A bill to require the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to carry out a program of outreach to veterans of World War II and the Korean conflict on the nature and availability of benefits for veterans, and for other purposes.

Mr. President, this week marks the third anniversary of that terrible day in 2001 when terrorists attacked America's commercial and governmental capitals. On that occasion, in the largest attack ever on American soil, 2,973 innocent individuals lost their lives. The victimization of America went beyond this astounding number, with physical injuries to many, damage to our Nation's economy, and psychological trauma among millions who witnessed these shocking events.

While nothing we do can erase this pain, we can honor and pay tribute to those who have suffered by ensuring that terrorists never again attack our land. We have come a long way since 2001 in enhancing this country's ability to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, but, as the 9/11 Commission said in its final report, we are not yet safe. Increasing our safety against terrorist attack requires new strategies, new ways of thinking, and new ways of organizing our government.

Today I am pleased to be joined by Senators Lieberman, Specter, Bayh, Graham of South Carolina, Daschle, and Clinton in introducing legislation designed to implement the 9/11 Commission recommendations, which were issued just prior to the August recess. Governor Tom Kean and Representative Lee Hamilton have endorsed this bill, and assured us that it accurately reflects the Commission's intent.

With the introduction of this bill, the Senate now has before it legislation that addresses each of the Commission's 41 recommendations, which together are designed to build unity of effort across the U.S. Government--all in an effort to prevent future terrorist attacks. The provisions of this bill outline the shape and objectives of a global counterterrorism strategy, and suggest a reconfiguration of our national security and homeland security apparatus within the U.S. Government. As anyone who reads the legislation will quickly see, it also cuts across jurisdictional lines with respect to the Senate committee prerogatives. There are portions of this bill that deal with intelligence, foreign affairs, defense, border security and commerce, transportation security, and more. In normal times, naysayers would caution that this fact alone could paralyze this body. But these are not normal times. International terrorism poses a real and present danger to the United States, and it is our responsibility as elected officials to take action on the Commission's recommendations.

I would like to highlight some of the major aspects of the bill, and I know that the other sponsors also will provide details on the bill's structure.

The largest section of this bill concerns the reorganization of our intelligence community. This legislation establishes a National Intelligence Authority to unify the efforts of the community, and this new entity would be headed by a National Intelligence Director, NID. The NID also would act as the principal intelligence advisor to the President, taking over this function from the Director of Central Intelligence. The NID would have direct budgetary authority and significant personnel authority over all of the intelligence agencies, except those that generate intelligence that falls under the purview of one department alone, such as tactical military intelligence. The NID would have influence over the budgets for these other entities that do provide this very specific intelligence. Assisting the NID would be four deputies, including a principal deputy, another that serves currently as the CIA Director and would handle foreign intelligence, a deputy that also serves as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and a fourth that handles domestic intelligence.

Also established in this bill is a National Counterterrorism Center to oversee all of the U.S. Government counterterrorism operations, including analysis, net assessments, and guidance for joint counterterrorism operations. The center would be headed by a deputy- level official who can adjudicate policy disagreements among the agencies and, if need be, bump them up to the National Security Council for a decision. In addition to the National Counterterrorism Center, the bill authorizes the NID to establish ``National Intelligence Centers'' that will address particular geographic or functional areas. These centers will, like the NCTC, bring together the full range of reporting and analysis on particular topics so that no one with a need to know is cut out of the loop. There are also provisions designed to ensure that increased centralization of the intelligence community does not lead to a reduction in the range of analytical views available to policymakers.

Finally in the intelligence title, the bill codifies the critical reforms that Director Mueller has begun at the FBI, including his efforts to improve the FBI's intelligence capabilities and develop a personnel cadre that specializes in national security issues.

In its report, the 9/11 Commission found that the biggest impediment to ``connecting the dots'' among diverse sources of homeland security information is the widespread resistance to sharing. To address this problem, the Commission recommended that the President create a new ``trusted information network'' modeled on a framework developed by a Markle Foundation task force. This bill directs the President to create an information network among all Federal departments and agencies with responsibilities for homeland security, among State and local authorities, and among relevant private sector entities. The legislation describes key attributes that should be incorporated into the network and sets forth an ambitious schedule for development and implementation.

The Commission report stated that, ``Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult and important. So long as oversight is governed by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need. The United States needs a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure to give America's national intelligence agencies oversight, support, and leadership.''

The Commission offered several options for how Congress should be restructured to best provide for strong oversight over both intelligence and homeland security. With respect to intelligence, it recommended that Congress create either a joint committee modeled after the Joint Atomic Energy Committee or House and Senate Committees with combined authorizing and appropriating powers. With respect to homeland security, it recommended that Congress create a single, principal point of oversight and review, noting that DHS officials now appear before 88 different committees and subcommittees.

