Mr. Speaker, in reference to H. Res. 905, I submit an address by former Senator Sam Nunn, Co-Chairman and CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, presented on December 16, 2003 at a symposium entitled…
Mr. Speaker, in reference to H. Res. 905, I submit an address by former Senator Sam Nunn, Co-Chairman and CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, presented on December 16, 2003 at a symposium entitled Kazakhstan: Reducing Nuclear Dangers, Increasing Global Security.
Symposium Keynote Address
(By Sam Nunn)
I want to thank our guests for joining us today in the
United States Senate, where so much deliberation has taken
place on how to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and where
the example of Kazakhstan has been welcomed and celebrated as
a model of what we must see in the 21st century.
President Nazarbayev is one of the greatest champions of
nuclear nonproliferation in the world--not merely by his
words, but--most importantly--by his actions and his nation's
example.
President Nazarbayev tells a very striking personal story
in the prologue of his book Epicenter of Peace. As a child,
he remembered having in his home an army rifle that had been
taken by one of his relatives--a Kazakh militiaman--in a
rebellion against a regular Russian army unit in 1916. One
day his grandmother said that the rifle had brought
suffering--that it should be cast out of the house. So
President Nazarbayev's father took the rifle to the
authorities, but not before removing the bayonet, which the
grandmother ordered be made into a sickle. She supplied the
handle that she made herself from her old spindle. As a young
boy, the President used that sickle to cut hay. This
childhood event--dismantling a weapon and building from it a
tool of peace and commerce--foreshadowed the work of his
adult life. It is the heart of the Biblical passage ``they
shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears
into pruning hooks.''
President Nazarbayev dismantled his nation's nuclear
weapons and out of that action built a friendship with the
United States, an example for the world, and an opportunity
for his people to move toward a more promising future. Iran
and other nations could learn from Kazakhstan that a nation
can grow, modernize, make progress, and gain stature not in
spite of renouncing nuclear weapons, but because of it.
Increasing global security also has a critical economic
dimension. In making the decision to disarm, President
Nazarbayev also chose to use his nation's resources to build
an economic base that would benefit all the citizens of
Kazakhstan. The world's economy and stability depends on
diversifying our energy base--so the Kazakhstan role in
energy development is very important. The pressure is
appropriately increasing on both governments and industry
to embed ``transparent'' processes and good governance
practices into their management systems. The government of
Kazakhstan clearly understands this issue, given the
heightened attention to increased oil production in the
Caspian region. The transparency demonstrated by the
government of Kazakhstan recently in announcing at a press
conference the royalties received for a recent large
petroleum project is a very positive step, and one that
should be recognized, showcased, and supported widely.
Revenue transparency is an issue on which industry and
governments will likely continue to face pressure. I
applaud the inclusive and constructive approach that has
been taken to date, and I encourage all parties involved
to continue the dialogue and working together to advance
this important topic. Without economic stability--every
step in the security arena becomes more difficult.
Let me acknowledge and thank Minister Vladimir Shkolnik for
his role both in Kazakhstan's economic development and in its
nuclear disarmament example. President Nazarbayev had the
personal vision to renounce nuclear weapons, but he also had
something just as important. He had in Minister Shkolnik, a
man with the determination and the skill to get it done. The
world owes you a great debt, Mr. Minister.
I also want to thank Ambassador Saudabayev, who this past
August in Athens, Georgia, so graciously presented to me
Kazakhstan's highest award to non-citizens. The Ambassador is
a vigorous and talented advocate for Kazakhstan's interests
in the United States. He has a keen understanding of where
our nations' interests intersect, and how we can advance them
together. Kazakhstan is fortunate to have a man of his talent
in Washington.
It is fitting that we meet here in the halls of the United
States Senate, because it was here that the first legislative
debate took place on the question of reducing the nuclear
threat in the post-Cold War world.
