Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007

Mr. President, Senators Craig, Kennedy, Martinez, Boxer, Voinovich and I are once again introducing legislation that will address the chronic labor shortage in our Nation's agricultural industry. This bill is a priority for me--and for the tens of thousands of farmers who are currently suffering--and I hope we will move it forward early in this Congress.

The Agricultural Job Opportunities, Benefits, and Security Act, or AgJOBS, is the product of more than ten years of work. It is a bipartisan bill supported by growers, farmers, and farm workers alike. It passed the Senate last year as part of the comprehensive immigration reform bill last spring in the 109th Congress. It is time to move this bill forward.

The agricultural industry is in crisis. Farmers across the Nation report a 20 percent decline in labor.

The result is that there are simply not enough farm workers to harvest the crops.

The Nation's agricultural industry has suffered. If we do not enact a workable solution to the agricultural labor crisis, we risk a national production loss of $5 billion to $9 billion each year,

according to the American Farm Bureau.

California, in particular, will suffer. California is the single largest agricultural state in the nation. California agriculture accounts for $34 billion in annual revenue. There 76,500 farms that produce half of the nation's fruits, vegetables, and nuts from only 3 percent of the Nation's farmland.

California farms produce approximately 350 different crops: pears, walnuts, raisins, lettuce, onions, cotton, just to name a few.

Many of the farmers who grow these crops have been in the business for generations. They farm the land that their parents and their grandparents farmed before them.

The sad consequence of the labor shortage is that many of these farmers are giving up their farms. Some are leaving the business entirely. Others are bulldozing their fruit trees--literally pulling out trees that have been in the family for generations--because they do not have the labor they need to harvest their fruit.

Once the trees are gone, they are replaced by crops that do not require manual labor. And our pears, our apples, our oranges will come from foreign sources.

The trend is quite clear. If there is not a means to grow and harvest our produce here, we will import produce from China, from Mexico, from other countries who have the labor they need.

We will put American farmers out of business. And there will be a ripple effect felt throughout the economy: in farm equipment, inputs, packaging, processing, transportation, marketing, lending and insurance. Jobs will be lost and our economy will suffer.

The reality is that Americans have come to rely on undocumented workers to harvest their crops for them.

In California alone, we rely on approximately one million undocumented workers to harvest the crops. The United Farm Workers estimate that undocumented workers make up as much as 90 percent the farm labor payroll.

Americans simply will not do the work. It is hard, stooped labor, requiring long and unpredictable hours. Farm workers must leave home and travel from farm to farm to plant, prune, and harvest crops according to the season.

We must come to terms with the fact that we rely on an undocumented migrant work force. We must bring those workers out of the shadows and create a legal and enforceable means to provide labor for agriculture. That realization is what led to the long and careful negotiations creating AgJOBS.

The AgJOBS bill is a two part bill. Part one identifies and deals with those undocumented agricultural workers who have been working in the United States for the past 2 years or more. Part two creates a more usable H-2A Program, to implement a realistic and effective guest worker program.

The first step requires undocumented agricultural workers to apply for a ``blue card'' if they can demonstrate that they have worked in American agriculture for at least 150 workdays over the past 2 years. The blue card entitles the worker to a temporary legal resident status.

The blue card itself is encrypted and machine readable; it is tamper and counterfeit resistant, and contains biometric identifiers unique to the farm worker.

The second step requires that a blue card holder work in American agriculture for an additional 5 years for at least 100 workdays a year, or 3 years at 150 workdays a year.

Blue card workers would have to pay a $500 fine. The workers can travel abroad and reenter the United States and they may work in other, non-agricultural jobs, as long as they meet the agricultural work requirements.

The blue card worker's spouse and minor children, who already live in the United States, may also apply for a temporary legal status and identification card, which would permit them to work and travel.

The total number of blue cards is capped at 1.5 million over a five year period and the program sunsets after 5 years.

At the end of the required work period, the blue card worker may apply for a green card to become a legal permanent resident.

There are also a number of safeguards. If a blue card worker does not apply for a green card, or does not fulfill the work requirements, that individual can be deported.

Likewise, a blue card holder who commits a felony, three misdemeanors, or any crime that involves bodily injury, the threat of serious bodily injury, or harm to property in excess of $500, cannot get a green card and can be deported.

This program, for the first time, allows us to identify those hundreds of thousands of farm workers who now work in the shadows. It requires the farm workers to come forward and to be identified in exchange for the right to work and live legally in the United States. And it gives farmers the legal certainty they need to hire the workers they need.

The program also modifies the H-2A guest worker program so that it realistically responds to our agricultural needs.

Currently, the H-2A program is bureaucratic, unresponsive, expensive, and prone to litigation. Farmers cannot get the labor when they need it. AgJOBS offers a much-needed reform of the outdated system.

The labor certification process, which often takes 60 days or more, is replaced by an ``attestation'' process. The employer can file a fax- back application form agreeing to abide by the requirements of the H-2A program. Approval should occur in 48 to 72 hours.

The interstate clearance order to determine whether there are U.S. workers who can qualify for the jobs is replaced by a requirement that the employer file a job notification with the local office of the state Employment Security Agency. Advertising and positive recruitment must take place in the local labor market area.

Agricultural associations can continue to file applications on behalf of members.

The statutory prohibition against ``adversely affecting'' U.S. workers is eliminated. The Adverse Effect Wage Rate is instead frozen for 3 years, and thereafter indexed by a methodology that will lead to its gradual replacement with a prevailing wage standard.

Employers may elect to provide a housing allowance in lieu of housing if the governor determines that there is adequate rental housing available in the area of employment.

Inbound and return transportation and subsistence are required on the same basis as under the current program, except that trips of less than 100 miles are excluded, and workers whom an employer is not required to provide housing are excluded.

The motor vehicle safety standards for U.S. workers are extended to H-2A workers.

Petitions for admission of H-2A workers must be processed and the consulate or port of entry notified within 7 days of receipt. Requirements are the same as current law.

Petitions extending aliens' stay or changing employers are valid upon filing.

Employers may apply for the admission of new H-2A workers to replace those who abandoned their work or are terminated for cause, and the Department of Homeland Security is required to remove H-2A aliens who abandoned their work.

H-2A visas will be secure and counterfeit resistant.

A new limited federal right of action is available to foreign workers to enforce the economic benefits required under the H-2A program, and any benefits expressly offered by the employer in writing. A statute of limitations of three years is imposed.

Finally, lawsuits in State court under State contract law alleging violations of the H-2A program requirements and obligations are expressly preempted. Such State court lawsuits have been the venue of choice for litigation against H-2A employers in recent years.

