COVERT Act of 2008

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 5909, the Catching Operational

Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Random Testing Act of 2008, otherwise known as the COVERT Act.

This act simply would prohibit the disclosure of information concerning a covert test conducted by TSA, the Inspector General of DHS, or GAO to any individual prior to the completion of the test. The bill also requires any TSA covert testing team to be accompanied by a cover team to monitor the covert test and to confirm the identity of the covert testing team to any appropriate individual, if an individual or security screener not aware of the covert test identifies the covert testing team as a threat to security.

This bill is substantially modified from the bill as originally introduced because there was some real give-and-take and compromise produced on the part of both sides of the aisle at the subcommittee level and with the full committee staff.

And for that I am thankful and believe that we have a better product as a result of that consultation and that give and take.

One of the things we wanted to make sure we did not do in attempting to prevent people spilling the beans, so to speak, on these kinds of covert tests was to have such a heavy-handed approach that it might tip off people by the presence of additional folks. We've worked that out here, and I thank the gentleman and the gentlelady for being able to do that.

I would just have one small point, perhaps disagreement with the chairman. There are reports that there was a tipping off in one particular instance that was intentional, seemingly meant to give people notice that there was going to be a test or it was about to take place. In another case, at least from my review of the files, it appears to be inadvertent, and I believe something on the order of within 30 seconds the notice that was contained in an e-mail was retrieved by the responsible party when he realized someone else had put that out. And then there's a third one that's somewhat in dispute between TSA and some Members of the House, and others.

And all I would say is, irrespective of how many there were, if there was just one, that's one too many. This bill I think helps us move in the direction of improving the circumstances so the likelihood of that occurring is much less in the future than it would have been without this legislation. And so for those reasons, I would enthusiastically support H.R. 5909 and ask my colleagues to support it.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

May I inquire as to how much time I have remaining?

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Again I rise in support of H.R. 5909, the Catching Operational Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Random Testing Act of 2008. I just wish we had the Catching Operational Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Real Energy Production in this Country Act of 2008.

The gentlelady from New York has suggested that it's almost insignificant what we do offshore and that we are not actually going after those things right now. Well, let me just put some facts on the table.

According to the U.S. Minerals Management Service--not a Republican or Democratic operation--America's deep seas on the Outer Continental Shelf contain 420 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Now, to put that in perspective, the United States consumes 23 trillion cubic feet per year; so 20 times, almost, what we get per year.

And 86 billion barrels of oil contained in the deep seas on the Outer Continental Shelf; 86 billion barrels of oil, and currently the U.S. imports 4.5 billion barrels of oil per year. So that's about the equivalent of a little less than 20 years of our imports. But 85 percent of the lower 48 Outer Continental Shelf energy resources remain under the lock and key of the Federal Government.

Now, why do I say this deals with operational vulnerabilities? We have said in this bill that if you tip off people that they're being investigated, they might not act as they normally do. They might take advantage of you because they know that you are doing these covert operations. Similarly, we are the only developed Nation in the world that forbids safe energy production on our Outer Continental Shelf. No other country in the world does that. Brazil just explored on theirs, and they found the largest single gas find in modern history. In fact, some people are saying that Brazil will now be energy independent and not even have to deal with their ethanol production by way of sugar. Oh, by the way, we could be importing ethanol from sugar from Brazil at much lower costs than ethanol produced by corn in the United States. We have a 53 cent per gallon subsidy for corn-based ethanol, and we have something on the order of a 51 cent tariff on any ethanol brought in produced by sugar from Brazil or anywhere else, and I believe the farm bill brings it down to 45 cents. So we basically have put ourselves in the hole by about 90 cents per gallon with respect to ethanol that makes more cents from sugar than that that we're producing in corn.

But even though Brazil is the leader in the world in ethanol produced by sugar, it went ahead and explored on their Outer Continental Shelf. And what did they find? The largest single find. Now, if you had looked a year ago or 2 years ago about the proven reserves for Brazil, that would not even be there because we didn't know about it.

The other thing is, with technology, already known fields can produce more than they ever did before. One of the reasons I have a little bit of knowledge of this, I grew up in Long Beach, California.

We have been producing offshore Long Beach since before I was born. Every single citizen of the State of California who has any interest in the schools of California is proud of the fact, frankly, that there are subsidies that go to our schools from the royalties paid as a result of producing offshore Long Beach.

Now we haven't had a major oil spill in my lifetime. We have I think over 1,000 rigs in the gulf coast that have been sitting there during these tremendous storms that we call hurricanes, including Katrina, that came through that area in the last few years. Not a single drop of oil has resulted, even though we have had massive destruction of all other kinds of facilities in that area.