Late last month, the Senate leadership tasked a bipartisan working group with examining how best to implement these recommendations and asked it to report back to the leadership as soon as possible. In recognition of this ongoing review, our bill does not propose the committee structures we believe should be adopted, but instead includes a Sense of the Congress that both houses of the 108th Congress adopt all necessary rule changes so that the committee structures for the 109th Congress are revised in accordance with one of the options recommended by the Commission.

It is incumbent on each member to put aside jurisdictional power struggles and take action that is in the interest of securing our homeland. We should strive to never again read a report that calls Congressional oversight ``dysfunctional.'' We simply must heed the Commissions call to action and fundamentally overhaul Congressional oversight for intelligence and homeland security. As the Commission stated, ``tinkering with the existing structure is not sufficient.''

As recommended by the Commission, we have included provisions to help ensure that an incoming President-elect can start putting together his national security team during a transition between administrations. Our legislation would establish procedures for expediting security clearances and Senate consideration of top national security appointees, as well as any necessary clearances for presidential transition team members. In addition, it directs the President to consolidate security clearance responsibilities in a single Federal agency, and to work with the new NID to set uniform standards for granting security clearances so that they are accepted by all Federal agencies.

One lesson from the Commissions report is that no one set of strategies is sufficient to prevent future terrorist attacks. The United States must use all of the instruments at our disposal to counter the short and long-term threats posed by international terrorism. For this reason, we have devoted an entire title of the bill to the role of diplomacy, foreign aid, and the military. The legislation would renew the U.S. commitment to Pakistan's future, in light of the critical role that country plays in the war on terror, and authorizes a substantial increase in aid to Afghanistan. It addresses our relations with Saudi Arabia and suggests establishing an international contact group to develop a multilateral counterterrorism strategy. Other provisions in our bill will enhance America's ability to fight the war of ideas by promoting universal values of democracy, tolerance, and openness. It authorizes increased funding for U.S. broadcasts to Muslim countries and would ramp up the scale of education and exchange programs.

This bill notes that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a grave and gathering threat to this country, and suggests ways to strengthen our nonproliferation programs. And, since portrayals of mistreatment of captured terrorists hinders our ability to engage in the wider struggle against them, this legislation both reiterates standards for their humane treatment once captured, and calls on the U.S. Government to develop a common approach to detainee treatment, along with its coalition partners.

One significant way to prevent future terrorist attacks on American soil is to stop terrorists from entering the country in the first place. This bill contains a number of provisions that would enhance the security of our borders, transportation systems and critical infrastructure. For example, our legislation requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to work with multiple government agencies to develop a unified strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility both domestically and internationally. In addition, to efficiently screen persons entering the United States, we must integrate the multiple terrorist screening systems already in place. This bill would require the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a comprehensive screening system that brings together an integrated network of screening points, and to work to fully implement the entry and exit functions of the U.S. VISIT system at all ports of entry as quickly as possible.

The Commission also pointed out what appears to be a gaping hole in our border security. I am referring to the ability of people who claim to be United States citizens to orally attest to their citizenship when passing from Canada or Mexico into the United States. Numerous reports, including a recent GAO study, point to our porous borders as potential terrorist entryways into this country. Our legislation would require everyone entering the U.S. to present a passport, at a minimum.

Of course, travel documents only work insofar as they are authentic and can be authenticated by our officials. Our bill requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish uniform Federal standards for driver's licenses and birth certificates. It is long past time that we take action to protect these documents from being used to commit identity theft, terrorism, and other criminal acts.

Although there has been considerable progress in tightening transportation security since September 11, the Commission made several recommendations to further improve the system. For example, the computer systems and protocols used to vet passengers before they board a plane are not substantially different than the systems that failed to prevent the 9/11 hijackers from boarding their flights. Therefore in this legislation we require the Transportation Security Administration to take over and improve the no-fly list process, and to improve the screening of air passengers for explosives and the screening of air cargo. In addition, we require DHS to set risk-based priorities for defending various transportation assets, and then figure out a plan and budget to get the job done.

Mr. President, I am in full agreement with the Commission that we need to broadly address transportation security vulnerabilities. In fact, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation has already reported several legislative measures designed to improve the security of other transportation modes. A maritime security bill was signed into law in 2002, and we reported a subsequent maritime security measure earlier this year. We also reported, and the Senate has passed, a bus security bill, and our rail security legislation is pending on the Senate Calendar. These measures must be enacted before we adjourn.

The Commission made a number of recommendations to further our national preparedness and emergency response efforts. Its report states that ``homeland security assistance should be based strictly on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities,'' and implores that ``Congress should not use this money as a pork barrel.'' I heartily agree. In following this recommendation, the legislation directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to allocate assistance based on the threats, risks, and vulnerabilities facing a community, along with its population and other specific criteria. It also establishes an expert advisory panel to develop benchmarks for assessing the homeland security needs and capabilities of various communities, and rescinds the current formula for homeland security grants.