AgJOBS is the one part of the immigration bill about which there is uniform agreement. Everyone knows that agriculture in America is supported by undocumented workers. As immigration enforcement tightens up, and increasing numbers of people are prevented from crossing the borders or are being deported, the result is our crops go unharvested.

We are faced today with a very practical dilemma and one that is easy to solve. The legislation has been vetted over and over again. Senator Craig, I,

and a multitude of other Senators have sat down with the growers, with the farm bureaus, with the chambers, with everybody who knows agriculture, and they have all signed off on the AgJOBS bill.

This is our opportunity to solve a real problem.

I ask my colleagues to join Senator Craig, Senator Kennedy, Senator Martinez, Senator Boxer, Senator Voinovich and me in supporting this legislation.

I also ask by unanimous consent that the text of this bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise to introduce legislation to protect one of Americans' most valuable but vulnerable assets: social security numbers.

The bill I propose is identical to legislation that I introduced last year. This is the fifth Congress in which I have proposed legislation to protect social security numbers. I stand before you again today because I believe that this issue is too important to ignore.

We all know that once a person's social security number is compromised, the path to identity theft is a short one. The Federal Trade Commission estimates that as many as 10 million Americans have their identities stolen each year.

The crime takes many forms. Thieves can obtain social security numbers through public records--marriage licenses, professional licenses, and countless other public documents--many of which are available on the internet.

These stolen social security numbers then act like virtual keys, allowing the thieves to unlock an individual's identity.

Thieves open credit cards and charge them to the max. Often, the victim does not even realize what has happened until they are denied credit in the future because of the unpaid debt on the fraudulent credit cards.

Thieves open bank accounts in the victim's name and write bad checks.

Thieves get driver's licenses or identification cards, and even apply for government benefits in the victim's name.

Identity theft is serious. A person whose identity is stolen can lose thousands of dollars and take months or even years to regain their good name and credit.

The damage, loss, and stress of identity theft are considerable.

Victims may lose job opportunities, or be denied loans for education, housing, or cars because of negative information on their credit reports. They may even be arrested for crimes they did not commit.

The ease with which social security numbers can be accessed is distressing, but also, unnecessary.

The Social Security Number Misuse Prevention Act would require government agencies and businesses to do more to protect Americans' social security numbers. The bill would: stop the sale or display of a person's social security number without his or her express consent; prevent Federal, State and local governments from displaying social security numbers on public records posted on the Internet; end the printing of social security numbers on government checks; prohibit the employing of inmates for tasks that give them access to the social security numbers of other individuals; limit the circumstances in which businesses could ask a customer for his or her social security number; commission a study of the current uses of social security numbers and the impact on privacy and data security; and institute criminal and civil penalties for misuse of social security numbers.

This legislation is simple and necessary to stop the growing epidemic of identity theft that has been plaguing America and its citizens.

As we move further into the information age and rely more on information sharing, this problem will only get worse, unless we take action. I urge my colleagues to support the Social Security Number Misuse Prevention Act.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act.

It is vitally important that Congress take immediate action to ensure that individuals are notified when companies, Federal agencies, and other institutions suffer security breaches that could jeopardize their personal information.

The Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act is a simple, straightforward bill that would require that notice be sent to individuals in the event of a data breach which compromises their personal information.

Providing individuals with knowledge that their personal information has been accessed by a hacker will allow them to take action to prevent or limit the damage caused by these security breaches.

The need for such legislation is, unfortunately, self-evident given the spate of data breaches we have all read and heard about. Unfortunately, almost every week we learn of a new breach.

For example, there have been major data breaches in just the last few months at Boeing, UCLA, the Colorado Department of Human Services, Starbucks, the Chicago Voters' Database, and Akron Children's Hospital.

Given this ongoing problem, it is not surprising that Americans have made it clear that they want Congress to act. A September 2005 CBS News/New York Times national poll on privacy and identity theft found that 89 percent of Americans are ``concerned'' about the theft of their personal identity information and 68 percent of Americans feel that Congress should do more to regulate personal data and its collection.

According to the Federal Trade Commission identity theft affects approximately 10 million Americans each year. In 2004, there were 635,173 identity theft and fraud complaints made to the Federal Trade Commission's Consumer Sentinel. In 2004, identity fraud cost Americans $52.6 billion dollars. Over the past 2 years, approximately 18 million individuals in this country have been exposed or affected by identity theft.

Data breaches threaten individual's economic and emotional well being. A person whose identity is stolen can lose thousands of dollars and it can take months or even years for a person to regain their good name and credit. So when a data breach occurs, people have a right to find out as soon as possible.

That is why I have introduced and tried to pass legislation that would: require that the Federal Government and business entities notify individuals when there has been a security breach involving their personal data; ensure that the notice is provided without unreasonable delay; create very limited exceptions to notification for national security and law enforcement purposes, as well as instances in which law enforcement certifies that there is no threat of harm to the individual; provide civil remedies against those who do not notify individuals and the provisions of the bill would be enforced by State attorney generals; and pre-empt all state laws so that there is a single, nationwide notification requirement.

I strongly believe that individuals have a right to be notified when their most sensitive information is compromised--because it is truly their information.

The instant legislation will give all Americans more control and confidence about the safety of their sensitive personal information. They will know when their data has been compromised so that they take the appropriate steps to protect themselves.

In November 2005, the Judiciary Committee approved the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act. That bill included similar notification legislation. Unfortunately, the Senate took no further action and the bill expired at the end of the 109th Congress.

Since then, the problem of identity theft has worsened--there have been numerous large scale data security breaches involving companies, federal agencies, and universities.

We cannot afford to keep waiting to act. I urge the Senate to pass the Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act to give Americans the information they need to protect themselves from identity theft.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, last November, John York, the owner of the San Francisco 49ers, announced his intention to move the team to Santa Clara.

The 49ers have been an integral part of San Francisco for the past 60 years. The team was founded in 1946 as part of the All-American Football Conference and joined the National Football League in 1950, when the two leagues merged.

The team's name is derived from the city's history, celebrating the miners who rushed to San Francisco in search of gold in 1849 and helped build the city.

The team has been a part of San Francisco for so long, and is such a central part of its culture, that the prospect of the team leaving concerns many of the people of San Francisco.

In response, I am introducing the Football Fairness Act that provides a new and limited antitrust exemption that is designed to slow the frequent movement of National Football League teams and prevent communities from suffering the financial and intangible costs of these moves.

As Mayor of San Francisco, I had the pleasure of witnessing several 49ers' Super Bowl victory parades.

What I remember most about those victories is the way the team's success brought the city together. I've also seen other cities unite in celebration of their teams' championships.

Our football teams are more than just businesses. They are a common denominator that cut across class, race, and gender to bond the people of a city. They are a key component of a city's culture and identity.

