2007 Civil Rights Pay Fairness Act

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this ill-considered and over- reaching legislation.

Proponents of this bill claim it simply reverses a May 29, 2007, U.S. Supreme Court decision and further clarifies congressional opposition to wage discrimination against employees in the workplace. In reality, however, it will set into motion unintended consequences that its supporters simply are not willing to acknowledge.

At the outset, let me make it clear that opposition to discrimination of

any type, be it gender discrimination, racial discrimination, or any other type of discrimination inside or outside the workplace is not confined to one party or the other. Every Member of this Chamber stands in strong opposition to the unfair treatment of any worker, but at the same time we must stand firmly behind a process that ensures justice for all parties, and that includes protecting against the potential for abuse and over-litigation. That, I believe, is where the two parties diverge on the bill before us. We aren't taking sides for or against discrimination in the workplace; rather, we're staking out different positions on fair and equitable justice and the rule of law.

For more than 40 years, title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act has made it illegal for employers to determine an employee's pay scale based on his or her gender. And this is a principle upon which all of us, Democrats and Republicans alike, can agree. As such, current law provides that any individual wishing to challenge an employment practice as discriminatory must first file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within the applicable statute of limitations, which is either 180 or 300 days, depending on his or her state of employment after the alleged workplace discrimination occurred.

The statute of limitations was clearly established in the law to encourage the timely filing of claims, which helps prevent the filing of stale claims and protects against abuse of the legal system.

Consider these worst case scenarios, for example. Without a statute of limitations in place, an employee could sue for discrimination resulting from an alleged discriminatory act that might have occurred 5, 10, 20, 40, or even more years earlier. And without a statute of limitations in place, it is entirely conceivable that a worker or retiree could seek damages against a company run by employees and executives that had nothing to do with the initial act of alleged discrimination that occurred dozens of years ago.

H.R. 2831 would essentially dismantle the statute of limitations and replace it with a new system under which every paycheck received by the employee allegedly discriminated against starts the clock on an entirely new statute. While fair-minded and principled, this dramatic change in civil rights law would have incredibly far-reaching impact, one that supporters of the bill have yet to take the time to thoroughly and appropriately consider. And B, under H.R. 2831, the worst case scenarios I just described would become commonplace. And let's not kid ourselves; our Nation's trial lawyers would seize upon them.

Because H.R. 2831 would dismantle the critical statute of limitations, the Bush administration last week threatened to veto, should the bill ever arrive at his desk. Specifically, the administration noted that the legislation ``would serve to impede justice and undermine the important goal of having allegations of discrimination expeditiously resolved.''

Furthermore, the effect of elimination of any statute of limitations in this area would be contrary to the centuries' old notion about limitations, period, for all lawsuits.

At this time, Mr. Speaker, I would like to enter the Statement of Administration Policy into the Record

Executive Office of the President, Office of Management

and Budget,

Washington, DC, July 27, 2007.

Statement of Administration Policy H.R. 2831--Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay

Act of 2007 (Rep. Miller (D) CA and 31 Cosponsors)

The Administration supports our Nation's anti-

discrimination laws and is committed to the timely resolution

of discrimination claims. For this and other reasons, the

Administration strongly opposes the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of

2007. H.R. 2831 would allow employees to bring a claim of pay

or other employment-related discrimination years or even

decades after the alleged discrimination occurred. H.R. 2831

constitutes a major change in, and expanded application of,

employment discrimination law. The change would serve to

impede justice and undermine the important goal of having

allegations of discrimination expeditiously resolved.

Furthermore, the effective elimination of any statute of

limitations in this area would be contrary to the centuries-

old notion of a limitations period for all lawsuits. If H.R.

2831 were presented to the President. his senior advisors

would recommend that he veto the bill.

Meaningful statutes of limitations in these sorts of fact-

intensive cases are crucial to the fair administration of

justice. The prompt assertion of employment discrimination

permits employers to defend against--and allows employees to

prove--claims that arise from employment decisions instead of

having to litigate claims that are long past. In such cases,

evidence often will have been lost, memories will have faded,

and witnesses will have moved on. Moreover, effective

statutes of limitations benefit employees by encouraging the

prompt discovery, assertion, and resolution of employment

discrimination claims so that workplace discrimination can be

remedied without delay.

