A bill to amend the USA PATRIOT Act to repeal the sunsets.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a bill that would repeal Sec. 224 of the USA Patriot Act. Section 224 provides that 16 different parts of the Patriot Act ``shall cease to have effect on December 31, 2005.'' The authorities subject to this sunset include some of the most important provisions of the Act. They are sections 201, wiretapping in terrorism cases; 202, wiretapping in computer fraud and abuse felony case; 203(b) sharing wiretap information; 203(d), sharing foreign intelligence information; 204, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) pen register/trap and trace exceptions; 206, roving FISA wiretaps; 207, duration of FISA surveillance of non-United States persons who are agents of a foreign power; 209, seizure of voice-mail messages pursuant to warrants; 212, emergency disclosure of electronic surveillance; 214, FISA pen register/ trap and trace authority; 215, FISA access to tangible items; 217, interception of computer trespasser communications; 218, purpose for FISA orders; 220, nationwide service of search warrants for electronic evidence; 223, civil liability and discipline for privacy violations; and 225, provider immunity for FISA wiretap assistance.

Rather than praise the Patriot Act myself, I would like to quote others who have done so. First, I would note that the President has called on Congress to renew all parts of the Patriot Act that are scheduled to expire next year. As he has emphasized, ``to abandon the Patriot Act would deprive law enforcement and intelligence officers of needed tools in the war on terror, and demonstrate willful blindness to a continuing threat.''

FBI Director Robert Mueller, in a hearing before the Judiciary Committee yesterday, also voiced strong support for renewing the Patriot Act. As he noted, ``for over two and a half years, the PATRIOT Act has proved extraordinarily beneficial in the war on terrorism and has changed the way the FBI does business. Many of our counterterrorism successes, in fact, are the direct results of provisions included in the Act, a number of which are scheduled to `sunset' at the end of next year. I strongly believe it is vital to our national security to keep each of these provisions intact.''

Similarly, in an April 14 field hearing before the Judiciary Committee, Deputy Attorney General James Comey stated that the Patriot Act ``has made us immeasurably safer.'' He also responded to the allegation, occasionally made by some critics, that the Patriot Act was passed too quickly. He replied that ``the USA Patriot Act was not rushed, it actually came 10 years too late.''

The importance of the Patriot Act to American security also has drawn the attention of the 9/11 Commission. Former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean has noted that the Commission has had ``witness after witness tell us that the Patriot Act has been very, very helpful, and if the Patriot Act, or portions of it, had been in place before 9/11, that would have been very helpful.''

This praise has not been limited to the Republicans who have participated in the Commission's proceedings. Former Attorney General Janet Reno, for example, testified before the Commission that ``everything that's been done in the Patriot Act has been helpful.''

Nor is President Bush alone among the major candidates for President this year in hailing the importance of the Patriot Act. Indeed, his principal rival for the office, Senator Kerry, recently claimed that he would go even further than the President. According to an April 25 story in the Los Angeles Times, Senator Kerry's spokesman insists that ``it is the challenger, not the president, who brings the most muscular view of the Patriot Act into the race.'' Senator Kerry's presidential campaign website even includes a ``Plan to Restore American Security,'' which lists as its number-one priority to ``improve intelligence capabilities.'' Senator Kerry states that he ``understands that intelligence information is the key to disrupting and dismantling terrorist organizations and that we need to improve our intelligence capabilities, both domestically and internationally, in order to win the war on global terrorism.''

One reform implemented by the Patriot Act that Attorney General Reno and others have particularly emphasized is its authorization for information sharing. Because this part of the Patriot Act is often praised but infrequently described in detail, I would like to quote the following accounts of pre-Patriot barriers to information sharing, and of the investigative successes that the removal of those barriers has made possible.

The FISA Court of Review decision upholding the Patriot Act's authorization for information sharing, In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717,

F.I.S. Ct. Rev. 2002 , describes the origins of the pre-Patriot

barriers:

Apparently to avoid running afoul of the primary purpose

test used by some courts, the 1995 [Attorney General]

Procedures [(``Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and

the Criminal Division Concerning Foreign Intelligence and

Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations'')] limited

contacts between the FBI and the Criminal Division in cases

where FISA surveillance or searches were being conducted by

the FBI for foreign intelligence (FI) or foreign

counterintelligence (FCI) purposes. The procedures state that

``the FBI and Criminal Division should ensure that advice

intended to preserve the option of a criminal prosecution

does not inadvertently result in either the fact or the

appearance of the Criminal Division's directing or

controlling the FI or FCI investigation toward law

enforcement objectives.'' Although these procedures provided

for significant information sharing and coordination between

criminal and FI or FCI investigations, based at least in part

on the ``directing or controlling'' language, they eventually

came to be narrowly interpreted within the Department of

Justice, and most particularly by OIPR, as requiring OIPR to

act as a ``wall'' to prevent the FBI intelligence officials

from communicating with the Criminal Division regarding

ongoing FI or FCI investigations. Thus, the focus became the

nature of the underlying investigation, rather than the

general purpose of the surveillance. Once prosecution of the

target was being considered, the procedures, as interpreted

by OIPR in light of the case law, prevented the Criminal

Division from providing any meaningful advice to the FBI.''

In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 727-28 citations omitted.

FBI Director Mueller, in his testimony yesterday, provided a concrete account of the impact that these information-sharing barriers had on intelligence investigations:

Prior to September 11, an [FBI] Agent investigating the

intelligence side of a terrorism case was barred from

discussing the case with an Agent across the hall who was

working the criminal side of that same investigation. For

instance, if a court-ordered criminal wiretap turned up

intelligence information, the criminal investigator could not

share that information with the intelligence investigator--he

could not even suggest that the intelligence investigator

should seek a wiretap to collect the information for himself.

If the criminal investigator served a grand jury subpoena to

a suspect's bank, he could not divulge any information found

in those bank records to the intelligence investigator.

Instead, the intelligence investigator would have to issue a

National Security Letter in order to procure that same

information.

Chicago U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald, in an October 21, 2003 hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, described how these pre- Patriot information-sharing limits undercut one potentially vital terror investigation. Mr. Fitzgerald discussed the grand-jury testimony of Wadih el Hage, a key member of the Al Qaeda cell in Nairobi who, in September 1997, was apprehended while changing flights in New York City. Federal prosecutors subpoenaed el Hage from the airport to testify before a Federal grand jury in Manhattan. Mr. Fitzgerald described how el Hage:

[P]rovided some information of potential use to the

intelligence community--including potential leads as to the

location of his confederate Harun and the location of Harun's

files in Kenya. Unfortunately, as el Hage left the grand-jury

room, we knew that * * * [because of pre-Patriot

restrictions] we would not be permitted to share the grand-

jury information with the intelligence community. * * *

Fortunately, we found a way to address the problem that in

most other cases would not work. Upon request, el Hage

voluntarily agreed to be debriefed by an FBI agent outside

the grand-jury room * * *. El Hage then repeated the essence

of what he told the grand jury to the FBI agent, including

his purported leads to on the location of Harun and his

files. The FBI then lawfully shared the information with the

intelligence community. In essence, we solved the problem by

obtaining the consent of a since-convicted terrorist. We do

not want to have to rely on the consent of al Qaeda

terrorists to address the gaps in our national security.

