Mr. President, I am pleased to reintroduce legislation today that would increase the mileage reimbursement rate for volunteers. Under current law, when volunteers use their cars for charitable…
Mr. President, I am pleased to reintroduce legislation today that would increase the mileage reimbursement rate for volunteers.
Under current law, when volunteers use their cars for charitable purposes, the volunteers may be reimbursed up to 14 cents per mile for their donated services without triggering a tax consequence for either the organization or the volunteers. If the charitable organization reimburses any more than that, they are required to file an information return indicating the amount, and the volunteers must include the amount over 14 cents per mile in their taxable income. By contrast, the mileage reimbursement level currently permitted for businesses is 40.5 cents per mile.
We are asking volunteers and volunteer organizations to bear a greater burden of delivering essential services. But the 14 cents per mile limit is posing a very real hardship for charitable organizations and other nonprofit groups. I have heard from a number of people in Wisconsin on the need to increase this reimbursement limit.
A representative of one organization, the Portage County Department on Aging, explained just how important volunteer drivers are to their ability to provide services to seniors in that county. The Department on Aging reported that dozens of volunteer drivers delivered meals to homes and transported people to medical appointments, meal sites, and other essential services.
As many of my colleagues know, the senior meals program is one of the most vital services provided under the Older Americans Act, and ensuring that meals can be delivered to seniors or that seniors can be taken to meal sites is an essential part of that program. Unfortunately, Federal support for the senior nutrition programs has stagnated in recent years. This has increased pressure on local programs to leverage more volunteer services to make up for lagging Federal support. The 14 cents per mile reimbursement limit, though, increasingly poses a barrier to obtaining those contributions. Portage County reports that many of their volunteers cannot afford to offer their services under such a restriction. And if volunteers cannot be found, their services will have to be replaced by contracting with a provider, greatly increasing costs to the Department, costs that come directly out of the pot of funds available to pay for meals and other services.
And the same is true for thousands of other non-profit and charitable organizations that provide essential services to communities across our Nation.
By contrast, businesses do not face this restrictive mileage reimbursement limit. The comparable mileage rate for someone who works for a business is currently 40.5 cents per mile. This disparity means that a business hired to deliver the same meals delivered by
volunteers for Portage County may reimburse their employees over double the amount permitted the volunteer without a tax consequence.
This doesn't make sense. The 14 cents per mile volunteer reimbursement limit is badly outdated. According to the Congressional Research Service, Congress first set a reimbursement rate of 12 cents per mile as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, and did not increase it until 1997, when the level was raised slightly, to 14 cents per mile, as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.
The bill I am introducing today is identical to a measure I introduced in the 107th Congress and the 108th Congress in nearly every respect. It raises the limit on volunteer mileage reimbursement to the level permitted to businesses. It is essentially the same provision passed by the Senate as part of a tax bill in 1999, and it is essentially the same provision that passed the Senate as part of the CARE Act.
At the time of the 1999 tax bill, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated that the mileage reimbursement provision would result in the loss of $1 million over the five-year fiscal period from 1999 to 2004. The revenue loss was so small that the JCT did not make the estimate on a year by year basis.
Though the revenue loss is small, it is vital that we do everything we can to move toward a balanced budget, and to that end I have included a provision to fully offset the cost of the measure and make it deficit neutral. That provision increases the criminal monetary penalties for individuals and corporations convicted of tax fraud. The provision passed the Senate in the 108th Congress as part of the JOBS bill, but was later dropped in conference and was not included in the final version of that bill.
I urge my colleagues to support this measure. It will help ensure charitable organizations can continue to attract the volunteers that play such a critical role in helping to deliver services and it will simplify the tax code both for nonprofit groups and the volunteers themselves.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the legislation be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, today I will reintroduce in the Senate the Reasonable Notice and Search Act. This bill is nearly identical to a bill I introduced in the 108th Congress, S. 1701. It addresses Section 213 of the USA-PATRIOT Act, the provision of that important statute passed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks that has caused perhaps the most concern among Members of Congress and the public. Section 213, sometimes referred to as the ``delayed notice search provision'' or the ``sneak and peek provision,'' authorizes the government in limited circumstances to conduct a search without immediately serving a search warrant on the owner or occupant of the premises that have been searched.