There are instances where a city cannot support a team, but it is disheartening when a city that can--and does--support a team is nevertheless abandoned and the loyalty of the fans discarded.

In 1985, then 49ers owner Eddie DeBartolo explored the possibility of moving the team to San Jose. As Mayor of San Francisco, I worked with the 49ers and we were able to reach an agreement to keep the team in San Francisco.

Today, I remain hopeful that an agreement to keep the team will be reached that will benefit the people of San Francisco and the 49ers' organization.

However, this situation highlights a broader trend of NFL teams abandoning cities after those communities invested substantial funds and good will into a team.

This persistent movement is bad for our cities.

In the last 25 years, National Football League teams have moved 7 times: Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles in 1982, Baltimore Colts to Indianapolis in 1984, St. Louis Cardinals to Tempe in 1988, Los Angeles Rams to St. Louis in 1994, Los Angeles Raiders to Oakland in 1994, Cleveland Browns to Baltimore in 1996, and Houston Oilers to Nashville in 1997.

However, during that same time period only 1 Major League Baseball franchise moved. In 2004, with the approval of Major League Baseball, the Montreal Expos became the Washington Nationals.

Why has there been stability in baseball, while National Football League teams have moved so frequently?

Unlike the NFL, Major League Baseball has an antitrust exemption which gives the league and its owners control over the movement of its teams.

When the Oakland Raiders sought to relocate to Los Angeles in 1982, the National Football League's owners voted to prevent the move. However, the courts found that the NFL's intervention was a violation of antitrust laws, and the League could do nothing to prevent the Raiders from moving.

Just 12 years later, the Raiders left Los Angeles to return to the same city and stadium it had abandoned.

If a city is incapable of supporting a team, it is understandable that a franchise would move. However, of the six cities that have seen National Football League teams leave in the last 25 years, five of those cities later received another NFL franchise.

It is clear that NFL teams are not moving because cities cannot support teams.

To address the real costs imposed on communities by the persistent and unnecessary franchise movement that we

have witnessed, I am introducing the Football Fairness Act.

The Football Fairness Act is straightforward and it is limited.

It would permit the National Football League to review and restrict its teams' movement. This should help keep the fans who support the NFL from being left out of the equation.

The Act is targeted. It limits the exemption from antitrust laws solely to the National Football League's ability to prevent the movement of its franchises. Consequently, the Act will not diminish competition.

I urge my colleague to support the Football Fairness Act and help prevent the damage done to fans and communities by frequent NFL franchise movement.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I am pleased today to introduce the Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007. I want to thank Senator Sununu for once again cosponsoring this bill, which we also introduced in the last Congress. Senator Sununu has consistently been a leader on privacy issues, and I am pleased to work with him on this effort. I also want to thank Senators Leahy, Akaka, and Wyden, for their continuing support of the bill.

The controversial data analysis technology known as data mining is capable of reviewing millions of both public and private records on each and every American. The possibility of government law enforcement or intelligence agencies fishing for patterns of criminal or terrorist activity in these vast quantities of digital data raises serious privacy and civil liberties issues--not to mention serious questions about the effectiveness of these types of searches. But four years after Congress first learned about and defunded the Defense Department's program called Total Information Awareness, there is still much Congress does not know about the Federal Government's work on data mining.

We have made some progress. We know from reviews conducted by the Government Accountability Office that as of May 2004 there were nearly 200 Federal data mining programs, more than one hundred of which relied on personal information and 29 of which were for the purpose of investigating terrorists or criminals. And we have learned a few more details on five of those programs from a follow-up report that GAO issued in August 2005. We also have a brief report from the DHS Inspector General published in August 2006, and as a result of my amendment to the DHS appropriations bill we have a July 2006 report from the Privacy Office at the Department of Homeland Security that provides some interesting policy suggestions relating to data mining.

But this information has come to us haphazardly, and lacks detail about the precise nature of the data mining programs being utilized or developed, their efficacy, and the consequences Americans could face as a result. Furthermore, much of the reporting thus far has focused on the Department of Homeland Security. It also appears there has been little if any government-wide consideration of privacy policies for these types of programs. Indeed, public debate on government data mining has been generated more by press stories than as a result of congressional oversight.

My bill would require all Federal agencies to report to Congress within 180 days and every year thereafter on data mining programs developed or used to find a pattern or anomaly indicating terrorist or other criminal activity on the part of individuals, and how these programs implicate the civil liberties and privacy of all Americans. If necessary, specific information in the various reports could be classified.

This is information we need to have. Congress should not be learning the details about data mining programs after millions of dollars are spent testing or using data mining against unsuspecting Americans. The possibility of unchecked, secret use of data mining technology threatens one of the most important values that we are fighting for in the war against terrorism--freedom.

Data mining could rely on a combination of intelligence data and personal information like individuals' traffic violations, credit card purchases, travel records, medical records, and virtually any information contained in commercial or public databases. Congress must conduct oversight to make sure that all government agencies engaged in fighting terrorism and other criminal enterprises--not just the Department of Homeland Security, but also the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense and others--use these types of sensitive personal information effectively and appropriately.

Let me clarify what this bill does not do. It does not have any effect on the government's use of commercial data to conduct individualized searches on people who are already suspects, nor does it require that the government report on these types of searches. It does not end funding for any program, determine the rules for use of data mining technology, or threaten any ongoing investigation that might use data mining technology.

My bill would simply provide Congress with information about the nature of the technology and the data that will be used. The Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act would require all government agencies to assess

the efficacy of the data mining technology they are using or developing--that is, whether the technology can deliver on the promises of each program. In addition, my bill would make sure that Congress knows whether the Federal agencies using data mining technology have considered and developed policies or guidelines to protect the privacy and due process rights of individuals, such as privacy technologies and redress procedures. With complete information about the current data mining plans and practices of the Federal Government, Congress will be able to conduct a thorough review of the costs and benefits of the practice of data mining on a program-by-program basis and make considered judgments about whether programs should go forward. Congress will also be able to evaluate whether new privacy rules are necessary.

In addition, Congress must look closely at the government's activities because data mining is unproven in this area. Some argue that data mining can help locate potential terrorists before they strike. But we do not, today, have evidence that pattern-based data mining will prevent terrorism. In fact, some technology experts have warned that this type of data mining is not the right approach for the terrorism problem. Just last month, the Cato Institute released a report--coauthored by a scientist specializing in data analytics and an information privacy expert--concluding that ``[t]he only thing predictable about predictive data mining for terrorism is that it would be consistently wrong.''

Some commercial uses of data mining have been successful, but have arisen in a very different context than counterterrorism efforts. For example, the financial world has successfully used data mining to identify people committing fraud because it has data on literally millions, if not billions, of historical financial transactions. And the banks and credit card companies know, in large part, which of those past transactions have turned out to be fraudulent. So when they apply sophisticated statistical algorithms to that massive amount of historical data, they are able to make a pretty good guess about what a fraudulent transaction might look like in the future.

