Agriculture Security Preparedness Act

Mr. President, I rise on behalf of myself and Senators Kennedy, Schumer, Corzine, Lautenberg, Durbin, and Levin to introduce the ``Anti-Terrorism Military Sniper Weapon Reclassification Act of 2003.''

This bill, identical to legislation I have introduced in the last two Congresses, will reclassify powerful fifty-caliber military sniper rifles under the National Firearms Act, thus making it much more difficult for terrorists, doomsday cults, and criminals to obtain these guns for illegitimate use.

Fifty-caliber sniper rifles, manufactured by a small handful of companies and individuals, are deadly, military style assault weapons, designed for armed combat with wartime enemies. They weight up to 28 pounds and are capable of piercing light armor at more than 4 miles. The guns enable a single shooter to destroy enemy aircraft, jeeps, tanks, personnel carriers, bunkers, fuel stations, and even communication centers. As a result, their use by military organizations worldwide has been spreading rapidly.

But along with the increasing military use of the gun, we have also seen increased use of the weapon by violent criminals and terrorists around the world.

These weapons are deadly accurate up to 2,000 yards. This means that a shooter using a 50-caliber weapon can reliably hit a target more than a mile away. In fact, according to a training manual for military and police snipers published in 1993, a bullet from this gun ``even at one and a half miles crashes into a target with more energy than Dirty Harry's famous .44 magnum at point-blank'' range.

And the gun is ``effective'' up to 7,500 yards. In other words, although it may be hard to aim at this distance, the gun will have its desired destructive effect at that distance--more than 4 miles from the target.

The weapon can penetrate several inches of steel, concrete, or even light armor. In fact, many ranges used for target practice do not even have enough safety features to accommodate these guns--they are just too powerful.

Recent advances in weapons technology allow this gun to be used by civilians against armored limousines, bunkers, individuals, and even aircraft--in fact, one advertisement for the gun apparently promoted the weapon as able to ``wreck several million dollars' worth of jet aircraft with one or two dollars worth of cartridge.''

This gun is so powerful that one dealer told undercover GAO investigators ``You'd better buy one soon. It's only a matter of time before someone lets go a round on a range that travels so far, it hits a school bus full of kids. The government will definitely ban .50- calibers. This gun is just too powerful.''

When I first introduced this bill, I commented that a study by the General Accounting Office revealed some eye-opening facts about how and where this gun is used, and how easily it is obtained. The GAO reports that many of these guns wind up in the hands of domestic and international terrorists, religious cults, outlaw motorcycle gangs, drug traffickers, and violent criminals.

According to a special agent at ATF's Atlanta Field Division, the Barrett .50-caliber rifle is ``a devastatingly powerful weapon against which most troops, most law enforcement and no civilians have any means of defense.'' He added that the rifle is ``a tremendous threat'' for ``those most shocking and horrifying crimes, assassinations, murders, assaults on law enforcement officers.''

In 1998, Federal law enforcement apprehended three men belonging to a radical Michigan militia group. The three were charged with plotting to bomb Federal office buildings, destroy highways and utilities. They were also charged with plotting to assassinate the State's Governor, a U.S. Senator and Federal judges. A .50-caliber sniper rifle was found in their possession along with a cache of weapons that included three illegal machine guns.

One doomsday cult headquartered in Montana purchased 10 of these guns and stockpiled them in an underground bunker, along with thousands of rounds of ammunition and other guns.

At least one .50-caliber gun was recovered by Mexican authorities after a shoot-out with an international drug cartel in that country. The gun was originally purchased in Wyoming, so it is clear that the guns are making their way into the hands of criminals worldwide.

Another .50-caliber sniper rifle, smuggled out of the United States, was used by the Irish Republican Army to kill a large number of British soldiers.

Even more recently we have learned that Al Qaeda has received .50- caliber sniper rifles--rifles that were manufactured right here in the United States. Nearly 2 years ago today, Essam al Ridi, a U.S. agent for Al Qaeda, testified that he acquired 25 Barrett .50-caliber sniper rifles and shipped them to Al Qaeda members in Afghanistan. We have no way of knowing whether Al Qaeda has obtained more or who has supplied them with these weapons, but we can be sure that any .50-caliber weapon in the hands of Al Qaeda will almost certainly be used against Americans or American interests.

Ammunition for these guns is also readily available, even over the Internet. Bullets for these guns include ``armor piercing incendiary'' ammunition that explodes on impact, and even ``armor piercing tracing'' ammunition reminiscent of the ammunition that lit up the skies over Baghdad during the Persian Gulf war.

