Mr. Speaker, I rise today on behalf of an honorable gentleman from my home state of Connecticut, Mr. Ralph Nader, to submit for the Record a copy of testimony that he earlier submitted to the Senate…
Mr. Speaker, I rise today on behalf of an honorable gentleman from my home state of Connecticut, Mr. Ralph Nader, to submit for the Record a copy of testimony that he earlier submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearing regarding the confirmation of Supreme Court Chief Justice Nominee Judge John Roberts.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony on the
nomination of Judge John G. Roberts Jr. for the position of
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. I
ask that this statement be made part of the printed hearing
record.
In 1994 I testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee
on the nomination of Stephen G. Breyer by President Clinton
to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States. In that testimony I called attention to the
importance of balance in the way our laws handle the
challenges of corporate power in America.
I said:
``For our political economy, no issue is more consequential
than the distribution and impact of corporate power.
Historically, our country periodically has tried to redress
the imbalance between organized economic power and people
rights and remedies. From the agrarian populist revolt by the
farmers in the late 19th and early 20th century, to the rise
of the federal and state regulatory agencies, to the surging
trade unionism, to the opening of the courts for broader non-
property values to have their day, to the strengthening of
civil rights and civil liberties, consumer, women's and
environmental laws and institutions, corporate power was
partially disciplined by the rule of law.''
Today it is more important than ever for all Supreme Court
Justices and, in particular, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court to have the inclination and wisdom to realize that our
democracy is being eroded by many kinds of widely reported
systemic corporate excesses. Giant multinational corporations
have no allegiance to any country or community, and the
devastation and other injustices they visit upon
communities throughout the United States and around the
globe have outpaced the countervailing restraints that
should be the hallmark of government by, for and of the
people. Unfortunately, the structure and scope of these
hearings are not likely to devote a sufficient priority to
the corporate issues of our times.
In 1816 Thomas Jefferson wrote: ``I hope we shall . . .
crush in its birth the aristocracy of our moneyed
corporations, which dare already to challenge our government
to a trial of strength and bid defiance to the laws of our
country.'' Imagine his reaction to the corporate abuses of
Enron Corp, HealthSouth Corp., Tyco, WorldCom or Adelphia
Communications Corp to name only a few, along with the drug,
tobacco, banking, insurance, chemical and other toxic
industries. The corporate crime and greed of today tower over
the abuses of the ``moneyed corporations'' of Jefferson's
day. The economic power of giant corporations is augmented by
a flood of Political Action Committee (PAC) money and
other donations that shape the quality and quantity of debate
in our country and consequently drive our society to
imperatives that are increasingly more corporate than civic.
You will hear about Judge Roberts from several
perspectives, but it is safe to assume that questions and
testimony about Judge Roberts' views on corporate power and
the rule of law will be inadequate given the broad and
profound impact giant corporations have on our democracy. An
important procedural and substantive corollary is the
important role our civil justice system plays in expanding
the frontiers of justice and in giving individuals the
ability to hold ``wrongdoers'' accountable in a court of law.
``If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one
commandment: Thou shalt not ration justice,'' said the famous
jurist, Learned Hand.
Unfortunately, powerholders, corporations and other
institutions which are supposed to be held accountable by the
civil justice system, are striving to weaken, limit and
override the province of juries and judges. Some companies,
led by insurers, have used expensive and focused media to
promote the view that civil juries are too costly and too
unpredictable. This narrow and short-sighted perspective is
contrary to the long-standing tenets of our democracy and in
particular the Seventh Amendment to our Constitution.
The civil jury system of the United States embraces a
fundamental precept of tested justice: ordinary citizens
applying their minds and values can and do reach decisions
on the facts in cases that often involve powerful
wrongdoers. This form of direct citizen participation in
the administration of justice was deemed indispensable by
this nation's founders and was considered non-negotiable
by the leaders of the American revolution against King
George III. But the civil jury is more than a process
toward bringing a grievance to resolution. The civil jury
is a pillar of our democracy necessary for the protection
of individuals against tyranny, repression and mayhem of
many kinds and for the deterrence of such injustices in
the future. Our civil jury institution is a voice for and
by the citizenry in setting standards for a just society.