The bill would also require certain broadcasters to vacate their television channels in a crisis so that their airwaves are available to first responders, and ensure that public safety organizations have access to this spectrum no later than January 1, 2007. In addition, it directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to work with other officials in developing effective communications capabilities, including back-up support. These steps are vital for closing the existing gaps in interoperability of emergency communications systems.

The Commissioners pointed out that the private sector controls 85 percent of the critical infrastructure in the Nation. Our bill directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a program to promote private sector preparedness for terrorism and other emergencies. It also directs the Secretary to report to Congress regularly on the adequacy of the government's plans to protect our Nation's critical infrastructure.

All of us who are concerned with threats to this Nation's security also wish to ensure that our efforts to protect Americans do not infringe on our civil liberties. After all, giving up the way of life we have fought so hard to defend is not an acceptable price for greater security. We must find a way to balance the two, and that is what this bill proposes to do. It creates a Privacy and Civil Liberties Board, as well as designated privacy and civil liberties officers within relevant Federal agencies, to analyze actions the enhanced security measures taken by our government and to ensure that civil liberties are appropriately considered as these policies are developed. The Board, which would reside within the Executive Office of the President, would advise the President and Federal agencies on the privacy and civil liberties implications of proposed and extant laws, as well as authority to oversee Federal agencies to ensure that civil liberties are being protected.

In addition, the legislation requires certain agency heads to designate senior officers to serve as privacy and civil liberties resources and watchdogs. Among these officers' responsibilities is ensuring that their agency has a process in place to receive, investigate, and respond to complaints from people who report privacy or civil liberties violations.

Having described the bill we are introducing today, I'd like to reiterate that it addresses each of the Commission's recommendations-- not more, not less. The sponsors all recognize that other legislative proposals will be offered that address the security of our Nation in the face of terrorist threats. In particular, I want to acknowledge the efforts by Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Government Affairs Committee. That Committee has a key leadership role in this area, and it is one that I greatly respect. I know that they are working to report a bipartisan reform proposal to reform the Intelligence community in the days ahead and look forward to Senate debate on their proposal.

The sponsors of today's legislation remain open to all proposals, and in fact, will have additional suggestions of our own. But the introduction of our legislation today ensures that the commendable work of the 9/11 Commission has a real opportunity to be debated, amended, and adopted. Despite the short and crowded legislative calendar, we urge the leadership to allow for debate on this and other proposals to address the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. Even in an election year, there is no higher priority than defending the American people against threats to their security.

Mr. President, there has been much talk over recent months about the importance of firm resolve in the face of threats to America's security and its integrity. This legislation presents the Congress with an opportunity this year to exhibit some resolve of our own. While we will act in the shadow of the dark hours of September 11, we can show the American people--and the world--that this government is committed to facing down the worst threats that face us today. We can move forward-- yes, in an election year, yes, by actually finding agreement regardless of party or committee assignment--to better protect and preserve the security of this Nation. With the Senate's serious and thorough consideration of the Commission's recommendations, we will honor those who have been patient enough to afford us this opportunity to change.

I will make two additional comments. One, we need to reform the institutions of government. This blueprint which outlines in legislative form the recommendations of the September 11 Commission are exactly that, a blueprint. I am confident that the Committee on Governmental Affairs, under the outstanding leadership of the Senator from Maine, Ms. Collins, working with Senator Lieberman, Senator Specter, and other members of the committee, will produce a legislative product of which everyone can be very proud. They have already begun a series of hearings, and I have complete confidence in their deliberations and their results.

Let me also say that one of the most difficult aspects of reform will be reform of the institutions here and in the other body. There is no doubt that either one of the two committee recommendations--that there be a joint committee along the lines of the now defunct Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or two separate permanent committees. Those committees have to have budgetary authority. They must be able to appropriate. If not, those committees will be debating societies and they will not have the influence or power necessary or authority necessary to supervise America's intelligence operations.

There are many other areas and many other ideas, including those of the White House and the executive branch that need to be taken into consideration. But I think this is a good start because if there is one thing all of us can agree on it is that the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission have been embraced by virtually one and all, clearly, with some reservations because it is not a perfect document. But overall, the overwhelming majority of Americans expect that we should act on this blueprint as a blueprint, but, second of all, that we should act-- that we should act.

There is no disagreement that our intelligence agencies and our ability to obtain the vital information that is necessary to maintain our national security and prevent another terrorist attack require us to act in an expeditious fashion.

I understand the majority leader, in consultations with Senator Daschle, has laid out a schedule for the Governmental Affairs Committee to report out the last week in September. I think that is a very worthwhile cause.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, it is good to see you after the recess. I thank my colleague and dear friend from Arizona, Senator McCain, for his comments. I support him in substance and in spirit, which is to say the urgency of Congress reacting to the report of the 9/11 Commission.