Several ammunition dealers were willing to sell armor piercing ammunition to an undercover GAO investigator even after the investigator said he wanted the ammunition to pierce an armored limousine or maybe to ``take down'' a helicopter. In fact, our own military helps to provide thousands of rounds of .50-caliber ammunition, by essentially giving away tons of spent cartridges, many of which are then refurbished and sold on the civilian market.

This bill will begin the process of making these guns harder to get and easier to track.

Current law classifies .50-caliber guns as ``long guns,'' subject to the least government regulation for any firearm. Sawed-off shotguns, machine guns, and even handguns are more highly regulated than this military sniper rifle. In fact, many States allow possession of .50- caliber guns by those as young as 14 years old, and there is no regulation on second-hand sales.

Essentially, this bill would reclassify .50-caliber guns under the National Firearms Act, which imposes far stricter standards on powerful and destruction weapons. For instance: NFA guns may only be purchased from a licensed dealer, and not second-hand. This will prevent the sale of these guns at gun shows and in other venues that make it hard for law enforcement to track the weapons.

Second, purchasers of NFA guns must fill out license transfer applications and provide fingerprints to be processed by the FBI in detailed criminal background checks. By reclassifying the .50-caliber, Congress will be making a determination that sellers should be more careful about to whom they give these powerful, military guns.

ATF reports that this background check process takes about 60 days, so prospective gun buyers will face some delay. However, legitimate purchasers of this $7,000 gun can certainly wait that long.

Clearly, placing a few more restrictions on who can get these guns and how is simply common sense. This bill will not ban the sale, use or possession of .50-caliber weapons. The .50-caliber shooting club will not face extinction, and ``legitimate'' purchasers of these guns will not lose their access--even though that, too, might be a reasonable step, since I cannot imagine a legitimate use of this gun.

I do not view the reclassification of .50-caliber weapons so much as an issue of firearm safety, but rather as a matter of national security. And I can say for a fact that I am not alone in that view.

Indeed the U.S. Air Force has studied the scenario of a potential terrorist attack with a .50-caliber weapon. According to a November 2001 article in the Air Force's official magazine, Airman, an antisniper assessment claimed that planes parked on a fully protected U.S. airbase are as vulnerable as ``ducks on a pond'' because the weapons can shoot from beyond most airbase perimeters. The Air Force has addressed the issue and the effectiveness of specially trained countersnipers to respond to a .50-caliber weapon attack on aircraft, fuel tanks, control towers, and personnel.

While I am glad to know our military has given due consideration to the threats posed by .50-caliber weapons, I have real concerns over the threats posed to civilian aviation.

Our Nation's airports in no way match the security measures at air force bases. These commercial facilities handle millions of passengers and tons of cargo each day and are especially vulnerable to the threats posed by .50-caliber weapons.

The threats to civilian aviation have been made abundantly clear over the last year and a half. The events of September 11 certainly showed the ability of terrorists to find loopholes in aviation security.

The recent attack on an Israeli airliner last November in Kenya serves as an example of the threat these weapons pose. Less than 4 months ago, an Israeli airliner, loaded with hundreds of innocent civilians, became the target of a terrorist attack. Two heat-seeking, Russian-made missiles known as SA-7s were launched at Arkia Flight 582 a few minutes after it took off from the Mombasa airport bound for Israel.

Fortunately, the two missiles passed by the jet, and the flight, with 271 people on board, was able to land safely in Tel Aviv a few hours later. A shoulder-fire missile launcher was found on the ground near the airport.

A previously unknown group calling itself the Army of Palestine claimed responsibility for the attacks, but government officials in Kenya and Israel, along with terrorism experts, said the operation was well coordinated and bore the trademarks of Al Qaeda or an affiliated group.

This type of attack, one on civilian aircraft, is exactly the sort that a .50-caliber weapon is capable of. Experts have agreed that .50- caliber weapons aimed at a plane while stationary, or

taking off or arriving could be just as disastrous as a hit from a missile launcher. Gal Luft, co-Director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security has described .50-caliber weapons as ``lethal to slow moving planes.''

For further assurance of the potential destruction of these weapons, simply listen to the manufacturers themselves. According to a Barrett Firearms Manufacturing Model 82A1 .50 caliber sniper rifle brochure.