The United States companies, that some on this floor have berated, have spent billions of dollars in development of new technology to make it safer. And the suggestion that somehow they are hiding, somehow they are not utilizing these leases that they have, is just a fantastic claim, because it is utterly preposterous that they would pay money for leases and then not try to see what is there. The fact of the matter is that 52 percent of the oil and gas wells that have been drilled by American companies, 52 percent over the last 5 years, have turned out dry. Now, did they get these leases because they wanted to find dry wells? No. They went because there is a certain risk.

It is not as easy as is suggested on this floor of the House that, okay, I am an oil company. I make money. I have friends who have worked on oil rigs who are missing fingers from the work that goes on there. I have friends that have worked in South and Central America who have worked on rigs at all time using what is called drilling mud, using those drill bits, losing fingers, working hard at it, realizing that you don't have a guarantee of every time you put a well down, you are going to get oil up.

So I just find it fantastic that in this argument, number one, we are told, well, we don't have that much oil. It is really the fault of Americans because they use so much oil. I don't know whether that sells too much, blaming Americans for using energy that allows their lives to be better than our parents' and grandparents' generation was in terms of the standard of living. And secondly, to berate American companies that are leaders in the world in technology around the world.

It is strange to me that some on the other side of the aisle believe that it is important for us to make sure we don't have any Outer Continental Shelf drilling off Florida, for instance, when Cuba has lease agreements with a number of countries, including China, although they haven't yet started to drill, that would allow them to drill within either 45 miles or 60 miles of our Florida coast. Now maybe it makes sense to tell the American people that they are at fault. I don't believe they are at fault. I think they are looking at us for some solutions.

We have a solution here to the problem of the possibility of tipping people off to testing. It makes no sense to me, and most on my side of the aisle, for us to be the only developed nation in the world tipping off the rest of the world that we are going to close off most of our areas of natural resources. Remember, when we got Alaska, some referred to it as Seward's Folly. Maybe we didn't realize the folly until now when we intentionally cut off our ability to be able to environmentally and safely explore and produce energy in Alaska.

But we divert a little bit from this bill. This bill is the Catching Operational Vulnerabilities By Ensuring Random Testing Act of 2008, COVERT testing. I congratulate the gentlelady for bringing this bill forward. I congratulate the chairwoman of the subcommittee for working on this along with those of us on this side. I congratulate the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, for bringing this forward.

With that, Mr. Speaker, I will yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 5909 and begin by thanking Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, Subcommittee Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, and Subcommittee Ranking Member Lungren for moving this legislation to the floor.

My bill, the Catching Operational Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Random Testing, or COVERT, Act would prohibit the advance notification of covert tests on transportation systems without direct approval from the highest officials in our Homeland Security operations.

This legislation bolsters accountability and integrity for covert testing within our transportation systems overseen by the Transportation Security Administration and the Department of Homeland Security.

The core principles and goals of covert testing are undermined when individuals are alerted in advance that a test or evaluation is imminent. In fact, in case we haven't figured it out, there is nothing covert about activities employees already know will occur. Unfortunately, there have been a number of reported incidents in which covert tests may have been compromised as a result of advanced notification to Transportation Security officers.

The Inspector General at the Department of Homeland Security found that between August 2003 and May 2004, Transportation Security Administration officials at San Francisco International Airport compromised covert testing efforts by tracking testers throughout the airport utilizing surveillance cameras, then notifying screening personnel in advance of the testers arriving at security checkpoints. The Inspector General also found that Transportation Security officers at Jackson-Evers International Airport in Jackson, Mississippi, reported receiving advance notice of covert tests conducted by TSA's Office of Inspection on February 12, 2004.

Finally, led by Chairman Thompson's efforts, the Homeland Security Committee discovered on April 2006 an e-mail sent via TSA's net hub system from the Office of Security Operations to all Federal security directors and other TSA airport officials informing them of testing at airports throughout the country.

In this unfortunate instance, while the e-mail may have violated TSA protocols, it did not constitute the sharing of sensitive information under the law. My legislation will close that loophole, making it a violation to tip off employees before covert tests without high-level approval at TSA and DHS.

During mark-up of this legislation, the Homeland Security Committee adopted an amendment allowing local law enforcement to be notified prior to a test if directed by the administrator providing for personnel flexibility by clarifying that only one individual is necessary to serve as a cover agent supervising testing, and including a study on implementation of these procedures and their impact on the Department's effort to improve transportation security.

I want to make it very clear to my colleagues that this bill does not tie the hands of DHS or TSA. It simply ensures that any decision to notify personnel in advance must come directly from the TSA administrator, the Inspector General of the Department, or the Comptroller General at GAO to ensure the safety of the traveling public and the testers.

I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 5909.

I will probably need an additional 4 minutes to respond, if you have it, Mr. Chairman, to Mr. Lungren on this very, very important issue that he has been referencing concerning drilling.