It was shortly after September 11 that Senator McCain and I introduced legislation, with Senators Specter, Bayh, and others, creating the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. We believed--and we know so many others agreed--that the Nation needed to know as clearly and definitively as possible what had happened, why it had happened, and what could be done to prevent such a heinous attack from ever happening again.

In particular, most understandably and movingly, the families of the 9/11 victims rightly demanded that we learn all we could from the tragedy that took their loved ones from them. In its 20-month existence, the Commission, headed by Governor Thomas Kean and Congressman Lee Hamilton, brought a laser focus to its task. The Commission insisted on talking to the people and seeing the documents that could help them understand and tell the full story. The result is not only a definitive account of what happened on September 11, but also a very thoughtful and compelling analysis of why it happened and where we must go from here. And I take it to be a sign of not only tribute to the Commission but of the public concern and interest in what the Commission had to say, that the published volume of its report, unlike any I have known of in a long time, remains a bestseller throughout our country.

So today, Senator McCain, Senator Specter, Senator Bayh, and I join together again to introduce the 9/11 Commission Report Implementation Act of 2004. This legislation embraces and expresses in legislative language all 41 of the recommendations in the Commission's final report. Some of those, involving calls to restructure the intelligence community, have already been the focus of extensive debate. Others, such as the proposals to crack down on fraudulent identification documents or to build new bridges to the Muslim world, have gotten less discussion. But

they are all--each and every one of them--the product of the outstanding and diligent work of the Commission and therefore deserve, indeed command, our attention. We did not attempt to pick and choose which of the 41 recommendations should be considered or legislated, or to edit the Commission's policy conclusions. Indeed, there are one or two areas where I might take a different approach to the concerns the Commission has raised. But the Commission's recommendations should be our starting point. And I believe in many cases, probably most, they should be our ending point as well.

Introducing this legislation is the fulfillment of the promise we made on the day the Commission issued its report: that we would express its proposals in legislation. At that time we had no idea whether anything would happen on the Commission report in August or September or October. It was that night that Senators Frist and Daschle, our bipartisan leadership, asked our Governmental Affairs Committee to assume responsibility for considering the Commission's report and making a set of proposals to the Senate no later than October 1.

This proposal we now introduce today will go to the Governmental Affairs Committee, formally or informally, to inform the work it is doing. The Governmental Affairs Committee now has the ball and will report to Congress, and is on a schedule, I am pleased to say, to report in advance of the deadline set by Senators Frist and Daschle, in advance of October 1.

So what does the Commission and therefore this legislation call for? The Commission's final report depicts a nation that was woefully unprepared for the attacks of September 11. As the Commission concludes: We need a new strategic vision to confront terrorism and a new unified effort to carry out that strategy. Such unity can only be achieved through a dramatic transformation of the status quo of our key organizations and policies. That is the first order of business.

The Commission has described how, in the course of its investigation, it repeatedly asked this question: Who was in charge prior to September 11, and who is in charge today? And it never received a satisfactory answer. In fact, Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton testified to us before our Governmental Affairs Committee that they still cannot point to some one individual in charge of the American intelligence effort, its enormous human and technological assets, and, therefore, no one who is personally accountable.

This is unacceptable. This legislation rightly creates a national intelligence director to serve as head of the intelligence community and principal adviser to the President for national intelligence matters. The director will have strong budget, resource, and personnel authority to shape priorities and break down the kinds of turf barriers and stovepipes that stood in the way of our Government pulling together in one place all the information we knew prior to September 11-- information that might well have prevented the attacks of September 11 from occurring.

These powers are far stronger than the current authorities exercised by the Director of Central Intelligence. This will create the capability and the accountability for someone to truly lead a unified intelligence effort that will, in turn, greatly benefit the specific fight against terrorism. This intelligence director will operate through a new agency, to be called the National Intelligence Authority. This is not a large new bureaucracy, but rather a command, control and coordination center to achieve a unified intelligence effort. Although the Commission originally called for this office to be created within the White House, numerous experts counseled against this and the Commissioners themselves now agree with that counsel. As a result, this legislation creates the National Intelligence Authority as an independent entity.

To help guarantee the government-wide antiterrorism cooperation that did not exist pre-9/11, the legislation also creates a National Counterterrorism Center, patterned on the joint commands of the Department of Defense, drawing on expertise from throughout the intelligence community. This center will serve as an analytic fusion center on terrorism, and will also have responsibility to develop operational plans for counterterrorism initiatives, and then to track and monitor the operations' implementation. As such, the center will build on the promise of the new multi-agency Terrorist Threat Integration Center it would replace, but go beyond that model to create an even more robust center that combines analytical and operational capabilities.

As recommended by the Commission, the legislation also provides for the creation by the National Intelligence Director of a number of national intelligence centers focused on either specific topics like weapons of mass destruction or specific geographic areas such as the Middle East. These centers will bring together the most experienced intelligence experts from across the intelligence community on a given issue or region, and can be created or eliminated as needed, giving us the flexibility to hone in on evolving priorities.