H.R. 2831 purports to undo the Supreme Court's decision of

May 29, 2007, in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. by

permitting pay discrimination claims to be brought within 180

days not of a discriminatory pay decision, which is the rule

under current law, but rather within 180 days of receiving

any paycheck affected by such a decision, no matter how far

in the past the underlying act of discrimination allegedly

occurred. As a result, this legislation effectively

eliminates any time requirement for filing a claim involving

compensation discrimination. Allegations from thirty years

ago or more could be resurrected and filed in federal courts.

Moreover, the bill far exceeds the stated purpose of

undoing the Court's decision in Ledbetter by extending the

expanded statute of limitations to any ``other practice''

that remotely affects an individual's wages, benefits, or

other compensation in the future. This could effectively

waive the statute of limitations for a wide variety of claims

(such as promotion and arguably even termination decisions)

traditionally regarded as actionable only when they occur.

This legislation does not appear to be based on evidence

that the current statute of limitations principles have

caused any systemic prejudice to the interests of employees,

but it is reasonable to expect the bill's vastly expanded

statute of limitations would exacerbate the existing heavy

burden on the courts by encouraging the filing of stale

claims.

Mr. Speaker, as the President's veto threat makes clear, H.R. 2831 is not a matter of tinkering around the edges as its supporters would have the American people believe. Rather, it is a fundamental overhaul of long-standing civil rights laws. The last major change to these laws occurred more than 15 years ago and after several years of debate. Yet, here we are, barely 2 months removed from a Supreme Court decision ready to grab headlines before we return home for the month of August by advancing a highly flawed bill without any regard to the long-term ramifications it could have should it ever make its way into law.

H.R. 2831 represents bad policy, and even worse processing, and for these reasons I will oppose it. I urge my colleagues to do likewise.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the gentlelady from Tennessee (Mrs. Blackburn).

Mr. Speaker, I now yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Keller), the subcommittee ranking member.

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Wilson), the subcommittee ranking member.

Mr. Speaker, I am happy now to yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Illinois (Mrs. Biggert), a member of the committee.

Mr. Speaker, how much time remains?

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from North Carolina (Ms. Foxx), a member of the committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from

Texas (Ms. Granger), a member of our elected leadership.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Minnesota (Mrs. Bachmann).

Mr. Speaker, I'm happy now to yield to the gentleman from New Mexico (Mr. Pearce) 2\1/2\ minutes.

How much time do we have?

Mr. Speaker, I'm happy to yield at this time to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Kline) 3 minutes, ranking member on the subcommittee.

It was my understanding we were going to finish up tomorrow.

So you want me to take 30 seconds?

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.

Mr. Speaker, as Mr. Kline just said, I think we have had a good debate here tonight.

As we did have that hearing on Ms. Ledbetter's case, the bill wasn't before us, but we did hear her story. And all of us I think felt bad for her for the things that happened to her 20, 30 years ago.

But what was also said, as we're sent here to represent all of our constituents, we can't totally let emotion guide our decisions. We have to make good law, sound law, and I think we're worried about losing the statute of limitations. I think that's something we really need to protect against.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 579, I call up the bill (H.R. 2831) to amend title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to clarify that a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice that is unlawful under such Acts occurs each time compensation is paid pursuant to the discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 6 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, discrimination is anathema to everything this country stands for. It is anathema to the promise that is America. Regrettably, the recent Supreme Court's recent Ledbetter v. Goodyear decision threatens to turn back the clock on the progress we have made since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 more than 40 years ago.

The Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter severely restricts the right of employees to challenge pay discrimination. It ignores the realities of the workplace, prior precedent, and the clear intent of Congress.

Justice Ginsburg's dissent in this narrowly divided 5-4 decision called on Congress to reverse this decision, and that is what we are here to do today.

Lilly Ledbetter, the plaintiff in this case, worked for Goodyear for over 19 years. When she retired as a supervisor in 1998, she discovered that her salary was 20 percent lower than that of the lowest-paid male supervisor. Not only was Ms. Ledbetter earnings nearly $400 a month less than her male colleagues, she also retired, obviously, with a substantially smaller pension.