Mr. Fitzgerald went on to describe how, in August 1998, the American Embassy in Nairobi was bombed by al Qaeda. Investigators quickly learned that el Hage's associate Harun was responsible. In this particular case, investigators had been able to work around information-sharing limits because of an al Qaeda terrorist's willingness to be interviewed by the FBI, and even with this information U.S. agents were not able to stop a terrorist attack. The pre-Patriot limits were not a decisive factor in blocking U.S. intelligence agents from preventing the Kenya bombing. But they could have been. As U.S. Attorney Fitzgerald concluded, ``we should not have to wait for people to die with no explanation [other] than that interpretations of the law blocked the sharing of specific information that probably [c]ould have saved [American lives].''

As Attorney General Reno noted in her testimony before the 9/11 Commission, ``these restrictions [on information sharing] have now been eliminated as part of the Patriot Act.'' Director Mueller, in his Judiciary Committee testimony yesterday, described the impact of this change:

The removal of the ``wall'' has allowed government

investigators to share information freely. Now, criminal

investigative information that contains foreign intelligence

or counterintelligence, including grand jury and wiretap

information, can be shared with intelligence officials. This

increased ability to share information has disrupted

terrorist operations in their early stages--such as the

successful dismantling of the ``Portland Seven'' terror

cell--and has led to numerous arrests, prosecutions, and

convictions in terrorism cases.

In essence, prior to September 11th, criminal and

intelligence investigators were attempting to put together a

complex jigsaw puzzle at separate tables. The Patriot Act has

fundamentally changed the way we do business. Today, those

investigators sit at the same table and work together on one

team. They share leads. They fuse information. Instead of

conducting parallel investigations, they are fully integrated

into one joint investigation.

These Patriot Act changes can directly be credited with some important recent successes in the war on terror. For example, in February 2003, Federal prosecutors arrested and indicted Sami Al-Arian and seven other suspected terrorists. The 50-count indictment indicated that Al-Arian was the financial director and the North American leader of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a terrorist group that has killed more than 100 people in and around Israel, including two Americans. Al-Arian wired money to groups in Israel that paid money to the families of terrorists who carried out suicide bombings. He also founded three organizations in Florida which, among other things, drafted final wills and testaments for suicide bombers.

Incredibly, through much of the 1990s, Al-Arian was secretly watched by two different sets of U.S. investigators. The FBI had been conducting a criminal probe of Al-Arian since 1995. Meanwhile, intelligence agents had monitored Al-Arian since the late 1980s. Because of pre-Patriot restrictions, the two sets of investigators were not able to share information and were not aware of the full extent of each other's investigations. It was only after the FISA Court of Review upheld Patriot

Act Sec. 203's information-sharing provisions in November 2002 that intelligence officials were able to show their files to prosecutors. Several months after this Patriot provision was upheld and made effective, prosecutors arrested and indicted Al-Arian and put an end to his activities.

Of course, the provisions of the Patriot Act subject to the Sec. 224 sunset include much more than just the three provisions that facilitate information sharing. Although I will not discuss all of those provisions in detail today--some of which have never been controversial--I would like to discuss one provision that has been a particular focus of attacks on the Patriot Act.

Section 215 of the Patriot Act allows the FBI to seek an order for ``the production of tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information.'' FISA defines ``foreign intelligence'' as information relating to foreign espionage, foreign sabotage, or international terrorism, or information respecting a foreign power that relates to U.S. national security or foreign policy. Thus Sec. 215 cannot be used to investigate ordinary crimes or even domestic terrorism. And in every case, a Sec. 215 order must be approved by a judge.

Alhough Sec. 215 is basically a form of subpoena authority, like that allowed for numerous other types of investigation indeed, it is more tightly restricted than other types of subpoenas because it must be pre-approved by a judge Sec. 215 has been heavily targeted by Patriot Act critics. Chief among their complaints is that Sec. 215 could be used to obtain records from bookstores or libraries. Some of these critics have even alleged that Sec. 215 would allow the FBI to investigate someone simply because of the books that he borrows from a library.

Section 215 could in fact be used to obtain library records, though neither Sec. 215 nor any other provision of the Patriot Act specifically mentions libraries or is directed at libraries. Nevertheless, Sec. 215 does authorize court orders to produce tangible records--which could include library records.

Where the critics are wrong is in suggesting that a Sec. 215 order could be obtained because of the books that someone reads or the websites that he visits. Sec. 215 allows no such thing. Instead, Sec. 215 allows an order to obtain ``tangible things'' as part of an investigation to ``obtain foreign intelligence information''-- information relating to foreign espionage or terrorism or relating to a foreign government or group and national security. By requiring a judge to approve such an order, Sec. 215 ensures that these orders will not be used for an improper purpose. And as an added protection against abuse, the Patriot Act also requires that the FBI ``fully inform'' the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on all use of Sec. 215 every six months. These checks and safeguards leave FBI agents little room for the types of witch hunts that Patriot Act critics conjure up.

Further, it bears mention that federal investigators already use an authority very similar to Sec. 215 the grand jury subpoena--to obtain bookstore records. As Deputy AG Comey recently emphasized in a letter that he submitted to the editor of the New York Times, ``orders for records under [Sec. 215] are more closely scrutinized and more difficult to obtain than ordinary grand jury supoenas, which can require production of the very same records, but without judicial approval.'' Similarly, in a September 11, 2003 editorial, ``Patriot (Act) Games,'' the Washington Post noted that investigative authority to review library records ``existed prior to the Patriot Act; the law extends it to national security investigations, which isn't unreasonable.''

Finally, I would emphasize that an intelligence or criminal investigation may have good and legitimate reasons for extending to library or bookstore records. For example, in a recent domestic terrorism case, Federal investigators sought to prove that a suspected bomber had built a particularly unusual detonator that had been used in several bombings. The investigators used a grand-jury subpoena to show that the suspect had purchased a book giving instructions on how to build such a detonator.

Moreover, we should not forget that terrorists and spies historically have used libraries to plan and carry out activities that threaten U.S. national security. We know, for example, that some terrorists have used computers at public libraries to use the internet and communicate by email. It would be unwise to place libraries and bookstores beyond the scope of anti-terror investigations.

Andrew McCarthy, a former federal prosecutor who led the 1995 terrorism case against Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, recently elaborated on this point in a November 13, 2003 article in National Review Online, ``Patriot Act Under Siege'':

[H]ard experience--won in the course of a string of

terrorism trials since 1993--instructs us that it would be

folly to preclude the government a priori from access to any

broad categories of business record. Reading material, we now

know, can be highly relevant in terrorism cases. People who

build bombs tend to have books and pamphlets on bomb making.