Jury findings incorporated in appellate court decisions
contribute to one of the few authoritative reservoirs of
advancing standards of responsibility between the powerful
and the powerless--whether between companies and
consumers, workers, shareholders and community or between
officialdom and taxpayers or citizens in general. Knowing
the evolution of the common law and the civil jury
provides compelling and ennobling evidence of this
progression of justice. Chief Justice William Rehnquist
wrote, ``The founders of our Nation considered the right
of trial by jury in civil cases an important bulwark
against tyranny and corruption, a safeguard too precious
to be left to the whim of the sovereign, or, it might be
added, to that of the judiciary.''
As the hearing unfolds, I suggest that the members of the
Judiciary Committee devote some time to areas beyond those
that are traditionally the focus of witnesses and questioning
by Committee members and ask fundamental questions about the
views of Judge Roberts, a former corporate lawyer at Hogan &
Hartson, regarding corporate power and the civil justice
system.
In the spirit of expanding the criteria by which the
Committee and the public can measure Judge Robert's judicial
and civic philosophy, I offer the following questions for you
to pose to the nominee. Some of the questions are narrowly
focused and some are broad-gauged. But, in their totality
they constitute the broad kind of ``litmus test'' that should
be applied in selecting and confirming all judges. In short,
does the nominee, having met the threshold requirements of
competency, believe that the rule of law should be used to
broaden and deepen, procedurally and substantively, our
democracy--even if it means the rights of the giant
corporation or powerful interests must be circumscribed to
protect the rights of the individual citizen and of
our communities--rural or urban, large or small?
In pursuing its own line of questions, the Committee should
not let its exploration of the nominee's views be
artificially restricted. Judicial nominees have given two
reasons for refusing to answer questions, but these reasons
are contradictory. First, they say, if they publicly express
their views, it will compromise them if the issue comes
before the Court. Second, they say, judges do not decide
legal issues in a vacuum: they only decide a concrete dispute
in a specific adversarial context. Accordingly, some nominees
claim it's silly or inappropriate, for example, to say
whether they believe the Constitution protects the right to
abortion, because Justices don't decide cases by asking such
abstract questions. They face a particular statute,
challenged by a particular party directly affected in a
particular way, and the resolution of that dispute will turn
on all those particulars.
This second response has a degree of merit--and undercuts
the first reason for refusing to answer most questions.
Precisely because neither nominees nor the public can know in
what context issues will reach the Court (if at all), it is
not problematic for nominees to discuss their views. They
should not say how they would decide an actual pending case,
but, short of that, it is fine for them to discuss issues
because that in no way commits them to taking sides in any
actual dispute--such disputes are invariably context-
specific. For example, a nominee may be asked about the
doctrine that treats a corporation as a ``person'' entitled
to various constitutional rights. His or her thoughts on this
issue will not tell us what he or she will do if such an
issue is raised in a case before the Court. The latter may
depend on the nature of the corporation (non-profit? media?
multi-national?), the nature of the claimed right, and much
more.
Moreover, even if the nominee testifies that he or she
disapproves the doctrine, as a Justice the nominee may hold
that the question is settled law. Or if a nominee says that
he or she agrees with the doctrine, a new circumstance--or a
party making a new argument--may lead the nominee to hold
otherwise. Nothing a nominee says guarantees that he or she
will decide any case any particular way. Nothing that is said
has to be fixed in stone. Judges do give opinionated public
speeches, do they not?
It may be wondered whether, in light of the above, any
purpose is served by asking the nominee his views. The answer
is yes. It's no secret that nothing a nominee says binds
the nominee once he or she receives an office with life
tenure. Nominees can't and shouldn't be bound. But
especially with a nominee who has a limited public record,
the hearings provide some basis for gauging the nature and
quality of his ideas, about his philosophy of due process
for example. At any rate they have that potential--if
Senators do their job and do not accept a nominee's self-
serving refusal to answer questions.
At the outset, it would behoove the Committee to establish
the parameters the nominee will use in fashioning responses
to your questions by asking:
What criteria are you using to determine if you will
directly answer or not answer questions posed to you by
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee?
If the Court has recently ruled on a matter, will you
provide the Committee with your views on the Court's ruling?
If a matter is long settled, will you provide the Committee
with your views on the Court's ruling?
Once this baseline has been established, the following
questions should shed light on nominee's approach to some
major issues of our day.
1. Lloyd Cutler, speaking as a prominent corporate
attorney, once said: ``There is one point I want to make
clear: we believe in the arguments that we make.'' Do you
believe the arguments you have made on behalf of your
corporate clients?
