which
was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place in title XII, insert the
following:

Subtitle __ Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026

SEC. __1. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Strategic Subsea Cables
Act of 2026''.

SEC. __2. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given the
term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code.
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(3) Appropriate federal agencies.--The term ``appropriate
Federal agencies'' means the following:
(A) The Department of Commerce.
(B) The Department of Defense.
(C) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(D) The Department of State.
(E) The Federal Communications Commission.
(F) The Department of the Treasury.
(G) The Department of Justice.
(H) Any additional Federal agencies, as determined by the
President.
(4) Critical undersea infrastructure.--The term ``critical
undersea infrastructure'' refers to both subsea
communications infrastructure and subsea energy
infrastructure.
(5) Interagency committee.--The term ``interagency
committee'' means the entity established under section
__1(b).
(6) Non-federal entity.--The term ``non-Federal entity''
means any nongovernmental entity that is an individual,
organization, or business involved in the operation,
maintenance, repair, or construction of critical undersea
infrastructure, including critical undersea infrastructure
owners.
(7) Sabotage.--The term ``sabotage'' means actions, or
preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to
cause defective production, operation, or damage to critical
undersea infrastructure, including the confidentiality,
availability, and integrity of data transmitted via subsea
communications infrastructure.
(8) Subsea energy infrastructure.--The term ``subsea energy
infrastructure'' means a subsea cable, pipeline, or other
equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed,
including--
(A) to transmit electricity, including via subsea
electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or
equipment related to the support of offshore energy
production installations;
(B) to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between
land-based or off-shore infrastructure; and
(C) associated landing stations and facilities.
(9) Subsea communications infrastructure.--The term
``subsea communications infrastructure'' has the same meaning
as ``submarine cable system'', as defined in section
1.70001(h) of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, and any
subsequent update to such meaning.

PART I--INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON CRITICAL UNDERSEA
INFRASTRUCTURE

SEC. __1. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure poses a
growing threat to United States and allied security and
economic prosperity.
(2) In recent years, numerous critical undersea
infrastructure sites were destroyed or damaged, including--
(A) in January 2022, the reported damage to subsea
communications infrastructure connecting the Norwegian
mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, home of
SvalSAT, the largest commercial satellite ground station on
Earth;
(B) in September 2022, the reported damage to 3 of the 4
trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas
pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast of the Danish
island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea;
(C) in February 2023, the reported damage to subsea
communications infrastructure connecting the main island of
Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait;
(D) in October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to-
Estonia Balticconnector natural gas pipeline spanning the
Gulf of Finland, in addition to the reported damage to subsea
communications cables connecting Estonia and Sweden and
Finland and Estonia;
(E) in November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-
to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea communications cables and the
Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea communications cable in the
central Baltic Sea;
(F) in December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-
to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable
and nearby subsea communications cables in the Gulf of
Finland;
(G) in January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans-
Pacific Express subsea communications cable connecting Taiwan
to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan;
(H) in February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea
communications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan
with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait;
(I) in January 2026, the reported damage to subsea
communications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea
linking Liepaja and Sventoji; and
(J) in January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa cable
connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel named the
Fitburg.
(3) In February 2024, NATO Defense Ministers established
the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network to coordinate
information and threat intelligence sharing among private and
public sector actors to protect critical undersea
infrastructure.
(4) In January 2025, following critical undersea
infrastructure sabotage in the Baltic Sea in December 2024,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched Baltic
Sentry to strengthen the protection of critical undersea
infrastructure.
(5) On February 21, 2025, the European Union published an
EU Action Plan on Cable Security to include the development
and deployment of an Integrated Surveillance Mechanism for
Submarine cables work to establish a dedicated regional hub
in the Baltic Sea to serve as a test bed of the integrated
surveillance approach.
(6) The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN)
published guidelines for Strengthening Resilience and Repair
of Submarine Cables and most recently announced plans to
``build a secure, diverse and resilient submarine cable
network'' and ``to facilitate the expeditious deployment,
repair, maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine
cables, between ASEAN Member States''.
(7) On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by the United
States, India, Japan, and Australia, met to reaffirm its
commitment to the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and
Resilience. In the meeting, the Quad underscored the need for
digital infrastructure collaboration, organizing a subsea
cables forum to be hosted by the United States and India and
encouraging regulatory harmonization between Quad partners.
Through this initiative, the Quad seeks to defend and promote
resilient, secure, and transparent digital infrastructure
across the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. __2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) critical undersea infrastructure represents vital
strategic and economic links