Terrorist leaders often possess literature announcing the

animating principles of their organizations in a tone

tailored to potential recruits. This type of evidence is a

staple of virtually every terrorism investigation--both for

what it suggests on its face and for the forensic

significance of whose fingerprints may be on it. No one is

convicted for having it--jurors are Americans too, and they'd

not long stand for the odious notion that one should be

imprisoned for the mere act of thinking.

When a defendant pleads ``not guilty,'' however, he is

saying: ``I put the government to its proof on every element

of the crime, including that I acted with criminal purport.''

Prosecutors must establish beyond a reasonable doubt not only

that the terrorist engaged in acts but did so intending

execrable consequences. If an accused says the precursor

components he covertly amassed were for innocent use, is it

not relevant that he has just borrowed a book that covers

explosives manufacture? If he claims unfamiliarity with the

tenets of violent jihad, should a jury be barred from

learning that his paws have yellowed numerous publications on

the subject? Such evidence was standard fare throughout Janet

Reno's tenure as attorney general--and rightly so.

In his testimony yesterday, FBI Director Mueller also described the importance to antiterror investigations of some of the other Patriot Act authorities subject to expire under Sec. 224. For example, Director Mueller noted that:

The PATRIOT Act gave federal judges the authority to issue

search warrants that are valid outside the issuing judge's

district in terrorism investigations. In the past, a court

could only issue a search warrant for premises within the

same judicial district--yet our investigations of terrorist

networks often span multiple districts. The PATRIOT Act

streamlined this process, making it possible for judges in

districts where activities related to terrorism may have

occurred to issue search warrants applicable outside their

immediate districts.

In addition, the PATRIOT Act permits similar search

warrants for electronic evidence such as email. In the past,

for example, if an Agent in one district needed to obtain a

search warrant for a subject's email account, but the

Internet service provider (ISP) was located in another

district, he or she would have to contact an AUSA and Agent

in the second district, brief them on the details of the

investigation, and ask them to appear before a judge to

obtain a search warrant--simply because the ISP was

physically based in another district. Thanks to the PATRIOT

Act, this frustrating and time-consuming process can be

averted without reducing judicial oversight. Today, a judge

anywhere in the U.S. can issue a search warrant for a

subject's email, no matter where the ISP is based.

[Further], the PATRIOT Act updated the law to match current

technology, so that we no longer have to fight a 21st-century

battle with antiquated weapons. Terrorists exploit modern

technology such as the Internet and cell phones to conduct

and conceal their activities. The PATRIOT Act leveled the

playing field, allowing investigators to adapt to modern

techniques. For example, the PATRIOT Act clarified our

ability to use court-ordered pen registers and trap-and-trace

devices to track Internet communications. The Act also

enabled us to seek court-approved roving wiretaps, which

allow investigators to conduct electronic surveillance on a

particular suspect, not a particular telephone this allows

them to continuously monitor subjects without having to

return to the court.

All of the authorities described by Director Mueller obviously are critical to antiterrorism investigations--and all will expire next year unless Congress acts to repeal Sec. 224.

In responding to some of the accusations of Patriot Act critics, I do not mean to dismiss the importance of either civil liberties or of independent oversight of the federal government. I would simply emphasize that the Patriot Act is carefully crafted legislation that both guarantees protection for civil liberties and is subject to ample oversight. I would note, in this vein, that in a report filed in January

2004, Department of Justice Inspector General Glenn A. Fine--an appointee of President Clinton described the results of his investigation of all recent civil-rights and civil-liberties complaints received by the Justice Department. The Inspector General found no incidents in which the Patriot Act was used to abuse civil rights or civil liberties.

The Patriot Act's provisions for independent oversight of the new authorities created by the Act were described in detail by Deputy AG Comey in his April 14, 2004 testimony before the Judiciary Committee. Mr. Comey noted:

First, the USA PATRIOT Act preserves the historic role of

courts by ensuring that the vital role of judicial oversight

is not diminished. For example, the provision for delayed

notice for search warrants requires judicial approval. In

addition, under the Act, investigators cannot obtain a FISA

pen register unless they apply for and receive permission

from federal court. The USA PATRIOT Act actually goes farther

to protect privacy than that Constitution requires, as the

Supreme Court has long held that law enforcement authorities

are not constitutionally required to obtain court approval

before installing a pen register. Furthermore, a court order

is required to compel production of business records, in

national security investigations.

Second, the USA PATRIOT Act respects important

congressional oversight by placing new reporting requirements

on the Department. Every six months, the Attorney General is

required to report to Congress the number of times section

215 has been utilized, as well as to inform Congress

concerning all electronic surveillance under the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act. Under section 1001 of the USA

PATRIOT Act, Congress receives a semiannual report from the

Department's Inspector General detailing any abuses of civil

rights and civil liberties by employees or officials of the

Department of Justice. It is important to point out that in

the Inspector General's most recent report to Congress, he

reported that his office has received no complaints alleging

misconduct by Department employees related to the use of a

substantive provision of the USA PATRIOT Act.

Finally, the USA PATRIOT Act fosters public oversight of

the Department. In addition to the role of the Inspector

General to review complaints alleging abuses of civil

liberties and civil rights, the Act provides a cause of

action for individuals aggrieved by any willful violation of

Title III or certain sections of FISA. To date, no civil

actions have been filed under this provision.

The United States has had some important successes in the war on terror so far. Worldwide, more than half of al Qaeda's senior leadership has been captured or killed. More than 3,000 al Qaeda operatives have been incapacitated. Within the United States, 4 different terrorist cells have been broken up--cells located in Buffalo, Detroit, Seattle, and Portland. 284 individuals have been criminally charged to date, and 149 individuals have been convicted or pleaded guilty, including: shoe bomber Richard Reid, six members of the Buffalo terrorist cell, two members of the Detroit cell, Ohio truck driver Iyman Faris, and U.S.-born Taliban John Walker Lindh.

Patriot-aided criminal prosecutions also have contributed to U.S. intelligence efforts to learn more about terrorist organizations. Facing long prison terms, some apprehended terrorist have chosen to cooperate with the U.S. government. So far, the Justice Department has obtained plea agreements from 15 individuals who are now cooperating with terror investigations. One individual has given the U.S. information about weapons stored by terrorists in the United States. Another cooperating terrorist has given U.S. investigators information about locations in the U.S. that are being scouted or cased for potential attacks by al Qaeda.

