Iran Nonproliferation Enforcement Act of 2005

Mr. President, I rise today to express my deep concern about the almost daily series of alarming developments in Iran and Syria. Both are state sponsors of terrorism. Both have worked to undermine our rebuilding efforts in Iraq. Tehran and Damascus both have a history of refusing to comply with global nonproliferation standards, and experts routinely cite disturbing trends that suggest these governments are aggressively pursuing programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. Iran clearly has the intention to develop nuclear weapons and is well on its way to doing so. It has been belligerent and dishonest in its dealings with the International Atomic Energy Agency and our European partners who are negotiating with Tehran. This led to the historic vote on September 24 of this year, when the IAEA Board of Governors found that Iran had breached its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and noted Iran's policy of concealing its nuclear work and facilities. What was Tehran's response to the international community? More defiance and the outrageous comments by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad calling for Israel to be ``wiped off the map.''

Since coming into office, this administration has mostly allowed these problems with Iran and Syria to fester while its focus was elsewhere. It has paid only intermittent attention when crises flare up and has not formulated a long-term and comprehensive strategy for dealing with the proliferation threat presented by these regimes. The situation has deteriorated to such an extent--with the rapid nuclear developments in Iran, the increasing proliferation risk that it and Syria pose, the undermining of our work in Iraq, and the extreme statements and actions recently taken by both Tehran and Damascus--that we must take immediate action.

Congress took action to augment the U.S. nonproliferation regime in 2000 when it overwhelmingly passed the Iran Nonproliferation Act, INA, in response to repeated transfers of ballistic missile technology and know-how from Russia and other countries to Iran. Known and suspected assistance from Russia, China, and Pakistan has also helped Iran make progress in its nuclear program. I believe that the 2000 legislation has winnowed the pool of transgressors by highlighting the most egregious among them; however, determined governments, industries, and individuals continue to find it a worthwhile risk to trade in goods and technology that can contribute to an Iranian WMD program. Clearly, it is time to strengthen the INA to prevent these transactions. A more robust INA can also serve as a model for curbing proliferation involving other countries--starting with Syria, whose policies may still be influenced by such determined and effective measures.

Congress is on the cusp of adopting some important changes to the INA with S. 1713. If enacted, the reporting and sanctions provisions of the statute would also apply to transactions involving Syria. In addition, the law would also target exports of WMD and missile technology from these two countries. The revamped Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act, ISNA, would be a positive step. However, we must do more.

Today, I along with my colleague from Arizona, Mr. Kyl, introduce the Iran Nonproliferation Enhancement Act of 2005. This bill would intensify and broaden the sanctions provisions in the INA. First, it requires mandatory sanctions for violators, an approach that Congress favored overwhelmingly when it passed the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. Second, it requires a more detailed justification from the President if he chooses to exercise a national security waiver. Third, it introduces requirements that make parent companies subject to INA sanctions, in addition to their proliferator subsidiaries. And fourth, it expands the list of sanctions to include prohibitions on U.S. investment, financing, and financial assistance for proliferators, in addition to the current arms and dual use export prohibitions.

The current sanctions mechanism is too weak. Under the INA, sanctions are authorized rather than required. Since 2000, the administration has chosen to impose INA sanctions on foreign companies or individuals on 65 occasions, with some entities having been sanctioned several times. The State Department has not revealed in unclassified form how many entities were reported but not sanctioned and why they were not sanctioned.

If we accept that a successful Iranian or Syrian WMD program poses a major threat, then we must get serious about our sanctions and make them mandatory. Our bill does just that. Making sanctions mandatory has precedents. As I previously noted, Congress overwhelmingly approved mandatory sanctions against foreign persons and entities engaged in missile proliferation to Iran as part of the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. President Clinton vetoed the bill, however, largely because at that time his administration was engaged in negotiations with Russia over export controls. The sense was that the newly formed government needed time to develop its controls over Russian business. In the end, the administration exercised its Executive order authority to impose broad sanctions on several Russian companies. However, we must let the international community know that the threat from proliferation is great and that export controls must be in place and enforced. Making sanctions mandatory sends that message.