A jury found that Goodyear discriminated against Ms. Ledbetter, and she was awarded $3.8 million in back pay and damages. This amount was reduced to the $360,000 damage cap in title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

Despite the jury's finding, the Supreme Court decided that while Goodyear discriminated against Ms. Ledbetter, and it is important that the Members understand that that is what the jury's determination was, they decided that her claim was made too late. Not that she was wrong, not that Goodyear was right. Her claim simply came too late.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act requires an employee to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of unlawful employment practices. Ms. Ledbetter filed within 180 days, as required, of receiving the discriminatory pay from Goodyear. In fact, she filed as soon as she found out that she was receiving discriminatory pay. She found out thanks to an anonymous note left in her mailbox.

But a slim majority of the Supreme Court found that, because Ms. Ledbetter did not file within 180 days of the discriminatory decision to write those discriminatory paychecks that she received for many, many years, her time had run out. She could not recover anything from Goodyear.

The majority's decision is absurd and entirely shuns the reason in order to satisfy this ideological agenda.

H.R. 2831, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, is narrowly tailored and designed to restore the law on pay discrimination as it was before the Supreme Court's decision, the law as it was for some 35 years, the law as it was reaffirmed in circuit court after circuit court, as it was affirmed by the Congress of the United States.

This bill restores the law so that the 180-day statute of limitations clock runs when a discriminatory pay decision or practice is adopted, when a person becomes subject to the pay decision or practice, or when a person is affected by the pay decision or practice, including whenever she receives a discriminatory paycheck. In other words, every discriminatory paycheck is a violation of the act. That is as the law was for these many, many years. That is what we seek to do.

The bill makes it clear that a victim of pay discrimination is entitled to a full 2 years of back pay. That is as the law currently is. You are entitled to recover up to 2 years' back pay under title

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews), a member of the committee.

(Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I recognize the gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Woolsey), a member of the committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Hawaii (Ms. Hirono), a member of the committee.

(Ms. HIRONO asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz).

Mr. Speaker, I reserve my time.

If I can inquire of the Chair as to the allocation of time?

As I understand, I have the right to close.

We're reserving 3 minutes; is that right?

So we're reserving 3 minutes each. You've got a half minute. You and I will close, and we will each have 3 minutes for tomorrow.

Yes.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 4 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, let us understand something here. They can say it until the cows come home, but the fact of the matter is, this legislation restores the law to what it was before. Up until the Supreme Court made its ruling, each discriminatory check that was issued was a violation of the law, and you had 180 days from the issuance of that check when you discovered it to file a claim. This legislation would restore that law as it was.

If you file that claim, if you were successful in proving your claim, you could receive up to 2 years back pay. That was the law up until the Supreme Court decision. That would be the law if we passed this legislation.

Now, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have said that if we pass this law, the courts will be inundated with lawsuits. The people will wait 5, 10, 15, 20 to file a lawsuit, that there will be cases where the witnesses die and memories fade and long times will expire and we won't be able to have justice. It will be a huge cost on the business community. It will change our competitive stature in the world. It will limit economic growth. All of that from little Lilly Ledbetter.

What's the problem with that? If all of that was true, why haven't my colleagues come to the floor of the House in the 12 years they controlled the House of Representatives and the United States Senate and asked to change the law? Why hasn't the President of the United States, who's been in office for 6\1/2\ years, asked to change the law?

Why hasn't that happened? Because none of the things you talked about happened under the previous law. It didn't change our competitiveness. They weren't involved in thousands of cases. People didn't wait 40 or 50 years to get 2 years back pay. No, none of those things happened.

But they want to scare people into believing if we go back to the law as it was before the Lilly Ledbetter case and the Supreme Court overturned all of these years of laws and justice and fairness and anti-discrimination provisions, that somehow all of these terrible things would happen, but they didn't happen, and that's been the law all of these years.

So, tomorrow we will get an opportunity to vote to restore the protections of every American citizen against pay discrimination, to restore justice to the workplace, to restore the right of an individual to be paid the same as those who are doing the same job for the same reasons and the same purposes. That's what we seek. That's all Lilly Ledbetter sought, but she couldn't get justice at the Supreme Court. No, she couldn't get it even though a jury found that that could be the situation.