The Patriot Act has played a major role in what U.S. antiterror investigations have accomplished so far. And it is clear that we will continue to need the authorities created by the Patriot Act into the foreseeable future. For these reasons, I am pleased to introduce today with my colleagues a bill to repeal Sec. 224 and make the Patriot Act permanent.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a bill that would repeal Sec. 224 of the USA Patriot Act. Section 224 provides that 16 different parts of the Patriot Act ``shall cease to have effect on December 31, 2005.'' The authorities subject to this sunset include some of the most important provisions of the Act. They are sections 201, wiretapping in terrorism cases; 202, wiretapping in computer fraud and abuse felony case; 203(b) sharing wiretap information; 203(d), sharing foreign intelligence information; 204, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) pen register/trap and trace exceptions; 206, roving FISA wiretaps; 207, duration of FISA surveillance of non-United States persons who are agents of a foreign power; 209, seizure of voice-mail messages pursuant to warrants; 212, emergency disclosure of electronic surveillance; 214, FISA pen register/ trap and trace authority; 215, FISA access to tangible items; 217, interception of computer trespasser communications; 218, purpose for FISA orders; 220, nationwide service of search warrants for electronic evidence; 223, civil liability and discipline for privacy violations; and 225, provider immunity for FISA wiretap assistance.

Rather than praise the Patriot Act myself, I would like to quote others who have done so. First, I would note that the President has called on Congress to renew all parts of the Patriot Act that are scheduled to expire next year. As he has emphasized, ``to abandon the Patriot Act would deprive law enforcement and intelligence officers of needed tools in the war on terror, and demonstrate willful blindness to a continuing threat.''

FBI Director Robert Mueller, in a hearing before the Judiciary Committee yesterday, also voiced strong support for renewing the Patriot Act. As he noted, ``for over two and a half years, the PATRIOT Act has proved extraordinarily beneficial in the war on terrorism and has changed the way the FBI does business. Many of our counterterrorism successes, in fact, are the direct results of provisions included in the Act, a number of which are scheduled to `sunset' at the end of next year. I strongly believe it is vital to our national security to keep each of these provisions intact.''

Similarly, in an April 14 field hearing before the Judiciary Committee, Deputy Attorney General James Comey stated that the Patriot Act ``has made us immeasurably safer.'' He also responded to the allegation, occasionally made by some critics, that the Patriot Act was passed too quickly. He replied that ``the USA Patriot Act was not rushed, it actually came 10 years too late.''

The importance of the Patriot Act to American security also has drawn the attention of the 9/11 Commission. Former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean has noted that the Commission has had ``witness after witness tell us that the Patriot Act has been very, very helpful, and if the Patriot Act, or portions of it, had been in place before 9/11, that would have been very helpful.''

This praise has not been limited to the Republicans who have participated in the Commission's proceedings. Former Attorney General Janet Reno, for example, testified before the Commission that ``everything that's been done in the Patriot Act has been helpful.''

Nor is President Bush alone among the major candidates for President this year in hailing the importance of the Patriot Act. Indeed, his principal rival for the office, Senator Kerry, recently claimed that he would go even further than the President. According to an April 25 story in the Los Angeles Times, Senator Kerry's spokesman insists that ``it is the challenger, not the president, who brings the most muscular view of the Patriot Act into the race.'' Senator Kerry's presidential campaign website even includes a ``Plan to Restore American Security,'' which lists as its number-one priority to ``improve intelligence capabilities.'' Senator Kerry states that he ``understands that intelligence information is the key to disrupting and dismantling terrorist organizations and that we need to improve our intelligence capabilities, both domestically and internationally, in order to win the war on global terrorism.''

One reform implemented by the Patriot Act that Attorney General Reno and others have particularly emphasized is its authorization for information sharing. Because this part of the Patriot Act is often praised but infrequently described in detail, I would like to quote the following accounts of pre-Patriot barriers to information sharing, and of the investigative successes that the removal of those barriers has made possible.

The FISA Court of Review decision upholding the Patriot Act's authorization for information sharing, In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717,

F.I.S. Ct. Rev. 2002 , describes the origins of the pre-Patriot

barriers:

Apparently to avoid running afoul of the primary purpose

test used by some courts, the 1995 [Attorney General]

Procedures [(``Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and

the Criminal Division Concerning Foreign Intelligence and

Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations'')] limited

contacts between the FBI and the Criminal Division in cases

where FISA surveillance or searches were being conducted by

the FBI for foreign intelligence (FI) or foreign

counterintelligence (FCI) purposes. The procedures state that

``the FBI and Criminal Division should ensure that advice

intended to preserve the option of a criminal prosecution

does not inadvertently result in either the fact or the

appearance of the Criminal Division's directing or

controlling the FI or FCI investigation toward law

enforcement objectives.'' Although these procedures provided

for significant information sharing and coordination between

criminal and FI or FCI investigations, based at least in part

on the ``directing or controlling'' language, they eventually

came to be narrowly interpreted within the Department of

Justice, and most particularly by OIPR, as requiring OIPR to

act as a ``wall'' to prevent the FBI intelligence officials

from communicating with the Criminal Division regarding

ongoing FI or FCI investigations. Thus, the focus became the

nature of the underlying investigation, rather than the

general purpose of the surveillance. Once prosecution of the

target was being considered, the procedures, as interpreted

by OIPR in light of the case law, prevented the Criminal

Division from providing any meaningful advice to the FBI.''

In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 727-28 citations omitted.

FBI Director Mueller, in his testimony yesterday, provided a concrete account of the impact that these information-sharing barriers had on intelligence investigations:

Prior to September 11, an [FBI] Agent investigating the

intelligence side of a terrorism case was barred from

discussing the case with an Agent across the hall who was

working the criminal side of that same investigation. For

instance, if a court-ordered criminal wiretap turned up

intelligence information, the criminal investigator could not

share that information with the intelligence investigator--he

could not even suggest that the intelligence investigator

should seek a wiretap to collect the information for himself.

If the criminal investigator served a grand jury subpoena to

a suspect's bank, he could not divulge any information found

in those bank records to the intelligence investigator.

Instead, the intelligence investigator would have to issue a

National Security Letter in order to procure that same

information.

Chicago U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald, in an October 21, 2003 hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, described how these pre- Patriot information-sharing limits undercut one potentially vital terror investigation. Mr. Fitzgerald discussed the grand-jury testimony of Wadih el Hage, a key member of the Al Qaeda cell in Nairobi who, in September 1997, was apprehended while changing flights in New York City. Federal prosecutors subpoenaed el Hage from the airport to testify before a Federal grand jury in Manhattan. Mr. Fitzgerald described how el Hage:

[P]rovided some information of potential use to the

intelligence community--including potential leads as to the

location of his confederate Harun and the location of Harun's

files in Kenya. Unfortunately, as el Hage left the grand-jury

room, we knew that * * * [because of pre-Patriot

restrictions] we would not be permitted to share the grand-

jury information with the intelligence community. * * *

Fortunately, we found a way to address the problem that in

most other cases would not work. Upon request, el Hage

voluntarily agreed to be debriefed by an FBI agent outside

the grand-jury room * * *. El Hage then repeated the essence

of what he told the grand jury to the FBI agent, including

his purported leads to on the location of Harun and his

files. The FBI then lawfully shared the information with the

intelligence community. In essence, we solved the problem by

obtaining the consent of a since-convicted terrorist. We do

not want to have to rely on the consent of al Qaeda

terrorists to address the gaps in our national security.

