Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I rise today to speak on H.R. 1362, the Accountability in Contracting Act, which was introduced by Government Oversight and Reform chairman…
Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise today to speak on H.R. 1362, the Accountability in Contracting Act, which was introduced by Government Oversight and Reform chairman Henry Waxman last week. I want to thank the chairman for working with us.
This is not a bill that we are particularly enthusiastic about. We have very divergent views in the way we should go about contract regulation, but we both want the same ends. And I want to commend him for working with us, addressing some of our concerns as it moved through the committee process.
This bill would attempt to reform our acquisition system through a series of restrictions and reports geared towards greater regulation and oversight. More specifically, the legislation would limit the duration of contracts awarded under urgent conditions; require agency reports on minimizing the use of fixed-price and sole-source contracts; require additional reports to Congress on cost questions by auditors; and broaden the reach of current limitations on post-employment opportunities for our acquisition workforce, as well as limit the ability of acquisition workers hired by the government from the private sector to participate in certain acquisition activities.
I want to thank the chairman again for working with me by including two provisions that we requested that are both intended to strengthen the Federal acquisition workforce through better training and management. The first would require the administrator for Federal Procurement Policy to come up with a government-wide definition for ``acquisition workforce.'' This modification would help give Federal agencies a clear picture of the composition of their existing acquisition workforce and provide a baseline for the improvement of the human capital resource dedicated to the management of the acquisition workload. The second would make permanent the Acquisition Workforce Training Fund, which was first enacted under SARA, the Services Acquisition Reform Act, which I authored.
Last week our committee revised the introduced version of the bill by approving an amendment I offered to address the concerns I had with the bill's expansion of post-employment restrictions. While I wholeheartedly support the desire to promote integrity, transparency and accountability in government, I was troubled by certain provisions in the bill which sought to significantly expand current post- employment restrictions and curb the government's capability to take advantage of the valuable technical abilities and skills of former private-sector employees.
At a time when we need to be looking for ways to retain qualified acquisition personnel, too many of whom are approaching retirement age, while at the same time looking for effective ways to
recruit new qualified people, the introduced version tried to instead impose new restrictions on these Federal employees. These restrictions would have had a detrimental impact on the executive branch's ability to recruit and retain the brightest and the best personnel for the acquisition workforce, something we can ill afford.
Our amendment shortened the bill's 2-year post-employment restrictions on contracting officers to 1 year and provided for a waiver of the restrictions on the ability of acquisition workers hired by the government from the private sector to participate in certain acquisition activities. My amendment also shortened the duration of the activity restrictions from 2 years to 1 year. While this language goes part way toward addressing my concerns about the negative effects such restrictions have had on the Federal Government's ability to recruit, hire, and retain the skilled acquisition workforce, I continue to have the same concerns.
The bottom line is that there are too many good people working for this government for us to pass onerous restrictions based on the misdeeds of a handful of employees. We need to promote the natural churn of employees between the public and private sector, instead of trying to stymie it. We can't, on the one hand, bemoan the quality of contract management, while on the other, create more obstacles to getting the people that we need to do the job.
In addition to the changes we made in committee last week, I am pleased to see the text of the bill that is on the floor today includes the good work of the Committee on Armed Services. That committee made significant improvements and clarifications to the underlying bill. The Armed Services Committee toned down some of the rhetoric in the bill. For example, by changing terms like ``limiting the abuse of abuse-prone contracts'' to ``improving the quality of contracts.''
More substantively, the Armed Services Committee raised the threshold of the report on preliminary audits of contractor costs from $1 million to $10 million. Nonetheless, I remain concerned a report like this, even at the higher threshold and the limitation to significant contractor costs, still presents a distorted and incomplete picture of the management of cost-type contracts. Contract auditors are critical cogs in the management system. They write audit reports which are submitted to aid the contracting officer in making his final determination whether particular costs are reasonable and consistent with applicable law and the contract terms and, therefore, permitted or what we call ``allowable under the contract.'' It is the outcome of the oversight process, not just the first phase, that we should be reviewing. If we want an accurate picture of costs actually billed to the government which the contracting officer determined the government will not pay, the unallowables, then we might learn something. But that is not what this bill does. The bill would only burden agencies with another meaningless reporting requirement and, I might add, add fodder up here for Members to take this review and make something of it that is probably not accurate.