Prior to the PATRIOT Act, secret searches for physical evidence were performed in some jurisdictions under the authority of Court of Appeals decisions, but the Supreme Court never definitively ruled whether they were constitutional. Section 213 of the PATRIOT Act authorized delayed notice warrants in any case in which an ``adverse result'' would occur if the warrant were served before the search was executed. Adverse result was defined as including: 1. endangering the life or physical safety of an individual; 2. flight from prosecution; 3. destruction of or tampering with evidence; 4. intimidation of potential witnesses; or 5. otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial. This last catch-all category could apply in virtually any criminal case. In addition, while some courts had required the service of the warrant within a specified period of time, the PATRIOT Act simply required that the warrant specify that it would be served within a ``reasonable'' period of time after the search.
It is interesting to note that this provision of the PATRIOT Act was not limited to terrorism cases. In fact, before the PATRIOT Act passed, the FBI already had the authority to conduct secret searches of foreign terrorists and spies with no notice at all under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Furthermore, the PATRIOT Act ``sneak and peek'' authority was not made subject to the sunset provision that will cause many of the new surveillance provisions of the act to expire at the end of this year unless Congress reenacts them. So Section 213 was pretty clearly a provision that the Department of Justice wanted regardless of the terrorism threat after 9/11.
Perhaps that is why this provision has caused such controversy since it was passed. In 2003, by a wide bipartisan margin, the House passed an amendment to the Commerce-Justice-
State appropriations bill offered by Representative Otter from Idaho, a Republican, to stop funding for delayed notice searches authorized under section 213. The size of the vote took the Department by surprise, and it immediately set out to defend the provision aggressively. Clearly, this is a power that the Department does not want to lose.
I raised concerns about the sneak and peek provision when it was included in the PATRIOT Act. I did not, and still do not, believe there had been adequate study and analysis of the justifications for these searches and the potential safeguards that might be included. I did not argue then, however, and I am not arguing now that there should be no delayed notice searches at all and that the provision should be repealed. I simply believe that this provision should be modified to protect against abuse. My bill will do four things to accomplish this.
First, my bill would narrow the circumstances in which a delayed notice warrant can be granted to the following: potential loss of life, flight from prosecution, destruction or tampering with evidence, or intimidation of potential witnesses. The ``catch-all provision'' in section 213, allowing a secret search when serving the warrant would ``seriously jeopardize an investigation or unduly delay a trial'' can too easily be turned into permission to do these searches whenever the government wants.
Second, I believe that any delayed notice warrant should provide for a specific and limited time period within which notice must be given--7 days. This is consistent with some of the pre-PATRIOT Act court decisions and will help to bring this provision in closer accord with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. Under my bill, prosecutors will be permitted to seek 7-day extensions if circumstances continue to warrant that the subject not be made aware of the search. But the default should be a week, unless a court is convinced that more time should be permitted.
Third, Section 213 should include a sunset provision so that it expires along with the other expanded surveillance provisions in Title II of the PATRIOT Act, at the end of 2005. This will allow Congress to determine if the balance between civil liberties and law enforcement has been correctly struck.
Finally, the bill requires a public report on the number of times that section 213 is used, the number of times that extensions are sought beyond the 7-day notice period, and the type of crimes being investigated with this power. This information will help the public and Congress evaluate the need for this authority and determine whether it should be retained or modified after the sunset.
These are reasonable and moderate changes to the law. They do not gut the provision. Rather, they recognize the growing and legitimate concern from across the political spectrum that this provision was passed in haste and presents the potential for abuse. They also send a message that Fourth Amendment rights have meaning and potential violations of those rights should be minimized if at all possible. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, today I will reintroduce the Library, Bookseller, and Personal Records Privacy Act. The bill is identical to the bill I introduced in the 108th Congress, S. 1507.
This bill would amend Sections 215 and 505 of the USA-PATRIOT Act to protect the privacy of law-abiding Americans. It would set reasonable limits on the Federal Government's access to library, bookseller, medical, and other sensitive, personal information under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (``FISA'') and related foreign intelligence authority.
I am pleased that several of my distinguished colleagues have joined me as original cosponsors of this important legislation.
