Mr. President, today I have introduced a bill entitled the U.S. National Security Protection Act of 2006. This legislation would enact some critical reforms with respect to the Committee on Foreign…
Mr. President, today I have introduced a bill entitled the U.S. National Security Protection Act of 2006. This legislation would enact some critical reforms with respect to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, CFIUS. I look forward to working with my colleagues in the coming days on this bill.
One thing is clear. The importance of reforming CFIUS has been brought into sharp focus by the proposed acquisition of P&O Steamship Navigation Company's U.S. port operations by Dubai Ports, DP, World, a company based in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, UAE. The reason so many people are concerned about that particular deal is obvious: while security threats are dynamic, assets such as our ports are, and always will be, a national security concern.
CFIUS's role is to vet these deals for possible national security dangers. But the problem here is that the CFIUS process is broken. Indeed, the DP World deal was approved in less than 30
days--even though U.S. law clearly required there to be a full 45-day investigation.
Many of us here in Congress have for a while now expressed concerns over whether the current CFIUS structure is adequately protecting our national security. The GAO also expressed these concerns in a report it released last September. So again, it's not like the cat has suddenly been let out of the bag that the CFIUS process needs reform.
Yet despite all the evidence to the contrary--most prominently, the DP World-P&O deal--the administration does not seem to believe that there is anything wrong with the CFIUS process.
The bill I introduced today--the National Security Protection Act of 2006--goes to the heart of three very simple principles. First, since CFIUS is set up to protect our national security, the intelligence community--whose fundamental purpose is to promote national security-- needs to have a formal and expanded role in CFIUS. Second, accountability and transparency need to be made a permanent part of the CFIUS process. And third, when critical U.S. infrastructure might be acquired by a foreign government-controlled entity, CFIUS must perform a full 45 day investigation--no exceptions.
My bill would address these issues by doing the following: First, it would add the Director of National Intelligence, DNI, and Director of the CIA, DCI, to the CFIUS panel.
Second, it would create a CFIUS Subcommittee on Intelligence whose members would represent the heads of all of the intelligence agencies of the U.S. government. That subcommittee, chaired by the Director of National Intelligence, would review and provide comments on matters to come before CFIUS--including comments on 30 day reviews which do not result in 45 day investigations and comments on the results of 45 day investigations. This subcommittee would also conduct 15 day initial reviews of all cases filed with CFIUS.
Some might ask why the DNI would need to serve on both the full CFIUS panel and on the subcommittee. The reasoning behind this is simple--the DNI has two important roles in the process. On the full committee, the DNI should fill a role of providing policy advice from the perspective of the intelligence community. On the subcommittee level, the DNI should oversee the collection, analysis, and reporting on specific, case-related intelligence that is vital to the CFIUS process.
Third, the National Security Protection Act would create two Vice Chair positions on the full CFIUS panel, to be filled by the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security. That will help to ensure that economic, intelligence, and security matters are given appropriate weight in the decision making process. Economic interests, while important, must never come ahead of the protection of our national security.
Fourth, this legislation would mandate that only the CFIUS chair, with the concurrence of the two Vice Chairs, or the President acting on his own authority, can sign off on a 30-day review which concludes that a potential deal poses no security threat. In addition, it would require that this determination be made in writing with the appropriate signatures, and mandate that the CFIUS Chair and Vice Chairs who make such a determination be at the level of Secretary so that this responsibility is not delegated to subordinates. Furthermore, if either of the Vice Chairs dissent with respect to the decision to not conduct a 45-day investigation, my bill would mandate that the matter be sent to the President for a final determination.
Fifth, my bill would require the President or CFIUS to notify Congress not later than 15 days after paperwork is submitted by companies for CFIUS review, and not later than 15 days after the commencement of all 30-day reviews and 45-day investigations.
Sixth, this bill would also require the President to provide quarterly reports to Congress detailing all 30- and 50-day actions. These reports would include the intelligence subcommittee's comments on each case, and they would be submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex.
Seventh, for any transaction where a foreign-owned company is seeking to acquire U.S. critical infrastructure, this bill would mandate that the company provide the appropriate notification to CFIUS of the proposed transaction as well as the required information for CFIUS to examine the case. Currently that process is voluntary and it shouldn't be.
Eighth and finally, the National Security Protection Act would amend existing U.S. law, which governs under what conditions the President must conduct a full 45-day investigation. Currently, U.S. law requires a full investigation if ``an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government'' attempts to acquire a U.S. entity engaged in interstate commerce that could affect U.S. national security. My bill would clarify this provision by requiring a 45-day investigation whenever the U.S. entity to be acquired controls, owns, or operates critical infrastructure in the U.S.
I don't want anyone to misinterpret what I am saying here. Foreign investment in the U.S. economy provides an important influx of capital. In today's globalized world, we would do tremendous damage to our economy by cutting off foreign investment. And I do not think anyone here is talking about that.
Just to provide some reference, according to the Commerce Department, in 2004, foreigners invested $113 billion in U.S. businesses and real estate. But that amount is only about half as much as U.S. firms invested abroad. So while we rightly have concerns about outsourcing and enforcement of fair trade practices, the U.S. obviously gets significant benefits from participating in the global economy.