Each year our Federal contract professionals use the acquisition system to purchase almost $400 billion worth of goods and services, ranging from paper clips to advanced weapons system, from sophisticated information technology and management services to grass cutting and window washing. Recent reforms, culminating in our Services Acquisition Reform Act of 2003, have modernized the way the government does business with the private sector. No longer is our government laden with inflexible, timely, and costly acquisition systems. Legislative efforts over the past decade have provided many of the tools necessary for our acquisition professionals to get the job done.
Unfortunately, the Federal acquisition system has been under stress in recent years because of the extraordinary pressures of a shrinking workforce, combined with the unprecedented Hurricane Katrina disaster relief and recovery efforts, the enormous job of managing contractors who provide logistical support for our troops in Iraq, and overseeing the daunting task of building an Iraqi infrastructure. To no one's surprise, this strain has resulted in a series of management problems that have been exaggerated by the press and exploited by opponents of the system.
Nevertheless, the system has worked pretty well, and the vast majority of the government's acquisitions have been conducted properly. The problems have largely been the result of management difficulties exacerbated by an overburdened and understaffed workforce, combined with improper actions by a handful of officials.
Frankly, Madam Chairman, I don't think that controls, reports, procedures and restrictions in this bill will go very far in addressing the challenges that face us today. Reverting to the bloated system of the past, weighted down with a process-oriented system doesn't help the government acquire the best valuable goods and services the commercial market has to offer and our government so desperately needs in a timely manner. Reverting to the past, under the rubric of fraud, waste and abuse and cleaning up the system may provide flashy sound bites and play well back home, but it doesn't give us the world-class acquisition system that we need to compete in the 21st century.
We have put the current system to the test in some of the most difficult environments imaginable: Hurricane Katrina reconstruction and Iraqi logistics and contracting and reconstruction. The failures which occurred have been rooted in the inadequacies of management and implementation.
And yet the Rules Committee, in looking at the Armed Services Committee report and ours, took out the provision that had the 1 percent additional funding for some of the management and implementation dollars that could have gone into training.
As legislators, we should resist the temptation to micromanage our acquisition system based on unproven anecdotes of failure and misconduct. More controls and procedures will not remedy poorly defined requirements or provide us with a sufficient number of Federal acquisition personnel with the right skills to select the best contractor and manage the subsequent performance.
Why should we force the taxpayers and private entities to undergo unreasonable burdens so politicians can reap short-term gain at the expense of crippling an already overburdened acquisition system and workforce?
It is for these reasons, Madam Chairman, we find this bill has sufficient shortcomings. These shortcomings are shared by the administration in their statement on administration policy in the ITAA, and I will discuss those as the debate goes further.
Finally, let me just say, this country, over the years, has had the debate over what is the appropriate role of oversight, how much is too much. But we need an acquisition system that works. And sometimes we spend so much in our rules and regulations, making sure somebody doesn't steal anything, that they can't do much of anything else either; and we get a system that is burdened and that does not create the efficiencies that we need to more forward. Once again, one of the greater issues that divide the chairman and myself is our philosophies on contracting. But I want to just commend him for working with us on this bill to try to get to where it is today. I know this is important to him.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Chairwoman, I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Duncan) for a unanimous consent request.
Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The administration strongly opposes H.R. 1362, which would impose a new statutory ban on how the government uses acquisition personnel and would restrict the executive branch's ability to determine the appropriate funding for acquisition workforce functions.
That is what they say on their statement on administration policy. We also note that other provisions would impose burdensome statutory requirements that overlap with more efficient administrative efforts to strengthen the use of competition and reduce fraud, waste, and abuse.
The administration also feels that this legislation would limit the Federal Government's ability to tap technical expertise of Federal employees who are former contractor employees.
Frankly, we need the best and the brightest overseeing these contracts. As I take a look at contracts that have failed, a lot of it is due to the fact that we have not had appropriate oversight within the executive branch, and being able to get the best and the brightest is a very, very critical component to this. These restrictions, the administration feels, would lower the quality of procurement, solicitations, and analyses and would significantly harm the executive branch's ability to recruit and retain the experienced procurement officials from the private sector to close skill gaps and strengthen the overall capabilities of the acquisition workforce.