Millions of Patriotic Americans love our country and support our military men and women in their difficult missions abroad, but worry about the fate of our Constitution here at home.
Much of our Nation's strength comes from our constitutional liberties and respect for the rule of law. That is what has kept us free for our two and a quarter century history. Our constitutional freedoms, our American values, are what make our country worth fighting for as we strive to win the war on terror.
Here at home, there is no question that the FBI needs ample resources and legal authority to prevent future acts of terrorism. But the PATRIOT Act went too far when it comes to the government's access to personal information about law abiding Americans.
Even though in the end I opposed the PATRIOT Act, there were many provisions that I did support. And even in those provisions I sought to amend when the bill was debated, there was often some change that I supported. For example, Congress was right to expand the category of business records that the FBI could obtain pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Prior to the PATRIOT Act, the FBI could seek a court order to obtain only travel records--such as airline, hotel, and car rental records--and records maintained by storage facilities. The PATRIOT Act allows any business records to be subpoenaed. I don't quibble with that change.
But what my colleagues and I do find problematic--and an increasing number of Americans who value their privacy and First Amendment rights agree with us--is that the current law allows the FBI broad, almost unfettered access to personal information
about law-abiding Americans who have no connection to terrorism or spying.
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act requires the FBI to show in an application to the court that the documents are ``sought for'' an international terrorism or foreign intelligence investigation. There is no requirement that the FBI make a showing of individualized suspicion that the documents relate to a suspected terrorist or spy.
In other words, under current law, the FBI could serve a subpoena on a library for all the borrowing records of its patrons or on a bookseller for the purchasing records of its customers simply by asserting that they want the records for a terrorism investigation.
Since the passage of the PATRIOT Act, librarians and booksellers have become increasingly concerned by the potential for abuse of this law. I was pleased to stand with the American Booksellers Association and the Free Expression Network over 2 years ago when we first started to raise these concerns.
Librarians and booksellers are concerned that under the PATRIOT Act, the FBI could seize records from libraries and booksellers in order to monitor what books Americans have purchased or borrowed, or who has used a library's or bookstore's internet computer stations, even if there is no evidence that the person is a terrorist or spy, or has any connection to a terrorist or spy.
These concerns are so strong that some librarians across the country have taken the unusual step of destroying records of patrons' book and computer use, as well as posting signs on computer stations warning patrons that whatever they read or access on the internet could be monitored by the federal government.
As a librarian in California said, ``We felt strongly that this had to be done. . . . The government has never had this kind of power before. It feels like Big Brother.''
And as the executive director of the American Library Association said, ``This law is dangerous. . . . I read murder mysteries--does that make me a murderer? I read spy stories--does that mean I'm a spy? There's no clear link between a person's intellectual pursuits and their actions.''
The American people do not know how many or what kind of requests Federal agents have made for library records under the PATRIOT Act. The Justice Department refuses to release that information to the public.
But in a survey released by the University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign, about 550 libraries around the Nation reported having received requests from Federal or local law enforcement during the past year. About half of the libraries said they complied with the law enforcement request, and another half indicated that they had not.
Americans don't know much about these incidents, because the law also contains a provision that prohibits anyone who receives a subpoena from disclosing that fact to anyone.
In testimony before the Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Ashcroft stated that as of September 18, 2003, the Department of Justice had never used Section 215. The Department has not made that claim in public testimony since then, leading many to speculate that the provision has now been used. Whether it has been used once, or dozens of times, the problem with the section remains--it is too broad and does not permit adequate judicial supervision. There is a potential for overreaching that Congress must address.
David Schwartz, president of Harry W. Schwartz Bookshops, the oldest and largest independent bookseller in Milwaukee, summed up well the American values at stake when he said: ``The FBI already has significant subpoena powers to obtain records. There is no need for the government to invade a person's privacy in this way. This is a uniquely un-American tool, and it should be rejected. The books we read are a very private part of our lives. People could stop buying books, and they could be terrified into silence.''
I would not claim that we have reached the point where people in this country are afraid to buy books, but section 215 is a tool that is unnecessarily broad. And it raises the specter of indiscriminate government snooping into the private lives of innocent citizens, which is an unnecessary distraction from the serious law enforcement work that is needed to fight terrorism.