We've been hearing frequently from my colleagues, my good friends like Mr. Lungren, from President Bush, and from other Republicans in the Congress. They continue to argue that opening more of the Outer Continental Shelf to oil and gas drilling will lower gasoline prices. But we can't drill our way to energy independence. The United States has only 1.6 percent of the world's oil reserves, but Americans consume 25 percent of the oil used around the world every day. Nearly 80 percent of oil and 82 percent of natural gas believed to exist on the Outer Continental Shelf is located in areas that are now open for leasing.

I thank the distinguished Chair.

Only 10.5 million of the 44 million leased offshore acres are actually producing oil or gas. So oil companies, my colleagues, are reaping billions in record profits, $123 billion in 2007 alone, received billions in subsidies in the 2005 energy bill, but they are not using the Federal lands already open to development. Given this, opening sensitive areas to drilling makes no sense.

For example, ExxonMobil made $40 billion in profits last year alone, but has only increased investment in drilling and production by $3 billion over the last 5 years. Oil and gas companies have stockpiled 9,000 drilling permits--9,000--my good friends--drilling permits-- without expanding domestic production.

The New Direction Congress is working to make America more energy independent and secure, lower costs to consumers, grow our economy with hundreds of thousands of new green jobs, and reduce global warming. This Congress has fought for historic new commitments to American-grown biofuels, sustained investments in clean renewable energy, large-scale efficiency improvements to buildings and

transportation, enhanced tools to crack down on OPEC price fixing and price gouging, and to investigate the effects on price of rampant commodity speculation. And this Congress has forced the President to increase supply and thereby lower costs by not continuing to fill the almost full Strategic Petroleum Reserve starting June 30.

I'm sure this debate will continue, my colleagues. And it seems to be a mantra of many of my good friends on the other side of the aisle, but I do wish there would be more focus on the oil companies using the drilling leases that they have and taking some of those profits and investing them and producing the oil that we need.

So I thank you, I thank the Chair, and I thank my good friend on the other side of the aisle for focusing on this issue. I'm sure we'll continue this discussion. But I would like to conclude by thanking everybody, because it has been a bipartisan effort, and I encourage support of H.R. 5909.

Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 5909) to amend the Aviation and Transportation Security Act to prohibit advance notice to certain individuals, including security screeners, of covert testing of security screening procedures for the purpose of enhancing transportation security at airports, and for other purposes, as amended.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill under consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this bill and yield myself as much time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 5909, the Catching Operational Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Random Testing Act of 2008, or the COVERT Act of 2008, was introduced by Congresswoman Lowey of New York.

The COVERT Act of 2008 was introduced to eliminate the practice of giving advance notice to transportation security workers of covert tests before the tests happened. I want to thank Congresswoman Lowey and the other members of the Committee on Homeland Security for working together in a bipartisan manner to approve this measure unanimously.

I also want to thank the Transportation Security Administration for recognizing the need for this legislation and working with us to ensure that the bill accomplishes its goal without impeding the way in which TSA conducts its covert testing.

This legislation is vital to protecting the integrity of covert tests of transportation security systems. We know of at least three incidents where covert tests were compromised by individuals who inappropriately warned security officials.

This bill will prohibit individuals from providing advance notice of these important covert tests to any persons, unless authorized to do so by the Assistant Secretary of TSA, the Inspector General of DHS, or the Comptroller General of GAO.

Covert testing efforts by TSA, the DHS IG, and GAO have helped to increase the effectiveness of our transportation security systems by highlighting vulnerabilities and keeping the screening workforce on their toes. Any effort to compromise these important testing efforts, whether intentional or accidental, should not be tolerated by this Congress.

If we choose to ignore the problems of the past, we will provide future opportunities to compromise a worthy program intended to educate the workforce and benefit the security of our transportation security systems throughout the country.

I strongly encourage all my colleagues to support H.R. 5909, which complements the work the committee has done on H.R. 1684, the DHS authorization bill that is pending before the Senate.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the author and supporter of this legislation, the gentlelady from New York (Mrs. Lowey).

Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentlelady an additional minute.

Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentlelady an additional 3 minutes to complete her statement.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I cannot emphasize how important these covert tests are to

protecting the country's transportation security systems. A single tip- off of a covert test is too many. We have already had three we know of. We must do our part to stop the next one from happening. We must do whatever we can to ensure that these tests remain covert and candid so we can truly evaluate our transportation security workers.

I look forward to working with my colleagues as we move forward on this important legislation that will make our transportation systems more secure. I ask my colleagues to support this important legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I rise to express my strong support for these six bills brought forth by the Committee on Homeland Security. I would like to commend Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member King for their continued efforts and leadership on presenting legislation to enhance and strengthen our Nation's security. I would also like to congratulate my colleagues on the committee who authored these bills--Chairman Thompson, Congresswoman Clarke, Congresswoman Lowey, Congresswoman Sheila Jackson-Lee, Congressman Dent and Congressman Langevin.

