Mr. President, I wish to make a few comments on the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin and what he referred to as the ``bulk collection'' amendment which he discussed yesterday and which is…
Mr. President, I wish to make a few comments on the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin and what he referred to as the ``bulk collection'' amendment which he discussed yesterday and which is amendment No. 3912. I would ask that this time be taken from the opponents of the amendment, if that is all right with my vice chairman.
The Senator from Wisconsin is offering an amendment that he argues will prevent what he calls ``bulk collection''. The amendment is intended, as described by the Senator from Wisconsin, to ensure that this bill is not used by the Government to collect the contents of all the international communications between the United States and the rest of the world. The Senator argues that the amendment will prevent ``bulk collection'' by requiring the Government to have some foreign intelligence interest in the overseas party to the communications it is collecting.
I regret to say I must oppose this amendment strongly. I do not believe it is necessary. I do believe, as drafted, the amendment will interfere with legitimate intelligence operations that
protect the national security of the lives of Americans.
In considering amendments today, we need to consider whether an amendment would provide additional protections for U.S. persons and whether it would needlessly inhibit vital foreign intelligence collection. I do not believe the amendment, as drafted, provides additional protections. Furthermore, intelligence professionals have expressed their concern that this amendment would interfere with vital intelligence operations, and there are important classified reasons underlying that concern.
Let us review why the amendment is unnecessary. First, bulk collection resulting in a dragnet of all the international communications of U.S. persons would probably be unreasonable under the fourth amendment. No bill passed by the Senate may authorize what the fourth amendment of the Constitution prohibits. What is more, the committee bill, in fact, explicitly provides that acquisitions authorized under the bill are to be conducted in a manner consistent with that same fourth amendment of the Constitution.
Second, the committee bill stipulates that acquisitions under this authority cannot intentionally target any person known to be located in the United States. And to target a U.S. person outside the United States, the Government must get approval from the FISA Court.
Third, the committee bill increases the role of the FISA Court overseeing the acquisition activities of the Government. The bill requires court approval of minimization procedures that protect U.S. persons' information. It maintains the prior requirement of court approval of targeting procedures.
In the unlikely event the FISA Court would give its approval to targeting procedures and minimization procedures that allow the Government to engage in unconstitutional bulk collection, the committee bill also strengthens oversight mechanisms in the executive and legislative branches, such as requiring assessments by the inspectors general in the Department of Justice and relevant agencies. These mechanisms are intended to ensure that such activity is detected and prevented.
The sponsor of the amendment says his amendment only requires the Government to certify to the FISA Court that it is collecting communications of targets for whom there is a foreign intelligence interest. But the committee already requires the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to certify to the FISA Court that the acquisition authorized under the bill is targeted at persons outside the United States in order to obtain foreign intelligence information. Because the remedy does not improve upon the protections in the bill for Americans and places new burdens on the surveillance of foreign targets overseas, I thus oppose this amendment and urge that it be rejected.
I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of the opponents' time.
Mr. President, I ask my esteemed vice chairman if I might have 6 minutes to oppose Senator Feingold's reverse targeting amendment No. 3913.
The Senator from Wisconsin has an amendment that requires a FISA Court order if the Government is conducting surveillance of a person overseas, but a significant purpose of the surveillance is to collect the communications of a person inside the United States with whom the target is communicating.
I share the Senator's goal in protecting the privacy interests of Americans, but I am afraid this amendment, as drafted, is unworkable and unnecessary.
The amendment is described as a way to prevent reverse targeting-- circumstances in which the Government would target persons overseas when its actual target is a person within the United States with whom the overseas person is communicating.
The fact is, reverse targeting is prohibited under FISA today. I repeat, it is prohibited under FISA today. If the person in the United States is the actual foreign intelligence target, the Government must seek a FISA order, and, in fact, the Government would have to have every incentive to do so in order to conduct comprehensive surveillance of such a person.