``The cost effectiveness of the Model 82A1 cannot be overemphasized when a round of ammunition purchased for less than 10 U.S. dollars can be used to destroy or disable a modern jet aircraft. The compressor sections of jet engines or the transmissions of helicopters are likely targets for the weapon, making it capable of destroying multimillion dollar aircraft with a single hit delivered to a vital area.''

The Nordic Ammunition Company is the developer of the Raufoss multipurpose ammunition for .50-caliber weapons that combines armor- piercing, incendiary, and explosive features and was used by U.S. forces during the gulf war. According to the company, the ammunition can ignite military jet fuel and has ``the equivalent firing power of a 20-mm projectile to include such targets as helicopters, aircrafts, light armor vehicles, ships, and light fortifications.''

The bill will simply place stricter requirements on the way in which these guns can be sold, and to whom. The measure is meant to offer a reasoned solution to making it harder for terrorists, assassins, and other criminals to obtain these powerful weapons. If we are to continue to allow private citizens to own and use guns of this caliber, range, and destructive power, we should at the very least take greater care in making sure that these guns do no fall into the wrong hands.

I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the need for greater preparation to protect our agriculture from a terrorist attack.

After September 11, the President placed agriculture on the list of critical infrastructure that deserved to be protected from an agroterrorist attack. Since then, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, USDA, has moved to improve our preparedness to prevent and respond to an attack upon our agriculture. The President's February 2003 ``National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets'' also outlines a strategy for increasing our ability to react to an agroterrorist attack. Yet, we still have a long way to go in protecting our agriculture industry.

There has been a steady drumbeat of warnings about the vulnerability of our agriculture. Two major studies were recently released that concluded we should do more to guard our agriculture. The Council on Foreign Relations, CFR, published a report on our emergency response capability that said we lacked an effective response to an attack on our national food supply. The report recommended spending an additional $2.1 billion over the next 5 years to improve our ``animal/ agricultural'' emergency response.

On the heels of the CFR report, the Partnership for Public Service issued a study that examined whether the Federal Government has the necessary expertise to defend against a bioterrorist attack. In regards to agricultural security, it said that federal agencies responsible for safeguarding our agriculture and food supply from bioweapons would face ``crushing burdens'' if our food and water supplies were contaminated.

These are just the most recent reports that recommend we need to do more to increase our guard. Last fall, the National Academy of Sciences published a major study on vulnerability of U.S. agriculture. The General Accounting Office, GAO, has issued three reports in the last year that looked at food processing security, foot and mouth disease, and mad cow disease. All suggested that we still have a way to go to prevent or prepare for an attack on our agriculture.

An attack on our agriculture could have serious consequences. Agricultural activity accounts for approximately 13 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product and nearly 17 percent of domestic employment. The United States is a top producer and exporter of agricultural goods, including beef, pork, poultry, wheat, corn and soybeans. Major agricultural States could be severely affected depending on the nature of the attack.

States with large cattle herds could be devastated by a deliberately set outbreak of foot and mouth disease. There were over 96 million cattle and calves in the United States valued at some $70 billion in 2003. Texas has the largest number by far, 14 million animals, and could be particularly hard hit. In 2001, the cattle industry generated $6.8 billion in income for Texas. The breeding herd of beef cows is particularly concentrated in Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas, with each State having have more than a million head of beef cows.

Dairy States could also suffer. The United States has over nine million milk cows that produce almost $25 billion in income. California and Wisconsin are the largest producers. Both have more than a million milk cows that yield close to $8 billion in income. But a number of States--Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington each have more than 200,000 cows, contributing substantially to their economies.

Hog-raising States also could be vulnerable to the spread of foot- and-mouth disease, or to an outbreak of African swine fever. The United States had almost 60 million hogs and pigs valued at over $4 billion dollars in 2002. Iowa has the largest industry with more than 15 million animals valued at over a billion dollars. North Carolina is next with some 9.6 million animals valued at a half a billion dollars. Ten additional States have substantial industries with more than a million animals: Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota.

States with large poultry industries are vulnerable to Exotic Newcastle Disease or avian influenza. In 2002, 14 States had flocks of over 15 million birds each: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Iowa alone has over 40 million birds valued at over $64 million.

Crops, such as wheat, could also be a target. A purposeful spread of the Karnal bunt wheat fungus could have a strong adverse impact on U.S. exports. The United States is the world's leading exporter of wheat, accounting for almost one-third of world wheat exports valued at over $3.5 billion in 2002. Since almost 80 countries do not allow Karnal infected wheat to be imported, a ban on U.S. exports could have a substantial effect on the U.S. economy. The Economic Research Service of the USDA estimated that the total cost of a reduction of exports from 2003 to 2007 could be over $7 billion if there was such a ban. The top wheat-producing States--Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington--would be particularly hard hit.