Mr. Fitzgerald went on to describe how, in August 1998, the American Embassy in Nairobi was bombed by al Qaeda. Investigators quickly learned that el Hage's associate Harun was responsible. In this particular case, investigators had been able to work around information-sharing limits because of an al Qaeda terrorist's willingness to be interviewed by the FBI, and even with this information U.S. agents were not able to stop a terrorist attack. The pre-Patriot limits were not a decisive factor in blocking U.S. intelligence agents from preventing the Kenya bombing. But they could have been. As U.S. Attorney Fitzgerald concluded, ``we should not have to wait for people to die with no explanation [other] than that interpretations of the law blocked the sharing of specific information that probably [c]ould have saved [American lives].''

As Attorney General Reno noted in her testimony before the 9/11 Commission, ``these restrictions [on information sharing] have now been eliminated as part of the Patriot Act.'' Director Mueller, in his Judiciary Committee testimony yesterday, described the impact of this change:

The removal of the ``wall'' has allowed government

investigators to share information freely. Now, criminal

investigative information that contains foreign intelligence

or counterintelligence, including grand jury and wiretap

information, can be shared with intelligence officials. This

increased ability to share information has disrupted

terrorist operations in their early stages--such as the

successful dismantling of the ``Portland Seven'' terror

cell--and has led to numerous arrests, prosecutions, and

convictions in terrorism cases.

In essence, prior to September 11th, criminal and

intelligence investigators were attempting to put together a

complex jigsaw puzzle at separate tables. The Patriot Act has

fundamentally changed the way we do business. Today, those

investigators sit at the same table and work together on one

team. They share leads. They fuse information. Instead of

conducting parallel investigations, they are fully integrated

into one joint investigation.

These Patriot Act changes can directly be credited with some important recent successes in the war on terror. For example, in February 2003, Federal prosecutors arrested and indicted Sami Al-Arian and seven other suspected terrorists. The 50-count indictment indicated that Al-Arian was the financial director and the North American leader of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a terrorist group that has killed more than 100 people in and around Israel, including two Americans. Al-Arian wired money to groups in Israel that paid money to the families of terrorists who carried out suicide bombings. He also founded three organizations in Florida which, among other things, drafted final wills and testaments for suicide bombers.

Incredibly, through much of the 1990s, Al-Arian was secretly watched by two different sets of U.S. investigators. The FBI had been conducting a criminal probe of Al-Arian since 1995. Meanwhile, intelligence agents had monitored Al-Arian since the late 1980s. Because of pre-Patriot restrictions, the two sets of investigators were not able to share information and were not aware of the full extent of each other's investigations. It was only after the FISA Court of Review upheld Patriot

Act Sec. 203's information-sharing provisions in November 2002 that intelligence officials were able to show their files to prosecutors. Several months after this Patriot provision was upheld and made effective, prosecutors arrested and indicted Al-Arian and put an end to his activities.

Of course, the provisions of the Patriot Act subject to the Sec. 224 sunset include much more than just the three provisions that facilitate information sharing. Although I will not discuss all of those provisions in detail today--some of which have never been controversial--I would like to discuss one provision that has been a particular focus of attacks on the Patriot Act.

Section 215 of the Patriot Act allows the FBI to seek an order for ``the production of tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information.'' FISA defines ``foreign intelligence'' as information relating to foreign espionage, foreign sabotage, or international terrorism, or information respecting a foreign power that relates to U.S. national security or foreign policy. Thus Sec. 215 cannot be used to investigate ordinary crimes or even domestic terrorism. And in every case, a Sec. 215 order must be approved by a judge.

Alhough Sec. 215 is basically a form of subpoena authority, like that allowed for numerous other types of investigation indeed, it is more tightly restricted than other types of subpoenas because it must be pre-approved by a judge Sec. 215 has been heavily targeted by Patriot Act critics. Chief among their complaints is that Sec. 215 could be used to obtain records from bookstores or libraries. Some of these critics have even alleged that Sec. 215 would allow the FBI to investigate someone simply because of the books that he borrows from a library.

Section 215 could in fact be used to obtain library records, though neither Sec. 215 nor any other provision of the Patriot Act specifically mentions libraries or is directed at libraries. Nevertheless, Sec. 215 does authorize court orders to produce tangible records--which could include library records.

Where the critics are wrong is in suggesting that a Sec. 215 order could be obtained because of the books that someone reads or the websites that he visits. Sec. 215 allows no such thing. Instead, Sec. 215 allows an order to obtain ``tangible things'' as part of an investigation to ``obtain foreign intelligence information''-- information relating to foreign espionage or terrorism or relating to a foreign government or group and national security. By requiring a judge to approve such an order, Sec. 215 ensures that these orders will not be used for an improper purpose. And as an added protection against abuse, the Patriot Act also requires that the FBI ``fully inform'' the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on all use of Sec. 215 every six months. These checks and safeguards leave FBI agents little room for the types of witch hunts that Patriot Act critics conjure up.

Further, it bears mention that federal investigators already use an authority very similar to Sec. 215 the grand jury subpoena--to obtain bookstore records. As Deputy AG Comey recently emphasized in a letter that he submitted to the editor of the New York Times, ``orders for records under [Sec. 215] are more closely scrutinized and more difficult to obtain than ordinary grand jury supoenas, which can require production of the very same records, but without judicial approval.'' Similarly, in a September 11, 2003 editorial, ``Patriot (Act) Games,'' the Washington Post noted that investigative authority to review library records ``existed prior to the Patriot Act; the law extends it to national security investigations, which isn't unreasonable.''

Finally, I would emphasize that an intelligence or criminal investigation may have good and legitimate reasons for extending to library or bookstore records. For example, in a recent domestic terrorism case, Federal investigators sought to prove that a suspected bomber had built a particularly unusual detonator that had been used in several bombings. The investigators used a grand-jury subpoena to show that the suspect had purchased a book giving instructions on how to build such a detonator.

Moreover, we should not forget that terrorists and spies historically have used libraries to plan and carry out activities that threaten U.S. national security. We know, for example, that some terrorists have used computers at public libraries to use the internet and communicate by email. It would be unwise to place libraries and bookstores beyond the scope of anti-terror investigations.

Andrew McCarthy, a former federal prosecutor who led the 1995 terrorism case against Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, recently elaborated on this point in a November 13, 2003 article in National Review Online, ``Patriot Act Under Siege'':

[H]ard experience--won in the course of a string of

terrorism trials since 1993--instructs us that it would be

folly to preclude the government a priori from access to any

broad categories of business record. Reading material, we now

know, can be highly relevant in terrorism cases. People who

build bombs tend to have books and pamphlets on bomb making.

