Mr. President, I rise today to introduce with my colleagues, Senators Feinstein, Grassley, Kyl, and Cornyn, a comprehensive bipartisan bill to increase gang prosecution and prevention efforts. The…
Mr. President, I rise today to introduce with my colleagues, Senators Feinstein, Grassley, Kyl, and Cornyn, a comprehensive bipartisan bill to increase gang prosecution and prevention efforts. The bill I introduce today is identical to S. 1735 that was favorably reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee in the 108th Congress.
This legislation, ``The Gang Prevention and Effective Deterrence Act of 2005,'' authorizes approximately $650 million over the next five years to support law enforcement and efforts to prevent youngsters from joining gangs. Of that, $450 million would be used to support Federal, State and local law enforcement efforts against violent gangs, and $200 million would be used for intervention and prevention programs for at- risk youth. The bill increases funding for the Federal prosecutors and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents needed to conduct coordinated enforcement efforts against violent gangs.
This bill also creates new criminal gang prosecution offenses, enhances existing gang and violent crime penalties to deter and punish illegal street gangs, enacts violent crime reforms needed to prosecute effectively gang members, and implements a limited reform of the juvenile justice system to facilitate Federal prosecution of 16- and 17-year-old gang members who commit serious violent felonies.
The problem of gang violence in America is not a new one, nor is it a problem that is limited to major urban areas. Once thought to be only a problem in our Nation's largest cities, gangs have invaded smaller communities. Gangs in Salt Lake County result in significant measure from the influence of gangs existing in Los Angeles and Chicago, but with local mutations.
Constituents frequently mention to me their extreme concern about gang violence in Utah. According to the Salt Lake Area Gang Project, a multi-jurisdictional task force created in 1989 to fight gang crime in the Salt Lake area, there are at least 250 identified gangs in Utah with over 3,500 members. In Utah, there are street gangs that are ethnically oriented, such as Hispanic gangs, as well as those affiliated with gangs from other cities, such as the Crips and Bloods, Folks and People, motorcycle gangs, Straight Edge gangs, Animal Liberation Front, Skinheads, Varrio Loco Town, Oquirrh Shadow Boys, Salt Lake Posse, and the list goes on. Some of these gangs are racist; some are extremist.
And what I find particularly troubling is that over one-third of the total gang membership is made up of juveniles. Thus, these crimes have a particular impact on youths.
Gangs now resemble organized crime syndicates which readily engage in gun violence, illegal gun trafficking, illegal drug trafficking and other serious crimes. All too often we read in the headlines about gruesome and tragic stories of rival gang members gunned down, innocent bystanders--adults, teenagers and children--caught in the cross fire of gangland shootings, and family members crying out in grief as they lose loved ones to the gang wars plaguing our communities.
Recent studies confirm that gang violence is an increasing problem in all of our communities. Based on the latest available National Youth Gang Survey, it is now estimated that there are more than 25,000 gangs, and over 750,000 gang members who are active in more than 3,000 jurisdictions across the United States. The most current reports indicate that in 2002 alone, after five years of decline, gang membership has spiked nationwide.
I have been--and remain--committed to supporting Federal, State and local task forces as a model for effective gang enforcement strategies. Working together, these task forces have demonstrated that they can make a difference in the community. In Salt Lake City, the Metro Gang Multi-Jurisdiction Task Force stands out as a critical player in fighting gang violence in Salt Lake City. We need to reassure outstanding organizations like this that there will be adequate resources available to expand and fund these critical task force operations to fight gang violence.
In my study of this problem, it has become clear that the government needs to work with communities to meet this problem head-on and defeat it. If we really want to reduce gang violence, we must ensure that law enforcement has adequate resources and legal tools, and that our communities have the ability to implement proven intervention and prevention strategies, so that gang members who are removed from the community are not simply replaced by the next generation of new gang members.
In closing, I want to commend my colleagues--Senators Feinstein, Grassley, Kyl and Cornyn. They have worked very closely with me as we considered these issues last Congress and I look forward to working with them and others as we proceed this year. I urge my colleagues to join with us in promptly passing this important legislation.
Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005. This important legislation consists of a package of smaller intellectual property bills that the House and Senate have been working to enact since last Congress. This legislation passed the Senate not once, but twice, during the waning days of the last Congress. Unfortunately, though, it was doomed by a non-germane amendment unrelated to intellectual property law. My hope is that we can work together this Congress to avoid this type of pitfall, and I commit to work with other members to do so.
