Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Gillmor). Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, there are several things about this…
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Gillmor).
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, there are several things about this bill that I am not sure have been discussed or are as widely known by the Members, but the first thing I would say is that the legislation is supported by all the federal bank regulators. It is also supported by all the industry groups. And it does several things. It addresses inefficiencies in the present system and deficiencies in the present system.
As far as deficiencies in the present system, one of the greatest is the fact that we have two different funds. The Savings Association Insurance Fund and the Bank Insurance Fund. All the Federal regulators have recommended combining those funds from the administrative cost savings and also because we do not want a situation where some of our institutions are paying certain basis points where others are not. We want more equity there so it gives no advantage for our thrifts over our banks or our banks over our thrifts.
Another problem we have had increasingly is the problem of free riders. Since 1996, there have been no assessments of the banks for the Federal insurance, and as a result of that, we have had several large brokerage firms which have never paid into the fund, and what they are doing is setting up affiliate banks, six or eight or nine affiliate banks, and they are advertising $800,000 or $900,000 worth of federally insured deposits. In other words, people can deposit $800,000 or $900,000 into to their fund, and it is federally insured. This really is an inequity because they have never paid into the system and they are offering that something that smaller banks and other banks that do not set up these affiliates or string of affiliates and can only offer $100,000 of coverage; and, in fact, those banks or thrifts that are only offering $100,000 worth of coverage are actually paying and have paid for coverage for some of the large brokerage firms.
And the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the industry have said that this ought to be corrected, and we do that in this bill. We do that in two ways. One is by requiring that everyone pay a minimum amount; number two, we increase the coverage; and number three, we allow more flexibility in when the premiums are charged. Right now when the bank reserves fall below 1.25 percent, the Federal Reserve actually has to start charging a premium, and then if the situation is not rectified within a year, they have to then start charging 23 basis points, and they have little discretion in this matter. The bank regulators and the industry have recommended that what we do as opposed to having a hard number that we give a range, or a discretionary range, and we have done that at 1.15 to 1.4.
What this allows to happen is, if we think about it, there are no premiums being charged, and then all of a sudden we go into a recession and we start charging a premium, or 23 basis points, it actually can worsen the recession, and at the time when banks ought to be lending money, suddenly they are having to pay these premiums. The time to fund the insurance program and the insurance reserve is in good times.
So what we have done in this bill is allow them to build up a reserve in the good times, and then when we come into a recessionary period and bank reserves start dropping, they have some discretion in not instituting a 23-basis-point charge on the banks. And policymakers and all the Federal bank regulators believe that this will not only strengthen the funds, but it will take away a bias against a down cycle that could actually make a down economic cycle worse.
One of the things that is being debated, and the gentleman I am going to yield to next is going to be in opposition to the coverage increase, is the coverage increase. When we consider increasing the coverage, there have been two arguments against that. One was a ``moral hazard'' argument. The FDIC, in response to some people saying that if we raise the coverage, it will be a moral hazard, actually commissioned a study and appointed the vice chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Blinder, as the chairman of that study commission, and they came back and said because these are risk-based premiums, there is absolutely no validity to the moral hazard argument.
If we think about it this way, what this is, is an insurance, and bank depositors pay a premium on their deposits for insurance coverage. And to argue that if that coverage is increased from $100,000 to $130,000 suddenly would cause reckless behavior, it would almost be like arguing that if I had automobile insurance and I had $100,000 worth of automobile insurance on my automobile, and I raised that to $200,000 of insurance coverage that I would suddenly start driving more recklessly or be more prone to have accidents, and we know that when people insure, whether it is a deposit, an automobile, or a home, they are not any more apt to act in a reckless nature. So that argument has been shot down pretty uniformly.
A second argument against it is that we do not need to increase it. But one of our last bank failures was a bank in Chicago, a medium-sized bank. And what we found, because we had not raised the coverage levels above $100,000 since 1980, we found over 700 customers of that bank lost a substantial amount of their deposits, and the reason they did that, if we think about what depositors do, we had several hundred of them that had an IRA account with that bank, and they had an IRA that was over $100,000, and they basically lost everything above $100,000. And one lady that was quoted in the Chicago Tribune said, The loss I sustained is going to be the difference between my having a retirement where I will not have to struggle, and now, basically having a bare bones retirement where I will have to struggle to make ends meet.
