Mr. President, today we are facing a crisis in the mortgage markets on a scale that has not been seen since the Great Depression: over 2 million homeowners face foreclosure at a loss of over $160…
Mr. President, today we are facing a crisis in the mortgage markets on a scale that has not been seen since the Great Depression: over 2 million homeowners face foreclosure at a loss of over $160 billion in hard-earned home equity; the Conference of Mayors recently reported, November 26, 2007, that they expect a decline of $1.2 trillion in property values in 2008 because of the crisis; over one out of every 5 subprime loans is currently delinquent according to First American Loan Performance, an industry research firm. These high default rates have frozen the subprime and jumbo mortgage markets and infected the capital markets to the point where central banks around the world have had to inject liquidity into the system to avoid the crisis from spreading to other segments of the market.
One of the fundamental causes of this serious crisis is abusive and predatory subprime mortgage lending. The Homeownership Preservation and Protection Act of 2007, which I am introducing today with a number of my colleagues, is designed to protect American homeowners from these practices, and prevent this disaster from happening again. The legislation will: realign the interests of the mortgage industry with borrowers to insure the availability of mortgage capital on fair terms both for the creation and sustainability of homeownership; establish new lending standards to ensure that loans are affordable and fair, and provide for adequate remedies to make sure the standards are met; and create
a transparent set of rules for the mortgage industry so that capital can safely return to the market without bad lending practices driving out the good.
The fundamental problem in the subprime market today is that the mortgage system has become extremely fragmented, with different entities responsible for selling, underwriting, originating, funding, and securitizing the loans. Too few of these entities have a stake in the long-term success of the mortgage. A recent article in The Economist, February 17, 2007, described the process succinctly:
Banks are traditionally supposed to know a bit about the
borrowers on their books. But, in many cases, their loans did
not stay on their books long enough for them to care.
Mortgages were written for a fee, sold to investment banks
for a fee, then packaged and floated for another fee. At each
link in the chain, the fees mattered more than the quality of
the loans. . . .
As the GAO concluded, ``Originators [mortgage brokers and lenders] had financial incentives to increase loan volume, partially at the expense of loan quality,'' October 10, 2007. For example, mortgage originators have an incentive to get a borrower to take out a larger loan than he or she needs, and at a higher interest rate than that for which the borrower would qualify, because the originator gets a higher commission for such loans.
Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan recently described the corrosive impact of this system on underwriting standards. In a speech to the American Bankers Association October 9, 2007, Mr. Dugan said:
When a bank makes a loan that it plans to hold, the
fundamental standard it uses to underwrite the loan is that
most basic of credit standards that . . . the underwriting
must be strong enough to create a reasonable expectation that
the loan will be repaid. But when a bank makes a loan that it
plans to sell, then the credit evaluation shifts in an
important way: the underwriting must be strong enough to
create a reasonable expectation that the loan can be sold or
put another way, the bank will underwrite to whatever
standard the market will bear.
The vast majority of subprime loans were made to be sold, and, hence, their underwriting standards simply were not sufficient to ensure a reasonable prospect of repayment for too many Americans.
While the focus of much of the news coverage has been on the impact of the crisis on financial institutions and markets, I ask my colleagues to keep in mind the affect this is having on individuals who are losing their homes, and on their neighbors, who are seeing their home equity erode as foreclosures in their neighborhoods increase.
It is important to keep in mind that only about 10 percent of subprime mortgages in the past several years have been made to first time home buyers. This market has not been primarily about creating a new set of homeowners; a majority of subprime loans have been refinances. While maintaining access to subprime credit on fair terms is important, too much of the subprime market in the past several years has actually put the homes and home equity of American families at risk.
The legislation seeks to set high standards for brokers, lenders, appraisers, servicers, and Wall Street and provide for strong remedies to restore accountability to the system. Specifically, the legislation will establish new protections for all borrowers including a prohibition on steering prime borrowers to subprime loans, which the Wall Street Journal recently found was widespread in the market. The bill establishes a fiduciary duty for mortgage brokers towards borrowers. It provides for a duty of good faith and fair dealing toward borrowers for all lenders.
The bill will establish new protections for subprime borrowers and borrowers who get exotic mortgages. First and foremost, brokers and lenders will have to establish the borrowers' ability to repay the loan, including for interest-only and option ARMs. In addition, the bill prohibits prepayment penalties and YSPs on these loans, and requires that these loans provide a net tangible benefit to the borrower.
The bill will tighten the definition of high cost loans and provide increased protections for these borrowers, including a prohibition of balloon payments, financing of points and fees, prepayment penalties and yield spread premiums, YSPs.
The bill will provide strong remedies to make sure these standards are met. The bill puts more ``cops on the beat'' by allowing state attorneys general to enforce the provisions of the law, and it does not preempt State law. States should be allowed the flexibility to address new abuses as they arise.
The bill will provide for limited liability for holders of a mortgage made in violation of law, whether it is the original lender or a subsequent investment trust. Unlike current law, which puts the burden on the borrower to find the party responsible for causing the harm, the legislation allows the borrower to go directly to the current mortgage holder for a cure.
The bill will also prohibit lenders from influencing appraisers, limit the ``junk'' fees mortgage servicers can charge, and require them to credit payments promptly, require foreclosure prevention counseling or loss mitigation before a foreclosure can take place, and uuthorize the hiring of additional FBI agents to fight mortgage fraud.
In the coming months, the housing crisis is going to get worse. We will need to continue to press lenders and servicers to provide real relief for homeowners threatened with foreclosure. FHA and the GSEs will have to play an expanded role. But as we deal with the cleaning up the current crisis, let us keep in mind the need to address the underlying problems that have created the crisis, and move to address those underlying causes by passing the ``Homeownership Protection and Preservation Act.''
Finally, I want to acknowledge the work of a number of my colleagues on this issue. Senators Schumer, Brown, and Casey introduced a bill on this topic earlier this year, S. 1299, from which I took some important provisions. In addition, Senators Reed and Menendez both made important contributions to the deliberations leading up to the introduction of this legislation.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill and a detailed summary be printed in the Record.