Before beginning my substantive discussion of the bill, I would like to thank my colleagues Senators Leahy, Cornyn, and Feinstein for their ongoing efforts on this legislation. Just as it was last year, this legislation is a group effort, and I want to take care to recognize the contributions and their excellent work along with that of Representatives Sensenbrenner, Smith, Berman, and Conyers in the House.
Before going into a title-by-title discussion of the bill, I would like to express my particular support for the Family Movie Act, which has been included in this legislation. Chairman Lamar Smith and I worked on this bill last Congress. It's important legislation both to parents who want the ability to use new technologies to help shield their families from inappropriate content as well as the technology companies, such as ClearPlay in my home State of Utah, that are working to develop these technologies. The Family Movie Act will give parents more say over what their children see, without limiting the creative control of directors and movie studios.
Title I of this Act, the Artists' Rights and Theft Prevention Act of 2005, (the ART Act), contains a slightly modified version of S. 1932, authored by Senators Cornyn and Feinstein in the 108th Congress. This bill will close two significant gaps in our copyright laws that are feeding some of the piracy now rampant on the Internet.
First, it criminalizes attempts to record movies off of theater screens. These camcorded copies of new movies now appear on filesharing networks almost contemporaneously with the theatrical release of a film. Several States have already taken steps to criminalize this activity, but providing a uniform Federal law--instead of a patchwork of State criminal statutes--will assist law enforcement officials in combating the theft and redistribution of valuable intellectual property embodied in newly-released motion pictures.
Second, the bill will create a pre-registration system that will permit criminal penalties and statutory-damage awards. This will also provide a tool for law enforcement officials combating the growing problem of music and movies being distributed on filesharing networks and circulating on the Internet before they are even released. Obviously, the increasingly frequent situation of copyrighted works
being distributed illegally via the Internet before they are even made available for sale to the public severely undercuts the ability of copyright holders to receive fair and adequate compensation for their works.
Title II of this Act, the Family Movie Act of 2005 (the FMA), resolves some ongoing disputes about the legality of so-called ``jump- and-skip'' technologies that companies like Clearplay in my home State of Utah have developed to permit family-friendly viewing of films that may contain objectionable content. The FMA creates a narrowly defined safe-harbor clarifying that distributors of such technologies will not face liability for copyright or trademark infringement, provided that they comply with the requirements of the Act. I have been working with my colleagues in the Senate and several leaders in the House-- including, most importantly Chairmen Smith and Sensenbrenner--for the past couple of years to resolve this issue. The FMA will help to end aggressive litigation threatening the viability of small companies like Clearplay which are busy creating innovative technologies for consumers that allow them to tailor their home viewing experience to their own individual or family preferences.
The Family Movie Act creates a new exemption in section 110(11) of the Copyright Act for skipping and muting audio and video content in motion pictures during performances of an authorized copy of the motion picture taking place in the course of a private viewing in a household. The version passed last year by the House explicitly excluded from the scope of the new copyright exemption so-called ``ad-skipping'' technologies that make changes, deletions, or additions to commercial advertisements or to network or station promotional announcements that would otherwise be displayed before, during, or after the performance of the motion picture. This provision was included on the House floor to address the concerns of some Members who were concerned that a court might misread the new section 110(11) exemption to apply to ``ad- skipping''' cases, such as in the recent litigation involving ReplayTV.
In the Senate, however, some expressed concern that the inclusion of such explicit language could create unwanted inferences with respect to the merits of the legal positions at the heart of recent ``ad- skipping'' litigation. Those issues remain unsettled in the courts, and it was never the intent of this legislation to resolve or affect those issues in any way. Indeed, the Copyright Act contains literally scores of similar exemptions, and none of those exemptions have been or should be construed to imply anything about the legality of conduct falling outside their scope. As a result, the Copyright Office has now confirmed that such an explicit exclusion is unnecessary to achieve the desired outcome, which is to avoid application of this new exemption in potential future cases involving ad-skipping devices. In order to avoid unnecessary controversy, the Senate bill omits the exclusionary language with the understanding that doing so does not in any way change the scope of the bill.
