A bill to amend chapter 25 of title 18, United States Code, to create a general provision similar to provisions found in chapter 47 of such title, to provide for criminal penalties for the act of forging Federal documents.

Mr. President, it is my understanding that Senator Stevens no longer needs to use his time at this time. I believe he will be speaking later. So I ask unanimous consent to vitiate the order that reserved time for Senator Stevens and instead have Senator Hutchison recognized to offer an amendment.

Mr. President, before the Senator from Mississippi has to leave the floor, I want to thank him for his advice and his support as we bring this very important legislation before the Senate for consideration. I very much value the advice and support of the Senator, and I appreciate all he is doing to help move this legislation forward. He has been a very early voice in identifying the flaws in our current intelligence system and has been stalwart in his support for significant reform. I thank the Senator from Mississippi.

I also commend the Senator from Texas for her continued effort to examine the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and to pursue legislative solutions, particularly in the area of improving the security of cargo and general aviation security in general. Senator Hutchison has been a longtime leader in this area. Her amendment encompasses a significant portion of S. 165 that the Senate passed by unanimous consent in May. I commend her for her foresight in recognizing areas of concern that have been singled out by the 9/11 Commission.

In the Commission's report, for example, the Commission noted that:

Major vulnerabilities still exist in cargo and general

aviation security.

The Commission went on to say that:

The TSA and Congress must give priority attention to

improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect

explosives.

The Commission says:

More attention and resources should be directed to reducing

or mitigating the threat posed by explosives in vessels'

cargo holds.

These are all areas of weakness identified by the Commission that the Senator from Texas would address in her amendment. It will assist in implementing several of the Commission's recommendations and as a whole will help to make our Nation's air passengers, air carriers, and air cargo more secure. I would note that the Department of Homeland Security has no objections to the Senator's amendment. When the roll call does occur, I will be urging our colleagues to support her efforts.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I, too, thank our leaders for their cooperation in moving this bill forward. The process they have outlined is a fair one. It will help us know how many amendments there are, and we will work with the sponsors of those amendments to ensure adequate debate.

If the Senator from Florida could tell me how much time he anticipates needing.

Mr. President, we would be happy, in light of the devastation to his State, to give the Senator from Florida 10 minutes, if that would be helpful.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following cosponsors be added to Collins-Carper-Lieberman-Coleman amendment No. 3705: Senators Voinovich, Leahy, Akaka, Rockefeller, Nelson of Nebraska, and Hagel.

Mr. President, Senator Voinovich, along with Senator Levin, was very instrumental in helping to draft the compromise represented in this amendment. I talked earlier about the efforts of the Senator from Delaware and the Senator from Connecticut, but I also wanted to acknowledge that Senator Voinovich and Senator Levin worked very hard to help us strike the right balance in allocating funding so that large States with high-threat areas would receive additional funding. Yet we wanted to make sure that we recognize that every State, regardless of size or population, has certain vulnerabilities.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, Senator Specter is offering the first of what I anticipate will be many amendments to alter the authority of the national intelligence director. He is arguing that the Collins- Lieberman bill does not go far enough. Later on in this debate you will hear from those who believe our bill empowers the NID too far, with too much authority in the NID.

Our approach gives the national intelligence director full budget authority, including the authority to execute, reprogram, and transfer funds over the entire budgets of the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, which are all now located within the Department of Defense.

Our bill also gives the NID enhanced tasking authority, the power to transfer personnel and authority over the selections of the heads of these agencies with concurrence from the Secretary of Defense.

What it does not do is sever the link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense, nor does it give the NID exclusive control over these agencies. And that would be the impact of Senator Specter's amendment. He would sever the link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense, and he would give the NID exclusive control over these agencies. I think that would be a mistake.

I believe our legislation strikes the right balance in the relationship that it sets forth between the NID and these agencies. I note that our approach is consistent with the recommendations of the 9/ 11 Commission. It is consistent with the recommendations of the administration. The 9/11 Commission, indeed, opposes adoption of Senator Specter's amendment. The Commission believes it would be a mistake to sever that link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense.

In deciding to keep these agencies--the NSA, the NGA, and the NRO-- within the Department of Defense, we were cognizant of the fact that the NSA and the NGA are designated as combat support agencies. We did not want to in any way weaken or break the bonds between these agencies and the military forces that serve in that capacity. Indeed, many current and former defense officials warned that taking such a step would be counterproductive and would risk breaking something that is working well for the military today.

For example, at our hearings, Secretary Powell said:

We should not break the link between these intelligence

organizations and the organizations that they are supporting,

especially within the military context and the direct kind of

support that the NRO and similar organizations give to the

warfighter.

I would note that by severing that link, the Specter amendment would create some real anomalies. For example, in his proposal, he requires that every 2 years, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would submit to the national intelligence director a report on the combat readiness of these organizations. Why would a report on

combat readiness go to the national intelligence director rather than to the Secretary of Defense?

There are some other unanticipated consequences of the Specter amendment that illustrate how wholesale changes to the status of NGA, NRO, and the NSA might have completely unintended consequences. For example, title X, section 442(b) now provides that the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall improve means of navigating vessels of the Navy and the merchant marine by providing, under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, accurate and inexpensive nautical charts, sailing directions, books on navigation, and manuals of instructions for the use of all vessels in the United States and of navigators generally. The Specter amendment, in changing the Secretary of Defense to the national intelligence director, would make the national intelligence director responsible for a navigation mapping responsibility that has nothing to do with intelligence. That is just an example of some of the unintended consequences.

Again, the approach taken by Senator Specter--and I know he has given this matter a great deal of thought--does not have the support of the 9/11 Commission. It does not have the support of the administration. It would sever the link between these combat support agencies and the Secretary of Defense.

I will note that these three agencies within the Pentagon do serve customers other than the Secretary of Defense. There are other consumers, such as the CIA, for the intelligence information they produce. That is why our legislation does give the NID significant authority over these agencies, including budget authority, the ability to transfer personnel, and the ability, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, to name the heads of these agencies. That is the right balance. But to break that link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense simply, in my judgment, does not make sense.

I urge opposition to the amendment.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia for his excellent comments. He states the case very well.

There are two final points that I would like to make on Senator Specter's amendment, and that is, when we asked Philip Zelikow, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, to comment on this, he gave us a history of why the Commission specifically rejected this approach, and we talked about many of the reasons.

But one other that he mentioned is that one damaging consequence of stripping NSA, NGA, and NRO out of the Department of Defense is that then the Pentagon might well feel obligated to recreate the capabilities within the Department at great expense and creating many more opportunities for bureaucratic conflict. That was a point made by the executive director in expressing his opposition to Senator Specter's amendment and in giving us an insight into why the Commission specifically rejected the route taken in this amendment.

I also note that Senator Specter's amendment, while it is intended to create clear lines of authority between the NID and the combat support agencies, in reality could well create much ambiguity and confusion. While the amendment gives the NID supervision, direction, and control over these combat support agencies, it keeps them housed in DOD buildings, on DOD land, and the amendment does not take away from the Secretary of Defense the direction and control he currently has over these agencies.

For example, the law that created the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, which is now the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, establishes that Agency under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. Yet under the Specter amendment, the NSA, the NGA, and the NRO would fall under the line authority of both Agencies. I think that would create tremendous confusion and ambiguity.

Mr. President, I see the time for the vote has arrived.

Mr. President, I urge support for Senator Hutchison's amendment.

If the Senator will yield on that point, I think this points out the confusion and ambiguity I pointed out earlier due to the way the Specter amendment is drafted. I agree that it creates confusion and also that the implications of substituting the national intelligence director for the Secretary of Defense throughout the laws creating these agencies creates a lot of unintended problems. That is one reason I believe this amendment should be defeated.

Mr. President, the bottom line of the Specter amendment is that it would sever the reporting relationship between the heads of these three combat support agencies and the Secretary of Defense. I don't think that makes sense. I understand these three agencies serve consumers of intelligence other than the Pentagon, other than the war fighters, but the Pentagon, the war fighter, is a very important consumer of the intelligence produced by these agencies, and that is why in our legislation we gave a lot of thought to how to handle the organization of these agencies and the reporting requirements.

We followed the advice of the 9/11 Commission. We kept a reporting relationship to the Secretary of Defense in acknowledgment of the combat support agency role played by these organizations. But in recognition of the fact that they also provide critical intelligence to the CIA and to a host of other agencies and to the President, we recognized that they are national as well.

What we have is a dual reporting responsibility to both the Secretary of Defense and the new national intelligence director. We do strengthen the control of the national intelligence director in significant ways in acknowledgment that these are national assets. We give the director control over the budget of these agencies. We allow the director to appoint the heads of these agencies with concurrence from the Secretary of Defense. The new national intelligence director can transfer personnel and funds. But we should not sever the link between those agencies and the Secretary of Defense. That would be a big mistake.

I urge my colleagues to oppose the Specter amendment.

I appreciate the support of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

The Senator is correct and his points are well taken. In reading to me the statement from that letter, the Senator has brought up another important point. Do we really believe that the national intelligence director should have line authority, day-to-day operational authority over all of those agencies? We know that the 9/11 Commission found that one reason the CIA Director was not as effective as he should be was he had too many jobs. He is head of the intelligence community, he runs the CIA, and he is the principal adviser to the President.

