Mr. President, today I am introducing the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 2007. This legislation is based on a bill I first offered in 2005. It is focused on facilitating…
Mr. President, today I am introducing the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 2007. This legislation is based on a bill I first offered in 2005. It is focused on facilitating implementation of the Nunn-Lugar program and removing some of the self- imposed restrictions that complicate or delay the destruction of weapons of mass destruction.
In 2005, the Senate approved this legislation in the form of an amendment I offered to the National Defense Authorization Act by an overwhelming vote of 78 to 19. Last year, the Senate adopted a similar amendment by unanimous consent. Unfortunately, these provisions were not included in either conference agreement.
While well-intentioned, the congressionally-imposed conditions on Nunn-Lugar have inhibited the amount of work that can be done to eliminate and safeguard weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union. Each year, a six month, thirteen step certification and waiver process must be completed before appropriated funds can be obligated to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. This annual process wastes money and valuable time--time lost in the fight against proliferation. In the field, it can prevent the availability of funds already authorized and appropriated by Congress for the Nunn-Lugar Program, thus delaying critical dismantlement work.
To date, the Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated for destroyed: 6, 934 nuclear warheads; 637 ICBMs; 485 ICBM silos; 81 ICBM mobile missile lauchers; 155 bombers; 906 nuclear air-to-surface missiles; 436 submarine missile launchers; 601 submarine launched missiles; 30 nuclear submarines; and 194 nuclear test tunnels.
Perhaps most importantly, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan emerged from the Soviet Union as the 3rd, 4th, and 8th largest nuclear weapons powers in the world. Today, all three are nuclear weapons free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program.
The Nunn-Lugar Program currently has a permanent waiver authority, to be used on an annual basis, for the congressionally-imposed certifications on the Nunn-Lugar program. While the waiver permits the program to continue its important work, the waiver does not solve the underlying problem.
In 1991, concerns surrounding Russian commitments to nonproliferation led the original Nunn-Lugar legislation to require President to certify annually that each recipient is ``committed to'' meeting six conditions: 1. Making a substantial investment in dismantling or destroying such weapons; 2. forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction; 3. forgoing any use of fissionable and other components of destroyed nuclear weapons in new nuclear weapons; 4. facilitating United States verification of weapons destruction carried out under the program; 5. complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and 6. observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection of minorities.
At the time, these conditions were important to defining the U.S. strategic relationship with each Nunn-Lugar recipient. The question we must answer today is, what national security benefit do the certification requirements provide the American people? Do the conditions make it easier or harder to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Russia or elsewhere? Do the conditions make it more likely or less likely that weapons are eliminated?
Congress imposed an additional six conditions on construction of the chemical weapons destruction program at Shchuchye. These conditions include: 1. Full and accurate Russian declaration on the size of its chemical weapons stockpile; 2. allocation by Russia of at least $25,000,000 to chemical weapons elimination; 3. development by Russia of a practical plan for destroying its stockpile of nerve agents; 4. enactment of a law by Russia that provides for the elimination of all nerve agents at a single site; 5. an agreement by Russia to destroy or convert its chemical weapons production facilities at Volgograd and Novocheboksark; and 6. a demonstrated commitment from the international community to fund and build infrastructure needed to support and operate the facility.
Some will suggest that the certification process is, at most, an annoyance, but not a serious programmatic threat. I disagree. While well intentioned, these conditions delay and complicate efforts to destroy weapons of mass destruction. If the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the number one national security threat facing our country, we cannot permit any delays in our response.
The Bush Administration withheld Russia's certification in 2002 because of concerns in the chemical and biological weapon arenas. President Bush recognized the predicament and requested waiver authority for the Congressionally-imposed conditions. While awaiting temporary waiver to be authorized in law, new Nunn-Lugar projects were stalled and no new contracts were finalized between April 16 to August 9, 2002. This delay caused numerous disarmament projects in Russia to be put on hold, including: 1. Installation of security enhancements at ten nuclear weapons storage sites; 2. initiation of the dismantlement of two strategic missile submarines and thirty submarine-launched ballistic missiles; and 3. initiation of the dismantlement of SS-24 rail-mobile and SS-25 road-mobile ICBMs and launchers. Clearly,
these projects were in the national security interest of the United States, but they were delayed because of self-imposed conditions and bureaucratic red tape. A second period of delay began on October 1, 2002, with the expiration of a temporary waiver. Again, U.S. national security suffered with the postponement of critical dismantlement and security activities for some six weeks until Congress acted.