Let us recall what was at stake back in 1991. In December
of that year, Vice President Dick Cheney was then Defense
Secretary, and he offered this analysis:
``If the Soviets do an excellent job retaining control over
their stockpile of nuclear weapons--let's assume they've got
25,000-30,000; that's a ballpark figure--and they are 99
percent successful, that would mean you could still have as
many as 250 that they were not able to control.''
So far--strong, visionary actions by many people have kept
that dire but plausible scenario from becoming reality. Dick
Lugar was an indispensible partner in creating the Nunn-Lugar
Program and a central crucial force in the Senate for
spending U.S. dollars to help secure nuclear weapons and
materials in the former Soviet Union. Graham Allison was a
brilliant voice from the outside urging action. At the start,
many members of Congress criticized this effort as aid to the
Soviet military. Six weeks or so later, the Senate voted 86-8
to spend $400 million to help secure the Soviet nuclear
stockpile and limit the spread of nuclear weapons as one
country split into fifteen countries, and one nuclear power
was replaced by four.
This first vote was not a blank check; it was a challenge.
We had to prove to the Congress that Cooperative Threat
Reduction made a clear contribution to our national security.
The courageous actions of President Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan
and Ukraine made a world of difference in proving the
effectiveness of our efforts.
I understand the term ``Kazakh'' is a version of a Turkic
word meaning ``free or independent''. The moment Kazakhstan
became free, it set an independent course among the nations
of the world. Its President declared the nation would
renounce nuclear weapons. Its parliament voted in 1993 to
confirm that--and set in motion the plans to destroy more
than one hundred SS-18 ICBMs, each with 10 high-yield
warheads, along with other smaller nuclear weapons--a larger
nuclear arsenal than held by China, France or the United
Kingdom.
President Nazarbayev's view was like his grandmother's:
these weapons have caused only suffering; they should be cast
out of the country.
The world should understand, more than it does, the
Kazakhstani suffering that led to that decision. As everyone
here knows, the Soviet Union's premier nuclear test site was
located in Kazakhstan at Semipalatinsk, where it was the
site of the first Soviet nuclear explosion, and nearly 500
more over the next forty years, more than one hundred of
them above ground. Because of the environmental
devastation caused by the Soviet nuclear test site at
Semipalatinsk, President Nazarbayev ordered the test site
closed on August 29, 1991--four months before the collapse
of the Soviet Union and 42 years to the day after the
first nuclear test there.
The release of radiation at the test site was far more
severe than Chernobyl--yet the world hears much of Chernobyl
and little of Semipalatinsk. Seventy percent of all Soviet
nuclear testing took place there. More than a million people
suffered dangerous doses of radiation from exposure to
fallout from the test site. Those exposed have suffered high
rates of cancer, infant mortality, birth defects, immune
deficiencies and nervous system disorders. Many of these
health defects don't end with the first generation; they are
passed on to children.
It was in large part an understanding of their suffering
and a respect for their sacrifice that caused Kazakhstan to
become a world leader in renouncing nuclear weapons.
Kazakhstan was not only willing to dismantle its nuclear
arsenal, but also eager to destroy the test sites.
Kazakhstan and the United States became strong security
partners from that decision forward, and money appropriated
here in the Congress helped pay for the dismantling of the
nuclear weapons, the destruction of the silos and the sealing
of the nuclear test tunnels.
That is an impressive record of security cooperation. Yet
there is another accomplishment of U.S.-Kazakhstan relations
that is a model for nuclear nonproliferation, and that is
Project Sapphire. In 1993, Kazakhstani officials approached
the U.S. Ambassador in secret, alerting him to the existence,
at the lightly-secured Ulba Metallurgical Plant, of 1,300
pounds of weapons-grade uranium--enough to make dozens of
nuclear weapons. Both Iraq and Iran were known to be seeking
this kind of high-grade material. It was dangerous, plentiful
and vulnerable.
After a year of planning, a 31-person team from the
United States flew to the region and worked with
Kazakhstani experts for six weeks to take the material out
of its containers, take precautions to make it safe during
transport, repackage it, and then ship it back to the
United States on two Air Force transporters. Once securely
stored in Tennessee, this uranium was blended down and
used to generate civilian power, in a continuation of the
``swords to plowshares'' tradition.