The enactment of H.R. 1, The Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act, was a major milestone for this Congress and I was proud to be a conferee to H.R. 1. With the passage of H.R. 1, Congress took the lead in making America more secure. H.R. 1 was a comprehensive measure to enhance our Nation's homeland security capabilities in profound ways.

The Homeland Security Committee has conducted numerous hearings to investigate the many areas covered by H.R. 1 and has worked diligently at developing legislation that focuses on specific areas of homeland security that require fine tuning in order to make H.R. 1 as effective as possible.

The bills being considered today will do everything from providing redress to Americans misidentified against the terror watch lists to enhancing DHS' capability to address the threat of improvised-explosive devices to ensuring the integrity of aviation security covert tests.

H.R. 4179, the Fast Redress Act of 2008, would enhance information sharing at DHS and between DHS and other Federal agencies that use the terrorist watch list or database. The bill also includes measures that would make the redress process more efficient and protect the civil rights of individuals on TSA's ``Cleared List'' and ``No Fly'' or ``Selectee'' lists.

H.R. 5909 is vitally important given the Committee's knowledge of at least three incidents that compromised the integrity of covert tests at TSA's screening checkpoints. It provides for security measures that would prevent disclosures that will jeopardize covert testing. H.R. 5982 will also enhance airport security by requiring information sharing on best practices for using biometrics to improve airport security. H. Res. 1150 recognizes the continued importance of rail security and ensuring that it is given equal importance in our national transportation security plans.

Bombing prevention is an integral part of our national security and requires that we provide the necessary resources for this purpose. H.R. 4749 does this by increasing funding and the capabilities of the Office of Bombing Prevention. Along similar lines, The Nuclear Forensics Attribution Act authorizes programs within DHS to develop an international framework to identify and intercept nuclear materials further reducing the possibilities of nuclear threat worldwide.

Lastly, I support H.R. 1333 which calls for both GAO and the DHS Secretary to examine and prepare a report on how the Civil Air Patrol can be integrated in our efforts to enhance national security and our war against terrorism. This is a positive effort in using local resources in supporting our homeland security mission.

I strongly urge my colleagues to support these bipartisan bills that have been thoughtfully crafted to enhance national security measures that are important to the implementation of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 5909, Catching Operational Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Random Testing Act of 2008, introduced by my distinguished colleague from New York, Representative Lowe. This important legislation will further shore up the gaps in our testing and evaluation protocols for transportation security.

As we've seen just in the past year, the details of covert tests and evaluations have been disseminated to the screener workforce, thereby ``tipping-off' those we are trying to accurately and responsibly test. The Committee on Homeland Security has been extremely concerned about this issue and I have held hearings in the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, of which I am the chair, in order to examine what exactly has gone wrong.

Any efforts to compromise these important testing efforts, whether intentional or on accident, should not be tolerated. Some have claimed that one of these incidents--the April 2006 e-mail from TSA's Office of Security Operations that tipped TSA field staff off to covert tests-- was unintentional, but evidence suggests otherwise. The April 2006 e- mail clearly referenced that individuals who were probing the system were Federal employees and even provided a physical description of one of the employees conducting the tests. This bill is necessary to prohibit individuals from providing advance notice of covert tests to any persons, unless authorized to do so by the Assistant Secretary of the Transportation Security Administration, the Inspector General of the Department, or the Comptroller General of the United States.

The COVERT Act of 2008 explicitly prohibits the advance notice or notification to individuals by those employees who are participating in a covert test or evaluation, which will ensure that the integrity of all covert testing efforts--across all modes of transportation--are protected, not just aviation. This legislation puts in place controls to monitor the testing personnel and the testing and evaluation procedures by building in accountability. It establishes the presence of a second team of covert test and evaluation employees with the first team in order to monitor and confirm their actions. Finally, the act requires an impact study to evaluate covert testing and evaluation and how it could be incorporated into other training and testing programs. The study is required to include: Recommendations on the implementation and execution of this section; an assessment on the results of covert testing; a summary of best practices on how to best integrate covert testing into other programs; and recommendations for additional personnel training necessary to fulfill this act. The study and report will also provide an assessment on the test and evaluation results and recommendations for personnel training required to fulfill the act.

Mr Speaker, if we choose to ignore these past disclosures, we provide future opportunities to compromise a worthy program intended to educate the workforce and benefit the security of our transportation systems throughout the country. One tip-off of a covert test is one too many. We've already had three that we know of. Let's do our part to stop any future tip-offs.

I am proud to support this incredibly important and timely legislation and I strongly encourage my colleagues to support this important legislation.