I have been concerned about the vulnerability of our agriculture for quite some time. When I was a member of the House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee, I was a supporter of the USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, APHIS. APHIS plays a critical role in guarding our borders and farms from agricultural pests and diseases, something that is of prime importance to Hawaii. As a Senator, I continue to be concerned about this problem. In the 107th Congress I introduced a bill to enhance agricultural biosecurity in the United States.

In this Congress, I have introduced two bills that will help address our shortcomings in agricultural security preparedness. The Agriculture Security Assistance Act, S. 427, and Agriculture Security Preparedness Act, S. 430, are designed to address the need for increasing coordination in confronting the threat to America's agriculture industry. The two bills provide for better funding and better- coordinated response to an incident of agroterrorism. The bills will also serve to increase our defenses against debilitating agroterrorism attacks.

The Agriculture Security Assistance Act is primarily aimed at assisting States and communities in responding to threats to the agriculture industry. The legislation will provide funds for communities and States to increase their ability to handle a crisis. It also will help animal health professionals to participate in community emergency planning activities to assist agriculturists in strengthening their defenses against a terrorist threat.

The Agriculture Security Preparedness Act will enable better interagency coordination thereby enhancing agriculture security. The legislation will establish senior level liaisons in Departments of Homeland Security, DHS, and Health and Human Services, HHS, to coordinate with USDA on agricultural disease emergency management and response. The bill requires DHS and USDA to work with the Department of Transportation to address the risks associated with transporting animals, plants, and people between and around farms.

Recently Mother Nature has provided warnings of the costs and dangers of a possible agroterrorist attack. In May, Canadians discovered that an 8-year-old cow that had been killed in January was infected with mad cow disease. The same disease affected cattle in Britain in the 1980s and 1990s leading to a slaughter of over 3.7 million animals.

Canada faced an enormous adverse economic impact due to the discovery of the mad cow disease. Canada's cattle industry generates $7 billion in cattle sales and the industry remained paralyzed during the period immediately following the discovery of the disease. Major importers of Canada's beef, like the United States, Mexico, Japan and Australia, temporarily halted their imports causing almost $8 million a day loss to the cattle industry. The news also affected companies like McDonald's, Wendy's, and Tyson Foods.

Canada acted to control the spread of the disease by quarantining herds of suspected cattle and slaughtering them to test for the presence of the disease. All the herds believed to have come in contact with the infected cow were quarantined and killed for medical examination. More than 2,700 Canadian cattle were slaughtered and eighteen farms were quarantined in the process of determining the disease's source and to control the spread of the disease.

In the United States, the southwest poultry industry has been beset by a costly outbreak of Exotic Newcastle Disease, END, since last fall. The outbreak was first detected in a backyard chicken flock in Los Angeles County in early October 2002. It then spread to Nevada, Arizona and Texas. Over the past months, some 25 countries including the European Union have put embargoes on chicken from affected areas. In Texas, where the poultry industry employs about 15,000 people and is ranked sixth in the Nation, the industry said it could lose about $100 million as a result of the embargoes. In California, State officials ordered the destruction of more than 3 million birds, enforcing a quarantine over a wide area. The outbreak in 2002 and 2003 cost the state almost $100 million to control the spread of the disease.

We all know an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. The Nation's capability to counter agroterrorism is increasing. But agriculture's central importance to our country suggests greater efforts are needed. As the recent cases of Mad Cow and Exotic Newcastle disease dramatically demonstrate, the consequences of a lack of preparedness could be quite high. Containing these naturally occurring diseases was costly and it involved extensive coordination. It could be much more difficult to counter a deliberate attack. The two bills I have introduced will help us to act now so that a future agroterrorist attack can be avoided, or dealt with rapidly before it can get out of hand. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. President, I rise today to express my concern that we need to do much more and do it much sooner to address the threat posed by Avian influenza and other infectious diseases.

The Avian influenza outbreaks that occurred in late June 2004 indicate that the virus is becoming more pathogenic and more widespread according to World Health Organization, WHO, officials. In addition, this virus has crossed the species barrier, moving from infected chickens or ducks directly into humans in three documented outbreaks since 1997.