This example shows how indispensable cooperation is in
keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of
dangerous people. The U.S. team arrived back in the United
States in late November. Elections three weeks before had
turned leadership of several legislative committees in
Congress over to new chairmen, some of whom were opposed to
Cooperative Threat Reduction. Project Sapphire offered
dramatic and visible proof of the security value of this
program and helped strengthen the arguments of those of us
who fought to continue funding.
Project Sapphire also provided a model for future
operations of this kind--such as an operation four years
later in the Republic of Georgia; a recent operation in
Serbia called Project Vinca, where NTI working with the U.S.,
Russian and Serbian officials, removed 100 pounds of highly
enriched uranium from the nuclear research reactor near
Belgrade; an another successful operation in Romania a few
months ago.
The United States and Kazakhstan must intensify our ties
across the board--economic, educational, cultural, and
especially on matters of security.
We have to continue to work together to shut down
Kazakhstan's fast breeder reactor that generated weapons-
usable plutonium. We have to make sure the weapons scientists
who used to work at the Stepnogorsk anthrax factory can find
peaceful work. NTI is working with Kazakhstan now on how to
convert an active research reactor from using 90% enriched
uranium to low-enriched uranium, and on blending down tons of
fresh HEU power reactor fuel for sale as LEU.
Kazakhstan has an important role in global security. Much
remains to be done and each crucial step is important to
Kazakhstan security, U.S. security and world security.
We must recognize and our priorities and resources must
reflect that:
1. The gravest danger in the world today is the threat from
nuclear, biological, an chemical weapons.
2. The likeliest use of these weapons are in terrorist
hands.
3. Preventing the spread and use of nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons should be the central organizing security
principle for the 21st century.
Terrorists are racing to get weapons of mass destruction,
and we are not yet racing to stop them. The citizens of all
nations need to understand that no one--no matter where in
the world they live--is safe from the consequences of a
terrorist nuclear attack. The economic impact of the
September 11 attacks was felt in all parts of the globe.
Tourism dollars plunged. Airlines went bankrupt. Corporations
announced layoffs.
But a nuclear 9/11 would make World Trade Center attacks
look like a warning shot. It would be impossible to calculate
the economic costs, because there is no way to calculate how
long it would take for citizens to recover the confidence
they need to spend and invest. The public would assume that
if the terrorists had one nuclear weapon, they could get
another. If they would use it in one city, they would use it
in another. If even one goes off, it's hard to see how we
could fully recover. We have to prevent it from happening--
ever.
How difficult is it for terrorists to attack us with a
nuclear weapon? That depends on how difficult we make it. No
terrorist can launch an attack without weapons-grade
material--plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Most
terrorists lack the sophisticated infrastructure necessary to
produce these materials; they would have to steal or buy
them.
So the most effective, least expensive way to prevent
nuclear terrorism is to lock down and secure weapons and
fissile materials in every country and every facility that
has them. The world is in a race between cooperation an
catastrophe. To win this race, we have to achieve cooperation
on a scale we've never seen or attempted before--not because
cooperation will give us a warm feeling of community, but
because every. other method will fail.
Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a charitable organization
working to reduce the global threats from nuclear, biological
and chemical weapons. He is also a senior partner in the law
firm of King & Spalding, where he focuses his practice on
international and corporate matters. He served as a United
States Senator from Georgia for 24 years (1972-1996).
Raised in the small town of Perry in middle Georgia, he
attended Georgia Tech, Emory University and Emory Law School,
where he graduated with honors in 1962. After active duty
service in the U.S. Coast Guard, he served six years in the
U.S. Coast Guard Reserve. He first entere politics as a
member of the Georgia House of Representatives in 1968.