Under the formulation proposed by the Senator from Pennsylvania, we would be worsening that problem by giving the NID line authority, day- to-day operational authority. That person cannot possibly run all of those agencies and still coordinate, oversee, and manage the intelligence community.

So I believe this amendment goes too far. The Specter amendment essentially creates a de facto department of intelligence, as my colleague from Connecticut has pointed out, and that approach was specifically rejected by the 9/11 Commission. They specifically considered what should be the reporting relationships of these three combat support agencies. They rejected the approach taken by the Specter amendment. The administration also opposes that approach. Our committee rejected that approach. Our witnesses did not think that approach was wise.

I urge my colleagues to join in opposition to the amendment offered by Senator Specter.

Mr. President, in committee, some of the Senators who signed that letter participated in the debate. They did not convince the majority of the committee members. So far in this debate today, I don't believe that other advocates of this approach have yet been heard, but they may well be heard tomorrow. I know Senator Bond wants to speak. I think there are both proponents and opponents who still wish to be heard.

The Senator's point is well taken.

It has not.

Mr. President, to answer the question of the Senator from Virginia, I believe it is consistent. I direct the Senator's attention to the very first sentence of this Statement of Administration Policy where it states: ``The Administration supports Senate passage of S. 2845.'' That is the bill before us. That is the bill that is also known as the Collins-Lieberman bill.

Mr. President, to respond to the question of the Senator from Virginia, our bill makes very clear that the budgets for the tactical intelligence programs remain under the authority of the Secretary of Defense. That is consistent with the position of the administration, and it is also consistent with the position of the 9/11 Commission.

What we are seeking to do is to put national intelligence assets--the budget for those programs--under the national intelligence director and, indeed, much of the budget for these agencies is currently within the National Intelligence Program, or what is now known as the NFIP, the National Foreign Intelligence Program, because as the Senator is well aware, these agencies are providing intelligence not just to the combatant commanders, the troops, DOD, but as one of the generals with whom we met told us, he talks far more often to the Director of the CIA than he does to the Secretary of Defense.

If we look at the administration's legislative language they have sent up, they, too, exclude the tactical intelligence assets. I think what this language is intended to convey is, as one of our witnesses said--as many of our witnesses said--the worst thing we could do is to create a national intelligence director who did not have budget authority. That power of the purse is arguably the most important authority given to the NID, but no one, to my knowledge, has advocated giving the NID authority over the tactical intelligence in the Department of Defense.

Yes, that the President has requested for the NID.

What I am telling the Senator is that if he looks at the language sent up by the administration, he will see--and if he looks at the language in our bill, he will see there has never been discussion in putting tactical intelligence--

Mr. President, I say to the Senator, I, obviously, am not the author--

That is correct, other than there may be some programs that are now part of the JMIP that are not principally for--and I see my colleague from Michigan joined us; we had a long debate in committee about this--that are not principally used for joint military purposes, but rather are national intelligence assets, and an example of that would be DIA.

Mr. President, I have no objection. I think that would be helpful.

Mr. President, if the Senator will yield?

I do not want to give the impression that our legislation tracks the administration's legislation in all respects, because it does not. What I was saying to the Chair and to the Senator from Virginia is there has never been support for bringing the tactical intelligence assets, bringing the budget for those programs under the national intelligence director's control. Our legislation specifically carves them out and keeps them under the control of the Pentagon. So I am a bit perplexed by this debate because nobody is proposing what the Senator seems to be fearing.

The full budget authority, in my view, applies to the national intelligence assets.

The Senator is correct.

I would say to the Senator that the Secretary already does have a voice. There is a requirement that as the national intelligence director develops the budget to be recommended to the President, he must do it in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy for the part of the intelligence community that is under the Secretary of Energy's control, et cetera.

In addition, we create a new entity called the joint intelligence community council, which I think already has an acronym, on which the Secretary of Defense will serve, which serves as an advisory board to the national intelligence director.

I also point out to the distinguished Senator from Virginia that ultimately it is the President's call on the budget. These are recommendations made by the national intelligence director. It is the President who ultimately decides.

Those provisions are extremely clear in the bill. I do not see how they can be ambiguous.

I would be happy to put the provisions in the Record. I question why it is necessary when everybody has the bill available. It is on page 12, for example, lines 20 through 25, in describing what the national intelligence director shall do. It says:

Developing and presenting to the President an annual budget

for the National Intelligence Program after consultation with

the heads of agencies or elements, and the heads of their

respective departments . . .

I do not see how it could be clearer.

After Congress acts.

And the law is signed by the President.

The appropriation is received by the NID for the national intelligence program.

Not for what is known as TIARA or JMIP.

Which portion?

Correct.

Mr. President, I apologize for interrupting the Senator.

The leaders have been waiting for Senator Lieberman and me since 5:30 for a meeting and they have summoned us again. I did not want to walk off the floor without explaining to my distinguished colleagues the fact that we have already kept our leaders waiting for more than 20 minutes.

I am sorry, I couldn't hear the Senator.

The Senator is correct. The vote will occur tomorrow.

We do not. We have not been able to determine how many people still want to speak on the amendment. We are trying to accommodate those who do wish to speak.

I would certainly welcome that. Perhaps we can try with the help of the floor staff to order the series of speakers. We will make sure the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee is protected in that regard.

We hope the Senator will be here.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I know the Senator from Kansas is waiting. I need to make a couple of very brief announcements, with the Senator's indulgence.

Amendment No. 3731 to Amendment No. 3705

Mr. President, I have two amendments that have been cleared on both sides. Both of these amendments are second-degree amendments to my underlying amendment No. 3705 regarding Homeland Security grants. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the Inhofe- Jeffords second-degree amendment No. 3731, which is at the desk, be considered and agreed to, with the motion to reconsider laid upon the table.

Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that the Levin second-degree amendment No. 3732, which is at the desk, now be considered and agreed to, with the motion to reconsider laid upon the table.

Mr. President, I hope we can continue to work on the underlying amendment with the goal of having a vote on it shortly. I also want to announce to all of my colleagues that we do intend to vote on Senator Specter's amendment tomorrow. I recognize there are a few Senators who have not been heard on it who desire to be heard, but we do intend to conclude the debate and vote on Senator Specter's amendment tomorrow.

I thank the Chair.

amendment no. 3731

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the conclusion of the vote I be recognized to speak in opposition to the Specter amendment for 10 minutes.

Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Specter amendment. I wish to compliment the managers of the bill, Senators Collins and Lieberman. I thought their arguments were overwhelmingly persuasive in support of the President's position and indeed the 9/11 Commission that these agencies--the National Security Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the former Mapping Agency, as we knew it; and the National Reconnaissance Office--have important intelligence functions. They are collection agencies. They must remain under the managerial supervision of the Secretary of Defense. I feel ever so strongly about that.

These three agencies are designated in law as combat support agencies, servicing our troops, the men and women of the Armed Forces wherever they are in the world facing harm's way, today, tomorrow, and in the future.

The President announced, on September 8, that these three agencies would not--I repeat, would not--be moved from the Department of Defense. This decision was based on two very important principles: One, no reform measures that the President advocates should disrupt ongoing operations in the war on terrorism. I am certain all colleagues fully appreciate the sensitivity of that extremely important decision and principle not to move these three agencies. Secondly, no ambiguity should be introduced in the chain of command, from the President through the Secretary of Defense down to the combatant commanders. That is vital to the war on terrorism and indeed other military operations.

These three agencies are designated combat support agencies providing direct intelligence support to the unified combatant commanders currently fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in other theaters.

The Secretary of Defense is accountable to the President. Under law-- I shall turn to the law momentarily. To ensure that these agencies provide the proper intelligence to our military customers, the Secretary of Defense must be able to direct them in executing their operational missions.

I would like to pause for a minute and draw to my colleagues' attention the law. It reads, for the Secretary of Defense:

The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director

of Central Intelligence, shall--

(1) ensure that the budgets of the elements of the

intelligence community within the Department of Defense are

adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the

Department of Defense. . . .

Further on down it reads:

(4) ensure that the elements of the intelligence community

within the Department of Defense are responsive and timely

with respect to satisfying the needs of operational military

forces. . . .

I do not see how the amendment of my colleague from Pennsylvania modifies the existing law, and that is imperative if this amendment is to be effective.

I draw my colleagues' attention further to the law, and that is title 10 with respect to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I read from section 193:

(a) Combat Readiness.--(1) Periodically (and not less often

than every two years), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a report on

the combat support agencies. Each such report shall

include--

(A) a determination with respect to the responsiveness and

readiness of each such agency to support operating forces in

the event of a war or threat to national security; and

(B) any recommendations that the Chairman considers

appropriate.

That law would have to be modified in some way were this amendment to be adopted.

So, in conclusion, Mr. President and colleagues, I foresee a potential disruption to operations were this amendment to become law. Numbers are classified, but approximately one-half of the employees of these agencies are Active-Duty military personnel.

In addition to national requirements, these agencies provide great volumes of tactical-level support to the warfighter.

Also, in existing law, I draw to my colleagues' attention that the Under Secretary of the Air Force is dual-hatted as a Director for the NRO. So that, too, would have to be amended and changed. Furthermore, the Director of the NSA is dual-hatted. He is a Deputy Commander of Strategic Command for Information, warfighting responsibility.