The events of 2002 are not the exceptions: They are the rule. In some years, Nunn-Lugar funds are not available for expenditure until more than half of the fiscal year has passed, and weapons of mass destruction slated for dismantlement await the U.S. bureaucratic process. This means that the program is denied access to these funds for large portions of the fiscal year in which they were intended to be spent while critical nonproliferation projects are put on hold. The bureaucracy generates reams of paper and yet ultimately produces an outcome that was never in doubt; namely, that it is in the national security interests of the United States to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Russia and elsewhere.
The certification and waiver processes consume hundreds of man-hours of work by the State Department, the Intelligence Community, the Pentagon, as well as other departments and agencies. This time could be better spent tackling the proliferation threats facing our country. Instead of interdicting WMD shipments, identifying the next AQ Khan, or locating hidden stocks of chemical and biological weapons, our nonproliferation experts spend their time compiling reports and assembling certification or waiver determinations. Even more frustrating is the fact that the majority of these reports are repetitive, in that the Department of State already reports on most of these issues in other formats.
Some will argue that the certification process provides the Administration with leverage on Russian behavior. I disagree. I do not believe any of the certification subjects are a good reason to stop the destruction and safeguarding of weapons of mass destruction. I would argue just the opposite; these are reasons for us to accelerate our efforts and become more vigilant in our approach.
These programmatic delays have given Russia, and others, cover to hide behind, pointing the finger of blame on the United States for slow program implementation and taking the spotlight off their failure to provide access and transparency. While we call on President Putin to speed up dismantlement and open more sites for security upgrades, congressionally-imposed conditions and funding delays are used as arguments against accelerating Nunn-Lugar projects.
I have concluded that despite the best intentions of Congress, the certification requirements on the Nunn-Lugar program have outlasted their utility. While the goals of the conditions are pure, they simply do not belong on nonproliferation programs. I would point out that the equally important nonproliferation programs at the Departments of Energy and State do not have these conditions. They do not suffer from the annual certification and waiver process. Why should the Nunn-Lugar program, focused on the dismantlement of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, be singled out for this treatment or need for leverage.
I am pleased that a number of administration officials and groups have endorsed the elimination of the certification and waiver process. The 9/11 Commission Report weighed in with an important endorsement of the Nunn-Lugar program, saying that ``Preventing the proliferation of [weapons of mass destruction] warrants a maximum effort--by strengthening counter-proliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.'' The Report went on to say that ``Nunn-Lugar . . . is now in need of expansion, improvement and resources.'' More recently, the follow-on 9/11 Public Discourse Project wrote that the elimination of the certification requirements ``is an important step forward in protecting the United States against catastrophic attack.''
Secretary Rice has testified that the Administration strongly supports my efforts pointing out that ``flexibility in being able to administer the program would be most welcome.'' Bob Joseph, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, also expressed his support saying pointedly to me that ``the fact that there are 13 steps that can take . . . six months or longer to get through certainly . . . underlines the rationale for [this legislation] . . . Whatever we can do, Senator, to improve the efficiency of the process, to reduce the time lines involved, and to provide greater flexibility for action, I would be in favor of.''
Charles Boyd, USAF (Ret.) and Stanley Weiss, the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman, respectively, of the Business Executives for National Security, wrote to the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate expressing support for the elimination of the certification requirements on the Nunn-Lugar program. They wrote in part: ``Even though conditions can be waived, doing so diverts time and effort that could otherwise be used to meet proliferation challenges. Relying on waivers also preserves the risk that funding delays could threaten existing projects and investments.''
In sum, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the number one national security threat facing the United States today. The Nunn-Lugar program is making tremendous contributions to the elimination of potentially vulnerable stockpiles. While the Congress' intentions in imposing annual certification requirements were pure, the process has evolved into a bureaucratic quagmire in to which months of work by numerous departments, agencies and bureaus are sunk. The Administration toils to produce a forgone conclusion; namely, that it is in U.S. interests to eliminate and secure weapons and materials of mass destruction. The funds for these operations are delayed while threats remain unaddressed. This is red-tape that we can do without. The only practical effect is unnecessary delays to our response to the number one national security threat facing the United States.