[[Page S3081]]

between the United States and its partners and allies;
(2) according to NATO, ``undersea cables carry an estimated
$10 trillion in transfers every day; two-thirds of the
world's oil and gas is either extracted at sea or transported
by sea; and around 95 percent of global data flows are
transmitted via undersea cables'';
(3) since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022,
there has been a marked increase in high-profile suspected
sabotage incidents resulting in damage to critical undersea
infrastructure, especially across Northern Europe and East
Asia;
(4) the United States Government has an important role to
play in advancing United States interests in international
bodies that oversee the protection of critical undersea
infrastructure, including promoting network resilience and
redundancy, and advancing regulations in support of these
goals;
(5) the United States Government should play a more active
role in NATO initiatives such as the NATO Maritime Centre for
the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure, the
Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell, the
Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network, and the NATO-EU
Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure,
allied maritime security efforts such as the Joint
Expeditionary Force, Indo-Pacific initiatives, including the
Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, and
international organizations such as the International Cable
Protection Committee (ICPC), in order to advance United
States national security and economic interests;
(6) the United States should lead efforts to promote the
deployment of resilient critical undersea infrastructure
networks, enhance situational awareness, strengthen
preparedness, and formalize collective responses among allies
and partners through enhanced information sharing and
coordination; and
(7) while critical undersea infrastructure owners and other
associated private sector stakeholders carry significant
responsibility in safeguarding this infrastructure, the
United States Government and allied foreign governments need
to play a greater role.

SEC. __3. ENHANCING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT WITH
RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL BODIES TO SAFEGUARD
UNITED STATES INTERESTS.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination
with the interagency committee, as appropriate, shall seek to
increase United States Government engagement with relevant
international bodies to advance United States national
security and economic interests as it relates to critical
undersea infrastructure.
(b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years,
the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees that includes the
following:
(1) A description of how increased United States Government
engagement with relevant international bodies, including in
coordination with the United States domestic subsea cable
industry, could support United States national security
objectives as it relates to the protection of critical
undersea infrastructure.
(2) A description of key objectives for promoting and
protecting United States national security interests within
relevant international bodies.
(3) A description of how the People's Republic of China
entities leverage their engagement with relevant
international bodies to further their strategic interests.
(4) A description of how encouraging other countries and
regional bodies to engage with relevant international bodies
can better ensure coordinated, consistent global subsea
communications infrastructure policies.
(5) A description of international bodies relevant for
critical undersea infrastructure where the United States
should increase its diplomatic engagement.

SEC. __4. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL
UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE.

(a) In General.--The President, in coordination with the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall
impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect
to any foreign person that the President determines, on or
after the date of the enactment of this Act, is responsible
for acts of sabotage or facilitates acts of sabotage against
critical undersea infrastructure, including--
(1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of
which knowingly--
(A) commits acts of sabotage; or
(B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical support,
security, or other services that facilitate or enable an act
of sabotage; and
(2) any foreign person that the President determines
knowingly--
(A) owns, operates, or manages the vessel or entity
described in paragraph (1);
(B) provides underwriting services or insurance or
reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity;
(C) facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to
support a vessel or entity described in paragraph (1);
(D) provides port or logistics services or facilities for
technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or
retrofitting or tethering of, a vessel described in paragraph
(1) for the purpose of evading sanctions;
(E) provides documentation, registration, or flagging
services for a vessel described in paragraph (1) for the
purpose of evading sanctions; or
(F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or senior
leadership of such a vessel or entity.
(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are the following:
(1) Blocking of property.--The President may exercise all
of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary
to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and
interests in property of a foreign person described in
subsection (a), if such property and interests in property
are in the United States, come within the United States, or
are or come within the possession or control of a United
States person.
(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--
(A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien described in
subsection (a) shall be--
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to
enter the United States; and
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into
the United States or to receive any other benefit under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(B) Current visas revoked.--
(i) In general.--The visa or other entry documentation of
an alien described in subsection (a) shall be revoked,
regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is
or was issued.
(ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under clause (i)
shall--

(I) take effect immediately; and
(II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry
documentation that is in the possession of the alien.