So in conclusion, I strongly support the position of the distinguished chairman and ranking member and urge colleagues to vote against this amendment.

Mr. President, the one thing we want to avoid is patchwork legislation. I have drawn to the attention of my colleague--

I thank my colleague. But, I say to the Senator, I would be happy to enter into a colloquy with you on this point.

I would hope you do so.

I pointed out specific provisions of the law requiring certain accountability of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. We do not want to do patchwork legislation.

My understanding, after reading and studying your amendment, is you take these three entities out of the Department of Defense. I do not read into the amendment where there is a residual authority left in the Secretary to perform the functions as prescribed in title 10 and, to some extent, title 50.

I will wait for the Senator from West Virginia to answer. You directed it to the Senator from West Virginia.

I am trying to inject a little lightheartedness.

I say to my good friend, a little humor now and then is well advised. But I understand precisely the question directed to me. Let us read your amendment. Would you read your amendment and show me where that residual authority under titles 10 and 50 are left in the Secretary of Defense?

I would draw that argument to the attention of the distinguished manager of the bill. My understanding, in reading some of your comments, is that I do not find in this amendment where there is a clear delineation of authority and that managerial responsibility, as required under titles 10 and 50, remains in the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. President, I am reading from section 305, Defense Intelligence Agency. I believe that is clear on the DIA, but I do not see it with reference to the National Reconnaissance Office. ``The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be under the direction, supervision, and control of the NID.'' I just see no residual managerial authority left in the Secretary of Defense to fulfill his statutory requirements under titles 10 and 50.

``Line of authority: The Director of National Reconnaissance shall report directly to the national intelligence director regarding the activities of the National Reconnaissance Office.'' I mean, there is the clear English language.

I say to my good friend, he may be well intentioned, but I am somewhat at a loss to find any reference in this amendment that preserves that residual responsibility which you have represented to the Senate.

Might I just hand you the amendment and ask you to point to the language which you feel leaves the residual authority in the Secretary of Defense?

I have given every opportunity to my colleague. I stand by my representations to my colleagues and I support the managers of the bill in having this amendment defeated.

Mr. President, if the distinguished manager would yield for a question, the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, in support of his amendment, submitted for the record a letter dated September 20, 2004, signed by a number of colleagues. Here is a statement that I believe confirms the proposition I just enunciated, that the amendment would strip the Secretary of all of his responsibilities as existing in other statutes. I will read it:

We are writing to you, however, to express our serious

concern that current draft of the bill, as described by your

summary and after review--

It is addressed to the chairman.

--by the Governmental Affairs Committee members and staff,

does not give the NID additional authorities that will be

required to provide the unity of leadership and

accountability necessary for real intelligence reform. In

particular--

This is the operative sentence.

--we feel strongly that the NID must have day-to-day

operational control of all elements of the intelligence

community performing national missions.

It goes on. So it is very clear.

I would say that they do single out the term ``national missions,'' but these combat support agencies perform both national missions and tactical combat missions. They are not clearly separable. I mean the soldier, sailor, airman, and marine in the field today relies on satellite intelligence, which is a national mission of, say, the NRO, as well as the tactical support the NRO gives in various ways.

So I feel that as I read the amendment, it is totally contradictory of the desire of the 9/11 Commission, totally contradictory of the advice and counsel that the President has given the Congress, am I not correct?

Mr. President, may I ask my distinguished colleague another question? This is a letter which is now submitted for the Record. It contains the names of about eight or nine other Senators. Have any of those Senators come to clarify this point? I would like to study what they have said.

I hope to be on the Senate floor when they do that. I wonder if the managers of the bill might acquaint them with the title 10 and title 50 provisions and ask where in the amendment those provisions are modified; otherwise, we are going to end up with a patchwork. That is one thing I know this chairman and ranking member do not wish to have.

Mr. President, I will pose a question to both managers, also members of the Armed Services Committee. As we proceed with this legislation, I am sure you are bearing in mind that we recall the aftermath of the 1991 war in which we participated in liberating Kuwait. You will recall as a member of the committee that General Schwarzkopf came before us at that time as sort of an after-action report. He talked in some detail about what he felt were shortcomings, particularly in the tactical intelligence, as to what he needed as a warfighter, as commander of the forces. That sounded alarms throughout the system. It startled many of us that that shortfall existed to that extent. Immediately the then Secretary of Defense and the successive Secretary of Defense--particularly Secretary Rumsfeld--have done everything possible to strengthen and remove the weaknesses that were in the system at that time.

As we proceed on this bill, I hope we have been mindful of particular tactical strengths that have been built into the existing system. It would be my fervent hope that nothing in this bill would roll back that progress. I wonder if the managers might address that, since both are members of the Armed Services Committee and have experience with the gulf war and what has been done in the ensuing years.

Mr. President, that is reassuring. If I might further inquire of my distinguished colleague, I was given today, and I expect the managers maybe earlier received this, in any event, this is the September 28 communication from the Executive Office of the President to the Senate. It is entitled ``Statement of Administration Policy.'' Has that been printed in the Record as yet today?

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, at this point in the debate or at the conclusion of our colloquy, to print this Statement of Administration Policy in the Record.

Mr. President, I think it is a document that will be of value to all Members of the Senate if they have not received it.

I would like to draw the attention of the two managers to that operative paragraph 2:

The Administration supports, in particular, the

establishment of a NID with full, effective, and meaningful

budget authorities and other authorities to manage the

Intelligence Community including statutory authority for the

newly created National Counterterrorism Center. The

Administration will oppose any amendments that would weaken

the full budget authority or any other authorities that the

President has requested for the NID. The Administration will

work in the legislative process to continue to strengthen and

streamline intelligence reform legislation and to make

adjustments to ensure that the President continues to have

flexibility in combating terrorism and conducting

intelligence activities.

It is the operative phrase that ``the Administration will oppose any amendments that would weaken the full budget authority,'' and the preceding sentence where they said ``a NID with full, effective, and meaningful budget authorities.''

Mr. President, first, I would like to ask the two managers, is the purport of this paragraph consistent with all the several provisions in the bill that refer to budget authority, in their judgment?

Without diminishing in any way that very encouraging sentence, if you go on to read the totality of this communication, there are expressly in here some reservations, but I will not get into that at this point in time.

I want to go back to these words, ``full, effective, and meaningful budget authorities.'' We just had a debate on the Specter amendment, which I believe, with no disrespect to my good friend and colleague, is an extreme viewpoint on this, and I am hopeful the Senate will not adopt it, but we do come back to this pivotal question, and tomorrow I hope to bring forth some amendments. Now that I see the expressed language and the Senator assured me her bill tracks this, I have to have some clarification--at least I shall seek clarification--of what is the remaining role of the Secretary of Defense with regard to those portions; namely, these three combat agencies, together with DIA, what is the residual area of collaboration, jointness, in the preparation of the budget--preparation is part 1--and then the execution of the budget after it goes through the authorization and appropriations process and begins to come back to the several departments and agencies.

So let's talk about what the Senator believes this language--which is consistent, as she says, with the language in the bill--I presume the Senator's language would not be modified or changed by this--what is left to the Secretary of Defense in regard to the budget authority?

Mr. President, I really think that is an important representation the Senator has made, but I do not read in this language of the communication from the White House the distinction that she draws between tactical and national. Can I refer the Senator again to this language?

I draw the attention of the distinguished managers to the words ``the Administration will oppose any amendments that would weaken the full budget authority. . . .'' It is the word ``full.''

To me ``full'' is the whole basket. It could be interpreted that way.

Mr. President, I acknowledge that, the JMIP and the TIARA in the language sent up. But it seems to me the writer of this could have been somewhat more explicit in the communication because this is an important communication to guide Senators desiring to establish their voting pattern in connection with the Senator's bill.

I think I pressed the point far enough and I think the Senator from Maine has been very courteous in her responses. I just want to bring to the attention of colleagues, when this says ``full,'' it is your understanding it did not include the JMIP, the TIARA, and those programs; is that correct?

I am privileged to be in this colloquy with my friends. I would like to have the assurance of the ranking member of the committee that he concurs in the statements just made by our distinguished Chair.

The question is the language sent up by the administration did have a breakout of the budget authority as relates to certain parts of the overall programs performed by these combat agencies.

I ask our distinguished manager of the bill whether this language in the communication today which said the administration opposed any amendments, because I proposed to have an amendment tomorrow--it may be opposed by the administration, but I want to make sure that the phrase ``full budget authorities'' is not amending what they sent up by way of language.

Well, time will tell. I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record a copy of the administration--I think the Senator referred to it as a bill although it was never introduced--language they sent up which made a clear reference and distinction to what budget authority was given to the NID and what residual remains in the Secretary of Defense. Am I correct on that?

Yes.

It was a communication from the administration----

I guess to the managers of the bill or the committee. Nevertheless, it is a document expressing the intentions, and the distinguished chairman has clearly indicated that her bill tracks that.

I asked that if a construction of this language we received today is full budget authority, it could lead someone to the conclusion that everything was transferred.