Terrorist leaders often possess literature announcing the

animating principles of their organizations in a tone

tailored to potential recruits. This type of evidence is a

staple of virtually every terrorism investigation--both for

what it suggests on its face and for the forensic

significance of whose fingerprints may be on it. No one is

convicted for having it--jurors are Americans too, and they'd

not long stand for the odious notion that one should be

imprisoned for the mere act of thinking.

When a defendant pleads ``not guilty,'' however, he is

saying: ``I put the government to its proof on every element

of the crime, including that I acted with criminal purport.''

Prosecutors must establish beyond a reasonable doubt not only

that the terrorist engaged in acts but did so intending

execrable consequences. If an accused says the precursor

components he covertly amassed were for innocent use, is it

not relevant that he has just borrowed a book that covers

explosives manufacture? If he claims unfamiliarity with the

tenets of violent jihad, should a jury be barred from

learning that his paws have yellowed numerous publications on

the subject? Such evidence was standard fare throughout Janet

Reno's tenure as attorney general--and rightly so.

In his testimony yesterday, FBI Director Mueller also described the importance to antiterror investigations of some of the other Patriot Act authorities subject to expire under Sec. 224. For example, Director Mueller noted that:

The PATRIOT Act gave federal judges the authority to issue

search warrants that are valid outside the issuing judge's

district in terrorism investigations. In the past, a court

could only issue a search warrant for premises within the

same judicial district--yet our investigations of terrorist

networks often span multiple districts. The PATRIOT Act

streamlined this process, making it possible for judges in

districts where activities related to terrorism may have

occurred to issue search warrants applicable outside their

immediate districts.

In addition, the PATRIOT Act permits similar search

warrants for electronic evidence such as email. In the past,

for example, if an Agent in one district needed to obtain a

search warrant for a subject's email account, but the

Internet service provider (ISP) was located in another

district, he or she would have to contact an AUSA and Agent

in the second district, brief them on the details of the

investigation, and ask them to appear before a judge to

obtain a search warrant--simply because the ISP was

physically based in another district. Thanks to the PATRIOT

Act, this frustrating and time-consuming process can be

averted without reducing judicial oversight. Today, a judge

anywhere in the U.S. can issue a search warrant for a

subject's email, no matter where the ISP is based.

[Further], the PATRIOT Act updated the law to match current

technology, so that we no longer have to fight a 21st-century

battle with antiquated weapons. Terrorists exploit modern

technology such as the Internet and cell phones to conduct

and conceal their activities. The PATRIOT Act leveled the

playing field, allowing investigators to adapt to modern

techniques. For example, the PATRIOT Act clarified our

ability to use court-ordered pen registers and trap-and-trace

devices to track Internet communications. The Act also

enabled us to seek court-approved roving wiretaps, which

allow investigators to conduct electronic surveillance on a

particular suspect, not a particular telephone this allows

them to continuously monitor subjects without having to

return to the court.

All of the authorities described by Director Mueller obviously are critical to antiterrorism investigations--and all will expire next year unless Congress acts to repeal Sec. 224.

In responding to some of the accusations of Patriot Act critics, I do not mean to dismiss the importance of either civil liberties or of independent oversight of the federal government. I would simply emphasize that the Patriot Act is carefully crafted legislation that both guarantees protection for civil liberties and is subject to ample oversight. I would note, in this vein, that in a report filed in January

2004, Department of Justice Inspector General Glenn A. Fine--an appointee of President Clinton described the results of his investigation of all recent civil-rights and civil-liberties complaints received by the Justice Department. The Inspector General found no incidents in which the Patriot Act was used to abuse civil rights or civil liberties.

The Patriot Act's provisions for independent oversight of the new authorities created by the Act were described in detail by Deputy AG Comey in his April 14, 2004 testimony before the Judiciary Committee. Mr. Comey noted:

First, the USA PATRIOT Act preserves the historic role of

courts by ensuring that the vital role of judicial oversight

is not diminished. For example, the provision for delayed

notice for search warrants requires judicial approval. In

addition, under the Act, investigators cannot obtain a FISA

pen register unless they apply for and receive permission

from federal court. The USA PATRIOT Act actually goes farther

to protect privacy than that Constitution requires, as the

Supreme Court has long held that law enforcement authorities

are not constitutionally required to obtain court approval

before installing a pen register. Furthermore, a court order

is required to compel production of business records, in

national security investigations.

Second, the USA PATRIOT Act respects important

congressional oversight by placing new reporting requirements

on the Department. Every six months, the Attorney General is

required to report to Congress the number of times section

215 has been utilized, as well as to inform Congress

concerning all electronic surveillance under the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act. Under section 1001 of the USA

PATRIOT Act, Congress receives a semiannual report from the

Department's Inspector General detailing any abuses of civil

rights and civil liberties by employees or officials of the

Department of Justice. It is important to point out that in

the Inspector General's most recent report to Congress, he

reported that his office has received no complaints alleging

misconduct by Department employees related to the use of a

substantive provision of the USA PATRIOT Act.

Finally, the USA PATRIOT Act fosters public oversight of

the Department. In addition to the role of the Inspector

General to review complaints alleging abuses of civil

liberties and civil rights, the Act provides a cause of

action for individuals aggrieved by any willful violation of

Title III or certain sections of FISA. To date, no civil

actions have been filed under this provision.

The United States has had some important successes in the war on terror so far. Worldwide, more than half of al Qaeda's senior leadership has been captured or killed. More than 3,000 al Qaeda operatives have been incapacitated. Within the United States, 4 different terrorist cells have been broken up--cells located in Buffalo, Detroit, Seattle, and Portland. 284 individuals have been criminally charged to date, and 149 individuals have been convicted or pleaded guilty, including: shoe bomber Richard Reid, six members of the Buffalo terrorist cell, two members of the Detroit cell, Ohio truck driver Iyman Faris, and U.S.-born Taliban John Walker Lindh.

Patriot-aided criminal prosecutions also have contributed to U.S. intelligence efforts to learn more about terrorist organizations. Facing long prison terms, some apprehended terrorist have chosen to cooperate with the U.S. government. So far, the Justice Department has obtained plea agreements from 15 individuals who are now cooperating with terror investigations. One individual has given the U.S. information about weapons stored by terrorists in the United States. Another cooperating terrorist has given U.S. investigators information about locations in the U.S. that are being scouted or cased for potential attacks by al Qaeda.

The Patriot Act has played a major role in what U.S. antiterror investigations have accomplished so far. And it is clear that we will continue to need the authorities created by the Patriot Act into the foreseeable future. For these reasons, I am pleased to introduce today with my colleagues a bill to repeal Sec. 224 and make the Patriot Act permanent.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce bipartisan legislation to expand access to college. I am pleased to be joined in this effort by Senators Collins, Kennedy, and Murray.