We do not have that kind of historical data about terrorists and sleeper cells. We have just a handful of individuals whose past actions can be analyzed, which makes it virtually impossible to apply the kind of advanced statistical analysis required to use data mining in this way. That raises serious questions about whether data mining will ever be able to locate an actual terrorist. Before the government starts reviewing personal information about every man, woman and child in this country, we should learn what data mining can and can't do--and what limits and protections are needed if data mining programs do go forward.

We must also bear in mind that there will inevitably be errors in the underlying data. Everyone knows people who have had errors on their credit reports--and that is the one area of commercial data where the law already imposes strict accuracy requirements. Other types of commercial data are likely to be even more inaccurate. Even if the technology itself were effective, I am very concerned that innocent people could be ensnared because of mistakes in the data that make them look suspicious. The recent rise in identity theft, which creates even more data accuracy problems, makes it even more important that we address this issue.

I also want to touch on one issue that has proved difficult in many debates about data mining: how to define the term. What is data mining? From policy debates to government reports, many people have wrestled with this question. While it can be defined more broadly, for the purpose of this reporting requirement, data mining is limited to the process of attempting to predict future events or actions by discovering or locating patterns or anomalies in data. However, for purposes of the reporting requirement in this bill, which seeks information on those data mining programs most likely to threaten the privacy and civil liberties of Americans, I have limited the definition in a couple of other ways. First, the bill's core definition of data mining is to conduct a query, search or other analysis of one or more electronic databases to ``discover a predictive pattern or an anomaly indicative of terrorist or criminal activity on the part of any individual or individuals.'' Data mining has a number of applications at various government agencies outside the context of terrorism and other criminal investigations, but I have limited the definition for purposes of this legislation in order to get reports on the programs most likely to raise privacy concerns. For example, the May 2004 GAO report identified a number of government data mining programs whose goals are managing resources efficiently or identifying fraud, waste and abuse in government programs, and that do not rely on personally identifiable information. I am not seeking reports on programs like these.

Second, as I alluded to earlier, the definition explicitly excludes queries to retrieve information from a database that is based on information--such as address, passport number or license plate number-- that is associated with a particular individual or individuals. This type of query is a traditional investigative technique. Although government agencies must be careful in their use of commercial databases, simply querying a Choicepoint database for information about someone who is already a suspect is not data mining.

Most Americans believe that their private lives should remain private. Data mining programs run the risk of intruding into the lives of individuals who have nothing to do with terrorism or other criminal activity and understandably do not want their credit reports, shopping habits and doctor visits to become a part of a gigantic computerized search engine operating without any controls or oversight, and without much promise of locating terrorists. As the Cato report put it, ``[t]he possible benefits of predictive data mining for finding planning or preparation for terrorism are minimal. The financial costs, wasted effort, and threats to privacy and civil liberties are potentially vast.''

At a minimum, the administration should be required to report to Congress about the various data mining programs now underway or being studied, and the impact those programs may have on our privacy and civil liberties, so that Congress can determine whether any benefits of this practice come at too high a price to our privacy and personal liberties. As Senator Wyden and I have told the Director of National Intelligence, we must have a public discussion about the efficacy and privacy implications of data mining. We wrote a letter to him on November 15, 2006, that included the following:

[W]e believe there needs to be a public discussion before

the implementation of any government data mining program that

would rely on domestic commercial data and other information

about Americans. There are serious questions about whether

pattern analysis of such data can effectively identify

terrorists, given the relative lack of historical data about

terrorist activities. And as the furor over the Total

Information Awareness program demonstrated, the American

public has serious--and legitimate--concerns about the

privacy ramifications of programs designed to fish for

patterns of criminal or terrorist activity in vast quantities

of digital data, collected by other entities for entirely

different reasons. Pattern analysis runs the risk of

generating a large number of false positives, meaning that

innocent Americans could become the subject of investigation.

Before we go down that path, it is critical that we have a

public discussion about the efficacy and privacy implications

of this technology. And, if we decide that data mining is

effective enough to warrant spending taxpayer dollars on it,

we should establish strong privacy protections to protect

innocent people from being the subject of government

suspicion.

Of course, the Intelligence Community should be taking

advantage of new technologies in its critical responsibility

to protect our country from terrorists, and much of its work

must remain classified to protect national security. But we

can have a public debate about what privacy rules should

constrain data mining programs deployed domestically, without

revealing sensitive information like the precise algorithms

that the government has developed.

This bill is the first step in this process--a way for Congress and, to the degree appropriate, the public to finally understand what is going on behind the closed doors of the executive branch so that we can start to have a policy discussion about data mining that is long overdue. I urge my colleagues to support this bill. All it asks for is information to which Congress and the American people are entitled.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of this bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I am pleased to reintroduce legislation that would put an end to automatic pay raises for Members of Congress.

As I have noted when I raised this issue in past years, Congress has the authority to raise its own pay, something that most of our constituents cannot do. Because this is such a singular power, Congress ought to exercise it openly, and subject to regular procedures including debate, amendment, and a vote on the record.

But current law allows Congress to avoid that public debate and vote. All that is necessary for Congress to get a pay raise is that nothing be done to stop it. The annual pay raise takes effect unless Congress acts.

This stealth pay raise mechanism began with a change Congress enacted in the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. In section 704 of that Act, Members of Congress voted to make themselves entitled to an annual raise equal to half a percentage point less than the employment cost index, one measure of inflation.

On occasion, Congress has voted to deny itself the raise, and the traditional vehicle for the pay raise vote is the Treasury appropriations bill. But that vehicle is not always made available to those who want a public debate and vote on the matter. Just last year, for example, the Senate did not consider the Treasury appropriations bill. Instead, we passed a series of continuing resolutions to fund government operations usually addressed in that bill and other appropriations bills that were not taken up. Because of that, Senators were effectively prevented from offering an amendment to force an up or down vote on the annual pay raise. And that situation was not unique.

As I have noted in the past, getting a vote on the annual congressional pay raise is a haphazard affair at best, and it should not be that way. The burden should not be on those who seek a public debate and recorded vote on the Member pay raise. On the contrary, Congress should have to act if it decides to award itself a hike in pay. This process of pay raises without accountability must end.

This issue is not a new question. It was something that our Founders considered from the beginning of our Nation. In August of 1789, as part of the package of 12 amendments advocated by James Madison that included what has become our Bill of Rights, the House of Representatives passed an amendment to the Constitution providing that Congress could not raise its pay without an intervening election. On September 9, 1789, the Senate passed that amendment. In late September of 1789, Congress submitted the amendments to the States.