The administration also is concerned with the new requirement in the bill that would impose exhaustive quarterly reporting on every significant contract management deficiency at the contractor and subcontractor levels. This requirement will interfere with agencies' abilities to address and resolve contract performance problems in a timely manner.
The Information Technology Association of America in Arlington, Virginia says: The Association joined with other members of the Acquisition Reform Working Group in pointing out flaws in H.R. 1362, while saying that such significant legislation deserves the same light- of-day and careful consideration as do the major government contracts that the majority seeks to control.
They note that the title of the bill alone mistakenly implies a lack of accountability for government contractors under current law. Their president, Phil Bond, notes that ``to the contrary, there is already abundant chapter and verse to bring best value to government and to protect the interest of taxpayers. What is really needed is better application of existing regulations by a fully staffed professional Federal acquisition corps working with responsible government contractors.''
The letter also points out to committee leaders that many of the contracting issues now being addressed are ``symptoms of the shortages of manpower and training for adequate contract management.'' And they note that ``the government can't retain personnel and fill existing job openings in the acquisition workforce.''
They also joined the working group in taking issue with the sections of the bill regarding disclosure of government contractor overcharges. While agreeing that the proper use and oversight of government contracts is paramount, they dispute any need for quarterly reports to Congress on contract charges that are adjudicated by the Defense Contract Audit Agency, the DCAA. They note that these are unnecessary provisions and would force significant
investment and government resources and additional burdens on acquisition personnel. So the ITAA comes out against it.
They also note that another section of the bill that seeks more restrictive cost reimbursement-type contracts is also unnecessary and potentially harmful. They note that such contracts typically are used when uncertainties and risks are high, as in emergency situations, and development programs when it is not feasible to set a fixed price for the work required. The Federal Acquisitions Regulations, the FAR, already establishes detailed criteria for proper selection of contract type, including limitations on the use of cost-type contracts ``for use only when uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to suit any type of fixed price contract.''
Madam Chairwoman, if we want to fix the Federal contracting system, the appropriate way is to hire, train, retrain, and pay well our acquisition personnel so that they have a toolbox of acquisition options to use to get the best deal for the government in every case, get the best value for the government. The taxpayers' dollars are at stake here, and their role ought to be to make sure the taxpayer dollars are spent most efficiently.
Adding burdens and layers and layers of regulatory reports do nothing to help that situation at all, and in many cases it can be very misleading as these burdens come out and we start taking out DCAA reports that have nothing to do with final adjudications of how these work. We already, by the way, have access to that information in Congress. What we don't have access to information is, and one of the things we would have liked to include, is to take final adjudications on costs that were deemed allowable and see what those costs are per contractor. That could have helped us in ferreting out which contractors are using these items. But this legislation does little to remedy those situations, unfortunately.
Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Chairwoman, may I inquire as to how much time is left on each side?
Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Let me start by saying we all want to limit the use of no-bid contracts. These go back of course to the Revolutionary War, where the troops were marching and they needed food and there is one farmer around. And you can't go out to bid to see who is going to sell you the lowest corn; you take what is there. But they should be limited, because competition is the cornerstone of our contracting system.
Let me go through some of the assertions that are made in support of the bill and give my thoughts.
Assertion one is that spending on sole source and other noncompetitive contracts has more than doubled over the last 5 years. And although spending has increased significantly over the last 5 years, it is due largely to 9/11 and Katrina. The total dollars competed is a percentage of total dollars available for competition. It has remained relatively constant between fiscal years 2001 and 2006, between 61 and 64 percent, according to the FPDS.
This notwithstanding, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Administrator will be seeking to help in the leadership of the CAOs to reinvigorate through administrative means the use of competition and related practice for achieving a competitive environment. The role of competition advocates should be revived, with special emphasis on planning and execution in the management of hard-to-task and delivery orders.
There is an assertion that over the last 5 years the administration has jeopardized taxpayer interests and squandered hundreds of millions of dollars by giving private contractors exclusive control over huge portions of the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.