(c) Implementation; Penalties.--
(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702
and 1704) to carry out this section.
(2) Penalties.--The penalties provided for in subsections
(b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to any
person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to
violate, or causes a violation of any prohibition of this
section, or an order or regulation prescribed under this
section, to the same extent that such penalties apply to a
person that commits an unlawful act described in section
206(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1705(a)).
(d) Exceptions.--
(1) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters
agreement and law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under
this section shall not apply with respect to the admission or
parole of an alien to the United States if admitting or
paroling the alien is necessary--
(A) to permit the United States to comply with the
Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations,
signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force
November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United
States, or other applicable international obligations of the
United States; or
(B) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement
activity in the United States.
(2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.--
Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity
subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any
authorized intelligence activities of the United States.
(3) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
(A) In general.--A requirement to block and prohibit all
transactions in all property and interests in property under
this section shall not include the authority or requirement
to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.
(B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term ``good''
means any article, natural or manmade substance, material,
supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test
equipment, and excluding technical data.
(4) Exception for humanitarian assistance.--Sanctions under
this section shall not apply to--
(A) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the
provision of agricultural commodities, food, medicine,
medical devices, or humanitarian assistance, or for
humanitarian purposes; or
(B) transactions that are necessary for or related to the
activities described in subparagraph (A).
(5) Exception for safety of vessels and crew.--Sanctions
under this section shall not apply with respect to a person
providing provisions to a vessel otherwise subject to
sanctions under this section if such provisions are intended
for the safety and care of the crew aboard the vessel, the
protection of human life aboard the vessel, or the
maintenance of the vessel to avoid any environmental or other
significant damage.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Admission; admitted; alien.--The terms ``admission'',
``admitted'', and ``alien'' have the meanings given those
terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(8 U.S.C. 1101).
(2) Agricultural commodity.--The term ``agricultural
commodity'' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of
the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
(3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an
individual or entity that is not a United States person.

[[Page S3082]]

(4) Medicine.--The term ``medicine'' has the meaning given
the term ``drug'' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
(5) Medical device.--The term ``medical device'' has the
meaning given the term ``device'' in section 201 of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
(6) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence to the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States
or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including
any foreign branch of such an entity; or
(C) any person in the United States.
(f) National Security Interests Waiver.--The President may
waive the application of sanctions under this section if,
before issuing the waiver, the President submits to the
appropriate congressional committees--
(1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the
waiver is in the national security interests of the United
States; and
(2) a report explaining the basis for the certification.

SEC. __5. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years,
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),
in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies,
shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional
committees that includes the following:
(1) A description, with respect to the applicable reporting
period, of the subsea cable manufacturing, installation, and
maintenance capabilities of the People's Republic of China
(PRC) and the Russian Federation.
(2) An analysis of the mission, capabilities, and
activities of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research
(GUGI) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,
including--
(A) a description of GUGI operations and capabilities in
deep water and littoral infrastructure surveillance, seabed
warfare, and sabotage, including recent activity trends and
development of new weapons systems;
(B) a description of GUGI's use of ostensibly civilian
research vessels to conduct critical undersea infrastructure
surveillance, seabed warfare, and potential sabotage;
(C) an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the ability
of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and equipment, as
well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions; and
(D) a list of suspected GUGI research or scientific
vessels, including vessel names and International Maritime
Organization and Maritime Mobile Service Identity numbers,
and related equipment that are suspected of engaging in dual-
use operations and probing of critical undersea
infrastructure.
(3) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and
activities of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), including--
(A) a description of GRU operations and capabilities
related to physical, electronic, and cyber surveillance,
monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure
and maritime logistics;
(B) a description of the use of Russian civilian merchant
and fishing vessels by the GRU, including a list of fishing
and merchant vessel names and International Maritime
Organization and Maritime Mobile Service Identity Numbers
believed to be involved in surveillance or sabotage
activities; and
(C) an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the ability
of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and equipment, as
well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions.
(4) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and
activities of the People's Liberation Army, the PRC Coast
Guard, the China Ship Scientific Research Center, HMN
Technologies, and other PRC-based entities, including
unmarked or dual-use maritime militia or commercial vessels
related to surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical
undersea infrastructure, including--
(A) a description of recent capability developments related
to surveilling or sabotaging critical undersea
infrastructure, including for both deep-sea and littoral
purposes; and
(B) a description of the PRC's use of ostensibly civilian
fishing, merchant, and research vessels for sabotage or
surveillance of critical undersea infrastructure, including
in the Indo-Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and the
Western Hemisphere.
(5) An assessment of cooperation between the Russian
Federation and the PRC on surveillance or sabotage of
critical undersea infrastructure, including--
(A) any current or planned operational coordination against
United States or allied and partner nation targets;
(B) any joint research, development, testing, or evaluation
of critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, sabotage,
or seabed warfare capabilities;
(C) any technology transfers or joint training related to
critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, sabotage, or
seabed warfare; and
(D) any coordination in procurement of advanced
technologies related to critical undersea infrastructure,
surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare, or circumvention
of sanctions against the Russian Federation.
(6) A list of instances during the previous calendar year
in which the United States, or allies and partners of the
United States, documented anomalous behavior from vessels,
either flagged, crewed, or operated by the PRC or Russia,
around critical undersea infrastructure, including--
(A) any official United States Government response to
counter the anomalous behavior; and
(B) any coordinated diplomatic action with allies and
partners.
(7) An assessment of the extent to which PRC-based entities
are involved in laying, maintaining, and repairing United
States-invested cables.
(b) Initial and Subsequent Reports.--The initial report
required under subsection (a) shall cover the period between
January 1, 2022, through the date of the enactment of this
Act. Subsequent reports required by subsection (a) shall
cover the previous calendar year for the reporting period.
(c) Classification.--The report required under subsection
(a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a
classified annex.