That this change in no way affects the scope of the exemption is clear when considering that the new section 110(11) exemption protects the ``making imperceptible . . . limited portions of audio or video content of a motion picture. . . .'' An advertisement, under the Copyright Act, is itself a ``motion picture,'' and thus a product or service that enables the skipping of an entire advertisement, in any media, would be beyond the scope of the exemption. Moreover, the phrase ``limited portions'' is intended to refer to portions that are both quantitatively and qualitatively insubstantial in relation to the work as a whole. Where any substantial part of a complete work, such as a commercial advertisement, is made imperceptible, the new section 110(11) exemption would not apply. The limited scope of this exemption does not, however, imply or show that such conduct or a technology that enables such conduct would be infringing. This legislation does not in any way deal with that issue. It means simply that such conduct and products enabling such conduct are not immunized from liability by this exemption.
This bill also differs from the version passed by the House last year in that it adds two ``savings clauses.'' The copyright savings clause makes clear that there should be no spillover effect from the passage of this law: that is, nothing shall be construed to have any effect on rights, defenses, or limitations on rights granted under title 17, other than those explicitly provided for in the new section 110(11) exemption. The trademark savings clause clarifies that no inference can be drawn that a person or company who fails to qualify for the exemption from trademark infringement found in this provision is therefore liable for trademark infringement.
Title III of this Act, the National Film Preservation Act of 2004, will reauthorize the National Film Preservation Board and the National Film Preservation Foundation. These entities have worked successfully to recognize and preserve historically or culturally significant films--often by providing the grants and expertise that enable local historical societies to protect and preserve historically significant films for the local communities for which they are most important. This fine work will ensure that the history of the 20th century will be preserved and available to future generations.
As a conservative Senator from a socially conservative state, I occasionally take a few swings at the movie industry for the quality and content of the motion pictures they are currently creating, but I will note for the record that I commend efforts to ensure that important artistic, cultural, and historically significant films are preserved for future generations. I commend my friend from Vermont for his perseverance in reauthorizing Federal funds to continue this important effort.
Title IV of this act, the ``Preservation of Orphan Works Act,'' also ensures the preservation of valuable historic records by correcting a technical error that unnecessarily narrows a limitation on the copyright law applicable to librarians and archivists. This will strengthen the ability of librarians and archivists to better meet the needs of both researchers and ordinary individuals and will result in greater accessibility of important works. I applaud my colleague in the House--Representative Howard Berman of California--for his efforts on this bill and am pleased to see it included in this Senate package.
Just to conclude, I will again thank Ranking Democratic Member Leahy, Senator Cornyn, Chairmen Sensenbrenner and Smith, as well as Mr. Conyers and Mr. Berman for their bicameral, bipartisan approach to these bills and to intellectual property issues generally.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
I would be happy to yield for a question from the distinguished Senator from Texas.
I thank my friend, the Senator from Texas, for that reminder. I would certainly have no objection to entering our previous colloquy into the Record again and ask unanimous consent that it appear after our remarks.
Mr. President, Section 102 of the ART Act establishes a new provision of Title 18 entitled, ``Unauthorized Recording of Motion Pictures in a Motion Picture Exhibition Facility.'' I ask Senator Cornyn, what is the purpose of this provision?
I have heard it said that this bill could be used against a salesperson or a customer at stores such as Best Buy or Circuit City if he or she were to point a video camera at a television screen showing a movie. Is this cause for concern?
Does the Senator from California agree with your colleague from Texas?
I have also heard some say that this statute could be used to prosecute someone for camcording a DVD at his home. Is this a fair concern?
Do the users of hearing aids, cell phones or similar devices have anything to fear from this statute?
It appears that there is no fair use exception to this provision. Is that correct?
Does the Senator from Texas agree?
My cosponsor, Senator Cornyn, raises an important point. While we removed the ``ad-skipping'' language from the statute to avoid this unnecessary controversy, you are absolutely correct that this does not in any way change the scope of the bill. The bill protects the ``making imperceptible . . . limited portions of audio or video content of a motion picture . . .'' An advertisement, under the Copyright Act, is itself a ``motion picture,'' and thus a product or service that enables the skipping of an entire advertisement, in any media, would be beyond the scope of the exemption. Moreover, the phrase ``limited portions'' is intended to refer to portions that are both quantitatively and qualitatively insubstantial in relation to the work as a whole. Where any substantial part of a complete work, such as a commercial advertisement, is made imperceptible, the new section 110(11) exemption would not apply.
The limited scope of this exemption does not, however, imply or show that
such a product would be infringing. This legislation does not in any way deal with that issue. It means simply that such a product is not immunized from liability by this exemption.
Certainly.