Good. And if they had inserted that in there, it would have been clearer, I hasten to add. We are not going to debate this further. In fairness, having raised this question, I think the Senator has brought considerable clarification. It may be the administration may be more forthcoming about what they precisely meant by the use of full budget authority in the use of this communication, but let me proceed in my questioning with regard to the residual authority of the Secretary of Defense over those budgets in the combat agencies, and I would like to add DIA, which is also a combat agency.

As the Senator says in her bill, those sections which are tactical are in the discretion of the Secretary in the preparation of the budget, and he would collaborate with the NID in preparing those sections. Now, on the national intelligence collection, I think the chairman agrees with me that the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines utilize that in carrying out their tactical missions, although it classifies the NRO and the gathering in space as the national program. Am I correct? It does feed into the tactical portion?

So, therefore, should not the Secretary of Defense have a voice--and I would like to see how we can describe that voice--in the compilation of that budget for the national program which in part supports the efforts of the forces in the tactical missions?

Mr. President, that is very helpful. I wonder if the Senator's staff would provide for the Record at this point an insertion of those references in the bill which supports the Senator's very important representation to the Senate just now, that the Senator feels he has the consultation role and such other roles as to assure the Secretary of Defense that he has a voice in the preparation of the budget.

I just wanted to have the pages annotated. I think my colleague witnessed several colleagues today saying it would be helpful if we could get a clearer understanding of some things, and I think the Record today could be of help to those who want to see in the Senator's bill precisely those sections which underpin the Senator's important representation. I ask if the Senator might consider putting that into the Record.

Mr. President, I was not challenging the language. I was simply trying to get a reference. The Senator provided it, and I thank the chairman.

If I could transition to the second part of this, the budget is prepared and approved by the President. It is then acted upon by the Congress by authorization and appropriation and it goes to the NID. Am I correct?

Right.

I thank the chairman. That portion of the budget then goes back to be administered by the Secretary of Defense; is that clear?

That nonnational portion.

It goes back to the Secretary of Defense. I thank the distinguished chairman on that point.

I see on the floor my distinguished colleague, the ranking member of the

Armed Services Committee. I wondered, since he followed this colloquy and I know he has worked very hard in this area with the Senator from Virginia, have some of his concerns which he has expressed to me been touched on in this colloquy?

I think I have the floor.

Mr. President, I think I have the floor. I am quite happy to yield to my colleague to respond to my inquiry.

Yes, if I could make a preliminary statement, and then I will be glad to yield. As a matter of fact, I will yield the floor. If you seek the floor, I am going to yield it momentarily.

Mr. President, first I thank the distinguished manager and ranking member for engaging in I think a very important colloquy. I wanted to make a record for some colleagues who have asked a number of questions, and I think we made an interesting record here that will help in their deliberations and thought processes.

I will have amendments tomorrow, hopefully to clarify some things which I feel should be clarified. They are constructive amendments, I say to the distinguished chair and ranking member, because I want to be cooperative and supportive of the President and your efforts. But I do feel very strongly that there are some amendments.

My colleague, Senator Levin, and I have worked together. It may well be we will jointly put in some amendments tomorrow on this subject. Not in a manner of a turf battle. I am really quite in temper that that word continues to be brought up, because I personally am striving to do what is best for this country and to make our intelligence system stronger as a consequence of this legislative process. I think it can be achievable. But I have to get clarifications. The language in this message that came up today about full budget authority seems to be somewhat contradictory of some other things. But we will work it out.

I thank the distinguished managers and I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3706 on behalf of Senator Shelby, Senator Roberts, Senator Bond, Senator Wyden, Senator Bayh, Senator Feinstein, and myself.

I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, this is one of two amendments which I intend to offer to strengthen the position of the national intelligence director. At the outset, I join many others in complimenting the chairwoman, Senator Collins, and the ranking member, Senator Lieberman, for their leadership and their outstanding work in presenting the bill which is now on the floor.

This measure is a long time in coming for decision by the Congress. In my view, had there been a strong national intelligence director in existence prior to September 11, 2001, the attack on 9/11 might well have been prevented. There were many indicators present. Had they all been put together, I think there is a good chance we could have avoided the calamity of that day.

There is a famous FBI report from Phoenix about this suspicious character who wanted to learn how to fly an airplane but who was not interested in takeoffs or landings. That information never got to the appropriate authority in headquarters at the FBI. There were two al- Qaida suspects in Kuala Lumpur known to the Central Intelligence Agency, information not communicated to the INS, to Immigration, so that those two al-Qaida agents came into the United States and were among the 19 hijackers who perpetrated the atrocities of 9/11.

There was an extensive investigation conducted by the Minneapolis office of the FBI, the famous 13-page, single-spaced memorandum by special agent Coleen Rowley about Zacarias Moussaoui. Had those leads been followed, had there been an application for a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act using the right standard--the FBI used the wrong standard--that would have produced a great deal of information which could have, in combination with other information, been pieced together to have warned us of the impending attack.

There is the information from NSA, where there was the tip that something was going to happen on 9/11 which was either not translated or not communicated to the Intelligence Committee.

There had been the information about Murad, an al-Qaida operative back in 1996, and his plans to fly an airplane into the CIA.

Those are only some of the threats. In combination and along with others, had we had all the information together, had we known what could have been pieced together, I think the likelihood is present that 9/11 could have been prevented.

During my tenure as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee during the 104th Congress, the Intelligence Committee reported a bill, S. 1718, which sought to lodge effective power in the Director of Central Intelligence. That position theoretically was in charge of all the intelligence community but, because of lack of authority, lack of budget control, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency was never able to carry out the role of being the unifier, the real leader of the intelligence community.

In section 707 of that bill, it provided for:

Enhancement of authority of Director of Central

Intelligence to manage, budget, personnel, and activities of

the intelligence community.

On a cross referral, by the time it got to the Armed Services Committee, the substance was taken out. There was a big turf battle and the effort to lodge authority in the Director of CIA to do effective direction and management of the Central Intelligence Agency went to naught.

Thirty days after 9/11, Senator Lieberman and I introduced legislation to create the Department of Homeland Security. That was on October 11 of 2001. When special agent Coleen Rowley testified before the Judiciary Committee in June of 2002, there was finally impetus to get support from the administration to move ahead with a Department of Homeland Security, and when the matter was debated on the floor of the Senate, the effort was made to vest authority in the Secretary of Homeland Security to direct other intelligence agencies. It seemed to us that when we were creating a new department, Homeland Security, this was an opportune time to pick up the strands of what had been attempted by S. 1718 back in 1996, and by many others.

It wasn't my idea alone. The Scowcroft Commission had come up with similar recommendations. Others had called for real power and real authority in a national director. It seemed to us that that was the time, with the new Department of Homeland Security, to give this effective power to the newly created Secretary of Homeland Security.

Our efforts, again, were unsuccessful because of the turf battles, because of the interests of the CIA and the Department of Intelligence, DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense and the FBI, and the

other agencies to protect their own turf.

In October of 2002, the House of Representatives passed a bill and went home leaving the Senate with the alternative of either taking the bill or letting the matter go over until the next year. I was prepared at that time to offer the amendment to give the Secretary of Homeland Security authority to direct some real power. After talking to Secretary Ridge, talking with the Vice President, and talking with the President, rather than have no bill at all, it was decided to proceed and let the matter stand without having that kind of authority for the Secretary of Homeland Security.

There the matter languished until the families of the victims of September 11 became a powerful advocacy group, which led to the creation of the 9/11 Commission, and the 9/11 Commission report was filed in July of this year. There was very substantial momentum finally to create a national intelligence director with some real authority to really manage the entire community.

Senator McCain, Senator Lieberman, Senator Bayh, and I have produced a bill as had been recommended by the 9/11 Commission and then the Governmental Affairs Committee proceeded to have hearings, came back after the recess in late July, had hearings in August, marked up the bill, and passed it out of committee last week. So it is now on the floor in a context where there is considerable public pressure created by the 9/11 Commission report and what the families of the victims have done. And the momentum is present.

There has been very substantial opposition to moving at this time. There are those who say this legislation is precipitous, that it ought not to be passed on the eve of an election, that we have more of an eye on 11/2, the election date, than we have on 9/11.

I reject those contentions. This issue has been under study for decades, and personally on my behalf since I spent 8 years on the Intelligence Committee and chaired the committee during the 104th Congress.

The 9/11 Commission unanimously and emphatically has called for the creation of a national intelligence director. It is my view that is a proposition whose time has come.

When I offered the amendment in committee, which was rejected although we received five votes in the committee, there was very intense lobbying coming, as I understand it--you can never present competent evidence which would stand up in court but a lot of lobbying from the protectors of their turf.

My amendment to create the strength of the national intelligence director was deferred until this day. It is my hope and expectation that from this bill we will have a national intelligence director if it is the one proposed by amendment or if it is the one which is in the bill which has been reported by the committee.

It is my conclusion after very substantial study and after very substantial thought and after very substantial consideration that we need a very strong national intelligence director. We need an independent national intelligence director who will stand up to the executive branch, who will stand up to the Congress, who will tell the Congress exactly what is needed by way of resources, and who will have the stature and strength to get that job done.

