Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I might consume. Today, Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 1361, the RECOVER Act. While there are many important things that this bill does, there…
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I might consume.
Today, Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 1361, the RECOVER Act. While there are many important things that this bill does, there are two provisions in particular, I believe, that unfortunately undermine the good work that has been done by the chairwoman in drafting the legislation.
I want to make clear, I think she has worked very hard. I think the staff has worked very hard to craft what they thought was a good bill, and I think it still has the potential. There are two amendments that we are going to offer subsequent to the general debate argument here, and if those amendments are adopted, I think they fix the bill sufficiently that we can support it because, as I indicated, I think there are many good things in this bill. But without those two provisions being passed, we unfortunately have to oppose it in its current form.
These two provisions, as I indicated, unfortunately make it impossible for me to support it as drafted, and the manager's amendment offered by the chairwoman, while making one of the provisions less problematic, does not assuage our underlying concerns about the two provisions that I just mentioned.
I think everyone can agree that all branches of government failed to respond adequately to the devastation that was Hurricane Katrina, and one of those agencies that did not measure up is the Small Business Administration unfortunately. This is not the conclusion of Democrats or Republicans, or Louisiana or Mississippi Members of Congress. It is a conclusion reached by the GAO, small business owners in the region and even the SBA itself.
While much of the focus on the response to Katrina has focused on the immediate aftermath and the failures of FEMA, the SBA plays a key role in the response to disasters by issuing loans to both homeowners and small businesses affected by the disaster. Thus, an inadequate response by the SBA undermines the recovery of communities devastated by natural disasters. It is vital that the SBA be prepared to handle future disasters, including some worst-case possible scenarios.
Administrator Preston understands this and has taken a number of steps to improve the SBA's readiness and made efforts to ensure that the inadequate response does not repeat itself. Through his efforts, he has reduced backlogs, streamlined loan processing,
improved customer service and identified points where the processing of disaster loans broke down. Administrator Preston also will ensure that the computer systems at the SBA will be improved; establish a reserve corps; utilize non-SBA staff to process loans; establish a new disaster manual that will be finalized by June 1 for the start of the current hurricane season; and continually revise responses to disasters based on the experience of previous disasters.
One may ask why a bill is necessary if Administrator Preston is making these changes. Well, as we have seen, other administrators may not have the same priorities and may reduce preparedness in the future to address other needs of the SBA. Therefore, incorporating many of these changes in statute will ensure that the administrator and SBA personnel will have the appropriate resources and congressional direction to ensure the SBA will have an adequate response to a disaster in the future.
Title I of the bill makes important changes in the SBA's management structure to ensure that the agency is prepared not only for predictable disasters but also the unpredictable ones. Title I requires the administrator to, A, develop a comprehensive disaster response plan; B, conduct an annual disaster simulation exercise; C, maintain a disaster reserve corps; D, create plans to obtain additional office space needed for major disasters; E, coordinate disaster assistance programs with FEMA; and create, from existing personnel, the position of an associate administrator for disaster assistance that has experience in both disaster planning and disaster response. These changes are all beneficial and will ensure that the SBA has the necessary tools and experience to respond to disasters.
These changes are supplemented by section 208, which provides enhanced lending authority to banks and other financial institutions that are preferred SBA lenders to process disaster loans in certain circumstances. Given the expertise of SBA preferred lenders, they should be able to supplement the SBA's capability to process disaster loans when necessary.
There are other important changes in title II that also are beneficial, and I commend the chairwoman, Chairwoman Velazquez, for including those in this legislation. By themselves, these provisions would have made an effective bipartisan bill that ensures the SBA has the current planning and future capacity to respond to a disaster, whether it is a local tornado or an incident of national significance such as Hurricane Katrina.
Unfortunately, the legislation has two critical provisions that, in my view, seriously undercut the otherwise excellent work of the committee in creating a structure that will ensure the SBA is prepared to respond irrespective of the scope of the disaster. The first provision would authorize, according to CBO estimates, $180 million in grants to small businesses that were denied SBA loans. The other provision would grant the administrator the authority to, in essence, create a grant program that replaces grant funds that must be applied against existing disaster loans issued by the SBA. In other words, it allows a double compensation, a person to be compensated for the same damage twice. Given my concern about these two provisions, I will be offering amendments at the appropriate time to strike these two provisions, two amendments that we will be offering.
If these two provisions are removed, I think the House would then be able to pass a sound bill on an overwhelmingly bipartisan basis that dramatically improves the administrative structure by which the SBA responds to disasters in a fiscally responsible manner.
As I indicated before, if the two amendments are not passed, unfortunately I am going to have to oppose this particular piece of legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he might consume to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Jordan) who, as one of the newer members of the committee, has been very active and is really contributing much to the committee already.
Mr. Chairman, we reserve the balance of our time.
Mr. Chairman, we will continue to reserve our time.
Mr. Chairman, we will reserve the balance of our time.
Mr. Chairman, prior to yielding back all our time, if I could just make a comment or two. I will yield myself as much time as I may consume. I will be very brief.
I just want to reiterate that there are things within this bill which I think are very good efforts in resolving some of the difficulties that we saw in Katrina.
First of all, the SBA's response time for loans and other things was unacceptable, and it is absolutely critical that it be improved upon. And I think there are some things in this bill that do just that. For example, better coordination between the SBA and FEMA; the requirement of a plan ahead of time, a disaster plan ahead of time that everybody knows about so you are not looking for a plan or trying to put one together after the disaster has already hit; it makes sense to do that ahead of time. This calls for this.
It calls for a reserve corps of trained personnel, which I particularly like because you are talking about training people ahead of time, but not necessarily hiring them as new government employees that then one has to pay and pay compensation to over a long period of time. So I like the fact that we are talking about training a reserve corps ahead of time.