SEC. __6. REPORT ON POTENTIAL SABOTAGE OF CRITICAL UNDERSEA
INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other relevant
Federal agencies, shall submit to the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the
appropriate congressional committees a report that includes
the assessment of the intelligence community, including
dissents from individual agencies, of the likely cause and,
if applicable, the attribution of the following instances of
reported sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure:
(1) In January 2022, the reported damage to the subsea
communications infrastructure connecting the Norwegian
mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard.
(2) The September 2022 sabotage of three of the four
trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas
pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast of the Danish
island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea, including--
(A) an assessment of the activities of Russian military
vessels, including those with undersea warfare capabilities,
at any of the Nord Stream blast sites in the months leading
up to the incident;
(B) a description of any Russian civilian or military
vessels intercepted or diverted from the blast sites in the
aftermath of the sabotage or vessels or underwater unmanned
vehicles that gained access to the blast sites;
(C) an assessment of the technical feasibility of a small
group of divers conducting the Nord Stream sabotage using the
rental boat ``Andromeda'' in the weather and sea conditions
present at the time;
(D) an assessment of whether the Russian Federation's
documented practice of recruiting or coercing Ukrainians or
other third country nationals to conduct sabotage operations
on land targets is applicable to a maritime context;
(E) an assessment of the fees and penalties for failure to
honor gas delivery contracts that Gazprom or other Russian
entities potentially faced due to the throttling of gas
deliveries via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline in 2021;
(F) an assessment of the insurance implications for Nord
Stream 1 and 2, as well as its insurers and Western
financiers, depending on the identity of the perpetrator;
(G) a description of the law enforcement investigations by
regional governments, the scope of their investigations, and
their outcomes;
(H) an assessment of whether any Russian vessels documented
in close proximity to the Nord Stream blast sites in the
months leading up to or immediately after the incident,
including those with undersea surveillance or warfare
capabilities, were present at other suspected sabotage sites
either before or after the incident in question; and
(I) any information on potential attribution received from
allied or partner nation communications through diplomatic or
intelligence channels.
(3) In February 2023, the reported damage to subsea
communications infrastructure connecting the main island of
Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait.
(4) In October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to-
Estonia Baltic connector natural gas pipeline, in addition to
subsea communications infrastructure connecting Estonia and
Sweden and Finland and Estonia.
(5) In November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-
to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea communications cable and the
Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea communications cable in the
central Baltic Sea.
(6) In December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-
to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable
and nearby subsea communications cables in the Gulf of
Finland.
(7) In January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans-
Pacific Express subsea communications infrastructure
connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of
Korea, and Japan.
(8) In February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea
communications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan
with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait.

[[Page S3083]]

(9) In January 2026, the reported damage to subsea
communications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea
connecting Liepaja and Sventoji.
(10) In January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa
cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel
called the Fitburg.
(b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.