In a year in which we are slated to reauthorize the Higher Education Act, we have had only a few hearings on the reauthorization in the HELP Committee. In these hearings and the discussions ongoing in the other body, there has been scant mention of our insufficient investment in need-based financial aid. Instead, the discussions have been dominated by proposals that will hurt, rather than help, the neediest students.

This is troubling, particularly as more and more students are being priced out of college, which shortchanges their future and that of our nation. Economic security is a necessity not just for the wealthy, but for every American. And the key to economic security is education.

An individual's climb up the economic ladder is directly related to the amount of education he or she receives. Given the strong correlation among educational attainment, employment, and wages, the cost of not going to college is just too high.

Almost a third of the growth in employment over the next decade is expected to occur in occupations that require at least a bachelor's degree. College graduates, on average, earn 60 percent more than high school graduates, while an individual with a professional degree earns almost four times what a high school graduate earns.

And yet, too many college students are under-prepared, underfinanced, and overworked. Those who make it through are saddled by nearly insurmountable loan debt. But many more cannot afford the cost of college at all.

Even though there have been gains due to the Higher Education Act, the current approach to student aid isn't alleviating the gaps between our lowest and highest income students nor is it addressing the gaps between the aid low-income students receive and the actual cost of attendance.

7 times as many students from high-income families 48 percent graduate from college by age 24 as students from low-income families 7 percent. Low-income, college-qualified high school graduates have an annual ``unmet need'' of nearly $4,000 in college expenses. Without drastic increases in need-based aid, over the next decade, according to a report by the Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance, 4.4 million low- and moderate-income college qualified high school graduates will not be able to pursue a four year degree full time and 2 million will not go to college at all.

A combination of factors has arisen to create this unfortunate situation, chief among them a decline in the purchasing power of the Pell Grant and sharp increases in the cost of college.

My predecessor, Senator Claiborne Pell, established what is now known as the Pell Grant in order to ensure higher education wasn't an ``unachievable dream.'' Almost one quarter of undergraduate students from colleges and universities nationwide receive a Pell Grant. It is the single largest source of grant aid for higher education funded by the Federal government.

Unfortunately, the Pell Grant's purchasing power has plummeted due to the slow growth in funding and the rapid rise of college prices. In the late 70s, the maximum grant covered 77 percent of costs at a public four-year institution. Today, the maximum Pell Grant of $4,050 covers only 41 percent.

On top of that, an estimated 60 percent of student aid is now in the form of loans and 40 percent in grants, a reversal of the distribution 20 years ago. Indeed, the average graduate has a student loan debt of $17,000. Pell Grant recipients, who represent the lowest income sectors of students, graduate with an average of $20,000 in student loan debt.

Over the last ten years, public and private 4-year college costs, tuition and fees, rose 47 percent and 42 percent, respectively, after adjusting for inflation, which is a more rapid growth rate than consumer prices. Over the last three years, since President Bush entered office, tuition has increased by 28 percent on average, even after inflation. Students have felt the bite as states have drastically cut funding for public colleges.

There is a further convergence of economic and demographic factors. In 2008, the largest number of students in our history will graduate from high school. A high percentage of these students will be from low- income, minority families, who will need student aid. At the same time, our Nation will need replacement workers as aging, college-educated baby boomers begin to retire in increasing numbers.

This crisis calls out for action. It should be a national imperative to ensure an educated citizenry and a world class workforce. Our Nation cannot afford to lose out on the countless returns from a robust education investment.

The legislation we introduce today, the ACCESS, Accessing College through Comprehensive Early outreach, State partnerships, and Simplification, Act, seeks to set our Nation back on the course that Senator Pell sought when he authored the grants later named after him in 1972.

The ACCESS Act revitalizes the Leveraging Educational Assistance Partnership (LEAP) program, which was established over thirty years ago to encourage States to play a role in helping low-income students go to college. Without this important, although extremely modest, Federal incentive, many States would never have established need-based grant programs and many States would not continue to maintain such programs.

Recognizing that LEAP can do even more to address the barriers to college access and persistence, the ACCESS Act forges a new Federal incentive for states--via higher levels of Federal match--to spur greater investments by states, colleges, businesses, and philanthropies in need-based grants for low-income students. At a time when public higher education is bearing the brunt of the fiscal crises confronting our States, we need to do more to encourage States to help low-income students attend college.

We want States to focus their energies on enhancing coordination and cohesion among Federal, State, and local programs and efforts of colleges, philanthropies, and businesses, with the goal of generating new investments in need-based aid sufficient to provide low-income students with an access and persistence grant to fill the gap in aid they face. All too often successful middle school students give up the dream of college because they think there is no way they can ever afford college. The ACCESS Act also requires States to notify low- income students beginning in middle school of their potential eligibility for student financial aid and encourages increased participation in early intervention, mentoring, and outreach programs.

The legislation is modeled after initiatives like the Rhode Island Children's Crusade in my home state and Indiana's 21st Century Scholars Program. A Lumina Foundation evaluation found that 21st Century Scholars--low-income students who receive an early notification of assistance, early intervention and support, and scholarships equivalent to the cost of in-state college tuition--were nearly 5 times more likely than non-participants to enroll in college. Indeed, successful college access programs are those that offer early intervention and mentoring services coupled with early information about estimated financial aid awards and adequate grant funding to make the dream of higher education a reality. Students participating in such programs are more financially and academically prepared, and thus more likely to enroll in college and persist to degree completion.

Our legislation also simplifies the financial aid process for low- income students. It allows more students to qualify for an Automatic- Zero Expected Family Contribution, aligning its eligibility with the standards for other Federal means-tested programs, like free school lunch, SSI, and Food Stamps. Students and families should not have to prove over and over again that they are low-income, and asking students to fill out lengthy forms when they already meet the eligibility level for Pell Grants is a burden we should ease.

In a similar vein, the legislation establishes a short, paper FAFSA- EZ application form for students qualifying for the auto-zero along with a tailored web-based system and a free telefile system for students without Internet access.

The ACCESS Act also expands college access for low-income students, in part by prohibiting a qualified education benefit, like education savings plans, from being considered as a student asset and by reducing the work penalty. The current income protection allowance levels are unrealistically low, creating a disincentive for students who work in order to pay college costs. I look forward to receiving further information on this and other problems addressed in the legislation when the Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance completes work on the congressionally mandated financial aid simplification study later this year.

We must act on this legislation and others to make sure that every student who works hard and plays by the rules gets the opportunity to live the American Dream.

I was pleased to work with the Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance, and a host of other higher education organizations and charitable foundations, including Scholarship America, on this legislation. I am also pleased that this legislation has the support of a range of higher education and student groups, including the American Association of Community Colleges, the American Association of State Colleges and Universities, the American Council on Education, the Association of American Universities, the Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities, the Center for Law and Social Policy, the Council for Opportunity in Education, National Association for College Admission Counseling, the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs, the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators, the United Negro College Fund, and the United States Student Association.