There is an enormous controversy about the resolution to authorize the use of force which Congress passed and the President acted on--a lot of concern about the adequacy of the intelligence which led to that judgment, the 77 votes in this body joined by a majority of Democrats as well as Republicans. But there is no doubt that however one views the resolution for use of force, it would have been highly desirable to have better intelligence.

The amendment which is embodied in amendment No. 3706 would give substantial additional authority to the national intelligence director than is contained in the committee bill. It would put the CIA under the national intelligence director. The national intelligence director would have the authority to manage and oversee the intelligence community, including the CIA, the NSA, the National Security Agency, the NRO, the National Reconnaissance Office, the NGA, the National Geospacial Agency, and national collection from the Defense Intelligence Agency leaving tactical intelligence within the Department of Defense as it is now.

Valid considerations have been raised that tactical intelligence ought to be left in the Department of Defense so the Department of Defense can carry out its functions. My amendment would leave that important facet with the Department of Defense.

The national intelligence director under the committee bill has budget authority over the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After a great deal of thought, this amendment No. 3706 does not include the FBI under the supervision, direction, and control of the national intelligence director as the other agencies enumerated would have the national intelligence director with the authority to supervise, direct, and control which, in my judgment, would give the national intelligence director the authority to manage and oversee the national intelligence community in an effective way.

The essence of my bill was circulated to the Governmental Affairs Committee with a letter dated August 3 of this year. I put the bill into the Congressional Record on September 7. I introduced the bill on September 15 under the caption of S. 2081. The amendment embodied in No. 3706 is somewhat different, as I have described it.

We are dealing here with agencies where there are inbred cultures of concealment. It is very difficult to get information, even as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

My experience has shown it was very difficult for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to know fully and adequately what has happened within his own agency. One of the matters which I referred to during the committee hearings was information which was disseminated by the CIA Chief of Reports and Requirements in the Soviet East European Division of the Central Intelligence Agency. This was a man who was in the CIA from 1950 until 1991. He had information which was tainted by the Soviet Union--information where the individual conceded that he knew the intelligence came from Soviet-controlled sources and that he disseminated that information at the highest levels of government without disclosing that fact to the individuals whom he transmitted the information that it came from controlled or tainted sources.

That information was transmitted, including transmission on January 13 of 1993. So it went to President George Herbert Walker Bush and it went to President-elect Bill Clinton.

When I took his testimony and expressed shock at what he had done, the individual confidently responded that he had acted entirely properly because disclosure of the controlled source that the information was tainted would have made it even harder, as he put it, to sell the intelligence to policymakers; that there was no reason to believe the Soviets used deception was inaccurate, and no customer would use it unless he had concealed the fact it was tainted.

This was an extraordinary approach, as I saw it, but I think revealing as to what happens within the Central Intelligence Agency, within the Bureau, where the individuals have their empires, where they know better than anybody else, and transmit information to the President of the United States and the President-elect, knowing it to be tainted and not telling the President or President-elect that it was tainted because they then would not use it, and saying that the information was given because the CIA agent, the CIA individual, knew that it was correct. That is just the height of audacity but I think indicative of the kinds of problems we face with the cultures of concealment that we have in the intelligence agencies.

Another matter which I refer to, in the course of the committee hearings, is relevant for presentation; that is, the difficulty of having adequate oversight over the intelligence agencies and the duties that the intelligence agencies have to make disclosures to the oversight committee.

In the spring of 2002, when I chaired a subcommittee of oversight on the Department of Justice and had a wide-ranging subpoena, a document was presented which I ask unanimous consent

be printed in the Record, Mr. President.

The essence of the document disclosed that there had been an effort by ranking officials in the Department of Justice to try to influence the FBI not to pursue an investigation on campaign finance irregularities in December of 1996 because at that time Attorney General Reno was under consideration for reappointment. The relevant part of this document from Director Freeh to Mr. Esposito, who was his deputy handling this matter:

I also advised the Attorney General of Lee Radek's comment

to you that there was a lot of ``pressure'' on him and PIS

[Public Integrity Section] regarding this case because the

``Attorney General's job might hang in the balance'' (or

words to that effect). I stated that those comments would be

enough for me to take him and the Criminal Division off the

case completely.

This matter was not brought to the attention of the Judiciary Committee as a matter of oversight. In my judgment, this is the kind of a matter which the Director, on his own, without request, without knowledge by the oversight committee, without subpoena, as it was disclosed some 4 years later, should have turned over as a matter of oversight.

Another amendment which I intend to offer would give the national intelligence director a 10-year term on the analogy to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That would enable the director of national intelligence to have a substantial degree of independence since his term would outlast the term of the President--4 years or, with reelection, a total of 8 years.

We have seen in today's press reports of very substantial problems in the FBI, where there are inadequate translators and a great deal of information from al-Qaida has gone untranslated. I have talked to FBI Director Mueller, who tells me the information is dated, but there is still a significant problem in having sufficient translators to handle that important matter so we have our intelligence in hand.

The national intelligence director is going to have to be strong and independent, with enough stature, with a tenure of a 10-year term, to come to the Congress and be able to see to it that adequate funds are provided for the intelligence community.

The media reports are full of information that show very substantial problems on what would happen in Iraq after a military victory with the insurgents. The national intelligence director is going to have to be strong and independent and bring those matters to the attention of the Congress as well as to the executive branch.

It is my hope that in this legislation we will do a complete job and structure the responsibilities of the national intelligence director to give him the authority on budget and the authority on supervision, direction, and control to effectively manage and oversee the entire intelligence community.

That is an abbreviated statement of a great many considerations. At this time, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, by way of a very brief reply at this time, others will say the committee bill goes too far, and the committee bill stands between others who would reject any reorganization of the national intelligence community. The amendment I have offered doesn't go to that point.

The question is, what is the best way to reorganize the national intelligence community? When reference is made to the comments by Mr. Zelikow, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, he made an analysis of S. 2811, which is a bill similar to the amendment now pending, but it is not the same. I think it is an overstatement to say that the 9/11 Commission rejects the amendment I have offered because it hasn't been considered by the Commission.

Former Senator Bob Kerrey, who was vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee during my tenure as chairman, called me, unsolicited, and said that he favored the elements which I had offered and thought it was preferable to have the national intelligence director with greater authority, which I was proposing.

I believe it is a fair statement to say that the 9/11 Commission would be pleased to see us move to establish a national intelligence director, whether it was along the lines of the committee report or whether it was along the lines of my amendment. I say, too, that it is important to establish a national intelligence director with as many powers as we can reasonably give the national intelligence director. I think that is what the 9/11 Commission is looking for. I don't think it can be accurately said that the 9/11 Commission rejects the substance of my amendment. Certainly, former Senator Bob Kerrey, who was a member of the 9/11 Commission, was not, as far as I can say from an unsolicited call. He said he liked the substance of what I was offering.

I think other Senators are going to be interested in participating in the debate. It was unknown, generally, what sequence would occur as to the offering of the amendment. But I think others will want to come and be heard.

I yield the floor.

Parliamentary inquiry: I believe we have 2 more minutes until 4:30.

I seek recognition to make a comment about the pending amendment.

Mr. President, we can get more into the details on rebuttal as to what Senator Collins has said. I do not think it is accurate that we are taking away key authority from the Department of Defense, but I want to print in the Record a letter signed by 14 Senators objecting to the committee bill saying that it ``does not give the NID additional authorities will be required to provide the unity of leadership and accountability necessary for real intelligence reform. In particular, we feel strongly that the NID must have day-to-day operational control of all elements of the Intelligence Community performing national missions.'' It is signed by Senators Roberts, Shelby, DeWine, Hatch, Lott, Snowe, Voinovich, Bayh, Graham, Wyden, Bond, Hagel, Chambliss, and myself. There is the current chairman, Senator Roberts, and three prior chairmen, Senator Shelby, Senator Graham, and myself.

I ask unanimous consent that this be printed in the Record together with a memorandum from me to the members of the Senate Intelligence Committee dated December 5, 1995.

A December 9, 1996 memorandum has already been printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I have listened with a keen interest, as I always do, when the Senator from Virginia speaks. The concerns which I have seen in my tenure on the Intelligence Committee and as chair-- and I served with the Senator from Virginia on the Intelligence Committee--is the dominance of the Department of Defense on the budget and the lack of coordination with the other intelligence agencies, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the counterintelligence branch of the

Mr. President, I yield the floor. I had the floor, but I do yield it.

Then in that event I will stay standing.

Mr. President, through the Chair, I would inquire of the Senator from Virginia, what does he see which would stop those various officers from complying with those requirements and still allow the national intelligence director to have overall management? That is my question to the Senator from Virginia.

I hadn't meant to promote Senator Warner.

If you are confused on the substance of the question, maybe the court reporter could repeat it.

There is nothing in the amendment which takes the so- called residual authority from the Secretary of Defense. The amendment gives to the national intelligence director management and supervision, but it does not undercut the directions of the statutes to which you have referred.

Mr. President, the concept of unintended consequences is not an unusual argument. It can be attenuated in many directions. My submission to this body is that the amendment is plain on its face, that it seeks to create a national intelligence director who has the authority to manage the intelligence community. When the Senator from Virginia cites responsibilities in existing law, there is nothing in my amendment which undercuts that law, nothing at all. Ambiguity, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder, and in this situation, on the face of the amendment, there is no ambiguity.