Furthermore, nonproliferation legislation should ensure that national security waivers are issued only under the most compelling of circumstances. The current national security waiver is too broad, and the administration can simply classify the reason for the waiver in order to remove almost all scrutiny. The message sent to those assisting Iran and Syria with WMD development is that, even if the United States catches them, there is only a small chance that we will actually do anything about it. There are legitimate reasons for classifying parts of these responses and that is why our bill allows the administration to submit part of the waiver explanation in a classified annex. However, our bill requires the Administration to provide more detailed explanations for such waivers and an explanation of why a justification is classified.

Currently, the INA sanctions restrict only U.S. arms and dual-use exports to violators, and an Executive order authorizes some additional restrictions. Our bill will ensure that all the significant tools in our sanctions arsenal are brought to bear on proliferators. It broadens INA sanctions to also include prohibitions on U.S. investment, financing, and financial assistance for violators, and if S. 1713 is enacted, also ban their imports into the United States. In an example identified by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, China National Aero-Technology Import Export Corporation, CATIC, which was sanctioned under the INA in 2002 and 2004, has subsidiaries that export to the U.S. Under our bill, the investment sanction would prevent U.S. companies from making new capital investments in CATIC factories. It would also forbid the purchase by U.S. persons of shares of CATIC Shenzhen Holdings and CATIC International Holdings, two CATIC- controlled companies that are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The new import ban would block the sale of CATIC products in the United States, cutting off an important source of revenue. Put simply, this bill would make it clear for companies like CATIC that they must make a choice--profit from their dealings with the vast U.S. market or continue to assist Iran or Syria with their WMD and missile programs. It is long past due that companies make such a choice.

Under the INA, parent companies can continue to do business with the U.S. and profit from our economy, even if their subsidiaries openly assist Iran with missile and WMD-related activities. Our bill attempts to end this aberration by expanding the scope of the sanctions to include the parent companies. The Wisconsin Project has identified serial proliferators who have flouted U.S. law because they know they cannot be touched by the current INA. China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, CASC, for example, has had three subsidiaries sanctioned--two of them repeatedly--for missile technology transfers to Iran. Meanwhile, CASC is marketing its commercial satellite launch program in our country. This amendment would force CASC to choose between selling missile technology to Iran and the business potential in future U.S. satellite launches. The bill's ban on investment would also affect the subsidiaries CASC has listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Similarly, the Chinese oil giant Sinopec has been selling glass-lined vessels useful for making poison gas to Iran through its subsidiaries. While INA sanctions were imposed on one of its subsidiaries, however, Sinopec remained free to raise billions of dollars on the New York Stock Exchange and even receive U.S. technology and U.S. foreign aid. This is absurd, and will no longer be possible if our bill becomes law.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize the urgency of this matter. The intelligence community expects that Iran will be able to produce a nuclear weapon within a decade, and the CIA has highlighted concern about Iran's robust missile program. Iran has pursued various methods for enriching uranium and experimented with separating plutonium. Iran's WMD program is making news headlines again, and the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran in noncompliance with the NPT. The Congressional Research Service reported in its review of the INA that Iran's efforts to acquire foreign WMD technology seem to have continued unabated. Similarly, Syria continues to rely on technology and assistance from abroad to develop its ballistic missile program. According to recent unclassified CIA reports, Syria's chemical weapon program also depends on equipment and precursor chemicals it receives from foreign sources.