I am most troubled, however, by a warning from WHO officials that the virus may acquire the ability to spread easily from human to human, and thus, trigger a global influenza pandemic. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC, an influenza pandemic could cause an estimated 89,000 to 207,000 deaths, 314,000 to 733,000 hospitalizations, and cost from $71-$167 billion in the United States alone. We cannot afford to take this threat lightly.

The so-called bird flu is deadly to humans. It killed 24 out of 35 people who

contracted it from chickens in Thailand and Vietnam earlier this year. In July an additional three were killed in Vietnam. This fatality rate is in the same range as the Ebola virus which is considered one of the most virulent viral diseases known to man.

Lack of effective treatment options for Avian flu contribute to its lethality. Creating an effective vaccine for the Avian influenza virus is extremely difficult. The virus is so deadly that a vaccine cannot easily be grown in eggs, the usual method of production. Other vaccine production methods are being studied, but the required extensive safety tests for a new vaccine mean that large scale vaccine distribution is not feasible in the near term.

Equally disturbing is that only one drug is currently believed effective to treat Avian flu, an antiviral medicine called Tamiflu which helps only if taken within one to two days of developing symptoms of the disease.

The WHO recently decided Tamiflu should be included in regional stockpiles to be distributed at the first sign of a new influenza virus spreading among humans. Unfortunately, if a pandemic of Avian flu were to occur now, the manufacturer of Tamiflu could not produce enough of the drug to meet the huge demand that would occur, and there is no generic substitute.

In light of these very limited treatment options, we should heed the WHO's warning and take aggressive steps to prevent a pandemic from occurring while at the same time increasing our preparedness to respond to all public health emergencies by developing a global defense system against the outbreak of diseases, including those resulting from terrorist attacks.

On July 31, 2003, I introduced S. Res. 208 to address this concern. The resolution seeks to improve American defenses against the spread of infectious diseases by calling for improvements in global disease surveillance capabilities because the early warning of a disease outbreak is key to its identification, the quick application of countermeasures, and the development a cure.

The recent Presidential Directive 10, ``Biodefense for the 21st Century,'' observes that many bioterror attacks could initially mimic naturally occurring diseases and potentially delay recognition of an attack. This is another important reason why I believe that the United States must strengthen its ability to detect diseases before they cross our borders. To pursue this initiative, I along with Senators Bingaman, Dodd, Durbin, Feinstein, Inouye, Leahy, Levin, Lieberman, Murray, and Sarbanes sent a letter to President Bush urging his support for global health issues at the 2004 Group of Eight, G-8, Summit. Our letter underscored the need for better disease surveillance and reporting systems which are inclusive of all public health emergencies of international concern.

I am pleased that the G-8 committed to take steps to expand and initiate new biosurveillance capabilities to detect bioterror against humans, animals, and crops; improve bioterrorism prevention and response capabilities; increase protection of the global food supply; and respond to, investigate, and mitigate the effects of alleged uses of biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease.

The administration followed the G-8 summit with the August release an updated draft of the 1978 Pandemic Influenza Response and Preparedness Plan for 60 days of public comment. This plan outlines the administration's proposed national strategy for preparing and responding to an influenza pandemic. Developing a strategy is good and the administration is to be commended for its concern, but far better would be committing more resources now to programs that have already been identified as critical to our preparedness.

For example, the administration's fiscal year 2005 budget request, which cuts public health preparedness for State and local governments by more than $105 million and hospital preparedness funding at the Health Resources and Services Administration by $39 million, seriously calls into question the administration's commitment to ensuring that U.S. citizens are protected from bioterrorist events and other public health emergencies.

I commend the President and the G-8 for expressing support for global health issues, but words and plans are not enough. We need action and we need action now. We must act together to reduce the grave threat that biological weapons and naturally occurring infectious diseases pose to the safety and security of the world.

Adoption of S. 427, the Agriculture Security Assistance Act, and S. 430, the Agriculture Security Preparedness Act, which I introduced in 2003 to help protect our Nation from an agroterror attack, would be a good first step for the United States as we strive to live up to the promises made to our G-8 partners. S. 427 would assist states and communities in responding to threats to the agriculture industry by providing funding for biosecurity grants to farmers and community planning activities. S. 430 would enable better interagency coordination within the federal government as it works to plan and respond to a threat to American agriculture.

We should also ensure that the National Security Council, and the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services have the funding and support they need to fully implement the commitments made at the 2004 G-8 summit. CDC's fiscal year 2005 budget request for global disease detection shows an increase of $27.5 million over the fiscal year 2004 budget. However, this funding increase comes at the expense of other important public health initiatives. We should not be robbing Peter to pay Paul when it comes to the health and safety of our Nation.