Mr. President, I regret the Senator from Virginia is at a loss, but that doesn't affect the plain language of the amendment and the fact that it doesn't disturb the responsibilities under the section cited by the Senator from Virginia.

I think the amendment speaks for itself, I say to Senator Warner.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I rise to address the critical issue that is before the Senate--reform of our intelligence community and restructuring of the Federal Government to enhance our ability to wage the global war on terror and protect our Nation from other threats.

I commend Senators Collins and Lieberman and their staffs for their hard work and leadership on this issue, and I am proud to be a cosponsor of this legislation.

I also thank the Senate leadership for making this a priority. There is no issue more important for us to address. In fact, I believe this legislation is the most important I have worked on since coming to the Senate in 1999.

The war on terror is unlike any conflict we have fought--covert holy warriors seeking to infiltrate our society and those of our allies to do us grievous harm. Against this radical enemy, intelligence is of the greatest importance. We must do everything we can to strengthen our intelligence capabilities. If you think of what we need to do about terrorism, we need to attack, we need to prevent, and we need to prepare. Intelligence is the greatest weapon we have in all three of those categories.

Before I comment on this legislation before us, however, I would like to first offer some principles and thoughts that have guided my deliberations.

First, we must do no harm. Great progress has been made since September 11, 2001, to improve the operations of our intelligence community and make our country more secure. There is no greater evidence of that than when I travel in Ohio to various large urban areas. I am so impressed with the cooperation that now exists as contrasted to what was there before 9/11. Because we are making progress, we must be sure that we do not inadvertently set back our current efforts. We must implement additional improvements.

Second, we must not restructure the intelligence community to deal solely with the threat of terrorism caused by Islamic extremists, as pressing a concern as that is. There are many other threats that require close scrutiny by the intelligence community. Reform must address the threats that will confront America 10 and 20 years in the future in addition to those faced today.

For example, the United States must continue to monitor regional conflicts which have the potential to undermine stability in various parts of the world such as India, Pakistan, China, and Taiwan. Regional conflicts, such as between India and Pakistan, are motivated by political, social, and historical reasons unique to their own countries. In the event that regional conflicts should escalate to such proportions that chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons would be used, as would be possible in the event of a conflict between India and Pakistan, U.S. interests certainly would be threatened. The intelligence community must remain keenly aware of what is happening in other areas of the world so that the U.S. is not only prepared and able to respond but so that we can do everything in our power to prevent such a crisis from happening.

The United States must also monitor threats presented by rogue nations such as North Korea, rogue states that have the ability to foster regional instability and harm U.S. interests. They, too, must be closely monitored as dictators such as Kim Chong-il look to enhance their power and position. If not, the U.S. risks strategic surprise which would be devastating to our national security interests.

Additionally, the United States must address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These weapons have the ability to cause grave harm to Americans and life as we know it if found in the wrong hands. They could be used by terrorists against cities in the United States, they could be used in regional conflict, or they could be used by a rogue state to enhance its power.

Third, we should make it clear to the American people that the different perspectives presented on the Senate floor are legitimate. A review of the hearings held by various congressional committees during August and September demonstrated that many former Government officials who have had distinguished careers in senior national security posts hold contradictory opinions on the 9/11 Commission recommendations and related national security issues.

Fourth, reforming the Federal Government to address the challenges of global terrorism is going to take several years to accomplish. It is not going to happen that fast. It is my hope that during the next Congress we will address the critical challenges confronting the Federal law enforcement community, for example. For example, rationalizing responsibility and missions and personnel systems is vital to ensure that Federal law enforcement is best equipped to confront foreign terrorists operating in the United States.

I am pleased that we have addressed some of the needs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the legislation we are considering today. But much more remains to be done, and it is important for our national security to finish this job.

As my colleagues may know, I sponsored legislation that became law that requires the Office of Personnel Management to study Federal law enforcement personnel systems and recommend improvements. I was concerned that we were going forward with personnel changes and getting some coordination between those law enforcement agencies and the homeland security, but we were failing to do the same thing with law enforcement agencies that were outside of the Department of Homeland Security. The Office of Personnel Management has implemented that legislation. They have made some significant recommendations on how we can improve the relationships, classifications, and so forth, with those outside of Homeland Security. It would be my hope that we implement those recommendations.

Regarding the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, I strongly support creating a robust national intelligence director, but I have been wrestling with exactly how much authority we should give the new national intelligence director. I appreciate the balance that Senators Collins and Lieberman were trying to achieve in their legislation. It is clear to me that these authorities should not be diminished.

In fact, in committee I offered an amendment that would give the national intelligence director reorganization authority over the national intelligence program so that the director could identify efficiencies and eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort. It is unfortunate that my amendment was weakened in committee, and I am still considering amendments to strengthen the management authority of the national intelligence director.

The intelligence community budget process is extremely complex. Indeed, the manner in which these agencies interact with each other is probably the most complicated interagency process in the Federal Government. The budgets of the 15 intelligence community agencies, including all those of the Armed Forces, are intertwined in the National Foreign Intelligence Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program, the tactical intelligence and related activities.

The Collins-Lieberman legislation seeks to bring clarity to the situation by defining a national intelligence program. However, we may be able to improve this budget definition, and I will weigh all amendments to do so carefully.

At the same time, we must be careful not to erode the budget authority of the national intelligence director. I understand that some of my colleagues may offer amendments to give the national intelligence director a fixed term in an attempt to immunize this individual from political pressure. I would note that a host of other provisions, including a strong inspector general for the intelligence community and an ombudsman to specifically guard against political concerns, have been created to do exactly that.

Quite the contrary, a fixed term is unnecessary and could diminish the effectiveness of the national intelligence director. A close and trusting working relationship with the President is going to be key to the success of the effectiveness of the national intelligence director. We should not weaken this relationship by mandating a fixed-term appointment.

The Governmental Affairs Committee heard testimony from three former Directors of Central Intelligence, and all agreed that the national intelligence director should serve at the pleasure of the President. An incoming President should not be stuck with a national intelligence director from a previous administration.

I know that the Presiding Officer, in his former capacity as Governor of the State of Tennessee and as a member of the Bush Cabinet, understands that if this individual doesn't have the confidence of the President of the United States, his or her effectiveness is going to be diminished a great deal. So much of what this person can accomplish will have a lot to do with that relationship with the President because there are going to be situations where there are going to be differences of opinion. Finally, the boss has to decide them. If you have somebody there that has the job and doesn't have the confidence of the boss, we are in trouble.

Mr. President, although this legislation deals primarily with improving structured roles and missions, the human capital challenges confronting our intelligence community must not be overlooked.

In March of 2001--it seems like a long time ago--my Government Management Subcommittee held a hearing entitled ``The National Security Implications of the Human Capital Crisis.'' The panel of distinguished witnesses that day included former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, a member of the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century. Secretary Schlesinger concluded his testimony with these remarks:

As it enters the 21st century, the United States finds

itself on the brink of an unprecedented crisis of competence

in Government. The maintenance of American power in the world

depends on the quality of U.S. Government personnel, civil

and military, at all levels. We must take immediate action in

the personnel area to ensure that the United States can meet

future challenges. That fixing of the personnel problem is a

precondition for fixing virtually everything else that needs

repair in the institutional edifice of U.S. national security

policy.

He was so right. Secretary Schlesinger's insightful comments were reinforced by the 9/11 Commission on page 399 of the report. The Commission said ``significant changes in the organization of the Government.'' The Commission went on to say:

We know that the quality of people is more important than

the quality of the wiring diagrams. Some of the saddest

aspects of the 9/11 story are the outstanding efforts of so

many individuals straining, often without success, against

the boundaries of the possible. Good people can overcome bad

structures, but they should not have to.

I will never forget that after 9/11 the first thing that came to my mind was we didn't have the right people with the right knowledge and skills at the right place at the right time. If you go back and look at all of the report, it gets back to that situation and also the fact that they weren't communicating with each other.

I am pleased that the Collins-Lieberman legislation includes some important human capital provisions. I offered an amendment in committee, which was unanimously accepted, that provides enhanced classification and pay flexibilities for intelligence analysts at the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Specifically, my amendment enables the FBI to work with the OPM to develop new classification standards and pay rates for intelligence analysts. The amendment also allows the bureau to improve their performance management system for their intelligence analysts and establishes two congressional reporting requirements. The amendment was completely within the spirit of the 9/11 recommendations, which noted that the FBI should create a specialized and integrated national security workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture with strong experience in intelligence and national security throughout the organization.

I thought the other incredible thing after 9/11 was the cry that went out: Can anybody speak Farsi? Can anybody speak Arabic? You would have thought that after the Persian Gulf war there would have been a very aggressive effort, because of the instability of the area, for us to bring in people who could speak Farsi and Arabic. If you looked at the State Department a couple years ago, you would have found we had all kinds of linguists who could speak fluent Russian. But the threat had changed. We didn't have the capacity to change with that threat. Hopefully, with this new national intelligence director, we are going to be able to have that flexibility.

It is my hope that this amendment will provide the Federal Bureau of Investigation with essential human capital flexibilities specifically targeted to building an elite cadre of intelligence analysts. In addition, Senator Lugar and I will offer another amendment to the bill to improve the Presidential appointment process, which has been broken for decades. Over the coming days, I want to work with Senators Collins and Lieberman on this amendment.