What is more, the base bill, S. 2248, makes the prohibition on reverse targeting explicit. The Government cannot use the authorities in this legislation to target a person outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target for surveillance a person within the United States.
In addition, the base bill, the Intelligence Committee bill, also strengthens the protection of U.S. person information that is collected in the targeting of foreign targets overseas by requiring that the FISA Court approve the minimization procedures that apply to this collection activity.
The Feingold reverse targeting amendment, however, goes too far. The amendment would prohibit the Government from using the authorities of this act ``if a significant purpose'' of the acquisition is to ``acquire the communications'' of a particular known person within the United States. In order to acquire such communications, the Government would be required to seek a regular FISA Court order.
The problem is that we are revising the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act today in large measure precisely because we want the intelligence community to have the ability to detect and acquire the communications of terrorists who call into the United States. In other words, in order to detect and prevent terrorist attacks, finding out if a foreign terrorist overseas is in contact with associates in the United States is actually a significant purpose of this legislation, and it will always be a significant purpose of any targeting of a foreign terrorist target overseas by the intelligence community.
As the Statement of Administration Policy--that is objections usually that come over from the White House--points out:
A significant purpose of the intelligence community
activities is to detect communications that may provide
warning of homeland attacks and that may include
communication between a terrorist overseas who places a call
to associates within the United States. A provision that bars
the intelligence community from collecting those
communications is unacceptable.
Who is to say that person from overseas is not a terrorist and he is contacting a person in the United States to discuss something which is not in the national interest or which has intelligence implications? You cannot in good conscience bar the intelligence community from collecting these communications. That is unacceptable.
Again, reverse targeting is prohibited under current law. I think that is the third time I have said that. Reverse targeting is prohibited by the committee bill. The amendment is not needed to achieve its stated goals. It will harm vital intelligence collection. I urge the amendment be defeated.
I reserve the remainder of our time.
Mr. President, I ask that I be given unanimous consent to speak on the underlying bill.
Mr. President, I say to the Presiding Officer that far and away the most contentious issue in this FISA debate is whether private companies that assisted the Government in implementing the President's warrantless surveillance program should be provided liability protection.
Three amendments will be offered that relate directly to this issue.
First, Senators Dodd and Feingold have an amendment that would strike all of title II of the underlying bill--that is, S. 2248--on liability protection as reported by the Intelligence Committee.
Second, Senator Specter will offer an amendment--I think at 3:30-- that provides for a different remedy; namely, the substitution of the U.S. Government itself for the carriers in the lawsuits that have been filed against the carriers.
Third, Senator Feinstein has prepared an amendment that would keep the basic structure of title II--to wit, liability immunity--but would have the courts, rather than the Congress, determine whether carriers relied in good faith on the representation made to them by the executive branch of our National Government.
I will address the particulars of each amendment as it is offered, but first I would like to describe the background behind the Intelligence Committee's approach to this whole issue of immunity.
Critics have suggested that providing liability protection for telecommunications companies is akin to congressional endorsement of the President's warrantless surveillance program. I understand the passion stirred by this issue. Rather than consulting with Congress or the courts, the President created a secret surveillance program--no question about that--based on very dubious legal reasoning. That was unnecessary, that was unwise, that would, therefore, cause passions and suspicions.
But anger over the President's program should not prevent us as a deliberative body from addressing the real problems the President has created.
Because of the lawsuits over the program and the damage to the telecommunications companies' reputations, companies that were once willing to help the Government, based on assurances of legality from the highest levels of Government, may now be questioning that assistance.
Let's reflect on that for a moment. These are corporations. They have no names at the present time. They have to make money. The Government comes to them, as they have in the past on much smaller matters, and with the authority of the President saying, this is in the national interest; with the legal advice of the Attorney General saying, this is legal; and then the Director of the National Security Agency sending out letters that say, we require you, we compel you, we request to you--or other words--that you cooperate with us.