We must take action to increase WHO's global disease surveillance capability, including supporting their effort to revise the International Health Regulations by expanding the scope of required disease reporting to include all public health emergencies of international concern. An April 2004 Government Accountability Office, GAO, report on emerging infectious diseases, ``Asian SARS Outbreak Challenged International and National Responses,'' GAO-04-564, noted that the response by governments in SARS-affected countries was hindered by inadequate disease surveillance systems, poor communication, ineffective leadership, insufficient public health capacity, and limited resources.

While the International Health Regulations provide the legal framework for global infectious disease control, WHO's Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, GOARN, is the primary mechanism by which WHO mobilizes technical resources for the investigation of and response to disease outbreaks of international importance. The SARS outbreak was the first time that the GOARN network was activated on such a large scale for an international outbreak of an unknown emerging infectious disease. During the SARS outbreak, GOARN's human resources were stretched to capacity. GOARN experienced difficulty in sustaining the response to SARS over time and getting the appropriate experts out into the field.

These difficulties in responding to and containing the SARS outbreak demonstrate the urgent need to strengthen our ability to respond to global health emergencies. For example, the CDC reported that if the United States had experienced many SARS cases during the global outbreak, CDC might not have been able to make as many of their staff available to assist GOARN. In light of this, the implications of a bioterror event or an influenza pandemic are chilling. The SARS outbreak sickened 8,089 people causing 774 deaths in 2003, and an influenza pandemic is estimated by CDC to affect 10 times as many people.

CDC's fiscal year 2005 budget request for global disease detection is $50 million. This figure is not adequate when one considers that the SARS outbreak alone cost Asian economies $11 billion to $18 billion and resulted in losses of 0.5 percent to 2 percent of total output. If we multiply that by 10 for an influenza pandemic, the numbers are staggering. If we act now to increase funding for these programs, we have a chance to help prevent such a tragic situation from happening. By helping the world cope with infectious disease outbreaks we not only increase global public health, but help ensure the health and safety of the American people as well.

Mr. President, I rise today to call attention to the urgent need to prepare America against an attack on our agriculture. The Nation's agriculture industry is crucial to our prosperity. Yet it does not receive the protection it needs. Our food supply system is vulnerable to accidental or intentional contamination that would damage our economy, and, most importantly, could cost lives.

There is no need to question whether animal-borne diseases can actually threaten the United States. Look to last December's mad cow disease outbreak: only one cow was found to be infected, and yet the U.S. beef industry was thrown into a tailspin from which it still has not recovered. As a result: American cattle prices fell by 20 percent; some predict beef exports will fall by 90 percent from 2003 to 2004; and more than 40 foreign countries have instituted bans on American beef, most of which will not be lifted in the near future. This fallout resulted from the infection of only two cows.

In the beginning of February, a version of the avian influenza, a disease sweeping through Southeast Asian poultry that has killed at least 22 people to date, was discovered on two Delaware chicken farms. It also surfaced in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and a far more contagious strain was later reported in Texas. While the two strains found in these States carry no know risk to humans, this discovery illustrates how easily an animal-borne disease can break out in the United States. Only four farms and one live chicken market have tested positive for the disease. Yet this discovery resulted in the slaughter of over 92,000 chickens in the U.S. to date and a ban on American poultry exports in a number of Asian countries and the European Union.

We should learn two things from these recent outbreaks: No. 1, the cost to the agriculture community for even a small outbreak is high, and, No. 2, we must be prepared for the unexpected.

While the emergence of mad cow and the avian flu in American agriculture has been detrimental, it has not come close to causing the amount of damage a larger outbreak could create.

Imagine if either of these diseases spread across the Nation instead of being contained to just a few farms.

Or worse, imagine if the strain of the avian flu that is currently claiming human lives in Asia was found in the United States.

In these scenarios, the outbreak would have been far more difficult to contain and much more costly to our Nation.

A 1994 Department of Agriculture study said that if a foreign animal disease became entrenched in the United States, it would cost the agriculture industry at least $5.4 billion. A 2002 report by the National Defense University predicted that this figure would be three to fives times greater today. On a smaller scale, an outbreak that only penetrated 10 farms could have as much as a $2 billion economic impact.

Earlier this month, the President released Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9, HSPD-9, aimed at addressing many of these concerns. HSPD-9 is a great first step. It signals the administration is aware of the vulnerability in our agriculture sector and considers this to be a homeland security priority.