I am pleased these intelligence reform proposals have already been the focus of numerous hearings, and these issues, as I have said, will be under active consideration in the Governmental Affairs Committee in the coming days.

The work on this legislation and the work that the Governmental Affairs Committee is doing has proceeded distinctly, separately, but collaboratively, and work on each has informed and, I believe, strengthened the other.

I hope--I know the cosponsors of this legislation share that hope-- the package we are introducing today will be of real help to the Governmental Affairs Committee as it frames the legislation it--we-- will report out to the Senate. I am confident the Senate can actually begin to consider it well before the end of September.

The intense debate over the Commission's recommendations on intelligence reform may have obscured the sweeping proposals the Commission made in other areas--very strong and important proposals on border and transportation security, on information sharing, on national preparedness and congressional oversight.

Those proposals are included in this legislation as well. As a result, we hope its introduction will jump-start debate and consideration of those other vital reforms.

First, the Commission stressed we must do all we can to stop this problem at the source--that is, to alter the conditions and dynamics that give rise to terrorism in the first place. This legislation includes the recommendations to strengthen our efforts to fight international terrorism using such tools as diplomacy and foreign aid. For instance, the legislation would increase U.S. foreign assistance to Afghanistan and renew our commitment to Pakistan. It would enhance our outreach to the Muslim world through U.S. broadcasts to the region, educational exchange programs and a fund to boost educational opportunities for Muslim youth.

This will be a long and difficult challenge, however, and we must assume international terrorism will be with us for years to come and prepare accordingly. In addition to the intelligence community reforms I have already mentioned, the Commission calls for a range of new programs and policies to combat terror.

Information sharing is one such critical step. Terrorism has made the homeland part of the frontlines, but too many government officials still believe information related to terrorist threats must be carefully hoarded among a select group. Even colleagues within the intelligence community are often not trusted with vital information, much less officials outside the national security elites or in state and local government. We must break down these information barriers and engage a far broader community in the task of fighting terrorism. This will would create an urgently needed information sharing network to break down the information stovepipes that currently hamper our efforts to stay one step ahead of the terrorists. The network, which is modeled on a proposal by a task force of the Markle Foundation, would consist of policies and information technology designed to facilitate and promote sharing of terrorism information throughout the Federal government, with state and local agencies and, as appropriate, the private sector.

The President will be required to submit an implementation plan to Congress, including clear deadlines, assignment of responsibilities and budget requirements. The proposal includes safeguards for privacy and civil liberties.

The bill includes critical provisions to restrict terrorist travel-- the strategies and methods by which terrorists can, and did, come to this country and position themselves for attacks. It would expand our efforts to collect and utilize intelligence regarding terrorist travel strategies and methods. The legislation also requires an integrated screening system to ensure adequate screening at the nation's entry points and to access transportation systems and critical infrastructure. Complementary provisions in the bill require stronger document requirements for all travelers, including citizens, to enter the United States; acceleration of the automated biometric entry and exit system known as U.S.-Visit; and improved security for identification documents such as driver licenses and birth certificates.

In the area of transportation security, the 9/11 Commission warned against the government's heavy focus on passenger aviation to the near exclusion of other modes of transportation. As its Final Report states, ``[o]ver 90 percent of the nation's $5.3 billion annual investment in the [Transportation Security Administration] goes to aviation--to fight the last war.'' Yet we are investing little in protecting the 14 million Americans who use transit systems each weekday, or safeguarding our port systems that handle millions of shipping containers each year. What is lacking, the Commission states, is ``a forward-looking strategic plan systematically analyzing assets, risks, costs and benefits.'' Following its recommendations, this legislation calls for a comprehensive transportation security strategy to assess risks and set priorities across all modes of transportation. It also seeks to close ongoing gaps in aviation security by requiring the Transportation Security Administration, rather than the airlines, to screen passenger names against a consolidated terrorist watchlist. Additional aviation- related measures include explosives screening for all passengers and their carry-on bags, accelerated research and deployment of explosives detection technologies, and measures to improve the security of cargo traveling on passenger aircraft.

To help deter terrorist attacks and minimize the effect of any attacks that do occur, we must improve our preparedness capabilities and this legislation includes the Commission's recommended steps to do so. The bill would require that homeland security preparedness grants be distributed solely on the basis of criteria related to threat and risk, eliminating the per state minimum in current law. It would facilitate first responder communications by assigning certain radio spectrum to public safety agencies for their use--an important step toward solving the critical challenge of enabling first responders to talk to one another during an emergency. Fighting terrorism is a challenge for our entire national community and the Commission also stressed the importance of preparedness within the private sector. This legislation requires the Department of Homeland Security to promote a voluntary preparedness standard for the private sector. It also presses the Secretary of DHS to complete efforts to inventory the nation's critical infrastructure, assess the threats and vulnerabilities regarding these critical assets, and ensure there are measures to protect them.