We have another situation that we talked about in committee, and that was the fact that today many people are selling and buying houses, and when they do, they put the proceeds of that sale or the purchase price for that sale in a bank account. In 1980 the average price of a home was around $100,000. Today it is several times that amount. So imagine that if one is closing on a house, they sell their house, they get a $400,000 or $300,000 check or even a $200,000 check for that house, and most Americans put their savings in a house, they go down to their bank and they deposit that check and the bank happens to fail.
And every once in a while, a bank does fail like the one in Chicago. In that case, they had 12 people that had deposited the proceeds from the sale of their homes in the weeks before and they lost all of that money above $100,000. Some would say and some have said in opposing coverage increase that what Americans ought to do is when they sell a home, if they sell a home for $300,000, they ought to ask the closing attorney to write three $100,000 checks and they ought to deposit that in three different banks, or, if they are going to purchase a house, they ought to go to three different institutions and deposit that money in three different institutions, and then when they show up at the closing, they ought to write three different checks.
We know as a practical matter, Mr. Chairman, that people are not going to do that, and we should not ask them to do that. What we ought to do is raise coverage levels to reflect realities today.
The last time that coverage was increased in 1980, if we increased it for inflation today, it would be well over $180,000. Instead, we are only increasing it to $100,000 as a compromise. If we went back to not 1980 but we went back to 1974, which was the time before that that it was increased $40,000, and if we had adjusted it in 1980, it would be over $200,000. If we disregarded that increase and went back to 1974, it would be $180,000. So we are actually playing catchup here, and we have used that smaller number in an attempt to compromise with those who objected to increasing it at all.
I will say this: This bill passed with 111 votes the first time it was up, I think, but, anyway, I will get those statistics later, but I think it had 18 ``no'' votes the first time, 11 ``no'' votes the second time.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher), who is in opposition to the bill.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself all remaining time.
There are several things I think we need to say to correct the record. One was it was said by the gentleman in opposition that this was taxpayer guaranteed; and, in fact, these deposits are insured not by the taxpayer, but by the BIF and SAIF funds; and it is the depository that insures his own accounts. And for the taxpayer to pay one red cent, all assets of every federally insured financial institution would have to be exhausted before the taxpayer would have to pay one cent. In other words, all the assets of all of the federally insured banks and savings associations would have to be paid.
And in that regard, I am sure the gentleman from California would agree that if that moment ever came, we would be, we would probably be in dire straights, and I certainly never anticipate that happening. It has never happened in the history of our country. The savings and loans were exhausted, not the banks. The BIF account has never been exhausted; the savings and loan account thing was exhausted because of failures of savings and loans.
And if we say, as the gentleman said, that the reason why all the savings and loans failed is because we increased coverage from $100,000 to $130,000, we did that for the banks and the credit unions at the same time. No credit unions failed; very few banks failed. In some States, no institutions failed, where in States like California, Texas, where you had weak regulation, weak oversight, several failed; or you had the oil patch in Texas where many of them failed.
In fact, the cost to the taxpayer would have been greater had the first $100,000 of accounts not been insured. It would have been a much greater loss. Thank goodness the first $100,000 of accounts were insured. If we had another failure today, $130,000 would be insured, and we would have insurance for it. So to say that insurance coverage is taxpayer funded, the taxpayer is not funding this. If the taxpayer were funding it, his analogy would be right.
And the last thing that he says, and he has said this, is that this was the cause of the savings and loans to fail. This has been looked at by this Congress, it has been looked at by the FDIC, it has been looked at by the Federal Reserve and, actually, I am going to introduce this. This is about 20 different reasons that government reports have causes for the failures of the S&Ls; and on that list of 20, nowhere does it say because of an increase in coverage. In fact, the FBI submitted what they thought were the reasons, the FDIC submitted what they thought were the reasons, all the bank regulators, and nowhere on any of those lists do we find increase in coverage. In fact, what you do find is one study showed that taxpayer exposure was less because the funds were insured up to $100,000.