I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this important legislation and work for its inclusion in the upcoming reauthorization of the Higher Education Act.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of this legislation be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Credit Card Minimum Payment Warning Act. I greatly appreciate the significant contributions Senator Durbin made to this

bill, and I thank him very much for that. Also, I thank Senator Leahy and Senator Schumer for cosponsoring this legislation.

Americans are carrying enormous amounts of debt. In 2003, consumer debt increased for the first time to more than $2 trillion, according to the Federal Reserve. This is a 28-percent increase since the year 2000. According to the Daily Bankruptcy News, consumer debt is now equal to 110 percent of disposable income. Ten years ago, it was 85 percent; and 20 years ago, it was 65 percent. A key component of household debt can be attributed to the use of credit cards. Revolving debt, mostly comprised of credit card debt, has more than doubled from $313 billion in January 1994 to $753 billion in debt in January 2004. A U.S. Public Interest Research Group and Consumer Federation of America analysis of Federal Reserve data indicates that the average household with debt carries approximately $10,000 to $12,000 in total revolving debt and has nine credit cards.

More and more working families are trying to meet growing financial obligations and are having difficulties surviving financially. When interest rates do eventually rise, consumers' increasing debt obligations will be compounded further.

As household debt has increased, bankruptcy filings have surged to record levels. In the year 2003, more than 1.6 million consumers filed for bankruptcy. This staggering amount is an increase of 5.6 percent over the previous record set in 2002. Bankruptcies disrupt the lives of consumers and limit their ability to access credit in the future. In addition, bankruptcies lead to significant financial losses for creditors. It is imperative that we make consumers more aware of the long-term effects of their financial decisions, particularly in managing their credit card debt, so that they can avoid bankruptcy.

Even as we contemplate the consequences of more and more debt, it has become easier to access credit. Pre-approved credit card offers are now a routine piece of mail. Students are offered credit cards at earlier ages, especially in view of the success that credit card companies are having with their aggressive campaigns targeted towards college students. Mr. President, 55 percent of college students acquire their first credit card during their first year in college, and 83 percent of college students have at least one credit card. Forty-five percent of college students are in credit card debt, with the average debt being over $3,000.

While it is relatively easy to obtain credit, not enough is done to ensure that credit is properly managed. Currently, credit card statements fail to include all of the information necessary to allow individuals to make fully informed financial decisions. Additional disclosure is needed to ensure that individuals completely understand the implications of their credit card use.

Our legislation will provide a wakeup call for consumers. It will make it very clear what costs consumers will incur if they make only the minimum payments on their credit cards. The personalized information they will receive for each of their accounts will help them to make informed choices about the payments that they choose to make towards their balance.

This bill requires a minimum payment warning notification on monthly statements stating that making the minimum payment will increase the amount of interest that will be paid and extend the amount of time it will take to repay the outstanding balance. Consumers would have to be informed of how many years and months it will take to repay their entire balance if they make only the minimum payments. In addition, the total costs in interest and principal, if the consumer pays only the minimum payment, would have to be disclosed. These provisions will make individuals much more aware of the true costs of their credit card debts.

The bill also requires that credit card companies provide useful information so that people can develop strategies to free themselves of credit card debt. Consumers would have to be provided with the amount they need to pay to eliminate their outstanding balance within 36 months. Finally, the legislation would require that creditors establish a toll-free number so that consumers can access trustworthy credit counselors. In order to ensure that consumers are referred from the toll-free number to only trustworthy organizations, the agencies for referral would have to be approved by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Reserve Board as having met comprehensive quality standards. These standards are necessary because certain credit counseling agencies have abused their nonprofit, tax-exempt status and have taken advantage of people seeking assistance in managing their debts. People believe, sometimes mistakenly, that they can place blind trust in nonprofit organizations and that their fees will be lower than those of other credit counseling organizations.

Too many individuals may not realize that the credit counseling industry does deserve the trust that consumers often place in it.

The Credit Card Minimum Payment Warning Act has been endorsed by the Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter of support and factsheet from these organizations be printed in the Record.

I also ask unanimous consent that the text of the Credit Card Minimum Payment Warning Act be printed in the Record following my remarks.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation that will empower consumers by providing them with detailed personalized information to assist them in making informed choices about their credit card use and repayment. This bill makes clear the adverse consequences of uninformed choices, such as making only minimum payments, and provides opportunities to locate assistance to eliminate credit card debt.

Mr. President, I am delighted to be working with my friend the distinguished Senator from Hawaii, Senator Akaka, to introduce a measure that provides a simple yet vital commodity to users of credit cards. The commodity I speak of: information.

The modern-day credit-reporting system has benefitted consumers by making affordable credit more widely available than ever before, and the spread of credit cards is an important part of this ``credit revolution.'' Along with this revolution in credit availability, however, we need a revolution in consumers' ability to manage their credit. Two facts provide a quick and simple snapshot of our progress in that regard. In the fourth quarter of 2003, the number of delinquencies on regular consumer loans went down. That same quarter, the number of past-due credit card accounts hit an all-time high. Clearly, an increasing number of credit card holders need to do a better job of responsibility managing their credit exposure.

This bill is designed to help them to do just that by providing that vital commodity, information. It would require credit card statements to provide information that will help consumers understand the relationships among their total balance, the minimum payment due, and the accumulation of interest over time. Specifically, this bill would require that statements provide the following information: the amount of time it would take to pay off the total balance if just minimum payments are made each month; the total cost to the consumer that would be incurred over that time period, broken into interest and principle; the payment amount that would be necessary each month to pay off the total balance in three years; and a toll-free telephone number consumers could call to get a referral to a legitimate, accredited, non-profit credit counseling agency.

We would like to think that the credit card companies would be glad to provide whatever information their consumers needed to responsibly manage their credit. The fact of the matter is, though, that they do not provide the information I just described, and chances are they will not begin doing so on their own initiative. These numbers are not all that hard to calculate. A few lines of computer code is all it would take. And yet provision of these three simple numbers would provide a huge payback by helping credit card users quickly and easily get a clearer understanding of the size of their balance and what the consequences will be for them--in terms of time and financial cost--of carrying that balance.

Let me be extra clear about one thing: This bill will help markets for credit work better. As Adam Smith told us, the free flow of information is an absolute prerequisite of an efficient market. For markets to work, buyers must know and understand what they are buying. When our bill becomes law, credit card holders--who are simply buyers of credit in the marketplace--will have a better understanding of what exactly they are buying into, for the long term. The result can only be that the credit markets will better serve us, and that our households and our Nation will be on stronger financial footing.

I thank my friend Senator Akaka for working with me on this important measure. I am also delighted that my friends Senator Schumer and Senator Leahy have joined us as original cosponsors. I urge the rest of my colleagues to join us by cosponsoring this bill.