Iraq Contingency Planning Act

The United States initiated combat operations against the Saddam Hussein regime on March 19, 2003, and concluded those operations in April 2004 with the defeat of the Iraqi military and the collapse of the Hussein regime.

The Bush Administration had been warned that while military action against the Hussein regime would likely succeed, rebuilding Iraq and winning the peace would be more difficult. In particular, intelligence reports from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon’s Joint Staff, the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the Central Intelligence Agency’s National Intelligence Council warned that United States troops could face significant postwar resistance. An Army War College report from February 2003 warned that without an overwhelming effort to prepare for the United States occupation of Iraq, The United States may find itself in a radically different world over the next few years, a world in which the threat of Saddam Hussein seems like a pale shadow of new problems of America’s own making..

Despite these warnings, the Bush Administration invaded Iraq without a comprehensive plan in place to secure and rebuild the country.

United States Armed Forces personnel have remained in Iraq since the beginning of combat operations, and in over nearly four years of war, hundreds of thousands of members of the Armed Forces have served with honor and distinction in Iraq, over 3,100 members of the Armed Forces have died, and over 22,500 members of the Armed Forces have been wounded.

On January 10, 2007, after years of growing sectarian violence in Iraq, President George W. Bush addressed the American people to announce a plan entitled The New Way Forward in Iraq, consisting of the additional deployments of at least 21,500 United States troops in Iraq.

On January 16, 2007, the Secretary of Defense said that we expect in certain areas to be able to see whether the Iraqi government is carrying out the commitments that it has made and that are so critical to the success of this strategy . . . within two or three months..

On February 5, 2007, the President submitted a request for supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 2007, including $5,600,000,000 to increase United States forces in the Iraqi theater of operations to support the Government of Iraq with 21,500 United States ground forces and an expanded Naval presence. At the same time, the President also submitted a proposed budget for fiscal year 2008 which did not request funding for these additional troops in Iraq.

On February 1, 2007, the intelligence community presented to the President the first National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq in nearly four years.

The NIE, the most authoritative written judgment of the Director of National Intelligence with respect to Iraq, states that Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during … the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate..

The NIE states that as Iraq’s security environment worsens, three prospective security paths could emerge—

Congress needs to know how the Administration expects to respond to each of those possibilities, and what specific plans are being taken and what specific plans are being developed to be able to respond to such possibilities.