Mr. President, I rise today to express my deep concern about the almost daily series of alarming developments in Iran and Syria. Both are state sponsors of terrorism. Both have worked to undermine…
Mr. President, I rise today to express my deep concern about the almost daily series of alarming developments in Iran and Syria. Both are state sponsors of terrorism. Both have worked to undermine our rebuilding efforts in Iraq. Tehran and Damascus both have a history of refusing to comply with global nonproliferation standards, and experts routinely cite disturbing trends that suggest these governments are aggressively pursuing programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. Iran clearly has the intention to develop nuclear weapons and is well on its way to doing so. It has been belligerent and dishonest in its dealings with the International Atomic Energy Agency and our European partners who are negotiating with Tehran. This led to the historic vote on September 24 of this year, when the IAEA Board of Governors found that Iran had breached its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and noted Iran's policy of concealing its nuclear work and facilities. What was Tehran's response to the international community? More defiance and the outrageous comments by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad calling for Israel to be ``wiped off the map.''
Since coming into office, this administration has mostly allowed these problems with Iran and Syria to fester while its focus was elsewhere. It has paid only intermittent attention when crises flare up and has not formulated a long-term and comprehensive strategy for dealing with the proliferation threat presented by these regimes. The situation has deteriorated to such an extent--with the rapid nuclear developments in Iran, the increasing proliferation risk that it and Syria pose, the undermining of our work in Iraq, and the extreme statements and actions recently taken by both Tehran and Damascus--that we must take immediate action.
Congress took action to augment the U.S. nonproliferation regime in 2000 when it overwhelmingly passed the Iran Nonproliferation Act, INA, in response to repeated transfers of ballistic missile technology and know-how from Russia and other countries to Iran. Known and suspected assistance from Russia, China, and Pakistan has also helped Iran make progress in its nuclear program. I believe that the 2000 legislation has winnowed the pool of transgressors by highlighting the most egregious among them; however, determined governments, industries, and individuals continue to find it a worthwhile risk to trade in goods and technology that can contribute to an Iranian WMD program. Clearly, it is time to strengthen the INA to prevent these transactions. A more robust INA can also serve as a model for curbing proliferation involving other countries--starting with Syria, whose policies may still be influenced by such determined and effective measures.
Congress is on the cusp of adopting some important changes to the INA with S. 1713. If enacted, the reporting and sanctions provisions of the statute would also apply to transactions involving Syria. In addition, the law would also target exports of WMD and missile technology from these two countries. The revamped Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act, ISNA, would be a positive step. However, we must do more.
Today, I along with my colleague from Arizona, Mr. Kyl, introduce the Iran Nonproliferation Enhancement Act of 2005. This bill would intensify and broaden the sanctions provisions in the INA. First, it requires mandatory sanctions for violators, an approach that Congress favored overwhelmingly when it passed the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. Second, it requires a more detailed justification from the President if he chooses to exercise a national security waiver. Third, it introduces requirements that make parent companies subject to INA sanctions, in addition to their proliferator subsidiaries. And fourth, it expands the list of sanctions to include prohibitions on U.S. investment, financing, and financial assistance for proliferators, in addition to the current arms and dual use export prohibitions.
The current sanctions mechanism is too weak. Under the INA, sanctions are authorized rather than required. Since 2000, the administration has chosen to impose INA sanctions on foreign companies or individuals on 65 occasions, with some entities having been sanctioned several times. The State Department has not revealed in unclassified form how many entities were reported but not sanctioned and why they were not sanctioned.
If we accept that a successful Iranian or Syrian WMD program poses a major threat, then we must get serious about our sanctions and make them mandatory. Our bill does just that. Making sanctions mandatory has precedents. As I previously noted, Congress overwhelmingly approved mandatory sanctions against foreign persons and entities engaged in missile proliferation to Iran as part of the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. President Clinton vetoed the bill, however, largely because at that time his administration was engaged in negotiations with Russia over export controls. The sense was that the newly formed government needed time to develop its controls over Russian business. In the end, the administration exercised its Executive order authority to impose broad sanctions on several Russian companies. However, we must let the international community know that the threat from proliferation is great and that export controls must be in place and enforced. Making sanctions mandatory sends that message.