Under HSPD-9, the President directed the Department of Homeland Security to ensure the execution of a number of much needed security measures, including the following: Develop surveillance and monitoring systems for animal and plant disease and the food supply that provide early detection of poisonous agents; develop nationwide laboratory networks for food, veterinary, and plant health that ensures communication and coordination between related facilities; and develop a National Veterinary Stockpile that contains enough vaccine and antiviral products to respond to the most damaging animal diseases.

But the President's initiative does not go far enough because it fails to address a number of serious shortcomings with the current governmental response to agriculture security, such as: Lack of communication between Federal agencies; insufficient coordination with, and funding for, State and local officials; inadequate international collaboration; and the impeding nature of some State and local laws to effective response plans.

To address these many concerns, I introduced two bills, S. 427, the Agriculture Security Assistance Act, and S. 430, the Agriculture Security Preparedness Act, to increase the coordination in confronting the threat to America's agriculture industry and provide the needed resources. My legislation provides for more targeted State and local funding and a better-coordinated Federal system.

The Agriculture Security Assistance Act would assist States and communities in responding to threats to the agriculture industry by authorizing funds for: Animal health professionals to participate in community emergency planning activities to assist farmers in strengthening their defenses against a terrorist threat; a biosecurity grant program for farmers and ranchers to provide needed funding to better secure their properties; and the use of sophisticated remote sensing and computer modeling approaches to agricultural diseases.

The Agriculture Security Preparedness Act would enable better interagency coordination within the Federal Government by: Establishing senior level liaisons in the Departments of Homeland Security, DHS, and Health and Human Services to coordinate with the Department of Agriculture, USDA, and all other relevant agencies on agricultural disease emergency management and response; requiring DHS and USDA to work with the Department of Transportation to address the risks associated with transporting animals, plants, and people between and around farms; requiring the Attorney General to conduct a review of relevant Federal, State, and local laws to determine if they facilitate or impede agricultural security; and directing the State Department to enter into mutual assistance agreements with foreign governments to facilitate the share of resources and knowledge of foreign animal diseases.

Over 30 Federal agencies have jurisdiction over some part of the response process in the event of a breach of agricultural security. In a report on the United State's preparedness for responding to animal- borne diseases issued in August 2003, Trust for America's Health, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization founded to raise the profile of public health issues, stated that, ``The U.S. is left with a myriad of bureaucratic jurisdictions that respond to various aspects of the diseases, with little coordination and no clear plan for communicating with the public about the health threats posed by animal-borne diseases.'' Protecting America's agriculture and its citizens requires Federal agencies to know who is responsible for what portion of the prevention and response to an attack on our agriculture.

State and local officials, and the communities they serve, are the front

lines of defense for American agriculture. Without adequate resources, both in terms of funding and advice, these defenses will fail. While the presidential directive mandates the creation of a coordinated response plan that would include Federal, State, and local partners, it falls short of supplying the State and local officials with the necessary funding and guidance to better protect their jurisdiction. Surprisingly, the administration proposes huge cuts in fiscal year 2005 to homeland security grants for the States.

We have witnessed the impact a small, unintentional outbreak of mad cow disease had on our country. We cannot wait for a far more damaging and widespread attack on our agriculture system. While I commend the President's initiative in this area, further action is needed. I urge my colleagues to support this overdue legislation to protect America's breadbasket.

Mr. President, last Friday, December 3, 2004, Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson, in his resignation speech, stated, ``For the life of me, I cannot understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do so.'' These are strong words coming from the man charged with protecting the Nation's food supply. Yet this sort of warning is not news to those of us who follow this issue.

The security of our Nation's food supply is of great concern to me. Over the past year, the United States has been reminded repeatedly of the vulnerable nature of the American agriculture system and the ease with which terrorists could manipulate that vulnerability. In 2003, mad cow disease surfaced for the first time in Washington State and various strains of the avian influenza began cropping up across Asia and in the United States. I have come to the floor repeatedly over the past few years to call attention to this growing problem. I also introduced legislation to strengthen prevention and response efforts as early as 2002.

At a November 2003 Governmental Affairs Committee hearing, ``Agroterrorism: The Threat to America's Breadbasket,'' Dr. Peter Chalk, a RAND policy analyst, testified that an attack on American livestock could be extremely attractive to a terrorist for the following four reasons: one, a low level of technology is needed to do considerable damage; two, at least 15 pathogens have the capability of severely harming the agriculture industry; three, a terrorist would not need to be at great personal risk in order to carry out a successful attack; and four, a disease could spread quickly throughout a city, State, or even the country.