This amendment addresses a critical recommendation in the 9/11 Commission Report. It is a problem I have been examining for years. During my time in the Senate, I have found political appointees to be dedicated and diligent professionals who want to make a difference for our country. They often leave high-paying corporate jobs only to find their commitment to our Nation requires an increase in workload and a decrease in salary.

I talked to one individual who filled out the financial disclosure form and all that was required. He said that it cost him $200,000 to pay the professional people to do all the things that were required in this disclosure form that is now currently in effect with the Federal Government. I suspect that the President, when he appointed the Secretary of Education, had to go through all these forms, and so forth, and wondered to himself whether he ought to do it. Before they even begin to work for the Government, however, as I mentioned, they must first navigate the complex, turbulent, and outdated Presidential appointment process--an area where reviews and recommendations for improvement have gone unheeded far too long.

In 1937, a committee issued the first report on improving the Presidential appointment process. During the 67 years since this inaugural report, the appointment process has been formally examined 14 additional times. After such extensive reviews, it is disconcerting for this Senator that we have not been able to enact meaningful reform in this area.

To capture the essence of the problem, understand first that the number of politically appointed positions has grown from 286 to 3,361 over the past 4 decades. This increase is straining an already overburdened system. And the time it takes to complete an appointment has increased through the years from just over 2 months during the Kennedy administration to 8 months in the current administration. I think Secretary Rumsfeld said his team didn't go into place until 6 months after he had been appointed as Secretary of Defense.

Mr. President, 8 months is simply too long to fill an appointed position. I am afraid that if we do not update the current system for processing Presidential appointees, we run the risk of driving good people away from appointed Government service. Progress has been made on this issue during the last several years.

First, on February 15, the Hart-Rudman commission issued their report entitled ``The Roadmap for National Security Imperative for Change,'' which in part examined the Presidential appointment process. The Commission's final report observes: The ordeals to which outside nominees are subjected are so great, above and beyond whatever financial or career sacrifice is involved, so as to make it prohibitive for many individuals of talent and experience to accept public service.

Then on April 4 and 5, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held 2 days of hearings on the state of the Presidential appointment process. During those hearings Paul Light from the Brookings Institution said:

Past and potential Presidential appointees alike view the

process of entering office with disdain, describing it as

embarrassing, confusing, and unfair. They see the process as

far more cumbersome and lengthy than it needs to be.

By the way, I held a hearing a couple weeks ago, and Paul Light was there,

and he reiterated that same statement he made in 2001.

On May 16, 2001, the Governmental Affairs Committee passed Senator Fred Thompson's bipartisan bill to streamline the Presidential appointments process that I cosponsored with Senators Akaka, Durbin, Lieberman, and Lugar. Although it passed the Governmental Affairs Committee in the 107th Congress, it did not pass the full Senate. When Senator Fred Thompson left the Senate, I promised him I would continue to push for appointments reform. Therefore, in April of last year, I reintroduced the Presidential Appointments Improvement Act, and today I urge my colleagues to pass this important proposal.

What happens is that after the President comes in and he goes through this line of getting people appointed, they get off on other things, and they forget about the problems they went through to get all their appointees. So it kind of goes to the bottom of the stack in terms of priorities. This 9/11 Commission implementation by the Senate gives us a wonderful opportunity to do something about this problem that has lingered for so many years.

I am certain all my colleagues have read the recommendations in the 9/11 Commission report. As you recall, one of the recommendations underscored the importance of improving the Presidential appointment process. Specifically on page 422, the report states:

Since a catastrophic attack could occur with little or no

notice, we should minimize as much as possible the disruption

of national security policymaking during the change of

administration by accelerating the process for national

security appointments. We think the process could be improved

significantly so transitions can work more effectively and

allow more new officials to assume their responsibilities as

quickly as possible.

The 9/11 Commission report also noted that in 2001, the new administration, like others before it, did not have its team on the job until at least 6 months after it took office. In fact, I commented to people that after the length it took for the President to finally know he was President, we lost that period of time once the President was elected and started building his team; they were just concentrating on who was going to be the President. Once that was done, then they started to concentrate on who the people were going to be in the administration.

They did a great job of taking care of the initial people, but, as you know, it took a long time for them to start filling in that organization.

My amendment offers realistic governmentwide solutions to the problems identified by the 9/11 Commission and the 14 other Commission studies and reports that have detailed the importance of streamlining the Presidential appointment process.

The four main provisions of the amendment include streamlining the financial disclosure forms for executive branch employees. Two, requiring agencies to examine the number of Presidential-appointed positions and recommending to Congress which positions could be eliminated. We are asking them to do it. Three, allowing Presidential candidates to obtain a list of appointee positions 15 days after they receive their party's nomination so they will have an idea of the kind of people they have to look for if they are elected President of the United States. And four, requiring the Office of Government Ethics to review the conflict-of-interest laws.

The principles behind this amendment are simple, and given the bipartisan nature in which the original bill passed the Governmental Affairs Committee last Congress, I ask my colleagues to adopt this amendment. Although it will not solve all the problems with the appointments process outlined in the 9/11 Commission report, the amendment is an important first step for updating an outdated system.

I urge the Senate to support its adoption. Senator Lugar and I will be working with Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman to try to obtain their support for this amendment and to also work out any of the problems they may have with it.

Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment which I cosponsored with Senator McCain. This is the first of several he and I will be introducing, along with other Members, which would implement recommendations of the 9/11 Commission not included in the underlying bill that Senator Collins and I have introduced which focuses on intelligence reform.

Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment of Senator Hutchison. I thank her for proposing it. She was ahead of her time because she has been on this case, along with members of the Commerce Committee, at least since March of last year, when the bill came out of the Commerce Committee; in fact, the Senate passed this bill unanimously in May of 2003.

Unfortunately, there has been no action that meets up with this bill in the House. So Senator Hutchison is quite right to introduce this as an amendment to our underlying reform of the intelligence community. This is directly relevant to the 9/11 Commission's conclusion that ``major vulnerability still exists in cargo and general aviation security. These, together within adequate screening and access controls, continue to present aviation security challenges.'' That comes from the 9/11 Commission.

The Commission concluded that we are safer than we were on September 11, 2001, but we are not yet safe. This underlying bill is aimed at reforming our intelligence community so we will be safe, so we can see the threats coming at us, hear them, and stop them before the terrorists are able to strike, but also that we may adopt other provisions of the 9/11 Commission report.

Senator McCain and I introduced an amendment that was the first to pass a short while ago. I hope this amendment will pass as well, because it tightens existing weaknesses, loopholes in the screening of cargo transported in passenger aircraft, opening up a vulnerability that we all fear terrorists may exploit to strike at us.

I thank the Senator from Texas for not only being foresighted last year in seeing this weakness in our defenses to terrorism but for coming forth and introducing this amendment. It will strengthen the bill Senator Collins and I and other members of the Governmental Affairs Committee have brought out and, therefore, I urge its adoption.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, if I might say a word before that and then I will be happy to yield the floor to Senator Nelson. Maybe I should yield to the chairman who will probably say the same thing I will be saying.

I am very grateful to the Senate majority leader and to the Senate Democratic leader for this agreement and for the pace they are setting for consideration of this bill on a bipartisan basis. These are not ordinary times. This is not ordinary legislation. It goes to the heart of our security. We want to have thoughtful debate.

The chairman of the committee, Senator Collins, and I found in the committee that when we let some time for debate occur, people came to very thoughtful conclusions, totally without regard to party. The votes on all the amendments went all around the lot. I think people ultimately felt good about the process.

By setting these deadlines now for amendments to be noticed and then filed, we are going to expedite exactly that kind of thoughtful consideration so we can get this done with the same feeling of, well, confidence that we are doing the right thing. We are not only doing something we need to do quickly, but we are doing it the right way. So I thank the majority leader and Senator Daschle for their help on that matter and the help they have given to Senator Collins and me.

Mr. President, with great respect for Senator Specter, friend and colleague, I rise to oppose this amendment.

I want to say that Senator Specter has been a very constructive member of the Governmental Affairs Committee, not just on this matter but on so many others that come before the committee. He has contributed substantially to the strength of the bill that is before the Senate that Senator Collins and I have offered. He and I talked quite seriously about this earlier in the year, and ultimately my conclusion was that it would construct a bridge too far.

We have a crisis, which the 9/11 Commission documents, which is that we have an intelligence community, as we discussed yesterday and showed on the graphs, without a leader, without anyone in charge. It is so frustrating to the point of being infuriating to read the lengthy narrative at the beginning of the 9/11 Report to see documented the failure to connect the dots. The cases that Senator Specter mentioned-- one agency knowing something, not telling it to another agency, which might well have either kept out some of the terrorists who struck us on September 11--should have--or would have opened our eyes to the plot that was being hatched that FBI agents came face to face with, this is a system, the American intelligence community, without a leader.

The most urgent recommendation, according to Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton, that the Commission makes to us is to create a strong national intelligence director and then, right alongside that, a strong counterterrorism center--connect the dots. We have done this. Senator Collins documented the various powers we have given to the national intelligence director.