We need to make a serious effort to inhibit WMD development by Iran and Syria. Strengthening the INA is one concrete way to do that for Iran, and when S. 1713 is enacted, also for Syria. We must make clear to the world that assisting Tehran and Damascus in developing the most dangerous weapons cannot and will not be tolerated. For example, China is a country with which we continue to build closer ties. However, a recent Rand study concluded that although China has improved its export control system on paper, it does not consistently and effectively implement these controls. Russia is also an important partner, but it has continued to provide Iran with nuclear technology. India is another nation with which the United States continues to grow closer, and the President has even committed to helping it with nuclear energy technology. Yet India also has very close ties to Iran. We must make clear to these nations and to the entire world that it is in the best interest of the international community that Iran and Syria do not expand their WMD capabilities. We must also make it crystal clear that if you assist these nations with their quest for weapons, there will be serious consequences for you in your relationship and dealings with the United States. Strengthening the INA as we suggest will make that message clear and further our national security goals.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the legislation be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today to express my deep concern about the almost daily series of alarming developments in Iran and Syria. Both are state sponsors of terrorism. Both have worked to undermine our rebuilding efforts in Iraq. Tehran and Damascus both have a history of refusing to comply with global nonproliferation standards, and experts routinely cite disturbing trends that suggest these governments are aggressively pursuing programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. Iran clearly has the intention to develop nuclear weapons and is well on its way to doing so. It has been belligerent and dishonest in its dealings with the International Atomic Energy Agency and our European partners who are negotiating with Tehran. This led to the historic vote on September 24 of this year, when the IAEA Board of Governors found that Iran had breached its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and noted Iran's policy of concealing its nuclear work and facilities. What was Tehran's response to the international community? More defiance and the outrageous comments by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad calling for Israel to be ``wiped off the map.''

Since coming into office, this administration has mostly allowed these problems with Iran and Syria to fester while its focus was elsewhere. It has paid only intermittent attention when crises flare up and has not formulated a long-term and comprehensive strategy for dealing with the proliferation threat presented by these regimes. The situation has deteriorated to such an extent--with the rapid nuclear developments in Iran, the increasing proliferation risk that it and Syria pose, the undermining of our work in Iraq, and the extreme statements and actions recently taken by both Tehran and Damascus--that we must take immediate action.

Congress took action to augment the U.S. nonproliferation regime in 2000 when it overwhelmingly passed the Iran Nonproliferation Act, INA, in response to repeated transfers of ballistic missile technology and know-how from Russia and other countries to Iran. Known and suspected assistance from Russia, China, and Pakistan has also helped Iran make progress in its nuclear program. I believe that the 2000 legislation has winnowed the pool of transgressors by highlighting the most egregious among them; however, determined governments, industries, and individuals continue to find it a worthwhile risk to trade in goods and technology that can contribute to an Iranian WMD program. Clearly, it is time to strengthen the INA to prevent these transactions. A more robust INA can also serve as a model for curbing proliferation involving other countries--starting with Syria, whose policies may still be influenced by such determined and effective measures.

Congress is on the cusp of adopting some important changes to the INA with S. 1713. If enacted, the reporting and sanctions provisions of the statute would also apply to transactions involving Syria. In addition, the law would also target exports of WMD and missile technology from these two countries. The revamped Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act, ISNA, would be a positive step. However, we must do more.

Today, I along with my colleague from Arizona, Mr. Kyl, introduce the Iran Nonproliferation Enhancement Act of 2005. This bill would intensify and broaden the sanctions provisions in the INA. First, it requires mandatory sanctions for violators, an approach that Congress favored overwhelmingly when it passed the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. Second, it requires a more detailed justification from the President if he chooses to exercise a national security waiver. Third, it introduces requirements that make parent companies subject to INA sanctions, in addition to their proliferator subsidiaries. And fourth, it expands the list of sanctions to include prohibitions on U.S. investment, financing, and financial assistance for proliferators, in addition to the current arms and dual use export prohibitions.

The current sanctions mechanism is too weak. Under the INA, sanctions are authorized rather than required. Since 2000, the administration has chosen to impose INA sanctions on foreign companies or individuals on 65 occasions, with some entities having been sanctioned several times. The State Department has not revealed in unclassified form how many entities were reported but not sanctioned and why they were not sanctioned.

If we accept that a successful Iranian or Syrian WMD program poses a major threat, then we must get serious about our sanctions and make them mandatory. Our bill does just that. Making sanctions mandatory has precedents. As I previously noted, Congress overwhelmingly approved mandatory sanctions against foreign persons and entities engaged in missile proliferation to Iran as part of the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. President Clinton vetoed the bill, however, largely because at that time his administration was engaged in negotiations with Russia over export controls. The sense was that the newly formed government needed time to develop its controls over Russian business. In the end, the administration exercised its Executive order authority to impose broad sanctions on several Russian companies. However, we must let the international community know that the threat from proliferation is great and that export controls must be in place and enforced. Making sanctions mandatory sends that message.