Although the amendment on pay raises languished for two centuries, in the 1980s, a campaign began to ratify it. While I was a member of the Wisconsin State Senate, I was proud to help ratify the amendment. Its approval by the Michigan legislature on May 7, 1992, gave it the needed approval by three-fourths of the States.

The 27th Amendment to the Constitution now states: ``No law, varying the compensation for the services of the senators and representatives, shall take effect, until an election of representatives shall have intervened.''

I honor that limitation. Throughout my 6-year term, I accept only the rate of pay that Senators receive on the date on which I was sworn in as a Senator. And I return to the Treasury any additional income Senators get, whether from a cost-of-living adjustment or a pay raise we vote for ourselves. I don't take a raise until my bosses, the people of Wisconsin, give me one at the ballot box. That is the spirit of the 27th Amendment. The stealth pay raises like the one that Congress allowed for 2006 certainly violate the spirit of that amendment at the very least.

This practice must end and this bill will end it. Senators and Congressmen should have to vote up-or-down to raise Congressional pay, and my bill would require just that. We owe our constituents nothing less.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I have long worked to reduce the burden that Federal regulations bear on small businesses. Over the past twenty years, the number and complexity of Federal regulations have multiplied at an alarming rate. These regulations impose a much more significant impact on small businesses than larger businesses. A recent report prepared for the Small Business Administration's Office of Advocacy found that in 2004, the per-employee cost of Federal regulations for firms with fewer than 20 employees was $7,647. That was 44.8 percent more than the $5,282 per-employee cost faced by businesses with 500 or more workers.

That is why today, I rise with Senators Kerry, Enzi, and Landrieu to introduce the Small Business Compliance Assistance Enhancement Act of 2007. Our bill would clarify requirements that exist under Federal law to ensure that agencies produce useful small business compliance guides that explain, in a readable format, the compliance requirements of complex rules. This ``small,'' targeted reform, which would not create any new rules or requirements, would have a major benefit for small businesses across the country.

In 1996, the Senate passed without opposition the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) to make the Regulatory Flexibility Act more effective in curtailing the impact of regulations on small businesses. One of the most important provisions of SBREFA is a requirement that agencies produce compliance assistance materials to help small businesses satisfy regulatory obligations. Unfortunately, over the years, agencies have done a poor job of meeting this requirement. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found that agencies have ignored this requirement or failed miserably in their attempts to satisfy it. The GAO has also found that the language of SBREFA is unclear in some places about what is actually required. Consequently, small businesses have been forced to figure out on their own how to comply with these regulations. This makes compliance that much more difficult to achieve, and therefore reduces the effectiveness of the regulation.

The Small Business Compliance Assistance Enhancement Act of 2007 would close those loopholes and requires agencies to produce quality compliance assistance materials for small businesses. Our bill is drawn directly from the GAO's recommendations and is intended only to clarify an already existing requirement. Similarly, the compliance guides that the agencies will produce are merely suggestions about how to satisfy a regulation's requirements without imposing further requirements or additional enforcement measures. Nor does this bill, in any way, interfere or undercut an agency's ability to enforce its regulations to the full extent they currently enjoy. Furthermore, our bill was included as part of the Small Business Reauthorization and Improvements Act that was unanimously reported out of the Senate Small Business Committee in the 109th Congress.

All too often, small businesses do not maintain the staff, or possess the financial resources to comply with complex Federal regulations. This puts them at a disadvantage compared to larger businesses, and reduces the effectiveness of the agency's regulations. If an agency cannot describe how to comply with its regulation, how can we expect a small business to figure it out? This was the reason the requirement to provide compliance assistance was originally included in SBREFA, and this rationale is just as valid today as it was in 1996.

Specifically, our bill would clarify that a small business compliance guide

is required whenever an agency determines that a rule will have ``a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities''. This would avoid confusion about whether the agency should produce a compliance guide.

Second, our bill would also clarify how a guide shall be designated. Under current law, agencies must ``designate'' the publications prepared under the section as small business compliance guides. However, the form in which those designations should occur is unclear. This term would be changed to ``entitle.'' Consistent use of the phrase ``Small Entity Compliance Guide'' in the title could make it easier for small entities to locate the guides that the agencies develop. This would also aid in using on line searches--a technology that was not widely used when SBREFA was passed. Thus, agencies would be directed to publish guides entitled ``Small Entity Compliance Guide.''

Third, our bill would clarify how a guide shall be published. SBREFA currently requires that agencies ``shall publish'' the guides, but it does not indicate where or how they should be published. At least one agency has published the guides as part of the preamble to the subject rule, thereby requiring affected small entities to read the Federal Register to obtain the guides. Under our bill, agencies would be directed, at a minimum, to make their compliance guides easily accessible and available through their websites. In addition, agencies would be directed to forward their compliance guides to known industry contacts such as small businesses or associations with small business members that will be affected by the regulation.

Fourth, our bill also clarifies when a guide shall be published. Section 212 of SBREFA currently does not indicate when compliance guides should be published. This means that even if an agency was required to produce a compliance guide, the agency may claim that they have not violated that requirement since there is no deadline established for when they had to produce that guide. Under our bill, agencies would be instructed to publish the compliance guides coincident with, or as soon as possible after, the final rule is published, provided that the guides must be published no later than the effective date of the rule's compliance requirements.

Finally, our bill would clarify the phrase ``compliance requirements.'' At a minimum, this term means what a small business has to do to satisfy the regulation, and when they will know they have met the requirements. This should include a description of the procedures a small business might employ. If, as is the case with many OSHA and EPA regulations, testing is required, the agency should explain how that testing should be conducted. Our bill makes clear that the procedural description should be merely suggestive--an agency would not be able to enforce this procedure if a small business was able to satisfy the requirements through a different approach.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, today I join with my colleague and friend Senator Ron Wyden, to introduce legislation which we have sponsored since 2004 to ensure the sound fiscal management of our Medicare prescription drug benefit. Together we both supported the enactment of the Medicare Modernization Act in 2003 (MMA), and we remain committed to seeing our seniors able to rely on a high quality, affordable benefit.

Today millions of American seniors are at last receiving assistance with the high cost of prescription drugs. For so many, that will make a difference between choosing whether to take needed medications and the other necessities of life. We have indeed come a very long way. We look forward to realizing all the incredible benefits of this coverage as we see the results of more affordable access to prescription drugs--better health for our seniors, and substantial health care savings.

This new benefit marks a milestone for Medicare. And that is an apt analogy because today Part D represents a landmark, not a destination. There is no doubt that this benefit is not all it could or should be, but it is a giant step forward in helping millions of seniors to afford medications which are so essential to health care today. For modem drugs not only treat disease, but actually can prevent its development.

