Mr. President, I rise to introduce two new bills to strengthen U.S. nonproliferation efforts. One of these is a new Conventional Arms Threat Reduction Act. The other is the fourth installment of the…
Mr. President, I rise to introduce two new bills to strengthen U.S. nonproliferation efforts. One of these is a new Conventional Arms Threat Reduction Act. The other is the fourth installment of the Nunn-Lugar legislation, the nonproliferation program that Sam Nunn and I sponsored in 1991.
In that year, Sam Nunn and I authored the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction or Nunn-Lugar Act, which established the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. That program has provided U.S. funding and expertise to help the former Soviet Union safeguard and dismantle their enormous stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, means of delivery and related materials. In 1997, Senator Nunn and I were joined by Senator Domenici in introducing the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, which expanded Nunn-Lugar authorities in the former Soviet Union and provided WMD expertise to first responders in American cities. In 2003, Congress adopted the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which authorized the Nunn-Lugar program to operate outside the former Soviet Union to address proliferation threats. The bill that I am introducing today would strengthen the Nunn-Lugar program and other nonproliferation efforts and provide them with greater flexibility to address emerging threats.
To date, the Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated or destroyed: 6,462 nuclear warheads; 550 ICBMs; 469 ICBM silos; 13 ICBM mobile missile launchers; 135 bombers; 733 nuclear air-to-surface missiles; 408 submarine missile launchers; 530 submarine launched missiles; 27 nuclear submarines; and 194 nuclear test tunnels.
The Nunn-Lugar program also facilitated the removal of all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. After the fall of the Soviet Union, these three nations emerged as the third, fourth, and eighth largest nuclear powers in the world. Today, all three are nuclear-weapons-free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn- Lugar program. In addition, Nunn-Lugar is the primary tool through which the United States is working with Russian authorities to identify, safeguard, and destroy Russia's massive chemical and biological warfare capacity.
These successes were never a foregone conclusion. Today, even after more than 12 years, creativity and constant vigilance are required to ensure that the Nunn-Lugar program is not encumbered by bureaucratic obstacles or undercut by political disagreements.
I have devoted much time and effort to overseeing and accelerating the Nunn-Lugar program. Uncounted individuals of great dedication serving on the ground in the former Soviet Union and in our Government have made this program work. Nevertheless, from the beginning, we have encountered resistance to the Nunn-Lugar concept in both the United States and Russia. In our own country, opposition often has been motivated by false perceptions that Nunn-Lugar money is foreign assistance or by beliefs that Defense Department funds should only be spent on troops, weapons, or other war-fighting capabilities. Until recently, we also faced a general disinterest in nonproliferation that made gaining support for Nunn-Lugar funding and activities an annual struggle.
The attacks of September 11 changed the political discourse on this subject. We have turned a corner--the public, the media, and political candidates are paying more attention now. In a remarkable moment in the first Presidential debate, both President Bush and Senator Kerry agree that the number one national security threat facing the United States was the prospect that weapons of mass destruction could fall into the hands of terrorists.
The 9/11 Commission weighed in with another important endorsement of the Nunn-Lugar program, saying that ``Preventing the proliferation of [weapons of mass destruction] warrants a maximum effort--by strengthening counterproliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.'' the report went on to say that ``Nunn-Lugar . . . is now in need of expansion, improvement, and resources.''
The first bill that I am introducing today is ``The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 2004.'' It would underscore the bipartisan consensus on Nunn-Lugar by streamlining and accelerating Nunn-Lugar implementation. It would grant more flexibility to the President and the Secretary of Defense to undertake non-proliferation projects outside the former Soviet Union. It also would eliminate Congressionally imposed conditions on Nunn-Lugar assistance that in the past have force the suspension of time-sensitive nonproliferation projects. The purpose of the bill is to reduce bureaucratic red tape and friction within our Government that hinder effective responses to nonproliferation opportunities and emergencies.
For example, recently Albania appealed for help in destroying 16 tons of chemical agent left over from the cold war. In August, I visited this remote storage facility, the location of which still remains classified. Nunn-Lugar officials are working closely with Albanian leaders to destroy this dangerous stockpile. But the experience also is illustrative of the need to reduce bureaucratic delays. The package of documents to be reviewed by the President took some 11 weeks to be finalized and readied for President Bush. From beginning to end, the bureaucratic process to authorize dismantlement of chemical weapons in Albania took more than 3 months. Fortunately, the situation in Albania was not a crisis, but we may not be able to afford these timelines in future nonproliferation emergencies.
The second piece of legislation that I am introducing is the ``Conventional Arms Threat Reduction Act of 2004'' or ``CATRA.'' This legislation is modeled on the original Nunn-Lugar Act. Its purpose is to provide the Department of State with a focused response to the threat posed by vulnerable stockpiles of conventional weapons around the world, including tactical missiles and man portable air defense systems, or MANPADS. Such missiles and other weapons systems could be used by terrorists to attack commercial and military targets, and U.S. facilities here at home and abroad. Reports suggest that Al Qaeda has attempted to acquire these kinds of weapons. In addition, unsecured conventional weapons stockpiles are a major obstacle to peace, reconstruction, and economic development in regions suffering from instability.
My bill declares it to be the policy of the United States to seek out surplus and unguarded stocks of conventional armaments, including small arms, light weapons, MANPADS, and tactical missile systems for elimination. It authorizes the Department of State to carry out an accelerated global effort to destroy such weapons and to cooperate with allies and international organizations when possible. The Secretary of State is charged with devising a strategy for prioritizing, on a country-
by-country basis, the obligation of funds in a global program of conventional arms elimination. Lastly, the Secretary is required to unify program planning, coordination, and implementation of the strategy into one office at the State Department. The bill also authorizes a budget increase commensurate with the risk posed by these weapons.
The Department of State has been working to address the threats posed by conventional weapons. But in my judgment, the current funding allocation and organizational structure are not up to the task. Only about $6 million was devoted to destroying small arms and light weapons during fiscal years 2003 and 2004. We need more focus on this problem and additional funding to take advantage of opportunities to secure vulnerable stockpiles from proliferation, theft, or diversion.
In August, I visited Albania, Ukraine, and Georgia. Each of these countries has large stockpiles of MANPADS and tactical missile systems and each has requested U.S. assistance to destroy them. On August 27, I stood in a remote Albanian military storage facility as the base commander unloaded a fully functioning MANPAD from its crate and readied it for use. This storage site contained 70 MANPADS that could have been used to attack an American commercial aircraft. Fortunately, the MANPADS that I saw that day were destroyed on September 2, but there are many more like them throughout the world. Too often, conventional weapons are inadequately stored and protected. This present grave risk to American military bases, embassy compounds, and even targets within the United States. We must develop a response that is commensurate with the threat.
I am offering these two bills now, during the November session, so that the administration, Congress, and the public can begin an examination of their merits. I will reintroduce these bills when Congress reconvenes in January. I am hopeful for strong support that reflects the priority status of U.S. nonproliferation efforts.