So we're going to have to restore this for the people of this country, and again, we'll simply be restoring the law. You can tell the doomsday scenarios all day long. You can predict all of the things that are going to happen, but none of them have happened in the last 35 years. None of them have happened in the last 35 years.

So at least you ought to properly represent what the law was and what the law will be, and with that, I look forward to the conclusion of the debate tomorrow

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my unexpired time, and I reserve the 3 minutes for tomorrow.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, the practical effect of this legislation is to do away with the statute of limitations in employment disputes. On May 29, 2007, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Ms. Ledbetter's claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

There is a strong public policy reason for having a statute of limitations in the employment context. Witness' memories fade, documents are lost, and employees die. We want these disputes to be resolved while witness' memories are fresh, documents are available, and the employees are alive.

The Ledbetter case is a perfect example. Ms. Ledbetter alleged sexual harassment misconduct by a single Goodyear supervisor, yet she waited 19 years after the former supervisor passed away from cancer to file a lawsuit.

On June 12, 2007, Ms. Ledbetter testified before our Education and Labor Committee. She stated, ``My story began in 1979 when Goodyear hired me to work as a supervisor in their tire production plant in Gadsden, Alabama. I worked there for 19 years. One of my supervisors asked me to go down to a local hotel with him and promised if I did, I would get good evaluations. He said if I didn't, I would get put at the bottom of the list. I didn't say anything at first because I wanted to try to work it out and fit in without making waves.''

At our hearing, I spoke with Ms. Ledbetter at length. She seemed like a nice lady to me. The conversation she described about the motel made you angry about it and sympathetic to her. I wondered what that supervisor would have said 19 years ago. Would he admit it? Would he deny it but not be very credible? Or would he have said that it couldn't have happened because he was in Canada at the time and here is my proof of that?

Well, it turns out that the U.S. Supreme Court was thinking the same type of thoughts I was about this matter. Their opinion makes their concerns crystal clear.

On page 12 of its opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote: ``The passage of time may seriously diminish the ability of the parties and the factfinder to reconstruct what actually happened. This case illustrates the problems created by tardy lawsuits. Ledbetter's claims of sex discrimination turned principally on the misconduct of a single Goodyear supervisor, who, Ledbetter testified, retaliated against her when she rejected his sexual advancements during the early 1980s. Yet, by the time of trial, this supervisor had died and therefore could not testify. A timely charge might have permitted his evidence to be weighed contemporaneously.''

Supporters of the legislation say that the time period of 300 days in most jurisdictions, 180 days in some, is not enough because an employer might hide the fact that the female employee's salary was less than the amount paid to men for the same work.

There are two responses to that. First, the judicial doctrine of equitable tolling would be available to those type of plaintiffs.

Second, the plaintiffs could file a claim under the Equal Pay Act. This Federal law forbids paying women less than men for the same work. It has a longer statute of limitations and an easier burden of proof. Ms. Ledbetter filed a Equal Pay Act claim, but it was thrown out on the merits by the trial judge who found that Goodyear paid

Ledbetter less because of her performance, not sex. Significantly, Ledbetter abandoned this Equal Pay Act claim.

Mr. Speaker, there is an old saying, hard cases make bad law. That applies here. Do we throw out the statute of limitations in employment cases because a nice lady waited 19 years to file a lawsuit? Common sense tells you the answer is no.

The same public policy reasons for a statute of limitations are still there. We want witness' memories that are fresh, documents that are available and employees who are still alive to tell what actually happened.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no.'

Mr. Speaker, I met Lilly Ledbetter during the House Judiciary Committee hearing last month. At that time, she explained how she was repeatedly harassed during her 20-year career at Goodyear. Lilly Ledbetter described for us in Judiciary how she had no proof of pay discrimination until someone anonymously slipped payroll records into her mailbox. Now, as much as our colleagues on the other side of the aisle would like to wish it to be otherwise, until a few months ago, it was established law that each paycheck constitutes a discriminatory act under the law.

When they were confirmed, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito promised to follow precedent. They promised to practice judicial restraint. Instead, they rewrote the law and pushed an activist, conservative agenda. They denied Lilly Ledbetter justice.