While we have seen this landmark progress, it has not come without difficulty. Yet today seniors are saving substantially on their prescription drugs and we see reports that four of five enrollees are pleased with the assistance they are receiving.

It is undoubtedly the help they are getting which has resulted in such satisfaction. Because the confusion, the complexity, and often a lack of oversight on the plans has created some serious consumer issues which we will continue to address. But today the first issue before us is the cost of prescription drugs in the plans.

Over 3 years ago the Congress was given a price tag for this benefit that was simply unrealistic. Recognizing an absence of cost management, I joined with Senator Wyden to address the escalating cost projections we were seeing. Today, some say all is well, as we hear that the estimated cost of the benefit declined somewhat from a peak estimate of about $720 billion over 10 years. Yet I must note that some of the reasons for that reduction are too quickly glossed over. Enrollment is lower than it was estimated to be as more Americans chose to stay in private coverage. We also saw this past year that we failed to reach many of those low income seniors who most needed help. Today as seniors enter their first full year of coverage, we will see a more realistic year--particularly in terms of more beneficiaries facing the donut hole.

We have heard estimates that the average senior is saving an average of $1,000 per year, but we should ask how that savings is being achieved. The discovery by many seniors--when they reached the donut hole--that their cost of medications was the same or even higher than what they paid prior to enrolling in Part D--that should be a red flag that we may not be seeing the purchasing power of seniors harnessed for the savings they deserve.

Back in 2005 the Medicare Actuary had estimated that drug plans would negotiate a discount of about 15 percent off undiscounted retail prices. So last year we were curious--just how were they doing in Maine? My staff compared prices for the top 24 medications used by seniors and found that our plan prices for those medications averaged less than 12 percent below the price any senior could already obtain, by simply walking into a retail pharmacy. That is not even using membership or association discounts, or using an on-line pharmacy like Drugstore.com--where seniors could obtain better prices. That result-- finding a single senior could do better than a plan--is certainly disappointing.

That points to a system that is working well in terms of subsidy, but certainly needs to improve in terms of negotiating substantial discounts. But we are told that the cost of the benefit is lower, and that premiums were stable this year. Yet if you ask what stand-alone drug coverage actually costs this

year, CMS will tell you that those premiums have gone up about 10 percent. Not unlike increases in the deductible, the size of the donut hole, and out-of-pocket expense. As Senator Wyden and I learned from GAO reports we have received, the prices of drugs used by seniors have inexorably increased since 2000 at two to three times the inflation rate.

So the costs of this program will remain a concern. Most of us envisioned that not only would the taxpayer contribute to helping seniors with drug expenses, but we would realize substantial savings from lower prices on prescription drugs.

That is why Senator Wyden and I proposed to achieve some balance in the public private partnership which is Part D today, and it is why today we are again introducing the Medicare Enhancements for Needed Drugs Act--the MEND Act. In this drug benefit the HHS Secretary should have a proper role in negotiation. Negotiation, not price setting.

It is clear that what the Congress intended to do was to create a true public-private partnership, utilizing competitive forces to bring more choices to seniors--in drugs, benefit plan designs, pharmacies, and more. So seniors can vote with their pocketbooks, and we can see their choices in the market influence the kind of benefit they receive. That is not the same as a system in which the government sets prices, and that is why our legislation specifically bans such a practice. Under our legislation, the Federal Government cannot set either prices or formularies--that is absolutely clear.

What I believe most of us desire to do is give the present system the best tools to achieve success. That means that the Secretary must have an oversight role. He should be examining performance and pointing out where plans need to improve. But today if he noticed a product on which poor discounts were being achieved, and he attempted to discuss that publicly, he would likely be accused of interference. Further, if a plan reported intransigence in trying to negotiate with a manufacturer, the Secretary could not respond. That makes no sense. It is a disservice taxpayers, beneficiaries, and the plans as well.

Our legislation rescinds the ``non-interference'' clause and directs the Secretary to negotiate for any necessary fallback plan, and in addition, to respond to requests for help from plans which cannot obtain reasonable negotiation.

We have also added two additional areas in which the Secretary must negotiate. First, as the CBO has stated that negotiation of single- source drugs could yield savings, our legislation directs the Secretary to engage in negotiation regarding those unique products. We also know that some drugs exist because the taxpayer provides substantial support to see them developed. The public deserves a fair price on those products it made possible, so the Secretary should weigh in those cases.

Finally, our bill protects beneficiaries by assuring that seniors will have access to a comprehensive coverage option--at least one plan in each region must provide the option to avoid the coverage gap, dreaded ``donut hole''. Today seniors in 11 States simply cannot obtain such coverage and they must at least have the option of protecting themselves.

These are reasonable ways to help plans succeed, and to protect both beneficiaries and taxpayers within the public-private partnership on which this benefit rests.

I call on my colleagues to join us in this effort, so that we may improve the partnership between private enterprise and the Federal Government in serving our seniors.

I ask consent that the bill's text be printed in the Congressional Record.

Mr. President, I am pleased today to introduce the Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007. I want to thank Senator Sununu for once again cosponsoring this bill, which we also introduced in the last Congress. Senator Sununu has consistently been a leader on privacy issues, and I am pleased to work with him on this effort. I also want to thank Senators Leahy, Akaka, and Wyden, for their continuing support of the bill.

The controversial data analysis technology known as data mining is capable of reviewing millions of both public and private records on each and every American. The possibility of government law enforcement or intelligence agencies fishing for patterns of criminal or terrorist activity in these vast quantities of digital data raises serious privacy and civil liberties issues--not to mention serious questions about the effectiveness of these types of searches. But four years after Congress first learned about and defunded the Defense Department's program called Total Information Awareness, there is still much Congress does not know about the Federal Government's work on data mining.

We have made some progress. We know from reviews conducted by the Government Accountability Office that as of May 2004 there were nearly 200 Federal data mining programs, more than one hundred of which relied on personal information and 29 of which were for the purpose of investigating terrorists or criminals. And we have learned a few more details on five of those programs from a follow-up report that GAO issued in August 2005. We also have a brief report from the DHS Inspector General published in August 2006, and as a result of my amendment to the DHS appropriations bill we have a July 2006 report from the Privacy Office at the Department of Homeland Security that provides some interesting policy suggestions relating to data mining.

But this information has come to us haphazardly, and lacks detail about the precise nature of the data mining programs being utilized or developed, their efficacy, and the consequences Americans could face as a result. Furthermore, much of the reporting thus far has focused on the Department of Homeland Security. It also appears there has been little if any government-wide consideration of privacy policies for these types of programs. Indeed, public debate on government data mining has been generated more by press stories than as a result of congressional oversight.