Dr. Tom McGinn, formerly of the North Carolina Department of Agriculture, demonstrated a computer-simulated attack of foot-and- mouth, or FMD, disease at our hearing where FMD was introduced in five States. According to Dr. McGinn's simulation, after five days 23 States would be infected; after 30 days 40 States would be infected. In this scenario, it would be likely that the disease would not be detected until the fifth day and a national order to stop the interstate movement of livestock would take place a few days later. Using Dr. McGinn's assumptions, over 23 million animals would die from illness or need to be destroyed. It is horrifying that such a massive blow could strike one of the United States' largest markets by simply coordinating the infection of five animals.

As a senior member of the Governmental Affairs Committee, one of my greatest concerns is the lack of governmental organization--Federal, State, and local--to address this problem. Over 30 Federal agencies have jurisdiction over some part of the response process in the event of a breach of agricultural security.

In a report on the country's preparedness for responding to animal- bourne diseases issued in August 2003, Trust for America's Health, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization founded to raise the profile of public health issues, stated:

The U.S. is left with a myriad of bureaucratic

jurisdictions that respond to various aspects of the

diseases, with little coordination and no clear plan for

communicating with the public about the health threats posed

by animal-borne diseases.

Protecting America's agriculture and its citizens requires Federal agencies to have clear areas of responsibility that leave no ground uncovered and open lines of communication, both between agencies and with the public.

State and local officials, and the communities they serve, are the front lines of defense for American agriculture. Without adequate resources, both in terms of funding and advice, these defenses will fail. Yet agriculture and food security have not been given the national attention necessary to prevent this failure.

On December 7, 2001, I stood on the floor of the Senate and warned of the vulnerability of American agriculture. To address my concerns, I introduced S. 2767, the Agriculture Security Preparedness Act, on July 22, 2002. My bill was not acted upon in the 107th Congress, so I continued my efforts in the 108th Congress with the introduction of S. 427, the Agriculture Security Assistance Act, and S. 430, the Agriculture Security Preparedness Act.

The Agriculture Security Assistance Act would assist States and communities in responding to threats to the agriculture industry by authorizing funds for: animal health professionals to participate in community emergency planning activities to assist farmers in strengthening their defenses against a terrorist threat; a biosecurity grant program for farmers and ranchers to provide needed funding to better secure their properties; and the use of sophisticated remote sensing and computer modeling approaches to agricultural diseases.

The Agriculture Security Preparedness Act would enable better interagency coordination within the Federal

Government by: establishing senior level liaisons in the Departments of Homeland Security, or DHS, and Health and Human Services to coordinate with the Department of Agriculture and all other relevant agencies on agricultural disease emergency management and response; requiring DHS and USDA to work with the Department of Transportation to address the risks associated with transporting animals, plants, and people between and around farms; requiring the Attorney General to conduct a review of relevant Federal, State, and local laws to determine if they facilitate or impede agricultural security; and directing the State Department to enter into mutual assistance agreements with foreign governments to facilitate the sharing of resources and knowledge of foreign animal diseases.

While some in the administration will say the situation is under control and there is no need for legislation from Congress, I would point to the failure of the Food and Drug Administration to comply with the basic food safety requirements in the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 in a timely manner. On Monday, the FDA published regulations requiring all companies involved in food production, processing, manufacturing, and transportation to keep detailed records identifying the source from which a food product was received and/or the recipient to whom a product was sent.

The Bioterrorism Act required that these regulations be issued by December 2003--a full 12 months ago. The administration will continue to drag its feet on this issue if we in the Congress are not attentive.

In the wake of Secretary Thompson's remarks, there has been much national attention given to the vulnerability of the American food supply. Some who had not focused on this issue in the past are publicly expressing concern about the safety of American food, and the national media is broadcasting special investigative reports on agroterrorism. President Bush was questioned about the issue during his press briefing with President Musharraf on Saturday.

The spotlight is being focused on this glaring weakness in U.S. security. We must do more to protect the American public from what experts describe as an obvious and vulnerable target. The real, and perceived, security of the Nation's food supply is critical to the continued prosperity of the United States. I will reintroduce S. 427 and S. 430 in the 109th Congress, and I urge my colleagues to cosponsor my bills. Together we can move this legislation forward and demonstrate that Congress is protecting our food supply.