Furthermore, nonproliferation legislation should ensure that national security waivers are issued only under the most compelling of circumstances. The current national security waiver is too broad, and the administration can simply classify the reason for the waiver in order to remove almost all scrutiny. The message sent to those assisting Iran and Syria with WMD development is that, even if the United States catches them, there is only a small chance that we will actually do anything about it. There are legitimate reasons for classifying parts of these responses and that is why our bill allows the administration to submit part of the waiver explanation in a classified annex. However, our bill requires the Administration to provide more detailed explanations for such waivers and an explanation of why a justification is classified.

Currently, the INA sanctions restrict only U.S. arms and dual-use exports to violators, and an Executive order authorizes some additional restrictions. Our bill will ensure that all the significant tools in our sanctions arsenal are brought to bear on proliferators. It broadens INA sanctions to also include prohibitions on U.S. investment, financing, and financial assistance for violators, and if S. 1713 is enacted, also ban their imports into the United States. In an example identified by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, China National Aero-Technology Import Export Corporation, CATIC, which was sanctioned under the INA in 2002 and 2004, has subsidiaries that export to the U.S. Under our bill, the investment sanction would prevent U.S. companies from making new capital investments in CATIC factories. It would also forbid the purchase by U.S. persons of shares of CATIC Shenzhen Holdings and CATIC International Holdings, two CATIC- controlled companies that are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The new import ban would block the sale of CATIC products in the United States, cutting off an important source of revenue. Put simply, this bill would make it clear for companies like CATIC that they must make a choice--profit from their dealings with the vast U.S. market or continue to assist Iran or Syria with their WMD and missile programs. It is long past due that companies make such a choice.

Under the INA, parent companies can continue to do business with the U.S. and profit from our economy, even if their subsidiaries openly assist Iran with missile and WMD-related activities. Our bill attempts to end this aberration by expanding the scope of the sanctions to include the parent companies. The Wisconsin Project has identified serial proliferators who have flouted U.S. law because they know they cannot be touched by the current INA. China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, CASC, for example, has had three subsidiaries sanctioned--two of them repeatedly--for missile technology transfers to Iran. Meanwhile, CASC is marketing its commercial satellite launch program in our country. This amendment would force CASC to choose between selling missile technology to Iran and the business potential in future U.S. satellite launches. The bill's ban on investment would also affect the subsidiaries CASC has listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Similarly, the Chinese oil giant Sinopec has been selling glass-lined vessels useful for making poison gas to Iran through its subsidiaries. While INA sanctions were imposed on one of its subsidiaries, however, Sinopec remained free to raise billions of dollars on the New York Stock Exchange and even receive U.S. technology and U.S. foreign aid. This is absurd, and will no longer be possible if our bill becomes law.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize the urgency of this matter. The intelligence community expects that Iran will be able to produce a nuclear weapon within a decade, and the CIA has highlighted concern about Iran's robust missile program. Iran has pursued various methods for enriching uranium and experimented with separating plutonium. Iran's WMD program is making news headlines again, and the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran in noncompliance with the NPT. The Congressional Research Service reported in its review of the INA that Iran's efforts to acquire foreign WMD technology seem to have continued unabated. Similarly, Syria continues to rely on technology and assistance from abroad to develop its ballistic missile program. According to recent unclassified CIA reports, Syria's chemical weapon program also depends on equipment and precursor chemicals it receives from foreign sources.