I think the idea of having simulation exercises called for ahead of time makes a lot of sense so that people are prepared.
As I indicated before, however, there are a couple of, in my view, fatal flaws to this particular piece of legislation, which we are going to address in a few moments here in a couple of amendments. And if they pass, then we would be very supportive of the whole act. If they don't, unfortunately, we would have to oppose the bill.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
This amendment is really rather simple. It just strikes section 211 of the bill as amended by the manager's amendment. Even though the manager's amendment addresses the direct cost provision of the original section as
determined by the CBO score, section 211 still is fraught with one major problem. And that is that it allows double compensation for the same injury or destruction or problem that the person had.
As I understand section 211 in the manager's amendment, here is how that provision operates: For example, a homeowner applies for a physical disaster loan from the SBA for, say, $100,000. The homeowner then receives a grant from the State for $50,000 for the same destruction. Under existing law, the homeowner would have to immediately pay back $50,000 of the SBA loan because the SBA loan only covers amounts not otherwise compensated for through some other financial resource. Typically, that is insurance, but it does not have to be. Section 211 does not change the requirement that the homeowner would have to pay down the $50,000 in the disaster loan. Instead, section 211 would then allow the homeowner to apply for a grant from the SBA to replace the same amount of money that they had just paid to the SBA to reduce their loan.
Now you are probably asking yourself why go through this convoluted process. Well, this is the only way for the majority to obtain a program that does not require direct spending, and therefore, it gets around the PAYGO problem. But even though this is an improvement over the bill as reported out of the committee because it has no direct spending and therefore is in compliance with PAYGO, it remains fundamentally flawed.
The disaster loan program is just that: the Federal Government's program designed to provide redress to those homeowners and small businesses injured in a disaster. And it is important to note that the vast majority of loan recipients, both businesses and homeowners, receive loans at heavily subsidized interest rates of 3 or 4 percent interest. It is not a grant program and was never designed to be a grant program. The interest rate subsidy, a 30-year term, and the SBA's authority to suspend payment on principal and interest constitute the compensation needed to rebuild many areas, from Chatsworth in California to Homestead in Florida.
Now, section 211 of H.R. 1361 has the recipient of a disaster loan obtaining a grant from a source other than the SBA, using that money to pay off all or a portion of the SBA disaster loan, and then apply to the SBA for a grant to replace the grant money that the recipient of the disaster loan just paid the SBA. And, again, I know this sounds very convoluted. In essence, there is a determination that double compensation is needed because the rather robust compensation already included in the Small Business Act and sufficient for other disasters is insufficient compensation. It is also important to note that, for victims of Hurricane Katrina, there are billions of other dollars that have been made available to assist these victims on an ad hoc basis, yet it is never enough. And this bill indicates that.
Now comes section 211 of H.R. 1361 in a clear effort to ensure that victims of Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma and Rita receive double compensation. This raises two distinct questions. First, why do victims of these three hurricanes get special treatment of double compensation, and why should not other disaster victims get double compensation? Yes, Katrina was a tragedy, but so were Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Charley and the attacks of September 11, for example. This seems incredibly arbitrary to select only those three disasters for something as unusual as double compensation.
Second and far more important is the concept, as I indicated, of double compensation. It has been a longstanding tradition of American jurisprudence that a party shall not receive double compensation for the same injury. That concept is codified in the disaster loan provisions of the Small Business Act by prohibiting the SBA from issuing a loan for amounts already compensated for by insurance or other means. Thus under current law, a disaster loan applicant cannot get an insurance claim for $100,000 for a $100,000 loss and also get an SBA disaster loan for the same amount of money.
Mr. Chairman, I ask that Members support this amendment. It is fiscally responsible and continues to recognize that individuals should not be granted double compensation.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Akin).
Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment is very straightforward. It strikes section 210 of the bill. Section 210 authorizes the administrator to issue grants of up to $100,000 to small businesses located in areas affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma, but only if the business was denied a disaster loan by the SBA.
This is really, in my view, the height of fiscal irresponsibility. The SBA's determination of whether to grant a disaster loan is based on its determination of reasonable assurance that you can repay your loan, which is a direct quote from the SBA's rules found in the Code of Federal Regulations. Thus, if the SBA has denied a business a disaster loan, it already has determined that it is unlikely, for whatever reason, to repay the loan. In other words, its capacity as a viable business is seriously called into question.
Section 210 provides that despite this determination, the Federal Government should create a grant program of up to $100,000 to help small businesses whose survivability was highly improbable to survive in the first place.
Again, the SBA has indicated that they don't think this business is viable, that it is going to survive, and then we are going to turn around and give them up to $100,000. It is just not fiscally responsible.
To fully fund all of those eligible, CBO estimates that the costs could be up to $180 million. I want to repeat that: $180 million we are talking about here. This seems again fiscally irresponsible, to fund grants when the SBA already has determined that the businesses are not likely to survive.
It also remains unclear whether the grants will be sufficient to satisfy the needs of small businesses. How many will be able to survive on a grant of $100,000 if they could not repay a disaster loan of that amount? CBO did not answer that question, but I suspect very few of these businesses will survive.
Although the provision is written to include all small businesses affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma, there are limitations on which businesses can apply based on the amount of housing stock in a county or parish that is damaged. It is highly likely that only small businesses in Louisiana will qualify. Was this done to reduce costs? If so, why are only Louisiana businesses favored? Were not many small businesses throughout the region devastated by these hurricanes? It seems patently unfair to single out certain businesses for a very generous grant program.
Mr. Chairman, I ask that Members support this amendment. To do otherwise, in my view, is just not a fiscally responsible stand to take. Again, every Member has to stand according to their own vote, and I am sure we will determine this based upon what they consider to be its merits.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.