SEC. __7. ENGAGING FOREIGN PARTNERS TO STRENGTHEN THE
SECURITY OF CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) as international critical undersea infrastructure
expands, there are increasing challenges to the proper
installation, maintenance, repair, and protection of
international subsea cables that have the potential to
undermine United States and foreign partner national security
interests;
(2) the United States is uniquely positioned to provide
technical, material, and other forms of support to
international partners to enhance the resilience of
international critical undersea infrastructure;
(3) the United States Government should enhance its
diplomatic efforts to work alongside trusted allies to help
foreign governments improve efforts to quickly and
effectively install, maintain, repair, and protect
international critical undersea infrastructure; and
(4) given the importance of critical undersea
infrastructure to United States and allied energy security
and prosperity, adversaries are increasingly prioritizing
capabilities designed to target United States and allied
subsea energy infrastructure.
(b) Commitment of Personnel and Resources.--The Secretary
of State shall devote sufficient personnel and resources
towards--
(1) engaging with foreign countries, in coordination with
other relevant Federal agencies, to improve security and
reduce barriers to the installation, monitoring, maintenance,
and repair of critical undersea infrastructure; and
(2) working with allies and partners to improve response
times to address critical undersea infrastructure sabotage,
including, as appropriate, by improving the coordination of
cable repair vessel deployments.
(c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the next 5
years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with other
relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report that outlines efforts by
the United States Government in the prior calendar year to
work with international allies and partners to strengthen the
security of and reduce barriers to the monitoring,
maintenance, repair, and protection of critical undersea
infrastructure, including--
(1) a list of current foreign policies or laws that create
barriers to United States-led efforts to install, maintain,
repair, and protect critical undersea infrastructure; and
(2) progress made in the previous calendar year as a result
of United States engagement with allies and partners.

PART II--DEPARTMENT OF STATE CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE EXPERTISE

SEC. __1. EXPANDING CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE-RELATED
EXPERTISE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall assign not
fewer than four full-time equivalent individuals, of which
not fewer than two individuals shall be assigned to the
Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy to cover subsea
communications infrastructure, in order to support the
Department of State's interagency engagement on matters
related to critical undersea infrastructure, including--
(1) critical undersea infrastructure protection and
resilience;
(2) coordination with United States allies and partners;
and
(3) United States engagement in international bodies that
cover critical undersea infrastructure.
(b) Assignment.--The Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital
Policy may not dual-hat currently employed personnel in
meeting the minimum hiring requirement outlined in subsection
(a).
(c) Notification.--Not later than 15 days after fulfilling
the hiring requirement in subsection (a), the Secretary of
State shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(d) International Cooperation on Critical Undersea
Infrastructure Sabotage.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report on how the United States Government plans to
prioritize diplomatic engagement within relevant
international bodies to spur increased information sharing
between allied and partner governments and relevant private
sector companies regarding threats to, and the sabotage of,
critical undersea infrastructure.

PART III--SUBSEA COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION,
CONSTRUCTION, AND REPAIR

SEC. __1. IMPROVING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COORDINATION OF
SUBSEA COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) According to a December 2024 United States Federal
Government white paper, ``There currently exists no forum in
which the full scope of the [subsea] cable industry can
effectively collaborate with the U.S. government to identify
and address shared challenges.''.
(2) United States Federal Government responsibilities for
the protection of subsea communications infrastructure,
damage reporting, information and intelligence sharing, and
emergency response are overseen by various government actors
through a multitude of mechanisms spanning several Federal
departments and agencies.
(3) In order for the subsea cable industry to align with
United States economic and security interests and help
industry prepare security risk mitigation measures, the
United States Government must provide the industry a clearer
concept of operations, assessed risks to cable supply chain
and infrastructure, enhanced and standardized security
measures, defined lines of effort in cases of emergency, and
definitive cost analysis.
(b) Establishment.--Not later than one year after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish
an interagency committee (referred to in this subtitle as the
``interagency committee'') comprised of the heads of the
appropriate Federal agencies, or their designees, to lead
United States Government efforts to--
(1) protect and improve the resilience of subsea
communications infrastructure;
(2) effectively collaborate with non-Federal entities,
including relevant members of the subsea cable industry, to
identify and address shared challenges to subsea
communications infrastructure security and resilience;
(3) coordinate United States Government policies to improve
subsea communications infrastructure security and resilience;
and
(4) address other matters related to subsea communications
infrastructure deemed appropriate and necessary by the
President.
(c) Coordination.--The President shall direct the
interagency committee to conduct an overview of the United
States Federal Government's operational authorities for
subsea communications infrastructure security and resilience.
The overview shall include an interagency concept of
operations for partnering with non-Federal entities,
including subsea communications infrastructure owners and
operators, to secure and repair subsea communications
infrastructure systems in a variety of crisis scenarios; and
(d) Analysis of Subsea Communications Infrastructure
Sabotage.--
(1) In general.--The President shall direct the heads of
the appropriate Federal agencies to develop strategies to
coordinate closely within the interagency process and with
subsea communications infrastructure industry stakeholders to
review sabotage and other threats to subsea communications
infrastructure, including by leveraging analysis from
industry-wide data, to--
(A) identify trends;
(B) refine attributions, particularly in cases of subsea
communications infrastructure sabotage;
(C) identify high-risk geographic areas for subsea
communications infrastructure construction;
(D) identify Federal Government functions and private
sector engagement methods to support the security of subsea
communications infrastructure; and
(E) inform future risk mitigation efforts to reduce damage
to subsea communications infrastructure.
(2) Strategy elements.--The strategies required under
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) resourcing requirements;
(B) coordination with United States allies and partners and
relevant subsea communications infrastructure industry
stakeholders; and
(C) the necessary technical expertise to make attributions
for subsea communications infrastructure sabotage.
(e) Report.--Not later than 30 days after establishing the
required interagency committee under subsection (b), the
President shall submit to Congress a report that includes the
following elements:
(1) Any resources required to sufficiently staff the
interagency committee and United States Federal agencies
overseeing the objectives outlined in subsection (b).
(2) A detailed plan for how the interagency committee will
advance the objectives outlined in subsection (b).