We need to make a serious effort to inhibit WMD development by Iran and Syria. Strengthening the INA is one concrete way to do that for Iran, and when S. 1713 is enacted, also for Syria. We must make clear to the world that assisting Tehran and Damascus in developing the most dangerous weapons cannot and will not be tolerated. For example, China is a country with which we continue to build closer ties. However, a recent Rand study concluded that although China has improved its export control system on paper, it does not consistently and effectively implement these controls. Russia is also an important partner, but it has continued to provide Iran with nuclear technology. India is another nation with which the United States continues to grow closer, and the President has even committed to helping it with nuclear energy technology. Yet India also has very close ties to Iran. We must make clear to these nations and to the entire world that it is in the best interest of the international community that Iran and Syria do not expand their WMD capabilities. We must also make it crystal clear that if you assist these nations with their quest for weapons, there will be serious consequences for you in your relationship and dealings with the United States. Strengthening the INA as we suggest will make that message clear and further our national security goals.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the legislation be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I come to the floor to introduce this bill, which repeals a provision in the 1977 reauthorization of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972--a provision which unduly restricts our ability to get States on the west coast the petroleum supplies they need.

In the last several weeks, some of our colleagues have participated in press conferences, sent out news releases, and come to the floor to talk about the impact of high energy prices. They have expressed concern about the effect these prices are having on our economy, our consumers, our businesses, and our national security.

I share their concerns. In fact, for over 3 years, I have been urging the Senate to deal with this situation.

It took one of the worst natural disasters in the history of our Nation for many to evaluate our energy policy. While the circumstances are tragic, I am glad our colleagues are taking a closer look at this.

The plan our colleagues now support aims to achieve the right goal, but it offers the wrong solution. Their plan calls for energy independence--a goal which I support. But they tout conservation as the only way to reach this goal. This approach would put us on the wrong course and fail to solve the larger problem.

Our country is in the midst of an energy crisis, and we cannot conserve our way out. To suggest otherwise does a great disservice to all Americans. We don't need a hollow plan, we need results.

We cannot get out of this crisis by blaming Americans--who are just trying to live their lives, run their businesses, and get to and from work--for the situation we are in. This is not solely a consumption problem; much of this crisis stems from misguided policies which have locked up our lands and prevented us from building new refineries.

The only way to become energy independent is through a combination of initiatives. Conservation is one part of the broader solution.

But we also need to develop renewable and alternative sources of energy and invest in nuclear power and we must develop our domestic oil and gas resources which exist on Federal lands.

The end to this crisis lies in the balance between conservation and development. Yes, I believe that Americans need to conserve our energy resources, but this alone won't solve our energy crisis. To suggest it will is to greatly mislead the American public.

We need to get serious about our energy policy.

My good friend and colleague, Senator Domenici, has told us we must expand on the Energy bill.

I agree with Senator Domenici, and I look forward to working with him on an energy policy for this country that makes sense.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita exposed a weakness in our domestic production and refining capability, weakness some of us have been warning about for years. All Americans have been hit with higher energy prices in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Some colleagues have expressed concern that this situation was compounded by price gouging. Senator Inouye and I, along with our colleagues on the Commerce Committee, are evaluating several bills pertaining to that issue. In the coming days, we will be moving forward to address some of those concerns.

In the process of reviewing these concerns, the claims by those on the west coast were of particular interest to me. Due to current restrictions in the MMPA, it is almost impossible for companies to expand their refineries to increase supply. The provision repealed by my bill is currently impacting the largest refinery on the west coast, affecting more than 300,000 gallons of fuel per day.

I introduce this bill to enable us to get petroleum resources to west coast States quickly and urge my colleagues to support this initiative.

Mr. President, today millions of Americans will exercise their most fundamental right under the Constitution the right to vote. As in every election, I hope all eligible Americans go to the polls to exercise this right. Voter participation is fundamental to our democracy, and we must do all we can to encourage those who can to vote.

After seeing what happened over the last two presidential elections, I have some other hopes for this Election Day. I hope all voters who go to the polls find voting machines that work, non-partisan poll workers who understand the law and enforce it without bias, lines that move smoothly, and ballots that make sense and are easy to understand. I also hope voters go to the polls today with accurate information about what is on the ballot, where they are supposed to vote, and what our Nation's voting laws are.

It might surprise some of you to know, but even in this awesome age of technological advancement and easy access to information, there are folks who will stop at nothing to try to deceive people and keep them away from the polls. These deceptive practices all too often target and exploit vulnerable populations, like minorities, the disabled, or the poor.