People say: Well, they cooperated. Of course they cooperated right after 9/11. I think anybody who is in the intelligence business understands what I am saying. There is no difference between the day after 9/11 and this day in terms of the threat to our country or those who are planning, plotting to do us harm.
The fact that no attacks have happened does not excuse the sense of relaxation on the whole subject--perhaps the congressional sense of relaxation on the whole subject. We need to continue this intelligence collection.
What is it, I am wondering, that the telecommunications companies get from this? What prestige? What large amount of money? What praise? What do they get from this? Do they get good public relations? No. They get 40 lawsuits, most of which are not based on anything to do with the TSP program. In other words, they are picked out of newspapers. People are dissatisfied, and class action suits arise.
So maybe they have been sued $10 billion. Maybe they have been sued $40 billion. We will not speculate on that at the present time. But in that they are corporations and in that they have no reward at all for doing this service for their country--which we call patriotism, and then cast that aside because that must mask some evil intent--they go ahead and they do it. Then, since they are corporations, their shareholders get extremely unhappy about it, which could be happening at the present time, and then they decide that maybe they will be less willing to do this. Several have done that. Several at the beginning did that.
Now, corporations are in business also to make a profit. The corporations that are involved in this are doing nothing but losing prestige, losing reputation, have angry shareholders. And I ask myself, what is it they get out of doing this, because people, particularly on my side of the aisle, are sometimes inclined to be suspicious of corporations, that they have some kind of a purpose behind all of this. Nothing could be further from the truth. They are losing. They are being criticized. They are being sued. It is costly. It takes away from their energy to carry out their other missions. It is not a situation in which a whole bunch of people are sitting around in these corporate headquarters discussing this, because only a very few people are allowed to know, and they have criminal sanctions against them if they tell anybody, should they have received any of these instructions from the Government.
So we are not talking about people here trying to undo the safety of the United States or to gain some kind of advantage for themselves. If this intelligence collection stops, I say to the Presiding Officer, we will be in a very sorry situation. I do not know how to say that more sincerely, more deeply felt, more based upon exhaustive study, including numerous meetings in committee with these folks and other meetings outside.
So they have been told it is legal, and by the National Security Agency Director they have been required, compelled, and in other words, some of which are quite strong, to do it. So they do start to do it, and they are paying one heck of a price for it.
What price are we paying? We are paying no price because they are still doing it. What price might we pay should they stop--because they are corporations, and they are responsible to their shareholders--if they should stop this type of activity? The price we would pay would be overwhelming. Without the cooperation and assistance of private companies--not compliance forced by a court but true cooperation--this country's law enforcement and intelligence agencies cannot obtain the information they need to protect this country. It is a fairly heavy statement to make. I chair the committee. I am not naive on these matters. I make that statement again. Without the cooperation and assistance of private companies, this country's law enforcement and intelligence agencies cannot obtain the information they need to protect this country.
Making the question of liability protection a proxy for disagreement with the President's program is, therefore, shortsighted, in this Senator's view, ignoring the reality that the Nation and future Presidents will depend on the assistance of these same companies for years to come.
In analyzing the question of liability protection, the Intelligence Committee sought to weigh these very real concerns about future intelligence collection against the possible outcome of lawsuits. We discussed it at length. Understanding this issue requires some background on the lawsuits that have been filed.
Currently, providers are subject to approximately, as I indicated, 40 civil lawsuits, some of which are class actions, which seek billions of dollars of damages--and I have given you a range--for privacy violations based on the companies' alleged provision of assistance and information to the intelligence community. The suits are based--many of them--on media reports about all sorts of intelligence activities. Many of them are not limited to the warrantless surveillance program disclosed by the President. That is ironic, but it is a heavy burden for the companies. If suits are brought that have nothing to do with the warrantless surveillance program disclosed by the President, they are out of order. But, as I will proceed to explain, the companies can never explain to a court that they are out of order. Although these suits involve different types of legal claims that are in varying stages of litigation, they share a common reality: that the Government has refused to publicly reveal the classified documents and information that would allow them to proceed.