SEC. __2. STRENGTHENING INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS ON
SUBSEA COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) Public-private Sector Information Sharing.--Consistent
with the necessary protections of classified information, the
sourcing of relevant intelligence material, and privacy and
civil liberties, all appropriate Federal agencies shall, with
the approval of the interagency committee and in direct
coordination with the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, including, as appropriate, with intelligence
sharing partnerships with trusted allies, in support of the
installation, maintenance, repair, and protection of subsea
communications infrastructure, issue procedures to establish
and promote--
(1) the timely sharing of classified information regarding
subsea communications infrastructure sabotage, any
indications of potential sabotage, and other threats to
subsea

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communications infrastructure held by members of the
interagency committee with non-Federal entities that possess
the necessary security clearances;
(2) the timely sharing between the interagency committee
and non-Federal entities of information related to subsea
communications infrastructure sabotage, information relating
to indications of potential sabotage, or authorized uses
under this subtitle, in the possession of the interagency
committee that may be declassified and shared at an
unclassified level;
(3) the timely sharing by the interagency committee to non-
Federal entities, and the voluntary, cooperative sharing by
non-Federal entities to the interagency committee, of
unclassified, including controlled unclassified, information
regarding subsea communications infrastructure sabotage,
indications of potential sabotage, and other threats to
subsea communications infrastructure;
(4) the timely sharing by the interagency committee to non-
Federal entities, and the voluntary cooperative sharing by
non-Federal entities to the interagency committee, when and
if appropriate, of information relating to indications of
potential subsea communications infrastructure sabotage or
authorized uses under this title, held by the interagency
committee or non-Federal entities about subsea communications
infrastructure sabotage, in order to prevent or mitigate any
potential adverse effects from such sabotage; and
(5) the timely release of funds to meet cost, schedule, and
performance metrics.
(b) Development of Procedures.--The procedures developed in
accordance with this section shall--
(1) ensure the interagency committee has and maintains the
capacity to identify and inform subsea communications
infrastructure sabotage and indications of potential subsea
communications infrastructure sabotage in real time to the
appropriate Federal agencies or non-Federal entities
consistent with the protection of classified information;
(2) incorporate, whenever possible, existing processes,
roles, and responsibilities of members of the interagency
committee and non-Federal entities for information sharing,
including subsea communications infrastructure-specific
information sharing and analysis entities; and
(3) require members of the interagency committee and other
appropriate Federal agencies which are sharing subsea
communications infrastructure sabotage indicators or
defensive measures to employ any applicable security controls
to defend against unauthorized access to or acquisition of
such information.
(c) Submittal to Congress.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the members of the
interagency committee, shall--
(1) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, submit to Congress the procedures required under
subsection (b); and
(2) not later than one year after submitting such
procedures, and annually thereafter for 5 years, submit to
Congress a report on the implementation and execution of
information sharing with private sector actors in the
previous year pursuant to subsection (a).
______