Furthermore, nonproliferation legislation should ensure that national security waivers are issued only under the most compelling of circumstances. The current national security waiver is too broad, and the administration can simply classify the reason for the waiver in order to remove almost all scrutiny. The message sent to those assisting Iran and Syria with WMD development is that, even if the United States catches them, there is only a small chance that we will actually do anything about it. There are legitimate reasons for classifying parts of these responses and that is why our bill allows the administration to submit part of the waiver explanation in a classified annex. However, our bill requires the Administration to provide more detailed explanations for such waivers and an explanation of why a justification is classified.
Currently, the INA sanctions restrict only U.S. arms and dual-use exports to violators, and an Executive order authorizes some additional restrictions. Our bill will ensure that all the significant tools in our sanctions arsenal are brought to bear on proliferators. It broadens INA sanctions to also include prohibitions on U.S. investment, financing, and financial assistance for violators, and if S. 1713 is enacted, also ban their imports into the United States. In an example identified by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, China National Aero-Technology Import Export Corporation, CATIC, which was sanctioned under the INA in 2002 and 2004, has subsidiaries that export to the U.S. Under our bill, the investment sanction would prevent U.S. companies from making new capital investments in CATIC factories. It would also forbid the purchase by U.S. persons of shares of CATIC Shenzhen Holdings and CATIC International Holdings, two CATIC- controlled companies that are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The new import ban would block the sale of CATIC products in the United States, cutting off an important source of revenue. Put simply, this bill would make it clear for companies like CATIC that they must make a choice--profit from their dealings with the vast U.S. market or continue to assist Iran or Syria with their WMD and missile programs. It is long past due that companies make such a choice.
Under the INA, parent companies can continue to do business with the U.S. and profit from our economy, even if their subsidiaries openly assist Iran with missile and WMD-related activities. Our bill attempts to end this aberration by expanding the scope of the sanctions to include the parent companies. The Wisconsin Project has identified serial proliferators who have flouted U.S. law because they know they cannot be touched by the current INA. China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, CASC, for example, has had three subsidiaries sanctioned--two of them repeatedly--for missile technology transfers to Iran. Meanwhile, CASC is marketing its commercial satellite launch program in our country. This amendment would force CASC to choose between selling missile technology to Iran and the business potential in future U.S. satellite launches. The bill's ban on investment would also affect the subsidiaries CASC has listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Similarly, the Chinese oil giant Sinopec has been selling glass-lined vessels useful for making poison gas to Iran through its subsidiaries. While INA sanctions were imposed on one of its subsidiaries, however, Sinopec remained free to raise billions of dollars on the New York Stock Exchange and even receive U.S. technology and U.S. foreign aid. This is absurd, and will no longer be possible if our bill becomes law.
In conclusion, I want to emphasize the urgency of this matter. The intelligence community expects that Iran will be able to produce a nuclear weapon within a decade, and the CIA has highlighted concern about Iran's robust missile program. Iran has pursued various methods for enriching uranium and experimented with separating plutonium. Iran's WMD program is making news headlines again, and the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran in noncompliance with the NPT. The Congressional Research Service reported in its review of the INA that Iran's efforts to acquire foreign WMD technology seem to have continued unabated. Similarly, Syria continues to rely on technology and assistance from abroad to develop its ballistic missile program. According to recent unclassified CIA reports, Syria's chemical weapon program also depends on equipment and precursor chemicals it receives from foreign sources.
We need to make a serious effort to inhibit WMD development by Iran and Syria. Strengthening the INA is one concrete way to do that for Iran, and when S. 1713 is enacted, also for Syria. We must make clear to the world that assisting Tehran and Damascus in developing the most dangerous weapons cannot and will not be tolerated. For example, China is a country with which we continue to build closer ties. However, a recent Rand study concluded that although China has improved its export control system on paper, it does not consistently and effectively implement these controls. Russia is also an important partner, but it has continued to provide Iran with nuclear technology. India is another nation with which the United States continues to grow closer, and the President has even committed to helping it with nuclear energy technology. Yet India also has very close ties to Iran. We must make clear to these nations and to the entire world that it is in the best interest of the international community that Iran and Syria do not expand their WMD capabilities. We must also make it crystal clear that if you assist these nations with their quest for weapons, there will be serious consequences for you in your relationship and dealings with the United States. Strengthening the INA as we suggest will make that message clear and further our national security goals.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the legislation be printed in the Record.