It is time to reconsider those provisions of the PATRIOT Act that are un-American and, frankly, unpatriotic.
But my concerns with the PATRIOT Act go beyond library and bookseller records. Under section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, the FBI could seek any records maintained by a business. These business records could contain sensitive, personal information--for example, medical records maintained by a doctor or hospital or credit records maintained by a credit agency. All the FBI would have to do is simply assert that the records are ``sought for'' its terrorism or foreign intelligence investigation.
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act goes too far. Americans rightfully have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their library, bookstore, medical, financial, or other records containing personal information. Prudent safeguards are needed to protect these legitimate privacy interests.
The Library, Bookseller, and Personal Records Privacy Act is a reasonable solution. It would restore a pre-PATRIOT Act requirement that the FBI make a factual, individualized showing that the records sought pertain to a suspected terrorist or spy while leaving in place other PATRIOT Act expansions of this business records power.
My bill will not prevent the FBI from doing its job. It recognizes that the post-September 11 world is a different world. There are circumstances when the FBI should legitimately have access to library, bookseller, or other personal information.
I'd like to take a moment to explain how the safeguard in my bill would be applied. Suppose the FBI is conducting an investigation of an international terrorist organization. It has information that suspected members of the group live in a particular neighborhood. The FBI would like to obtain records from the library in the suspects' neighborhood. Under current law, the FBI could decide to ask the library for all records concerning anyone who has ever borrowed a book or used a computer, and what books were borrowed, simply by asserting that the documents are sought for a terrorism investigation. But under my bill, the FBI could not do so. The FBI would have to set forth specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom the records pertain is a suspected terrorist. The FBI could obtain only those library records--such as borrowing records or computer sign-in logs--that pertain to the suspected terrorists. The FBI could not obtain library records concerning individuals who are not suspected terrorists.
So, under my bill, the FBI can still obtain documents that it legitimately needs, but my bill would also protect the privacy of law- abiding Americans. I might add that if, as the Justice Department says, the FBI is using its PATRIOT Act powers in a responsible manner, does not seek the records of law-abiding Americans, and only seeks the records of suspected terrorists or suspected spies, then there is no reason for the Department to object to my bill.
The second part of my bill would address privacy concerns with another Federal law enforcement power expanded by the PATRIOT Act--the FBI's national security letter authority. The FBI does not need court approval to use this power.
My bill would amend section 505 of the PATRIOT Act. Part of this section relates to the production of records maintained by electronic communications providers. Libraries or bookstores with internet access for customers could be deemed ``electronic communication providers'' and therefore be subject to a request by the FBI under its NSL authority.
As I mentioned earlier, some librarians are so concerned about the potential for abuse by the FBI that they have taken matters into their own hands before the FBI knocks on their door. Some librarians have begun shredding on a daily basis sign-in logs and other documents relating to the public's use of library computer terminals to access the internet.
Again, safeguards are needed to ensure that any individual who accesses the internet at a library or bookstore does not automatically give up all expectations of privacy. Like the section
215 fix I've discussed, my bill would require an individualized showing by the FBI of how the records of internet usage maintained by a library or bookseller pertain to a suspected terrorist or spy.
Yes, the American people want the FBI to be focused on preventing terrorism. And, yes, it may make sense to make some changes to the law to allow the FBI access to the information that it needs to prevent terrorism. But we do not need to change the values that constitute who we are as a Nation in order to protect ourselves from terrorism. We can protect both our Nation and our privacy and civil liberties.
An increasing number of Americans are beginning to understand that the PATRIOT Act went too far. Four States and over 350 cities and counties across the country have now passed resolutions expressing opposition to the PATRIOT Act. And it's not just the Berkeleys and Madisons of this Nation, but other States and communities with strong conservative and libertarian values, such as Alaska and cities in Montana, that have passed such resolutions.
I have many concerns with the PATRIOT Act. I am not seeking to repeal it, in whole or in part. In this bill, my colleagues and I are only seeking to modify two provisions that pose serious potential for abuse.
The privacy of law-abiding Americans is at stake, along with their confidence in their government. Congress should act to protect our privacy and reassure our citizens. The Library, Bookseller, and Personal Records Privacy Act bill is a reasonable approach to do just that. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce the Computer Trespass Clarification Act of 2005, which would amend and clarify section 217 of the USA-PATRIOT Act. This bill is virtually identical to a bill I introduced in the 108th Congress, S. 2783.