Yes it is. Let me ask that a copy of the section-by- section analysis of the Family Movie Act as amended by the Senate be included in the Record. This section-by-section analysis contains a more complete analysis of the bill as proposed today in the Senate, including the limited changes made by the bill Senators Leahy, Cornyn, Biden, and I offer today.
The analysis follows.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Family Movie Act of 2004, Amended
and Passed by the Senate
overview
Title II of the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of
2004 incorporates the House-passed provision of the Family
Movie Act of 2004, with limited changes as reflected in this
section-by-section analysis. As discussed herein, these
changes are not intended to and do not affect the scope,
effect or application of the bill.
The purpose of the Family Movie Act is to empower private
individuals to use technology to skip and mute material that
they find objectionable in movies, without impacting
established doctrines of copyright or trademark law or those
whose business models depend upon advertising. This amendment
to the law should be narrowly construed to effect its
intended purpose only. The sponsors of the legislation have
been careful to tailor narrowly the legislation to clearly
allow specific, consumer-directed activity and not to open or
decide collateral issues or to affect any other potential
or actual disputes in the law.
The bill as proposed in the Senate makes clear that, under
certain conditions, ``making imperceptible'' of limited
portions of audio or video content of a motion picture--that
is, skipping and muting limited portions of movies without
adding any content--as well as the creation or provision of a
computer program or other technology that enables such making
imperceptible, does not violate existing copyright or
trademark laws. That is true whether the movie is on
prerecorded media, like a DVD, or is transmitted to the home,
as through pay-per-view and ``video-on-demand'' services.
Subsection (a): Short Title
Subsection (a) sets forth the short title of the bill as
the Family Movie Act of 2004.
Subsection (b): Exemption from Copyright and Trademark
Infringement for Skipping of Audio or Video Content of
Motion Pictures
Subsection (b) is the Family Movie Act core provision and
creates a new exemption at section 110(11) of the Copyright
Act for the ``making imperceptible'' of limited portions of
audio or video content of a motion picture during a
performance in a private household. This new exemption sets
forth a number of conditions to ensure that it achieves its
intended effect while remaining carefully circumscribed and
avoiding any unintended consequences. The conditions that
allow an exemption, which are discussed in more detail below,
consist of the following:
The making imperceptible must be ``by or at the direction
of a member of a private household.'' This legislation
contemplates that any altered performances of the motion
picture would be made either directly by the viewer or at the
direction of a viewer where the viewer is exercising
substantial choice over the types of content they choose to
skip or mute.
The making imperceptible must occur ``during a performance
in or transmitted to the household for private home
viewing.'' Thus, this provision does not exempt an
unauthorized ``public performance'' of an altered version.
The making imperceptible must be ``from an authorized copy
of a motion picture.'' Thus, skipping and muting from an
unauthorized or ``bootleg'' copy of a motion picture would
not be exempt.
No ``fixed copy'' of the altered version of the motion
picture may be created by the computer program or other
technology that makes imperceptible portions of the audio or
video content of the motion picture. This provision makes
clear that services or technologies that make a fixed copy of
the altered version are not afforded the benefit of this
exemption.
The ``making imperceptible'' of limited portions of a
motion picture does not include the addition of audio or
video content over or in place of other content, such as
placing a modified image of a person, a product, or an
advertisement in place of another, or adding content of any
kind.
These limitations, and other operative provisions of this
new section 110(11) exemption, merit further elaboration as
to their purposes and effects.
The bill makes clear that the ``making imperceptible'' of
limited portions of audio or video content of a motion
picture must be done by or at the direction of a member of a
private household. While this limitation does not require
that the individual member of the private household exercise
ultimate decision-making over each and every scene or element
of dialog in the motion picture that is to be made
imperceptible, it does require that the making imperceptible
be made at the direction of that individual in response to
the individualized preferences expressed by that individual.
The test of ``at the direction of an individual'' would be
satisfied when an individual selects preferences from among
options that are offered by the technology.
An example is the C1earPlay model. C1earPlay provides so-
called `` filter files'' that allow a viewer to express his
or her preferences in a number of different categories,
including language, violence, drug content, sexual content,
and several others. The version of the movie that the viewer
sees depends upon the preferences expressed by that viewer.
Such a model would fall under the liability limitation of the
Family Movie Act.