Frankly, DOD is giving increased attention to contingency contracting, including training for acquisition and program personnel and standard operating procedures. The Department of Defense and other agencies have recognized the need to increase the number of prepositioned, competitively awarded contracts to address contingencies. Also, the Department of Defense has several audit agencies including the Defense Audit Agency and Defense Contract Management Agency working in theater to monitor the contracts and resources.
Another assertion that comes from the other side is that this administration has justified the award of lucrative sole source contracts by citing urgent and compelling needs but then allowed these contracts to continue years after the emergency has passed.
The Chief Acquisition Officers Council, the CAOC, has established an Emergency Response and Recovery Working Group to improve access to information that can assist the acquisition workforce in planning for and addressing emergencies. The working group created a community of practice Web site, accessible at http://acc.dau.mil/emergencyresponse, so that agencies can share information about their policies and procedures, their best practices, their training resources, and other information of interest. For example, the site provides a link to the Emergency Acquisition Field Guide developed by FEMA so other agencies can learn about and adopt, as appropriate, practices employed by FEMA for performing specific assignments or functions in an emergency acquisition environment.
The emergency response and recovery Web site includes a list of interagency contracts that offer the types of supplies and services that were required by agencies to address disaster recovery for Katrina and 9/11, such as communications equipment, fuel and transportation, pharmaceuticals, portable shelters, generators, tarps, bottled water, and emergency meals. The GSA has established a disaster relief and emergency preparedness homepage that provides a quick reference guide to offerings on its Multiple Award Schedules that can be suitable for addressing readiness, intervention, counteractive solutions, or post- emergency logistics.
Another assertion is that cost reimbursement-type contracts leave the taxpayer vulnerable to wasteful spending by providing contractors with little or no incentive to control costs. Between 2000 and 2005, the use of this type of contract has risen 75 percent.
Frankly, according to the FPDS again, the total government spending on contracts has increased considerably, roughly at the same percentage as the increases in cost-type contracts stated above. From fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2005, total spending increased from $219 billion to $380 billion.
But cost-type contracts play a useful and necessary role in contracting when uncertainties involved in contract performance don't permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract. And the contractors get caught on these many times when they move ahead and they estimate it to be one thing and then the needs of the contract change and they end up having to advance costs. So cost-type contracts in these types of situations are proven useful, but they are only good when they get the appropriate oversight from the procurement officers. And we don't address that underlying issue in a significant way in this legislation.
Agencies such as NASA rely on cost-type contracts for critical R&D work, such as planetary science and exploration missions, systems development operation support in physical engineering, and life sciences. In the early 1980s, there was a push towards fixed-price contracts for R&D to address failed major programs, cost overruns. But ultimately Congress passed legislation requiring a secretarial approval for contracts over $25 million. DOD regulations preclude award of a fixed-price contract for a development program unless the level of program risk permits realistic pricing and the use of a fixed-price type contract allows an equitable and sensible allocation of program risk between the government and the contractor.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Will the gentleman yield for just one comment?
Let me just note that on the bills on the Presidential records, the library, the whistleblowers, Mr. Waxman and his staff have worked very well with us. And the record should show that the reason we got such big bipartisan majority was their willingness to bend back and our ability to work back and forth. And I want to, again, commend him.
We have other differences on this bill which is close to my heart that I think he understands and we understand; but even here they have worked with us. And I think the record should note that they have gone out of their way and we appreciate that.
I yield myself 1 minute to note again the reason for the rise in sole-source contracts has been emergencies like 9/11 and Katrina, under which the exigencies which government is faced with at that point to meet in a timely manner doesn't allow you to go out in these cases for a wide swath of bids. But I think we share a common desire to bring more competition into government contracting.
I also want to note that at our committee hearing on February 8, the Inspector General, Richard Skinner, testified that the government's greatest exposure to fraud, waste and abuse is undoubtedly in the area of procurement. As already pointed out by members of this committee, he notes, the problem is not a new one. It dates back to the Federal Government's nearsighted policies in the early 1990s to reduce the Federal workforce. While acquisition management capabilities were being downsized, the procurement workload was on the rise.
I hope to continue to work with the gentleman as we focus on this acquisition workforce and give them the tools they need.
I would yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio, a member of the committee, Mr. Turner.