2. Do you believe limits on television station ownership
abridge the free speech rights of corporate broadcasters?
3. What is your view of the First Amendment rights of the
listeners being paramount to those of the broadcasters as
articulated by the Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U. S. 367 (1969)?
4. Do you see a problem when corporations are treated as
equal participants, with every right to use their First
Amendment rights to dominate public policy debates such as
those that occur in state and local referenda?
5. Do you believe the Court should uphold state and
Congressional limits on corporate political expression in
order to equalize contributions to public debates?
6. Do you believe that a strict reading of the Constitution
provides for the treatment of corporations as ``persons''
under the law for purposes of equal protection, freedom of
speech or due process of law? And, if so, what in the
Constitution's text provides a basis for this belief?
7. Many observers complain that law firms representing
large corporations routinely abuse the discovery process in
order to delay and harass their opponents. Have you observed
that phenomenon? If so, what should be done about it?
8. In 1986, in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986) the Supreme Court (5 to 3)
struck down a state regulation as violating a utility
company's ``right of conscience'' under the First Amendment.
What makes the case particularly unsettling is its
disconnectedness to opinions past and future. As Justice
Rehnquist observed in his lengthy dissenting opinion in the
case, ``the two constitutional liberties most closely
analogous to the right to refrain from speaking--the Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent and the constitutional right
of privacy--have been denied to corporations based on their
corporate status.'' Do you think it makes sense to attribute
a right of conscience to a commercial corporation?
9. Would any trade agreement, such as GATT, NAFTA, or CAFTA
ever require Senate ratification as a treaty?
10. Does the President have complete discretion to
determine whether an international trade or other agreement
must be submitted to the Senate for two-thirds treaty
approval? If not, what are the criteria that determine when
an international agreement must be submitted to the Senate
for two-thirds treaty approval?
11. Are there limits on Congress' power to strip federal
courts of jurisdiction over a particular issue? If so, what
are such limits?
12. Do you believe victims of defective products that meet
federal standards should be limited from recovering damages
from the manufacturers of the defective products?
13. Do you believe Congress should federalize and pre-empt
state products liability common law in any or all sectors?
14. Plaintiffs' trial lawyers have been blamed by their
corporate critics for all sorts of problems with the economy
and
legal profession. Do you believe that those representing
injured persons in product liability and medical malpractice
cases are harming America?
15. So-called tort-reform is aimed at restricting the
amount of non-economic damages, such as pain and suffering, a
party can receive. Are you concerned that this interferes
with the traditional role of juries and judges to find facts
and mete out appropriate justice?
16. Do you believe the use of the government contractor
defense should be limited in nonmilitary procurement? If so,
how?
17. Some people say the Ninth Amendment can play no
substantive role in protecting rights, that it's merely a
statement of principle or reminder of limited government.
Do you agree?
18. A number of legal scholars argue that the 11th
Amendment has been interpreted by the Court to shield states
from liability for wrongdoing in a way that blatantly
contravenes the original intention of the Amendment. Are you
familiar with that scholarship and do you find it persuasive?
19. In what circumstances, if any, is it appropriate for a
contractual arbitration clause to contract away substantive
contract law, tort, or statutory rights? For instance, can an
arbitration clause require arbitration of a worker's Title
VII rights and at the same time limit the worker's
compensatory damages to $200,000? Can that same clause
require the loser to pay the winner's attorney's fees? Can
that clause require that the parties to arbitration bear
their own attorney's fees?
20. Describe the presumption against preemption of state
law. Does it apply in some or all instances where federal law
is said to preempt state law?
21. Is the presumption against preemption of state law (by
federal law) similar to the plain statement rule that demands
that Congress speak with unmistakable clarity if it wishes to
override the states' sovereign immunity? If the presumption
against preemption is not similar to the plain statement
rule, explain how it is different?
22. How is the presumption against preemption applied in
cases where federal regulatory law (regulating, for instance,
drugs, boats, pesticides, motor vehicles, and the like) is
said to preempt state tort law that provides monetary
remedies to compensate for injuries caused by a product that
the federal government regulates?
23. Do you believe Congress should pre-empt the state-law-
based medical malpractice system?
24. What are your views on the ``American rule'' as opposed
to the English rule under which the losing party in
litigation generally pays the winner's costs, including
attorney's fees?