The Commission recognized that these new policies and programs will raise important issues regarding privacy and civil liberties and called for a new Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to ensure the protection of these liberties as laws and policies are developed and implemented to protect the nation from terrorism. This legislation creates such a board, which will consist of five individuals appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. In addition to advising the President and federal agencies, the board will have strong authority to conduct investigations and oversight of government actions in the war on terror.

Finally, as we look to the changes the Commission has urged for executive branch structures and programs, we cannot neglect the Commission's call to reform our own structures and its indictment of the status quo of congressional oversight of intelligence. We have to clean and reshape not only the executive branch, but we have to clean out and reshape our own house.

The Commission concluded that the Intelligence Committees of the House and Senate are not organized currently to provide the necessary leadership and oversight for intelligence and counterterrorism, and that jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security is also too broadly dispersed.

The legislation we are introducing today incorporates the mandate of the Commission that each Chamber reform its rules to create a more powerful Intelligence Committee and to consolidate oversight of the Department of Homeland Security in a single committee in each Chamber.

Clearly, we have our work cut out for us. But nothing is more important than to respond not just in a timely but in an urgent way to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and to do so, as the Commission itself did, in a way that puts partisanship aside and our national security first. The group of us introducing this legislation-- Senators McCain, Specter, Bayh, and I--stand shoulder to shoulder across party lines to achieve a safer nation, to protect the American people at home.

We are confident, as we go forward, that our colleagues on both sides of the aisle will join us. There will be differences of opinion. It would be shocking if there were not. Because the recommendations of the Commission represent bold change and dramatically alter the status quo, differences of opinion will naturally occur. They ought to occur. But I am confident in the end they will not be partisan. In the end, we will act and act quickly to implement much of the 9/11 Commission's report so that we can say to the American people, particularly those who lost loved ones on September 11, that we have taken action, done whatever we possibly could to prevent a terrorist attack such as the one that occurred on September 11, 2001, from ever happening again.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleagues-- Senators McCain, Lieberman, and Bayh--in introducing this legislation today which codifies the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The 9/ 11 Commission has accomplished a very important mission in stimulating the demand of the American people that action be taken to put all of our intelligence agencies under one command authority. Had this been done prior to 9/11, it is my judgment that 9/11 could have been prevented.

There was the famous FBI report from Phoenix about the suspicious character who wanted to learn to fly an airplane but wasn't interested in learning to take off or land. There were the suspicious people in Kuala Lumpur who turned out to be two of the terrorists known by the CIA to be al-Qaida, but it was not told to the INS to keep them out of the country. There was the information on Zacarias Moussaoui and the work of the FBI field office in Minneapolis with the 13-page, single- spaced report filed by Agent Coleen Rowley. Those factors and others gave clear-cut clues to what was happening or about to happen. Had they been pursued and investigated, the chances are good that 9/11 could have been prevented.

The Commission, in focusing public attention on the absolute necessity to have one commander, has accomplished something which had not been accomplished up until the present time. I served on the Intelligence Committee back in 1987, when we had the investigation of the Iran Contra affair. At that time I introduced legislation for a national intelligence director looking more to oversight at that time. In 1996, when I was chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I introduced legislation which would have provided budget and hiring authority under the CIA Director. Technically, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency has for some time--I believe going back to 1947--the overall direction of the intelligence community. But without budget authority and without hiring and firing, it has been virtually meaningless. But in 1996, I proposed that legislation.

In 2002, we moved for the creation of an Office of Homeland Security. Senator Lieberman and I introduced, 30 days after 9/11, legislation to create the Department of Homeland Security. But there were various objections to it, and the issue was not taken up seriously until mid- 2002. There was a real effort made in that legislation to have all of the intelligence agencies under one command authority. The House of Representatives passed a bill in October and left town, which they do from time to time, leaving us with the option of either taking their bill or not having a bill until the following spring.

At that time I had an amendment prepared to give the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to direct all of the other intelligence agencies. As I have said on the record before, and it is worth repeating briefly, I had a conversation that afternoon with Secretary Ridge who urged me not to offer the amendment. I told him I thought it had to be done. And when I declined to accept his recommendations, I got a call from Vice President Cheney who urged the same course. When I again declined, I later talked to the President that afternoon and decided that I would await a later date to press for having that authority to direct. But this has been a gaping hole in the intelligence apparatus forever.

The Scowcroft Commission filed a report, still in confidential form but widely reputed to create an individual in charge of the overall intelligence agency. So, finally, we are coming to the point where we are thinking very seriously about having one person in charge, a national director of intelligence, thanks to the focus of the 9/11 Commission.

The Government Affairs Committee on which I serve, with the leadership of Senator Collins, the chairman of the committee, and Senator Lieberman, the ranking member, did something very unusual. We returned in the first week of the recess on July 30 and held additional hearings. In reviewing the work of the 9/11 Commission at that time, I expressed for the record and would repeat now briefly the concerns I have about the so-called double hatting. The 9/11 Commission has recommended that the counterintelligence unit, for example, of the FBI stay under the direction of the Director of the FBI but report also to the national intelligence director so that the Director of the FBI counterintelligence unit would be so-called double hatted.