Section 217 of the PATRIOT Act addresses the interception of computer trespass communications. This bill would modify existing law to more accurately reflect the intent of the provision, and also protect against invasions of privacy.
Section 217 was designed to permit law enforcement to assist computer owners who are subject to denial of service attacks or other episodes of hacking. The original Department of Justice draft of the bill that later became the PATRIOT Act included this provision. A section by section analysis provided by the Department on September 19, 2001, stated the following: ``Current law may not allow victims of computer trespassing to request law enforcement assistance in monitoring unauthorized attacks as they occur. Because service providers often lack the expertise, equipment, or financial resources required to monitor attacks themselves as permitted under current law, they often have no way to exercise their rights to protect themselves from unauthorized attackers. Moreover, such attackers can target critical infrastructures and engage in cyberterrorism. To correct this problem, and help to protect national security, the proposed amendments to the wiretap statute would allow victims of computer attacks to authorize persons `acting under color of law' to monitor trespassers on their computer systems in a narrow class of cases.''
I strongly supported the goal of giving computer system owners the ability to call in law enforcement to help defend themselves against hacking. Including such a provision in the PATRIOT Act made a lot of sense. Unfortunately, the drafters of the provision made it much broader than necessary, and refused to amend it at the time we debated the bill in 2001. As a result, the law now gives the government the authority to intercept communications by people using computers owned by others as long as they have engaged in some unauthorized activity on the computer, and the owner gives permission for the computer to be monitored--all without judicial approval.
Only people who have a ``contractual relationship'' with the owner allowing the use of a computer are exempt from the definition of a computer trespasser under section 217 of the PATRIOT Act. Many people-- for example, college students, patrons of libraries, Internet cafes or airport business lounges, and guests at hotels--use computers owned by others with permission, but without a contractual relationship. They could end up being the subject of government snooping if the owner of the computer gives permission to law enforcement.
My bill would clarify that a computer trespasser is not someone who has permission to use a computer by the owner or operator of that computer. It would bring the existing computer trespass provision in line with the purpose of section 217 as expressed in the Department of Justice's initial explanation of the provision. Section 217 was intended to target only a narrow class of people: Unauthorized
cyberhackers. It was not intended to give the government the opportunity to engage in widespread surveillance of computer users without a warrant.
I should note that there is no specific evidence that the provision is being abused. But, of course, unless criminal charges are brought against someone as a result of such surveillance, there would never be any notice at all that the surveillance has taken place. The computer owner authorizes the surveillance, and the FBI carries it out. There is no warrant, no court proceeding, no opportunity even for the subject of the surveillance to challenge the assertion of the owner that some unauthorized use of the computer has occurred.
My bill would modify the computer trespass provision in the following ways to protect against abuse, while still maintaining its usefulness in cases of denial of service attacks and other forms of hacking.
First, it would require that the owner or operator of the protected computer authorizing the interception has been subject to ``an ongoing pattern of communications activity that threatens the integrity or operation of such computer.'' In other words, the owner has to be the target of some kind of hacking.
Second, the bill limits the length of warrantless surveillance to 96 hours. This is twice as long as is allowed for an emergency wiretap. With four days of surveillance, it should not be difficult for the government to gather sufficient evidence of wrongdoing to obtain a warrant if continued surveillance is necessary.
Finally, the bill would require the Attorney General to annually report on the use of Section 217 to the Senate and House Judiciary Committees. Section 217 is one of the provisions that is subject to the sunset provision in the PATRIOT Act and will expire at the end of 2005. We in the Congress need to do more oversight of the use of this and other provisions of PATRIOT Act in order to evaluate their effectiveness.
The computer trespass provision now in the law as a result of section 217 of the PATRIOT Act leaves open the possibility for significant and unnecessary invasions of privacy. The reasonable and modest changes to the provision contained in this bill preserve the usefulness of the provision for investigations of cyberhacking, but reduce the possibility of government abuse. We must continually seek to balance the need for effective tools to fight crime and terrorism against the civil liberties of our citizens. The Computer Trespass Clarification Act strikes the right balance, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