May I inquire as to how much time I have remaining.
I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California, the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Chairman, we fully support transparency and accountability in decision-making, but we need to remember we are asking for all of these audit reports that are only advisory in nature. They are not disposition. These are questioned costs, and contracting in a war zone or in an emergency often lacks appropriate documentation. But these are allowable costs.
I think to provide those to Congress not only gives you too much information, a lot of it can be misleading and can be misplayed.
Knowing that the results of an audit will be provided to Congress during the negotiation and the resolution process, which is what they are asking for, could unduly influence the impact the audit advice may have on the contracting officer's administrative determination. This inhibits their authority to appropriately and effectively resolve contracting issues using all of the relevant information available to them. This could also have the unintended effect of increasing the number of contract disputes.
But I know my colleague feels with a passion that we need to move ahead and do something of this order. I look forward to working with him on legislation on the acquisition workforce which we don't touch in this area. This legislation I think falls short of the promise, but I appreciate the willingness he has shown to work with us. We will address further issues later in our motion to recommit.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the offeror of the amendment just a clarification question before I yield.
For a company to have to disclose under this, it would be a foreign- owned company, I understand, that is based or has majority operations in a country described in subsection D. Any idea who that would apply to? I am just trying to figure out.
I am trying to figure out what companies this would apply to.
A foreign-owned company could be, if it is on the American Stock Exchange, that probably would not make it a foreign-owned company in all likelihood?
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman).
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter).
Let me just ask the author of the amendment, this would obviously apply, this is a list that evolves, as the Secretary of State certifies, is that correct?
I would assume that Iran, North Korea are probably on that list today?
Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, for example, would probably not be on that list today?
I am prepared to accept the amendment. I congratulate the gentleman for offering it.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Will the gentleman yield 30 seconds?
I will commend my friend from Delaware for offering this amendment. I would just say we are happy, and we are here to support it as well, and we think this adds to the bill.
Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
I am, Mr. Speaker, in its present form.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
This motion to recommit would bar Federal agencies from awarding contracts to colleges and universities that either prohibit on-campus military recruitment, or otherwise do not provide military recruiters access to campuses and to students that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access that is provided to any other employer.
On March 6, 2006, the Supreme Court reversed a Federal appeals court ruling in Rumsfeld vs. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights. In doing so, eight Justices upheld the constitutionality of the so-called Solomon amendment, upon which this motion is based, forbidding most forms of Federal aid to higher educational institutions that deny military recruiters access to students equal to that provided other employers.
Mr. Speaker, military recruiters must be given access to university and college campuses and students that is at least equal in quality and scope provided to other employers.
This motion establishes that requirement government-wide. We already do this to some agencies in government. A number of Departments are already covered; but since this bill is government-wide in scope, we make this government-wide in scope.
This motion establishes that requirement, thereby addressing an apparent trend among certain colleges and universities to attempt to frustrate military recruiters through official and unofficial mistreatment.
Unfortunately, this growing trend is not isolated to the higher education community, as evidenced by the decision last November by the San Francisco Board of Education to phase out Junior ROTC from the high school system over the next 2 years. At a time of war, when we are depending on a volunteer military, it seems counterproductive to be openly discriminating against our military personnel and to create perceptions that military service is not a noble and professional calling.
The Department of Defense noting that certain colleges and universities continue to restrict access or limit opportunities for military recruiters to participate fully in job fairs, placement office services and interview programs, supports congressional efforts to take action to pass legislation granting military recruiters access equal to that of other employers.
The motion to recommit would help prod those colleges and universities that currently do not provide equal access to military recruiters.
We also, I want to note, have a clause in here that this prohibition does not apply to an institution of higher education or a sub-element if the Secretary of Defense determines that the institution has a longstanding policy of pacifism based on historical religious affiliation.
I urge my colleagues to support this.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter).
Mr. Speaker, I would just add, 10 U.S.C. 983 already covers a number of agencies, the Department of Defense and others in terms of contracting and limitations that are put on colleges and universities that don't allow recruiters to come on campuses. This makes it government-wide.
This body has addressed this issue before. But I think it is time to make this government-wide, and I would urge my colleagues to support the motion to recommit.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.