During his tenure in the U.S. Senate, Senator Nunn served
as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. He also served on
the Intelligence and Small Business Committees. His
legislative achievements include the landmark Department of
Defense Reorganization Act, drafted with the late Senator
Barry Goldwater, and the ``Nunn-Lugar'' Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program, which provides assistance to Russia and
the former Soviet republics for securing and destroying their
excess nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
In addition to his work with NTI, Senator Nunn has
continued his service in the public policy arena as a
distinguished professor in the Sam Nunn School of
International Affairs at Georgia Tech and as chairman of the
board of the Center for Strategic and International Studies
in Washington, D.C.
He is a board member of the following publicly held
corporations: ChevronTexaco Corporation, The Coca-Cola
Company, Dell Computer Corporation, General Electric Company,
Internet Security Systems Inc., and Scientific-Atlanta Inc.
He is married to the former Colleen O'Brien and has two
children, Michelle and Brian, and one grandchild.
On the nuclear front: the mission is difficult--but it is
not complicated. We know where the dangerous and vulnerable
materials are; we know what how to be done; we know how to do
it; we have made some progress--but not enough.
There remains a dangerous gap between the pace of our
progress and the scope and urgency of the threat. The threat
extends well beyond the former Soviet Union. There are 100
nuclear research reactors and other facilities in 40
countries using highly enriched uranium--the raw material of
nuclear terrorism. Some of it is secured by nothing more than
an underpaid guard sitting inside a chain-link fence. In
August 2002, when nuclear weapons material was removed from
the research reactor near Belgrade, the U.S. and Russia said
they were going to move quickly on 24 similar sites. But it's
now been over a year and only one additional site has been
addressed. Two out of 25 shows the lack of urgency of this
work. We can argue as to who is to blame--Russia or the
United States or other countries--but the bottom line is that
our security is at stake no matter who is to blame.
Most governments and most leaders have still not
acknowledged by their actions, by their resource priorities,
and by their cooperation that the threat of catastrophic
terrorism is the most immediate, most likely, most
potentially devastating threat we face; that it threatens all
of us equally; that it demands urgent action; that it
requires a new level of cooperation. This is the kind of
danger that ought to focus our attention--because if we don't
prevent this threat, nothing else will matter.
What must we do? NTI has funded a project that brings
together a consortium of 21 research institutions across
Europe, Russia, the U.S. and Asia to work together on threat
reduction. Let me summarize their conclusion:
1. Nuclear weapons and materials--wherever they are in the
world--represent a grave danger. We must secure all of it,
everywhere, quickly to reduce the terrorist threat.
2. Tactical nuclear weapons must be accounted for and
secured.
3. All excess weapons-grade nuclear materials should be
secured and then destroyed.
4. Chemical weapons--every one of them--should be secured
and destroyed.
5. Biological weapons facilities of the former Soviet Union
must be open and transparent. We must help convert these
facilities and the labors of the scientists who used to work
in them, to peaceful commercial purposes.
The most positive recent development in Cooperative Threat
Reduction came in the summer of last year when the G8 nations
pledged $20 billion over ten years to launch the Global
Partnership and to secure and prevent the read of weapons and
mass destruction. Since this announcement many other nations
have joined the partnership. Kazakhstan has a great deal to
contribute to the partnership, and I hope that you will join.
The partnership should include everyone who has something to
safeguard and who has something to contribute to safeguarding
it. Kazakhstan is unique as an example of leadership.
A great opportunity to accelerate the work of the global
partnership comes next summer in Sea Island, Georgia, where
the leaders of the G8 will meet again. Either the G8 will
dramatically expand its threat reduction efforts, or the
Global Partnership will remain a second-tier response to a
first-tier threat--and leave grave dangers to our children.
In the race between cooperation and catastrophe, we have
taken steps in the right direction, but we're long past the
time when we can take satisfaction with step in the right
direction. A gazelle running from a cheetah is taking steps
in the right direction. It's not just a question of
direction; it's a matter of speed.
If a terrorist nuclear device exploded tonight in
Washington, New York, Astana, Moscow or London, what would we
wish we had done to stop it? Why aren't we doing that now?