My bill would require all Federal agencies to report to Congress within 180 days and every year thereafter on data mining programs developed or used to find a pattern or anomaly indicating terrorist or other criminal activity on the part of individuals, and how these programs implicate the civil liberties and privacy of all Americans. If necessary, specific information in the various reports could be classified.

This is information we need to have. Congress should not be learning the details about data mining programs after millions of dollars are spent testing or using data mining against unsuspecting Americans. The possibility of unchecked, secret use of data mining technology threatens one of the most important values that we are fighting for in the war against terrorism--freedom.

Data mining could rely on a combination of intelligence data and personal information like individuals' traffic violations, credit card purchases, travel records, medical records, and virtually any information contained in commercial or public databases. Congress must conduct oversight to make sure that all government agencies engaged in fighting terrorism and other criminal enterprises--not just the Department of Homeland Security, but also the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense and others--use these types of sensitive personal information effectively and appropriately.

Let me clarify what this bill does not do. It does not have any effect on the government's use of commercial data to conduct individualized searches on people who are already suspects, nor does it require that the government report on these types of searches. It does not end funding for any program, determine the rules for use of data mining technology, or threaten any ongoing investigation that might use data mining technology.

My bill would simply provide Congress with information about the nature of the technology and the data that will be used. The Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act would require all government agencies to assess

the efficacy of the data mining technology they are using or developing--that is, whether the technology can deliver on the promises of each program. In addition, my bill would make sure that Congress knows whether the Federal agencies using data mining technology have considered and developed policies or guidelines to protect the privacy and due process rights of individuals, such as privacy technologies and redress procedures. With complete information about the current data mining plans and practices of the Federal Government, Congress will be able to conduct a thorough review of the costs and benefits of the practice of data mining on a program-by-program basis and make considered judgments about whether programs should go forward. Congress will also be able to evaluate whether new privacy rules are necessary.

In addition, Congress must look closely at the government's activities because data mining is unproven in this area. Some argue that data mining can help locate potential terrorists before they strike. But we do not, today, have evidence that pattern-based data mining will prevent terrorism. In fact, some technology experts have warned that this type of data mining is not the right approach for the terrorism problem. Just last month, the Cato Institute released a report--coauthored by a scientist specializing in data analytics and an information privacy expert--concluding that ``[t]he only thing predictable about predictive data mining for terrorism is that it would be consistently wrong.''

Some commercial uses of data mining have been successful, but have arisen in a very different context than counterterrorism efforts. For example, the financial world has successfully used data mining to identify people committing fraud because it has data on literally millions, if not billions, of historical financial transactions. And the banks and credit card companies know, in large part, which of those past transactions have turned out to be fraudulent. So when they apply sophisticated statistical algorithms to that massive amount of historical data, they are able to make a pretty good guess about what a fraudulent transaction might look like in the future.

We do not have that kind of historical data about terrorists and sleeper cells. We have just a handful of individuals whose past actions can be analyzed, which makes it virtually impossible to apply the kind of advanced statistical analysis required to use data mining in this way. That raises serious questions about whether data mining will ever be able to locate an actual terrorist. Before the government starts reviewing personal information about every man, woman and child in this country, we should learn what data mining can and can't do--and what limits and protections are needed if data mining programs do go forward.

We must also bear in mind that there will inevitably be errors in the underlying data. Everyone knows people who have had errors on their credit reports--and that is the one area of commercial data where the law already imposes strict accuracy requirements. Other types of commercial data are likely to be even more inaccurate. Even if the technology itself were effective, I am very concerned that innocent people could be ensnared because of mistakes in the data that make them look suspicious. The recent rise in identity theft, which creates even more data accuracy problems, makes it even more important that we address this issue.

I also want to touch on one issue that has proved difficult in many debates about data mining: how to define the term. What is data mining? From policy debates to government reports, many people have wrestled with this question. While it can be defined more broadly, for the purpose of this reporting requirement, data mining is limited to the process of attempting to predict future events or actions by discovering or locating patterns or anomalies in data. However, for purposes of the reporting requirement in this bill, which seeks information on those data mining programs most likely to threaten the privacy and civil liberties of Americans, I have limited the definition in a couple of other ways. First, the bill's core definition of data mining is to conduct a query, search or other analysis of one or more electronic databases to ``discover a predictive pattern or an anomaly indicative of terrorist or criminal activity on the part of any individual or individuals.'' Data mining has a number of applications at various government agencies outside the context of terrorism and other criminal investigations, but I have limited the definition for purposes of this legislation in order to get reports on the programs most likely to raise privacy concerns. For example, the May 2004 GAO report identified a number of government data mining programs whose goals are managing resources efficiently or identifying fraud, waste and abuse in government programs, and that do not rely on personally identifiable information. I am not seeking reports on programs like these.

Second, as I alluded to earlier, the definition explicitly excludes queries to retrieve information from a database that is based on information--such as address, passport number or license plate number-- that is associated with a particular individual or individuals. This type of query is a traditional investigative technique. Although government agencies must be careful in their use of commercial databases, simply querying a Choicepoint database for information about someone who is already a suspect is not data mining.

Most Americans believe that their private lives should remain private. Data mining programs run the risk of intruding into the lives of individuals who have nothing to do with terrorism or other criminal activity and understandably do not want their credit reports, shopping habits and doctor visits to become a part of a gigantic computerized search engine operating without any controls or oversight, and without much promise of locating terrorists. As the Cato report put it, ``[t]he possible benefits of predictive data mining for finding planning or preparation for terrorism are minimal. The financial costs, wasted effort, and threats to privacy and civil liberties are potentially vast.''

At a minimum, the administration should be required to report to Congress about the various data mining programs now underway or being studied, and the impact those programs may have on our privacy and civil liberties, so that Congress can determine whether any benefits of this practice come at too high a price to our privacy and personal liberties. As Senator Wyden and I have told the Director of National Intelligence, we must have a public discussion about the efficacy and privacy implications of data mining. We wrote a letter to him on November 15, 2006, that included the following:

[W]e believe there needs to be a public discussion before

the implementation of any government data mining program that

would rely on domestic commercial data and other information

about Americans. There are serious questions about whether

pattern analysis of such data can effectively identify

terrorists, given the relative lack of historical data about

terrorist activities. And as the furor over the Total

Information Awareness program demonstrated, the American

public has serious--and legitimate--concerns about the

privacy ramifications of programs designed to fish for

patterns of criminal or terrorist activity in vast quantities

of digital data, collected by other entities for entirely

different reasons. Pattern analysis runs the risk of

generating a large number of false positives, meaning that

innocent Americans could become the subject of investigation.