Well, I do not think that can work under the very basic principle that no one can serve two masters.

The same kind of concept is present on double hatting with the CIA Director for the Department of Defense intelligence agencies. During the course of the Governmental Affairs hearings, I asked Congressman Lee Hamilton, cochairman of the 9/11 Commission, about the possibility of creating the director with a 10-year term, modeled after the FBI Director, to be able to have someone who would outlast the tenure of Presidents. I think that is also a concept which ought to be incorporated.

When the Governmental Affairs Committee was considering this issue and legislation, I prepared a draft bill which I submitted to the members of the Governmental Affairs Committee back on August 3 of this year.

I think it would be useful to put it into the Record. I ask unanimous consent that the text of that draft proposal be printed in the Congressional Record following my statement.

There are other proposals that have been made. The chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Roberts, has proposed legislation. So we have a great many ideas to choose from. As I sat at the Governmental Affairs hearing in early August, it was my hope that we would report out a bill early. I am pleased to say Chairman Collins has listed a markup for the week of September 20th, so that we should have a bill to present to the Senate early on. Then it is my hope we will act on this matter and act expeditiously. We have to get it right.

These are complicated matters. We have been studying them for a very long time. We have been studying them, to my personal knowledge, going back to 1987 in legislation I introduced, and again in 1996, and with the very extensive consideration of the legislation on homeland security in 2002. So I think we are ready to move ahead and make the kinds of judgments that are tough decisions, but that is the pay grade around here. I think the time has come to act.

It may not be a perfect bill. I have been in the Senate for 24 years now and I have not seen a perfect bill. The risks of inaction, in my view, are much greater than the risks of action. We know enough to make a sound judgment as to how to put the entire intelligence community under one umbrella.

I see my colleague Senator Bayh on the floor. I yield the floor.

Exhibit 1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

Mr. President, I have sought recognition to comment on legislation I am introducing today which would direct the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to provide a new, targeted program of outreach to veterans of World War II and the Korean conflict. The purpose of the program would be to inform these veterans, most of whom are now over the age of 70, of the veterans benefits to which they may be entitled, and to encourage them to apply for those benefits. The center piece of the new outreach program would be a $35 million nationwide public service announcement campaign through various print, radio, and television media outlets. I believe such a campaign would be the most effective, and efficient, way to ``get the word out'' about VA benefits and services, but my legislation gives VA flexibility to devise other means if appropriate.

I am concerned that there are a number of older veterans who served during World War II and the Korean conflict, and who are entitled to benefits from VA, are simply not aware of that fact. A recent article in the Philadelphia Inquirer told the story of a World War II veteran from Missouri who filed a claim for benefits in 1947 for a cold-weather injury suffered while wading through an icy French harbor. The claim was denied, but because of intensive outreach conducted the State of Missouri over 50 years later, the veteran recently was awarded 100 percent disability compensation. The same article cities survey data from VA which suggest that over one-half million veterans might be eligible for VA compensation benefits--if only they would file claims. A similar inference can be drawn from data from the Veterans Benefits Administration Fiscal year 2003 Annual Benefits Report which show that even though veterans of World War II and the Korean conflict comprise 31.6 percent of the total veteran population, only 23.2 percent of the total number of veterans actually receiving VA disability compensation are veterans of WWII and the Korean conflict. Further, it is a fact that Korean conflict and World War II veterans who are receiving compensation are compensated for fewer disabilities, on average, than are later generations of veterans.

I suspect that one reason for these discrepancies might be found in the fact that VA and the Department of Defense (DoD) now do a far better job than in prior years of educating service members of the benefits to which they are entitled. This year, VA compiled a report on its outreach activities--a report that was requested by Senator Russ Feingold and me--which outlines at great length programs--all laudable programs--of outreach specifically targeting service members and veterans recently discharged from service. For example, VA has a presence at 136 military installations which enables service members to receive complete medical examinations and disability ratings prior to discharge from service. VA and DoD also cooperate in providing intensive transition workshops for departing service members. I commend both VA and DoD for their outreach activities, particularly for such activities that target service members returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. Clearly, VA and DoD have made great strides in informing service members and veterans of their benefits at the point in their lives when such information is most useful, namely, at discharge from service. However, the intensity and breadth of outreach activities that are now the norm for the current generation of newly discharged veterans simply were not undertaken when World War II and Korean conflict veterans left service.

The Nation recently honored the World War II generation with the dedication of the World War II Memorial in Washington, and with celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the Normandy invasion. Just last year, we marked the 50th anniversary of the end of the Korean conflict. While the fan fare surrounding these events has waned, our efforts on behalf of veterans of these wars must not. It is imperative we make final attempts to let them, and their families, known of the benefits to which they are entitled. The legislation provides a first step to that end. I ask my colleagues for their support, and ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, it is a privilege for me to join my esteemed colleague Senator Specter from Pennsylvania and Senators Lieberman and McCain in this effort to implement the 9/11 Commission recommendations to defend our country.