25. What has been your reaction or views on Congressional
funding levels for federally funded legal services programs
over the last two decades? Should government be responsible
for funding representation for poor people in civil
litigation where important property or liberty interests are
at stake? Or should that be mainly or entirely a private
function?
26. Some scholars and judges believe that ``Originalism''
is the only principled method of constitutional
interpretation. Do you agree?
27. Do you believe that a declaration of war by Congress is
Constitutionally required for the United States to engage in
war?
28. Does a Congressional delegation of the war-making
discretion to the President in the form of a war resolution
meet the test of Article One, Section Eight of the
Constitution?
29. What level of equal protection scrutiny was applied in
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)?
30. What is the precedential effect of Bush v. Gore? In
other words, what kinds of equal protection claims does Bush
v. Gore control or apply to? After Bush v. Gore, may a
political entity (city, county, state) holding an election
use more than one type of voting methodology (paper ballots,
standard machines, punch cards, etc.) knowing that the error
rates (whether through undercounts or otherwise) are
different from one methodology to another?
31. Is there a need to amend our open government laws to
make the President subject to them in whole or in part? Would
such amendments be constitutional?
32. Do you believe arguments before the Supreme Court
should be televised in the way C-SP AN televises
Congressional deliberations?
33. In your view, is the Freedom of Information Act
functioning properly at this time? If not, what are the major
problems facing the Act?
34. In Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U S. 598 (2001)
case, the Court rejected the argument that a party that has
failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered
consent decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired
result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change
(the catalyst theory) in the defendant's conduct is entitled
to attorney's fees. Does the rejection of the catalyst theory
of fee recovery in the Supreme Court's Buckhannon decision
apply across-the-board to federal fee-shifting statutes? If
not, to what kinds of fee-shifting statutes is it likely to
apply and to what kinds is its application more doubtful?
35. Brian Wolfman, Director of the Public Citizen
Litigation Group notes, ``The Bush administration says that
Buckhannon applies to [Freedom of Information Act] FOIA
cases, even though Congress stated explicitly, when it
enacted FOIA, that fees should be available when FOIA cases
settle. The Bush Justice Department has consistently argued
to expand Buckhannon to every pro-consumer and civil rights
statute in every conceivable situation.'' What approach (or
approaches) to statutory construction of Congressional
enactment was evident in the Supreme Court's Buckhannon
decision? How would you describe the reliance on (or lack of
reliance on) legislative history in the majority's reasoning
in that case? Do you believe the Bush Justice Department is
applying the Buckhannon decision correctly?
36. From both a legal (constitutional) and practical
perspective, what is your view of the trend in the federal
judiciary toward releasing more of its opinions in
``unpublished'' form, i.e., where the relevant court accords
no precedential effect to the decision for other cases?
37. Should federal judges attend seminars which are funded
by private corporations (or by foundations that are funded by
such corporations) that have matters of interest to the
corporations before the courts?
38. Do you believe a government attorney, in a subordinate
position, should be forced (under penalty of discharge) to
work on a case or argue a position that he or she believes is
illegal, unconstitutional or unethical? Or should government
lawyers have a ``right of conscience'' like other
professionals?
39. What kinds of participation in civic life may federal
judges continue to be involved in once they assume their
judicial positions?
40. How many hours or what percent of their work time do
you think partners in major firms should devote to pro bono
work each year?
41. How many hours on average did you bill per year as a
partner and at what rates?
42. How many hours on average did you bill per year as an
associate?
43. What was the nature of your pro bono work and
approximately how much time per year did you devote to pro
bono work?
44. Corporate attorneys and legal scholars have written
books and articles decrying unethical or fraudulent billing
practices in large corporate law firms. An article in the
Summer 2001 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics titled
Gunderson Effect and Billable Mania: Trends in Overbilling
and the Effect of New Wages states that unethical billing
practices are ``a pervasive problem in law firms across the
country''--do you agree?
45. Did you ever observe unethical billing practices when
you were in private practice?
46. If so, what was the nature of and who were the
protagonists of such practices?
I hope these questions, whether asked orally or submitted
to the nominee in writing for response, spark a robust,
constructive debate between the Committee members and the
nominee. Such exchanges should provide the Senate and the
larger public with insights into how Judge John G. Roberts
will, if confirmed as Chief Justice, perform his duties.