Before we go down that path, it is critical that we have a

public discussion about the efficacy and privacy implications

of this technology. And, if we decide that data mining is

effective enough to warrant spending taxpayer dollars on it,

we should establish strong privacy protections to protect

innocent people from being the subject of government

suspicion.

Of course, the Intelligence Community should be taking

advantage of new technologies in its critical responsibility

to protect our country from terrorists, and much of its work

must remain classified to protect national security. But we

can have a public debate about what privacy rules should

constrain data mining programs deployed domestically, without

revealing sensitive information like the precise algorithms

that the government has developed.

This bill is the first step in this process--a way for Congress and, to the degree appropriate, the public to finally understand what is going on behind the closed doors of the executive branch so that we can start to have a policy discussion about data mining that is long overdue. I urge my colleagues to support this bill. All it asks for is information to which Congress and the American people are entitled.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of this bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I have come to the floor for just a couple of minutes to describe a piece of legislation that I and Senator Olympia Snowe have introduced today with 30 of our colleagues in the Senate dealing with the issue of drug reimportation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to show on the floor of the Senate a couple of bottles.

I would like to show two bottles that contained Lipitor, a drug that most of us know is a cholesterol-lowering drug. Lipitor is made by a company in a plant--in this case in Ireland--and in Ireland they put Lipitor in these two bottles, and they send the Lipitor in this bottle to Canada, and they send the Lipitor in this bottle to the United States.

The difference? Well, there is no difference. It is the same pill, put in the same bottle, made by the same company, an FDA-approved drug. The difference is the United States consumer pays 65 percent more for this drug than the consumer in Canada.

But it is not just Lipitor. And it is not just a plant in Ireland by this company that produces it and sends it to here and then to Canada, and charges the American consumer the highest prices. It is virtually all of the brand drugs. And in virtually every case, the American consumer is paying the highest prices for prescription drugs--the highest prices in the world.

My colleague, Senator Snowe and I and many others in this Chamber-- Senator Stabenow, Senator Kennedy, Senator McCain, and so many others-- 30 Senators have introduced this legislation that allows the reimportation of FDA-approved drugs--produced in FDA-inspected plants-- allows the reimportation of those lower priced prescription drugs into this country. It allows American consumers to take advantage of the global economy by buying that FDA-approved drug where it is sold for a fraction of the price.

One day, some while ago, on a beautiful summer day, outside of Oakes, ND, I was meeting with a group of farmers. At this farmyard, we were sitting on bales of straw and having a long discussion, and there was one older fellow there in his eighties, early eighties. He said to me: My wife has been suffering from breast cancer for 3 years. She is an elderly woman battling breast cancer now for 3 years. For 3 years, we have driven from the southern part of North Dakota into Canada to buy Tamoxifen for my wife to treat this breast cancer. She needs this medicine to fight the breast cancer, and the only way we can afford it is for us to get in the car and drive to Canada and buy Tamoxifen at 20 percent of the price we would have to pay in this country.

American consumers should not have to do that. They ought to be allowed to reimport prescription drugs that are made in FDA-approved plants and are FDA-approved drugs.

The legislation we have introduced today is necessary. I do not want American consumers to have to purchase prescription drugs elsewhere. I want them to be able to purchase them in this country at a fair price. The problem is, we are now paying the highest prices in the world. If we allow the reimportation, it will put downward pressure on prices in this country. That is our real goal.

Now the Congressional Budget Office has done a study. They tell us that brandname drugs cost 35 to 55 percent less in most other countries than they do in the United States. The AARP, American Association of Retired Persons, has done a study showing the drugs most frequently used by senior citizens in our country have increased by a 6.3-percent price increase from June 2005 to June 2006--double the rate of inflation.

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that if we pas the legislation we have now introduced today, there will be a savings of about $50 billion in direct savings over the next decade for American consumers, with $6.1 billion of that savings to the Federal budget.

So we believe this is important. We have been blocked from getting this legislation through the Congress for some long while. The leadership of this institution supports it. The legislation is bipartisan--broadly bipartisan.

Now let me say one other thing. Some people say, and particularly the pharmaceutical industry says, this cannot be done safely, it will jeopardize safety for American consumers. Well, let me say that the consumers in the European countries have been doing this for 20, 25 years. There is something called parallel trading. They have been doing it for 20, 25 years without any issues of safety. If you want to buy a drug in Spain, and you live in France, no problem. If you want to buy a drug in Italy, and you live in Germany, no problem. They have been doing that--called parallel trading--for 25 years. Surely, we can accomplish that in this country as well.

Let me show a couple of charts, briefly.

First, Americans are charged the highest prices in the world. This one chart compares it to Canada: Lipitor, Prevacid, Zocor, Zoloft, Celebrex. I will not go through the entire list.

Dr. Peter Rost, vice president of marketing for Pfizer, came to Washington, and here is what he said:

The biggest argument against reimportation is safety. What

everyone has conveniently forgotten to tell you is that in

Europe reimportation of drugs has been in place for 20 years.

He went on to say there is not any issue of safety.

And, finally, the American Association of Retired Persons endorses the legislation we have introduced today. I will not read all of that.

But the final chart shows what is happening with respect to spending on prescription drugs, and where it is heading, and why we ought to do something to give consumers the opportunity to see fair prices on prescription drugs.

Miracle drugs offer no miracles to those who cannot afford to buy them. I have no brief against the pharmaceutical industry. I want them to keep producing lifesaving, miracle drugs for this country. In fact, we produce a great deal of public spending in the NIH and elsewhere that gives them the research base for which a good number of those drugs is produced.

But let me also say that the pharmaceutical industry owes the American consumer a fair deal. We should not be paying the highest prices in the world for prescription drugs. It is not fair. And if the pharmaceutical industry is going to use a global economy in order to move its commodities and its various ingredients for prescription drugs around the world to produce in Ireland or to produce here or in Puerto Rico, then the American people ought to be able to use the global economy to get a better price on FDA-approved drugs.

We have waited a long while. I have worked on this I guess 6 or 8 years. We have been blocked repeatedly from getting a vote in the Congress, both in the House and the Senate. Now we have introduced, with broad, bipartisan support, an identical piece of legislation in the House and in the Senate.

I believe we will get a vote in both bodies and pass legislation and send it to the President of the United States. It will save $50 billion over the next decade on prescription drug bills for the American people, save the Federal Government $5 billion or $6 billion in spending, and give a fair deal to the American people that they will be able to buy prescription drugs at a fair price.

Mr. President, I look forward to consideration of this measure in the Senate. I am pleased on behalf of my colleague Senator Snowe and myself and a broad group of Republicans and Democrats in the Senate to push this legislation.

I see Senator Sanders is here, and I know she has worked on this issue for a long while as well. We have a broad, bipartisan group. We are going to push this and get this done in this session of Congress.