This is a bipartisan undertaking. We have proven we can rise above partisan politics. It remains to be seen whether we can rise above the bureaucratic inertia, gridlock, and turf jealousy that all too often afflict the Federal Government. I believe we must and I believe we can, if we are to uphold the weighty responsibility placed on us by our fellow American citizens.

The most important thing we can bring to this task is a sense of urgency. What began as a wake-up call on September 11 may not be answered following this November 2, unless we maintain the momentum generated by the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. All too often the country's attention, this body's attention, can be diverted into other arenas, keeping us from taking a difficult but necessary action that sustained focus and attention can achieve.

So I am very insistent that we regain the momentum, bring a sense of urgency and purpose to this calling, because it is what will be necessary to break down some of the barriers that too often in the past have kept us from doing what we now know to be important in terms of defending this country.

Our proposal is the most comprehensive one before the Congress. It addresses not only identifying and cracking down on terrorists who would threaten to do harm to the American people; it is also the only proposal that deals with the causes--the environment that gives rise to those violent individuals in the first place. We have to do both. If there is one thing I am absolutely certain of, it is no matter what resources, focus, and new structure we bring to the challenge of defending our country, we will not be able to identify and bring to justice every individual who wishes us harm. We have to prevent them from being created in the first place. We need to do both. That is what this calls for.

We emphasize accountability and this is vitally important. If you look at the failings that occurred before 9/11, and at some of the weaknesses exposed by the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, you can see there were some significant problems with our intelligence system. Yet, as far as I know, no individual has been admonished, no individual has been demoted, no individual has been fired. George Tenet fell on his sword and took responsibility. But as far as I know, that is as far as it goes.

Is this the best we can do in terms of having a structure that assigns missions and holds people accountable for successfully fulfilling them? I don't believe it is. This proposal we have placed before this Congress insists upon clearly delineated lines of authority, holds people clearly accountable for carrying out tasks, with consequences that will be easier to impose if people do not do the job we have a right to expect of them. If I were the President asking who was responsible or in charge or accountable for this, you would have a half dozen different individuals. But the only individual you can look at and say this person is in charge of a national security apparatus in this country is the President himself.

Well, that is not good enough because with all the President has to be responsible for, he needs to have someone subordinate to him, who is clearly identifiable, to bring coherence and accountability to the national security apparatus. That is what our proposal would put into place.

Finally, let me say two things. We need to increase the amount of information available to our country in order to provide for our defense. No matter what structure we provide, no matter how comprehensive or how much we emphasize accountability, we simply need to know more about dangerous individuals, dangerous places, and what they are doing in an attempt to harm America. There are glaring blind spots today, when it comes to intelligence, that will make us unable to defend our country. We are in the process of trying to correct some of those blind spots, but more needs to be done.

This report focuses like a laser, particularly on improving the level of human intelligence that will augment our technology, and other sources at our disposal to provide for the common defense.

In conclusion, let me say this. I am reminded of the old adage, ``Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.'' It is no longer possible to deny there are glaring weaknesses in the national security intelligence apparatus that sprung up following World War II. It was designed for a different time and a different challenge. We must seize this opportunity and put into place truly transformational change that will enable us to defend our country against the threats of the 21st century, not those that threatened us in the recent past.

Those who would temporize, equivocate, and those who would unduly compromise will bear a very heavy burden indeed should another tragedy strike this country. Now is the time for bold action. Now is the time to put aside the bureaucratic turf jealousies, inertia, and divisions that afflict the Congress and the executive branch and unite politically, unite across branches of Government, unite in a common purpose of truly bold reform and change, so that those who follow in our footsteps will know we have done everything humanly possible to protect this country.

Some of the sacrifices need to start with this Congress. Too often people have committee jealousies and they want to protect turf. We need to put that aside and unite as one people, one Congress, to protect this Nation. That is what this legislation does. So I am pleased to join with my colleagues in a bipartisan spirit to move the intelligence system forward and defend America.

I will conclude with a saying I once read. I am a member of the Intelligence Committee. At one of the briefings, we got what was actually a cover sheet of the budget for the intelligence community a couple of years ago. The budget is classified, but this is not. It was a quote from Napoleon Bonaparte, which I found interesting. Napoleon Bonaparte once said ``a well-placed spy is worth at least two divisions.'' Well, today a well-placed spy and access to timely, accurate information could be worth two American cities; it could mean the difference between hundreds of thousands of lives saved or lost.

Let us not get embroiled in political, bureaucratic, or other disputes when the fate of our Nation hangs in the balance. Now is the time to act. I am honored to join with my colleagues in proposing that we do exactly that.