Mr. President, I rise today for Senator Ensign, Senator Bennett and myself to introduce a bill to increase the safety and security of our Nation's nuclear power infrastructure, The Spent Nuclear Fuel…
Mr. President, I rise today for Senator Ensign, Senator Bennett and myself to introduce a bill to increase the safety and security of our Nation's nuclear power infrastructure, The Spent Nuclear Fuel On-Site Storage Security Act of 2005.
I am convinced that the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump will never be built because of the myriad of scientific, safety and technical problems in which it is mired. It simply is neither safe nor secure, as illustrated by several significant scientific, legal, and budgetary setbacks this past year.
Here are some of the highlights: On July 9, 2004, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the people of Nevada in a lawsuit to stop the proposed Yucca Mountain project. The court decided that U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's radiation standard for the site was not stringent enough to protect the public from the significant risks associated with nuclear waste and failed to follow the recommendation by the National Academy of Sciences.
On August 31, 2004, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board rejected Department of Energy's Yucca Mountain document database, saying it had failed to make public many of the documents that it had in its possession. The Board said, ``Given the 15 years that DOE had to gather, review, and produce its documents and the fact that the date of production, and the incompleteness of its privilege review, it is clear to us that DOE did not meet its obligation, in good faith, to make all reasonable efforts to make all documentary materials available.''
On October 4, 2004, the DOE Inspector General found that DOE has given away more than $500,000 worth of Yucca Mountain construction equipment in 2003. Half a million dollars is a tremendous amount of the people's money to waste.
On November 22, 2004, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board said DOE does not have a plan for safely transporting nuclear waste to the proposed repository.
On February 7, 2005, Dr. Margaret Chu, most recently the Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, said the project would be delayed until 2012 and that DOE's license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would not be filed until December 2005, delayed a year. To date, the license application still has not been filed.
On February 8, 2005, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board have called for hearings to review concerns over the corrosion of the titanium drip shields that are intended to keep water from leaking into casks inside Yucca Mountain.
On February 28, 2005, a DOE official said the proposed Yucca Mountain repository may not open until 2015.
On March 16, 2005, DOE revealed that documents and models about water infiltration at Yucca Mountain, a key issue, had been falsified.
On July 18, 2005, DOE announced that it will use dedicated train service for its rail transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste to Yucca Mountain, a shift from two decades of administration policy that ignores the fact that about one-third of reactor sites are not capable of shipping fuel by rail.
On August 22, 2005, EPA published its revised radiation standards for the proposed Yucca Mountain high-level waste dump. These standards are wholly inadequate, do not meet the law's requirements and do not protect public health and safety.
On October 13, 2005, DOE began a series of actions to overhaul the Yucca Mountain project. We are going back to the drawing board, frequently revisiting proposals discarded decades ago as unsafe or unworkable.
On October 25, 2005, DOE announced that it would be redesigning the spent fuel storage process, both the containers and facilities.
On November 16, 2005, the DOE Inspector General announced that DOE has ignored numerous admitted instances of falsification of technical and scientific date on the project, showing that years of quality assurance problems continue.
On November 17, 2005, DOE sent a detailed letter to its contractor specifying some of the desired changes in the site proposal.
At the December 7, 2005, at the NRC-DOE quarterly meeting on Yucca Mountain, DOE announced that it expects to re-baseline the project mid- 2006, requiring many of the technical and scientific analyses to be redone.
On November 19, 2005, the Energy and Water Appropriations bill became law, cutting the Yucca Mountain budget to $577 million, half of what DOE said it would need to keep the project on track.
In numerous media reports, DOE has confirmed that it is preparing a legislative package that addresses Yucca Mountain. Clearly, DOE cannot meet the current public health, safety and technical requirements.
It should be clear to anyone that the proposed Yucca Mountain project is scientifically unsound and that it cannot meet the requirements of law. It is not going anywhere. Delay after delay costs the taxpayers billions and billions of dollars for a project that the courts have ruled does not meet sufficient safety or public health standards. I do not believe that Yucca Mountain will ever open, and Nevada and the country will be safer for our successful efforts to stop the project.
Yet, we must safely store spent nuclear fuel.
A 1979 study by the Sandia National Laboratory determined that, if all the water were to drain from a spent fuel pool, dense-packed spent fuel would likely heat up to the point where it would burst and then catch fire, releasing massive quantities of volatile radioactive fission products into the air. Both the short-term and the long-term contamination impacts of such an event could be significantly worse than those from Chernobyl. The consequences would be so severe and would affect such a large area that all precautions must be taken to preclude them. This is the type of serious, avoidable risk against which all the Nation's nuclear sites can and should be protected to counter terrorist threats.
It is time to look at other nuclear waste alternatives. Fortunately, the technology to realize a viable, safe and secure alternative is readily available and can be fully implemented within 6 years if we act now. That technology is dry cask storage.
The technology for long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel in dry storage casks has improved dramatically in the past 20 years. Seventeen cask designs have. been licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which says that spent nuclear fuel can be safely stored using dry cask storage on-site at the nuclear power plants for at least 100 years. Already, dry casks safely store spent nuclear fuel at 34 sites throughout the country, many of them near communities, water ways and transportation routes. The Nuclear Energy Institute has projected 83 of the 103 active reactors will have dry storage by 2050.
Compared to water-filled pools, dry storage casks are significantly less vulnerable to natural and human-induced disasters, including floods, tornadoes, temperature extremes, sabotage, and missile attacks. In addition, dry storage casks are not subject to drainage risks, whether intentional or accidental.
On March 28, 2005, the Washington Post revealed that a classified National Academy of Sciences report concluded that the government does not fully understand the risks a terrorist attack
could pose to spent nuclear fuel pools and that it ought to expedite the removal of the fuel to dry storage casks that are more resilient to attack.
Our bill requires commercial nuclear utilities to safely transfer spent nuclear fuel from temporary storage in water-filled pools to secure storage in licensed, on-site dry cask storage facilities. After transferal, the Secretary of Energy will take title and full responsibility for the possession, stewardship, maintenance, and monitoring of all spent fuel thus safely stored. Finally, our bill establishes a grant program to compensate utilities for expenses associated with transferring the waste. The costs of transferring the waste and providing the grants will be offset by withdrawals from the utility-funded Nuclear Waste Fund.
Nuclear facilities currently provide 20 percent of our Nation's electricity, but in light of the events of September 11, they also present a security risk that we simply must address. There cannot be any weak links in the chain of security of our Nation's nuclear power infrastructure. There is absolutely no justification for endangering the public by densely packing nuclear waste in vulnerable spent fuel pools when it can be stored safely and securely in dry casks. This bill guarantees all Americans that our Nation's nuclear waste will be stored in the safest way possible.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill printed in the Record.