In the real world, discrimination is subtle and takes years to become evident. However, Justice Alito ruled that victims have only 180 days after a discriminatory decision has been made to file suit, even if that employee would have no way of knowing about it. This standard is impossible to meet. The opponents of this bill expect employees to be clairvoyant.

Many companies intentionally prohibit their employees from comparing salaries and pay raises, and this decision will allow employers to shield discriminatory practices.

The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act rights this wrong. It clarifies that an employee is discriminated against each and every time she receives an unfair paycheck, and I'm surprised at my colleagues, particularly my female brethren on the other side of the aisle, who are standing in front of this House and asking the House to continue and repeat the practice of discrimination against women who have been unfairly treated for years and years.

I urge my colleagues to support fair pay in the workplace, and I thank Chairman Miller for his leadership on this issue.

Mr. Speaker, I met Lily Ledbetter during a House Judiciary Committee hearing last month. At that time, she explained how she was repeatedly harassed during her 20-year career at Goodyear. She told me how she had no proof of pay discrimination until someone anonymously slipped payroll records into her mailbox. Until a few months ago, it was established law that each paycheck constitutes a discriminatory act under the law.

When they were confirmed, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito promised to follow precedent--they promised to practice judicial restraint. Instead, they rewrote the law and pushed an activist, conservative agenda. They denied Lily Ledbetter justice.

In the real world, discrimination is subtle and takes years to become evident. However, Justice Alito ruled that victims have only 180 days after a discriminatory decision has been made to file suit--even if that employee would have no way of knowing about it! This standard is impossible to meet.

Many companies intentionally prohibit their employees from comparing salaries and pay raises, and this decision will allow employers to shield discriminatory practices.

The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act rights this wrong. It clarifies that an employee is discriminated against each and every time she receives an unfair paycheck.

I urge my colleagues to support fair pay in the workplace, and I thank Chairman Miller for his leadership on this issue.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the principle of equal pay for equal work and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, H.R. 2831.

On May 29, 2007, the Supreme Court issued a disturbing and retrobressive ruling. In a 5-4 ruling the Court issued its decision in a sex discrimination case, Ledbetter v. Goodyear, that fundamentally changed protections that American workers have enjoyed for more than 40 years when they were codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

As a member of the House Committee on Education and Labor, I participated in a hearing on the flawed ruling in Ledbetter v. Goodyear. During that hearing the Committee heard testimony from Lilly Ledbetter describing the pay discrimination that resulted in her earning twenty percent less than the lowest paid man in the same position at Goodyear.

Applying the law as it was written and intended, the trial court awarded Lilly Ledbetter backpay and compensatory damages because of Goodyear's illegal sex discrimination. On appeal it went all the way to the Supreme Court, where Justice Samuel Alito led the 5-4 majority in dismissing the case. According to Justice Alito, when Lilly Ledbetter failed to file a discrimination case within the statutorily provided 180 days from the initial decision to pay her less than her male colleague, she was barred from filing a complaint and no relief was available. Despite documenting the sex based evaluation system Goodyear managers used, Lilly Ledbetter was denied justice and the rights afforded to her under the Civil Rights Act.

In a strongly worded dissent Judge Ginsburg noted the fallacy of the Majority's argument regarding the timeliness of Lilly Ledbetter's filing. She reminded the Court that a previous ruling that held each ``paycheck perpetuating a past discrimination . . . are actionable not simply because they are `related' to a decision made outside the charge-filing period . . . but because they discriminate anew each time they are issued.''

Judge Ginsburg explicitly called on Congress to intervene and uphold the protections provided by the letter and the spirit of the law, saying ``the ball is in Congress' court.''

Today, we answer Judge Ginsburg's call and reverse this disturbing Supreme Court decision. Today, we make clear that Congress is committed to protecting the rights of American workers and to ensuring that they have adequate remedies if they are discriminated against in the workplace.

The passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 clarifies that when it comes to discriminatory pay, the protections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act extend not only to these discriminatory pay decisions and practices but to every paycheck that results from those pay decisions and practices. Any reasonable citizen who believes that we need protect the rights of workers for fair treatment at the workplace and fair pay would surely find the Supreme Court decision unreasonable. We must act once to reestablish fairness. I urge my colleagues to support this important legislation.