But supporting free and fair trade, and working to protect the national interest, are not mutually exclusive. Because we are not just working to protect the American worker, we are also trying to protect his or her family, and the generations to come.
Simply put, national security should never be subordinated to commercial interests.
Some would suggest that this is an issue of race-baiting, ill will, or bias toward the Arab world. Let me be clear on that point. Nothing we say with respect to DP World or the situation in the UAE--or any other potential deal--should be construed as such.
To that end, I wholly reject the views of those who suggest that our concern with the DP World acquisition, and with other foreign government acquisitions of U.S. critical infrastructure, is somehow rooted in a xenophobic ideology.
Rather, when it comes to international business, there are two main issues that I think we as Americans are concerned with. One is the protection of the U.S. economy, our industrial base, and American workers. The other is the safeguarding of our national security. With respect to the DP World-P&O deal, we're mainly talking about that second issue.
According to United Press International, UPI, operations at up to 22 U.S. ports would come under the control of DP World if it is allowed to acquire P&O's U.S. port operations. This includes critical ports in New York, New Jersey, Baltimore, Miami, New Orleans, Mississippi, and Texas. And it reportedly includes two ports in Texas used by the Army, and through which approximately 40 percent of equipment shipped to our troops in Iraq has flowed.
Yet, CFIUS decided in less than 30 days that this deal did not pose a security threat to the U.S. There was no full and thorough 45 day investigation, which in my view was mandated by law. Indeed, the Byrd Amendment to Exon-Florio requires a full 45 day investigation if two conditions are met: first, that the acquirer is controlled or acting on behalf of a foreign government; and second, if the acquisition could affect U.S. national security. Both of these conditions are clearly met in this case.
There also appears to have been no consultation with Members of Congress on the DP World issue. In October, Deputy Treasury Secretary Kimmitt testified that he and his agency support more effective communication with Members of Congress to enhance the transparency of CFIUS. I ask where that communication was with respect to DP World.
Certainly, I understand the desire for protecting privacy, but that does not
excuse the lack of any real consultation with Congress and the resulting lack of transparency. This is an issue of checks and balances, which exist to protect Americans. And the protection of Americans must never be subordinated to foreign interests.
But there are other problems with CFIUS that have become apparent through the DP World case. Indeed, we recently learned that neither Secretary Snow nor President Bush knew about the DP World acquisition. Not even Secretary Snow's deputy knew about the matter while it was undergoing the initial 30 day review.
Now, given Secretary Snow's history with CSX, whose port operations were acquired by DP World in 2004, his lack of involvement was the right thing. I only wish that it had been intentional.
And when it comes to the President, I would simply ask this question: When operations at 22 critical U.S. ports are to be sold to a company controlled and owned by a foreign government, one with a questionable security history with respect to terrorism and WMD proliferation, why wasn't the President made aware of the deal?
In a March 1 New York Times article, the President was quoted as saying that ``If there was any doubt in my mind, or people in my Administration's mind, that our ports would be less secure or the American people endangered, this deal wouldn't go forward.''
I frankly have no idea how the President could reach this conclusion. There has been no thorough investigation, as required by law. The President did not even apparently know about the DP World deal until very recently. It is precisely this kind of superficial determination that has the American people so worried about their security--and rightly so.
If all of this is not evidence of a broken CFIUS process, then I do not know what is.
I know that some people would argue that the issue is not CFIUS--that the real issue is having adequate measures to protect our ports. Frankly, I think that both of these are major Issues.
And if we look at the pathetic security situation at our Nation's ports today, that becomes quite clear. Only about 5 percent of the cargo that comes through our ports is actually inspected. Indeed, the resources available to the Department of Homeland Security to undertake port and container security are woefully inadequate. According to reports, U.S. Customs has only 80 inspectors to monitor the compliance of nearly 6,000 importers, who are currently charged with maintaining the security of their goods during transit. The Coast Guard is even worse off with 20 inspectors dedicated to assessing worldwide compliance with relevant international shipping and port facility security codes. That's 100 people for the whole world. And it is a problem that needs to be fixed.
But CFIUS reform is an indispensable part of the process of strengthening U.S. national security. Indeed, the current problems are evident in other cases besides DP World. Most recently we learned about another deal with a Dubai-based company. That company, Dubai International Capital is seeking, as part of a $1.2 billion deal, to acquire London-based Doncasters Group Ltd. Doncasters has operations in the U.S.--primarily in my home state of Connecticut and in Georgia.
True, in this case, CFIUS has decided to perform the full 45-day investigation. I'm glad that they have, because Doncasters is involved in the production of components for some of our most critical military equipment, including the M1 Abrams tank.
But while I'd like to think that the Doncasters investigation was begun on its own merits, I must admit that I find the timing of this investigation highly suspect. In fact, it appears that this investigation was not even launched until the DP World issue became public and stirred up some very legitimate concerns.
So as we can see, it is critically important that we reform the CFIUS process. We can not afford to sit and wait on this. The U.S. National Security Protection Act of 2006 would significantly strengthen CFIUS and thus our national security. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of my bill, the U.S. National Security Act of 2006, be printed in the Record.