This limitation, however, would not allow a program
distributor, such as a provider of video-on-demand services,
a cable or satellite channel, or a broadcaster, to make
imperceptible limited portions of a movie in order to provide
an altered version of that movie to all of its customers,
which could violate a number of the copyright owner's
exclusive rights, or to make a determination of scenes to be
skipped or dialog to be muted and to offer to its viewers no
more of a choice than to view an original or an altered
version of that film. Some element of individualized
preferences and control must be present such that the viewer
exercises substantial choice over the types of content they
choose to skip or mute.
It is also important to emphasize that the new section
110(11) exemption is targeted narrowly and specifically at
the act of ``making imperceptible'' limited portions of audio
or video content of a motion picture during a performance
that occurs in, or that is transmitted to, a private
household for private home viewing. This section would not
exempt from liability an otherwise infringing performance, or
a transmission of a performance, during which limited
portions of audio or video content of the motion picture are
made imperceptible. In other words, where a performance in a
household or a transmission of a performance to a household
is done lawfully, the making imperceptible limited portions
of audio or video content of the motion picture during that
performance, consistent with the requirements of this new
section, will not result in infringement liability.
Similarly, an infringing performance in a household, or an
infringing transmission of a performance to a household, are
not rendered non-infringing by section 110(11) by virtue of
the fact that limited portions of audio or video content of
the motion picture being performed are made imperceptible
during such performance or transmission in a manner
consistent with that section.
The bill also provides additional guidance, if not an exact
definition, of what the term ``making imperceptible'' means.
The bill provides specifically that the term ``making
imperceptible'' does not include the addition of audio or
video content that is performed or displayed over or in place
of existing content in a motion picture. This is intended to
make clear in the text of the statute what has been expressed
throughout the consideration of this legislation, which is
that the Family Movie Act does not enable the addition of
content of any kind, including the making imperceptible of
audio or video content by replacing it or by superimposing
other content over it. In other words, for purposes of
section 110(11), ``making imperceptible'' refers solely to
skipping scenes and portions of scenes or muting audio
content from the original, commercially available version of
the motion picture. No other modifications of the content are
addressed or immunized by this legislation.
The House sponsor of this legislation noted in his
explanation of his bill, and the Senate is also aware, that
some copy protection technologies rely on matter placed into
the audio or video signal. The phrase ``limited portions of
audio or video content of a motion picture'' means what it
would naturally seem to mean (i.e., the actual content of
the motion picture) and does not refer to any component of
a copy protection scheme or technology. This provision
does not allow the skipping of technologies or other copy-
protection-related matter for the purpose of defeating
copy protection. Rather, it is expected that skipping and
muting of content
in the actual motion picture will be skipped or muted at
the direction of the viewer based on that viewer's desire
to avoid seeing or hearing the action or sound in the
motion picture. Skipping or muting done for the purpose of
or having the effect of avoiding copy protection
technologies would be an abuse of the safe harbor outlined
in this legislation and may violate section 1201 of title
17.
Violating the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and
particularly its anti-circumvention provisions, is not
necessary to enable technology of the kind contemplated under
the Family Movie Act. Although the amendment to section 110
provides that it is not an infringement of copyright to
engage in the conduct that is the subject of the Family Movie
Act, the Act does not provide any exemption from the anti-
circumvention provisions of section 1201 of title 17, or from
any other provision of chapter 12 of title 17. It would not
be a defense to a claim of violation of section 1201 that the
circumvention is for the purpose of engaging in the conduct
covered by this new exemption in section 110(11), just as it
is not a defense under section 1201 that the circumvention is
for the purpose of engaging in any other non-infringing
conduct.
There are a number of companies currently providing the
type of products and services covered by this Act. The Family
Movie Act is intended to facilitate the offering of such
products and services, and it certainly creates no impediment
to the technology employed by those companies. Indeed, it is
important to underscore the fact that the support for such
technology and consumer offerings that is reflected in this
legislation is driven in some measure by the desire for
copyright law to be respected and to ensure that technology
is deployed in a way that supports the continued creation and
protection of entertainment and information products that
rely on copyright protection. This legislation reflects the
firm expectation that those rights and the interests of
viewers in their homes can work together in the context
defined in this bill. Any suggestion that support for the
exercise of viewer choice in modifying their viewing
experience of copyrighted works requires violation of either
the copyright in the work or of the copy protection schemes
that provide protection for such work should be rejected as
counter to legislative intent or technological necessity.