Think about the story of the 2004 presidential election when voters in Milwaukee received fliers from the non-existent ``Milwaukee Black Voters League,'' warning that voters risk imprisonment for voting if they were ever found guilty of any offense--even a traffic violation. In that same election, in a county in Ohio, some voters received mailings misinforming voters that anyone registered to vote by the Kerry Campaign or the NAACP would be barred from voting.

Deceptive practices often rely on a few tried and true tricks. Voters are often warned that an unpaid parking ticket will lead to their arrest or that folks with family members who have been convicted of a crime are ineligible to vote. Of course, these warnings have no basis in fact, and they are made with one goal and one goal only to keep Americans away from the polls.

I hope voters who go to the polls today are not victims of such malicious campaigns, but I know hoping is not enough. That is why I am introducing the Deceptive Election Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of 2005 to provide voters with real protection from deceptive practices that aim to keep them away from the polls on Election Day.

The bill I am introducing today provides the clear statutory language and authority needed to get allegations of deceptive practices investigated. It establishes harsh penalties for those found to have perpetrated them. And the bill seeks to address the real harm of these crimes--voters who are discouraged from voting by misinformation--by establishing a process for reaching out to these misinformed and intimidated voters with accurate and full information so they can cast their votes in time. Perhaps just as important, this bill creates strong penalties for deceptive election acts, so people who commit these crimes suffer more than just a slap on the hand.

This legislation has the support of groups like the NAACP, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Common Cause, the Arc of the United States, United Cerebral Palsy, People for the American Way and the National Disability Rights Network.

Deceptive practices and voter intimidation are real problems and demand real solutions like those offered in my bill.

I hope my colleagues will join me and support this bill and work to ensure that all eligible voters have the opportunity to have their votes count.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Drug Free Varsity Sports Act of 2005. This bill would provide States with the resources they need to rid our schools of steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs.

I believe steroid use doesn't begin at the professional level. I am very concerned about performance-enhancing drug use among young athletes--specifically, high school athletes. Steroid use among high school students is on the rise. It more than doubled among high school students from 1991 to 2003, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Furthermore, a study by the University of Michigan shows that the percentage of 12th graders who said they had used steroids some time in their lives rose from 1.9 percent in 1996 to 3.4 percent in 2004. This is unacceptable and a health risk to our children.

Last year, the Polk County School District became the first in Florida to establish random testing for high school athletes, and the Florida House passed a bill that would have made Florida the first State to require steroid testing for high school athletes. That bill stalled in the Senate, but now Florida and other States are considering a similar law. Currently, less than 4 percent of U.S. high schools test athletes for steroids, and no state requires high schools to test athletes. Schools and States say that cost is usually the reason they don't test.

In response, I am introducing this legislation to help States with the resources they need to curb the use of steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs. My legislation would provide Federal grants directly to States so that they can develop and implement performance-enhancing drug testing programs.

The Drug Free Varsity Sports Act of 2005 would authorize $20 million in grants to States to create statewide pilot drug testing programs for performance-enhancing drugs. States that receive the grants would be required to incorporate recovery, counseling, and treatment programs for those students who test positive for performance-enhancing drugs.

Stopping the use of performance-enhancing drugs goes beyond testing. That is why my legislation also would require States that receive grants to allocate no less than 10 percent of the funding to establish statewide policies to discourage steroid use, through educational or other related means.

In addition, at a recent Senate Commerce Committee hearing on this issue, I called on all of the heads of the major professional sports leagues and their unions to begin a major, multi-sport, national advertising campaign. This campaign should be paid for by the leagues and their players, and directed at young people. It should focus on discouraging the use of performance-enhancing drugs. We must get the message out about the dangers of these drugs, and who better to send that message to young people than the leagues they watch and the players they idolize?

There is no simple solution to the issue of steroids in sports. Congress can do its part by enacting the Drug Free Varsity Sports Act of 2005. But the sports leagues, their players, coaches, and parents all must play an active role.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.