First, this has been a recommendation of commission after commission. Going back to the late 1940s, when the National Security Act was adopted and the Central Intelligence Agency was created, post Second World War, there was the creation of the Director of Central Intelligence who was supposed to be not just the head of the CIA but the overseer of our entire intelligence community. The position was taken but hamstrung. It was not given the power. The DCI was the same person as the head of the CIA. That contributed to the community being without a leader.

In this bill we separate these two positions. We create the overarching national intelligence director, separate from the head of the CIA, and we give that national intelligence director real budget authority, personnel authority and tasking, assignment coordinating authority, which we are convinced will make us a lot safer and stronger against the threat of terrorism here at home and against Americans and others throughout the world.

The Specter amendment goes further than that and would provide that not only would the national intelligence director in the underlying bill direct, oversee, and execute the budgets of these agencies, but he or she would also supervise, direct, and control their day-to-day operations. That approach would create a department in everything but name and put the national intelligence director in charge of multiple agencies on a day-to-day basis.

One of the witnesses before our committee was Philip Zelikow, Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission. We asked Dr. Zelikow: Did the Commission consider creating a department of intelligence, giving the national intelligence director the powers that the Specter amendment would give?

Dr. Zelikow said: Yes, the Commission considered creating such a department but decided against it on several bases.

And they are the bases of my opposition to the Specter amendment. First, the current job that the Director of Central Intelligence had-- which was CIA Director, director of presumably the overall intelligence community and principle intelligence adviser to the President--was in itself more than one person could do. To give powers to the national intelligence director for day-to-day operations of the agencies under his or her control would again give more authority, more responsibility than the Commission decided was appropriate and manageable.

The Commission also opted for what they considered to be a more modern management approach. They didn't want to create another big Federal bureaucracy; they wanted to create, really patterned after some very large and very successful private corporations in this country, a central management system, strong as our national intelligence director would be, with budget, personnel, tasking authority, but not top heavy, agile, and not in response or in charge of the day-to-day decisions of all of the agencies under that position. That is what we have in the approach we are taking in this bill.

Senator Collins said some people will say--and you will hear of amendments on this floor, as the debate goes on, from Members and those outside the Chamber who feel the bill Senator Collins and I have put before the Senate gives the national intelligence director too much power. They will try to strip away that power or fuzz it up so that it is not clear and the status quo can remain. There will be plenty of opportunity to argue against that when those amendments are filed.

But here we are in the middle of a war on terrorism, struck as we were on September 11, under a continuing threat of attack, alerts all over, particularly in Washington and New York--real concern--and to do what looks like protecting the status quo of the particular authority of existing agencies doesn't make sense. There will be those who feel our bill goes too far.

I don't mean to put words into Senator Specter's mouth because he is very eloquent, but this amendment suggests we have not gone far enough. The Commission deliberately decided not to take the National Security Agency, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and National Reconnaissance Organization out of the Department of Defense. The Commission was concerned, Dr. Zelikow said, about the balance between national and departmental guidance, and they didn't want to tilt the balance too far away from defense. The Commission's executive director portrayed the Commission's idea of a lean, creative command center this way:

Since terrorism poses such a revolutionary challenge to old

ways of executive management in our national security

bureaucracy,

counterterrorism requires an innovative response.

I believe the underlying bill does exactly that: real authority, decisionmaking authority, but lean and, may I add, mean, because the people who are threatening us are very mean.

The other thing the kind of structure we have created does is make it harder for the problems that many in the Senate and Committee on Intelligence cited in its report on prewar intelligence are worried about, which is group-think. There is an increased danger that persons at the top of the daily operations of the organizations--there is a danger that you will begin to have not the competition of ideas we want to see in our intelligence community and that we feel strongly will be encouraged by the national intelligence director we are creating by the language in the bill, the focus on independence and objectivity of intelligence and by the national counterterrorism center, which is ultimately the place where everybody who knows anything about a particular problem--in this case terrorism--and maybe the director will create other centers on weapons of mass destruction for particularly problematic countries like Iran or North Korea. Everybody in the Government who knows anything about that will sit down together to share what they have collected in the way of intelligence, share their analysis of it, and then plan jointly on how to stop it, how to deal with the threat represented by those situations.

So I believe Senator Specter's intentions are very good, and I admire him for them. But I think at this moment they are a bridge too far, both in the substance of where he would take us and also, frankly, in terms of the probability of any such measure passing Congress. There is an urgency to our deliberations, as we have said over and over again. I think if we reach too far, we may end up with nothing and nothing maintains the status quo, which failed us on September 11 and will fail us again unless we act.

I oppose the amendment. I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.

I ask unanimous consent to speak for not more than 1 minute.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I rise to support Senator Hutchison's amendment. It really strengthens the basic bill that we brought before the Chamber. It would reorganize our intelligence community to better deal with the threat of terrorism. We want this core proposal to be a vehicle for responding to the other recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and to close as many of the points of vulnerability that we have in America to terrorists as we possibly can.

The Commission said major vulnerabilities still exist in cargo and general aviation security. This amendment would go a long way toward ending those vulnerabilities. I thank the Senator from Texas, and I urge adoption of the amendment.

Mr. President, I thank Senator Warner, who chairs the Armed Services Committee, which the chairman of our committee and this ranking member are privileged to serve on, for his statement, his reference to sections of statute that could be compromised and indeed overridden if this amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania were adopted.

I thought that the colloquy between Senator Warner and Senator Collins was very illuminating. I hope our colleagues had a chance to listen to it because it did, I believe, ultimately explain why this is a bridge too far, a motto from the Second World War, where the troops were sent to take one bridge too far--I have the feeling that Senator Warner is going to know the background of this ``bridge too far'' reference--too far to hold the bridge and, as a result, the overall effort collapsed.

I am afraid this stretches too far and it weighs down the reforms we are trying to make. I believe the colloquy between Senator Warner and Senator Collins is a great argument for the balance we have struck. We leave the line authority over these national intelligence agencies with the Defense Department. Without going into details--because it is classified--thousands of men and women in uniform serve in these agencies. So we want to leave that line authority with the Secretary of Defense but create a reporting authority to the national intelligence director because the NID will oversee the entire intelligence community.

This has been a wonderful learning experience for Senator Collins and me. We met with the head of the NSA, General Hayden, and the head of the NGA, General Clapper, and it was fascinating to hear the extent to which they are not only providing day-to-day technical military intelligence to help their personnel in the field at Central

Command today, and other commands, but the way in which they are also providing, because of their extraordinary capabilities, daily assistance and intelligence security to law enforcement agencies. That is the balance we tried to strike.

I thank the Senator for his question, my chairman of the Armed Services Committee. It is an important question, one that Senator Collins and I weighed as we went through this process of accepting the assignment from the bipartisan leadership to consider and recommend to the Senate on the 9/11 Commission Report. We both take not only our responsibility to protect America's security under the Constitution seriously, we take our membership on the Armed Services Committee seriously. We have a purpose here. We want to put somebody in charge. The 9/11 Commission Report says the intelligence community doesn't have a leader. They are not coordinating their effort. As we do that, we said we want to make sure we don't compromise the quality and availability of intelligence to our warfighters. In fact, we believe our proposal not only doesn't compromise the quality of intelligence, but will ultimately improve it because there will be better coordination.

Even from within some of these agencies, national assets under the Defense Department, high officials said to us that they don't benefit, they don't think the military benefits, the warfighters benefit from the current ambiguity. Make those lines clear, and all the customers, if I can use that term, of intelligence will benefit, including the military.

Senator Warner knows that in specific regard to the so-called TIARA, or tactical intelligence budget of the military, that remains totally within the Defense Department, and so do most of the joint military intelligence programs. So the answer is a resounding yes. We understand the uncertainty, the anxiety because of our bill. The 9/11 Commission recommendations represent change. It does take the budget authority and put it under the national intelligence director for national intelligence programs, including these three within the Defense Department. So we understand the anxiety. But we think we put together a balanced system that will not only first provide the No. 1 customer of intelligence, the President of the United States, with the best intelligence, with the coordinated unity of effort that he requires, but do the same for the warfighters. That is our firm belief.

Mr. President, the sentence is subject to more than one interpretation. So I am not sure what the meaning of it is, but I can assure the Senator about what the intention of the underlying bill is and that is the way in which I look forward to continuing this discussion and debating any amendments the Senator might have.

I found a quote that may be reassuring to the Senator. It is from General Hayden, Director of the National Security Agency, when he testified before the House Select Committee on Intelligence on August 18 of this year about the 9/11 Commission recommendations. He said an empowered national intelligence director, with direct authority over the national agencies, including his own, should not be viewed as diminishing our ability or willingness to fulfill our responsibility as combat support agencies, which I found reassuring. That is certainly our intention and I hope the Senator from Virginia will find that reassuring as well. That, combined with the possibility that the administration might oppose one of the Senator's amendments, I hope will lead the Senator to reconsider.

Reserving the right to object, and I will not object, my understanding is, as the Senator said, this is not a complete bill. It was legislative language for parts of what ultimately have been covered in our bill.

I have no objection.

Absolutely.

Briefly, I thank Senator Warner for his statement in opposition to the Specter amendment and for the questions which he raised which I think have been helpful and clarifying. No doubt this discussion will continue in the days ahead.

I thank the Chair.