The House-passed bill included an explicit exclusion to the
new section 110(11) exemption in cases involving the making
imperceptible of commercial advertisements or network or
station promotional announcements. This provision was added
on the House floor to respond to concerns expressed by
Members during the House Judiciary Committee markup that the
bill might be read somehow to exempt from copyright
infringement liability devices that allow for skipping of
advertisements in the playback of recorded television (so
called ``ad-skipping'' devices). Such a reading is not
consistent with the language of the bill or its intent.
The phrase ``limited portions of audio or video content of
a motion picture'' applies only to the skipping and muting of
scenes or dialog that are part of the motion picture itself,
and not to the skipping of commercial advertisements, which
are themselves considered motions pictures under the
Copyright Act. It also should be noted that the phrase
``limited portions'' is intended to refer to portions that
are both quantitatively and qualitatively insubstantial in
relation to the work as a whole. Where any substantial part
of a complete work (including a commercial advertisement) is
made imperceptible, the section 110(11) exemption would not
apply.
The House-passed bill adopted a ``belt and suspenders''
approach to this question by adding exclusionary language in
the statute itself. Ultimately that provision raised concerns
in the Senate that such exclusionary language would result in
an inference that the bill somehow expresses an opinion, or
even decides, the unresolved legal questions underlying
recent litigation related to these so-called ``ad-skipping''
devices. In the meantime, the Copyright Office also made
clear that such exclusionary language is not necessary. In
other words, the exclusionary language created unnecessary
controversy without adding any needed clarity to the statute.
Thus, the Senate amendment omits the exclusionary language
while leaving the scope and application of the bill exactly
as it was when it passed the House. The legislation does not
provide a defense in cases involving so-called ``ad-
skipping'' devices, and it also does not affect the legal
issues underlying such litigation, one way or another.
Consistent with the intent of the legislation to fix a narrow
and specific copyright issue, this bill seeks very clearly to
avoid unnecessarily interfering with current business models,
especially with respect to advertising, promotional
announcements, and the like. Simply put, the bill as amended
in the Senate is narrowly targeted to the use of technologies
and services that filter out content in movies that a viewer
finds objectionable, and it in no way relates to or affects
the legality of so-called ``ad-skipping'' technologies.
There are a variety of services currently in litigation
that distribute actual copies of altered movies. This type of
activity is not covered by the section 110(11) exemption
created by the Family Movie Act. There is a basic distinction
between a viewer choosing to alter what is visible or audible
when viewing a film, the focus of this legislation, and a
separate entity choosing to create and distribute a single,
altered version to members of the public. The section 110(11)
exemption only applies to viewer directed changes to the
viewing experience, and not the making or distribution of
actual altered copies of the motion picture.
Related to this point, during consideration of this
legislation in the House there were conflicting expert
opinions on whether fixation is required to infringe the
derivative work right under the Copyright Act, as well as
whether evidence of Congressional intent in enacting the 1976
Copyright Act supports the notion that fixation should not be
a prerequisite for the preparation of an infringing
derivative work. This legislation should not be construed to
be predicated on or to take a position on whether fixation is
necessary to violate the derivative work right, or whether
the conduct that is immunized by this legislation would be
infringing in the absence of this legislation. Subsection (b)
also provides a savings clause to make clear that the newly-
created copyright exemption is not to be construed to have
any effect on rights, defenses, or limitations on rights
granted under title 17, other than those explicitly provided
for in the new section 110(11) exemption.
Subsection (c): Exemption from Trademark Infringement
Subsection (c) provides for a limited exemption from
trademark infringement for those engaged in the conduct
described in the new section 110(11) of the Copyright Act. In
short, this subsection makes clear that a person engaging in
the conduct described in section 110(11)--the ``making
imperceptible'' of portions of audio or video content of a
motion picture or the creation or provision of technology to
enable such making available--is not subject to trademark
infringement liability based on that conduct, provided that
person's conduct complies with the requirements of section
110(11). This section provides a similar exemption for a
manufacturer, licensee or licensor of technology that enables
such making imperceptible, but such manufacturer, licensee or
licensor is subject to the additional requirement that it
ensure that the technology provides a clear and conspicuous
notice at the beginning of each performance that the
performance of the motion picture is altered from the
performance intended by the director or the copyright holder.
Of course, nothing in this section would immunize someone
whose conduct, apart from the narrow conduct described by
110(11), rises to the level of a Lanham Act violation. For
example, someone who provides technology to enable the making
imperceptible limited portions of a motion picture consistent
with section 110(11) could not be held liable on account of
such conduct under the Trademark Act, but if in providing
such . . .