Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that United Nations weapons inspectors should be given sufficient time for a thorough assessment of the level of compliance by the Government of Iraq with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) and that the United States should seek a Security Council resolution specifically authorizing the use of force before initiating any offensive military operations against Iraq.

        [Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 55 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. RES. 55

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that United
Nations weapons inspectors should be given sufficient time for a
thorough assessment of the level of compliance by the Government of
Iraq with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) and
that the United States should seek a Security Council resolution
specifically authorizing the use of force before initiating any
offensive military operations against Iraq.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

February 5, 2003

Mr. Hastings of Florida submitted the following resolution; which was
referred to the Committee on International Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that United
Nations weapons inspectors should be given sufficient time for a
thorough assessment of the level of compliance by the Government of
Iraq with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) and
that the United States should seek a Security Council resolution
specifically authorizing the use of force before initiating any
offensive military operations against Iraq.

Whereas on November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 1441, stating that Iraq is in ``material breach'' of its
obligations under previous United Nations resolutions, and giving Iraq
``a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations'' and
to accept ``an enhanced inspection regime'';
Whereas Iraq formally accepted the return of weapons inspectors under the terms
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 on November 13, 2002,
and according to a joint statement issued January 20, 2003, by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations Monitoring
and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC), and Iraq, the Government of Iraq
has provided the weapons inspectors with access to all sites;
Whereas on December 7, 2002, Iraq provided a 12,000-page declaration of past
chemical, biological, and nuclear programs to the Security Council,
which declaration, after preliminary review, was described by Mohamed
ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA, as incomplete and
inconclusive, but which produced no ``smoking gun'';
Whereas, according to the joint statement made by UNMOVIC, IAEA, and Iraq on
January 20, 2003, Iraq pledged to offer United Nations inspectors more
help in their search for evidence of weapons of mass destruction and
expressed a readiness to respond to questions raised in connection with
the December 7, 2002, declaration;
Whereas Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, reported to the United Nations
Security Council on January 27, 2003, that Iraq has been cooperating
with the weapons inspectors on process but has failed to demonstrate
active cooperation on matters of substance;
Whereas Dr. Blix earlier characterized the January 27, 2003, report to the
Security Council as an interim update intended to mark ``the beginning
of the inspection and monitoring process, not the end of it'';
Whereas IAEA Director General ElBaradei reported to the Security Council on
January 27, 2003, that his agency has found no evidence that Iraq has
revived its nuclear weapons program;
Whereas Dr. ElBaradei urged the Security Council on January 27, 2003, to allow
the inspection process to ``run its natural course'' over the next few
months;
Whereas the United Nations weapons inspectors have failed to obtain evidence
that would prove that Iraq is in material breach of the terms of the
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002);
Whereas European and Arab officials are reportedly trying to persuade Saddam
Hussein to leave Iraq voluntarily, and senior officials in the executive
branch of the United States Government have said that they would welcome
exile for Hussein;
Whereas the emergence of a nuclear crisis in North Korea, and the contradictory
responses by the United States to the situations in North Korea and
Iraq, have cast doubts on the consistency and propriety of the United
States doctrine of preemption, especially in the international
community;
Whereas key members of the United Nations Security Council, including Great
Britain, Germany, the Russian Federation, France, and China, have
expressed their belief that the weapons inspectors need more time to
continue their work and have urged the United States not to rush to a
decision to invade Iraq without seeking the support of the Security
Council;
Whereas United Nations Security Resolution 1441 (2002) does not authorize the
use of force but instead stipulates that the Security Council will
convene immediately to consider any failure on the part of Iraq to
comply with the Resolution;
Whereas the President, in his September 12, 2002, address to the United Nations
regarding Iraq's failure to comply with previous United Nations Security
Council resolutions, pledged to work with the Security Council for the
``necessary resolutions'' and has stated repeatedly since that time that
he has made no decision on whether to invade Iraq;
Whereas no evidence has been presented to the House of Representatives or the
American people to link Iraq with the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks on the United States;
Whereas there is growing concern that war with Iraq would greatly heighten the
threat of terrorist attacks on United States citizens at home, including
the possibility of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon attacks;
Whereas the terrible cost of war--in lives lost in Iraq and potentially the
United States, Israel, and other nations in the Middle East and
elsewhere, and in the massive drain on America's treasure--is a cost
that the United States and its allies should strive to avoid if at all
possible; and
Whereas a United States-initiated war with Iraq is likely to inflame passions in
the Middle East and could precipitate further conflict between the
Israelis and Palestinians as well as a surge in regional terrorism: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives
that--
(1) the United Nations weapons inspectors should be given
sufficient time to carry out the inspections, and collect the
data, that are necessary for a thorough assessment of the level
of compliance by the Government of Iraq with United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002);
(2) the United States and other member nations of the
United Nations Security Council should work together to exhaust
all peaceful and diplomatic means for disarming Iraq before
launching an invasion of Iraq;
(3) international emissaries, including European and Arab
leaders, should be given adequate time to pursue strategies to
persuade Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq voluntarily and avert
war;
(4) before initiating any offensive military operation in
Iraq to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441
(2002), the United States should seek a specific authorization
for the use of force from the United Nations Security Council;
(5) the United States should re-engage in the Middle East
peace process in an effort to end the violence between the
State of Israel and the Palestinians; and
(6) the United States should redouble its efforts to secure
the United States homeland in light of the growing number of
intelligence assessments highlighting the vulnerability of the
United States for further terrorist attacks.
<all>