Mr. Chairman, I will just simply close by saying that all the Federal bank regulators say that this legislation will strengthen and reform our Federal guarantee program for bank deposits and by saying that today, if you sell a house for $120,000 or $140,000 or $160,000 or $200,000 and you deposit the proceeds in your bank account, you are probably not a rich person by definition. If you decide to buy a house and you put $150,000 in the bank or transfer it or get a loan from a bank and you deposit it in your account, you lose that, you certainly would not be defined as rich. And if you have a 401(k) and you happen to have over $100,000 in it, that does not make you a rich person. In fact, that represents, for many people, their entire savings is a 401(k); and, increasingly, those accounts are running over $100,000.
That is why the AARP and the Securities Investment Institute both endorsed this legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I had one glaring oversight in this entire debate concerning the bill. And that is the fact that the gentlewoman from Oregon (Ms. Hooley) who really played a monumental part in this legislation over the past 2 or 3 years and actually was the original cosponsor of this legislation has not been recognized.
I would like to commend her for her fine work on this bill. And I guess it is
a credit to her and her personality, despite that oversight she did not call attention to my omission. And so I commend the gentlewoman from Oregon (Ms. Hooley). She is an outstanding Member of this body. And in this legislation, she deserves a lot of credit for its passage and its support.
Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, one thing the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher) mentioned and I would like
to say in his defense: he has triplets at home, so I think we ought to have a lot of patience for the gentleman. They are very young. One- year-old triplets.
I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Second, the gentleman did mention the fact that we do have a provision in here covering municipal deposits or government deposits and that is for $2 million. The reason we did that is not to protect the big guy or the rich guy.
The reason we did that is from time to time a school system or a city or a county or a governmental retirement system will put $2 million or $1.5 million in a bank and it is really not practical for them to go around and put $100,000 in each bank. And that is basically as a result of the American Association of School Boards and others saying not only do we want to deposit more than that, but in several States, particularly the Farm Belt, there is only one hometown institution. And the school board or the government or the city or the fire district wants to deposit their money in their own hometown. And that is to allow that.
I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. Chairman, I have two counties, one is Bibb County, one is Shelby County. The school board in those counties is forced to take about 96 percent of their money and deposit it out of county because there are only two hometown institutions, and they would like to deposit in those, as long as those are rated A institutions, and again I say that they are paying a premium on their deposits for this coverage.
The second thing I would say is if the gentleman will go back to 1980, what you had is we deregulated the savings and loans. We made tremendous changes in their mission. And at that time they had 30-year mortgages. They had loaned out money at 4 percent, 4.5 percent, 5 percent. From 1979 to 1981, the interest rates increased, the Federal Reserve continued to increase the interest rate because of inflation, which the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank) mentioned, and they drove the interest rate up above 20 percent. The prime rate was 21 percent.
So the savings and loans were having to borrow money at 21 percent and had loaned it out at 4 and 5 percent; and predictably, particularly in Texas where the price of oil fell, the savings and loans in Texas started failing one right after the other. And as I said earlier, if it were this increase from 40 to 100,000, you would have expected to see it show up in the banks; you would expect it to show up throughout the Nation.
I do not think the people in Texas where most of the first failures occurred, Louisiana, I do not think they were engaged in any more fraudulent conduct or reckless behavior except that what they were doing, that was a boom economy in Texas and property values shot up, and there was a bubble and they came back down.
But during all of that, the bank fund did not fail. And as I have said before, before one dollar of taxpayer money comes out of this account, it requires the funds to be exhausted. It, second, requires the banks, their assets to be liquidated, and only at that point would the taxpayer step in. That would be a heck of a depression. And I think that would be a depression made only worse if school boards, governments lost their deposits, if people lost their 401(k)s, if they lost any of their savings above $100,000, businesses who had accounts. And some of those might be rich people, the guy that owns the small business and has $400,000 or $600,000 deposited or a contracting company that has just been paid on a contract.
I think it would make the recession or depression or economic shock that much worse. I believe that this legislation is sound legislation and should be supported.