The current fight in the courts is, therefore, not about whether damages should be awarded, whether the underlying program is legal or even whether any company participated in the President's program in good faith. Instead, the parties are fighting about access to classified information about the President's program. I have not heard that much discussed in this Chamber. This litigation could continue for years without a court ever addressing the underlying issues about the legality of the program. We seek wrongdoing whether, as some say, it is in the corporate boardroom or, as others would say--as I would say--in the halls of Government.
I stress the point: No court is likely to resolve the question of whether the President or any private company violated the law in the near future.
Some of my colleagues have argued that without these lawsuits, the public will never learn the details about the President's program. But litigation is highly unlikely to tell the story of what happened with the President's program. Too many of these facts dealing with intelligence sources and methods remain appropriately classified, and the executive branch is highly unlikely to agree to declassify additional information if it could affect the ongoing litigation.
Thus, the litigation is unlikely to result in a ruling in the near future about the legality of the conduct of the President nor any private company, nor, for that matter, the public disclosure of any additional information about the President's program. Instead, it is possible the cases, as I indicated, will continue for years as the courts debate whether information must be disclosed.
In the meantime, however, as I mentioned, the litigation poses a serious risk to U.S. intelligence collection. That is my job and that is the job of the committee I chair and the job of the chairman of the Intelligence Committee in the House. We are not about being courts, we are about trying to balance civil liberties as best as we can
with the ability of this country to collect an entirely different kind of intelligence that we were so busy doing recently in the Cold War era. Without the assistance of telecommunications providers, our intelligence community simply cannot obtain the intelligence it needs.
Is that a serious statement? Do Members of the Senate concern themselves with that? Is this just me, this Senator, standing up making a statement trying to win some votes? Or is there the possibility it could be true? If there is a possibility--and I think it is a probability it is true--then I don't understand why people can be confused on this subject because I think the choices are clear. Allowing companies to be dragged through the court system because of their alleged cooperation with the Government encourages them not to cooperate with any request, even those that are clearly legal without court compulsion. It also sends a message to all private companies: cooperate with the U.S. Government at your peril. Is that a bit of an overstatement? In the corporate boardrooms around this country, my guess is that is the discussion. Very few corporations have the capacity to help the Government in the way telecommunications companies do.
Discouraging private sector cooperation with the Federal Government is not, in the feeling of this Senator, the right long-term result for either the intelligence community or the American people.
Many have argued that providers who act unlawfully should be held accountable. I totally agree that all Americans, including corporate citizens, must follow the law and be held accountable for their failures. Companies that deliberately seek to evade privacy laws or legal restrictions on electronic surveillance can and should be subject to civil suit, but that is not the issue here, I would say to the Presiding Officer. That is not the issue.
The Intelligence Committee spent a lot of time, as I have indicated, this year looking into what happened over the past 6 years. Before deciding to provide liability protection for the companies, the Intelligence Committee heard testimony from relevant witnesses and carefully reviewed the written communications provided to participants in the program.
Participants were sent letters, all of which stated the relevant activities had been authorized by the President and all but one--and that was done by the legal counsel to the President--of which stated the activities had been determined to be lawful by the Attorney General of the United States. Shouldn't private companies be entitled to rely on the written representations of the highest levels of Government officials that their cooperation is necessary and has been determined to be lawful? Can you argue that if they get those notifications from the NSA Director and it has been approved by the Attorney General and has been declared essential for the national interest by the President, should they instead say: Oh, well, we don't care about that. That is not our business. We are not going to do that.
And isn't it reasonable to assume that a U.S. citizen who has been told the Attorney General has found their cooperation to be lawful is acting in good faith? If they have been through this process and they proceed to act on it, why is it so easy to stipulate they are not acting in good faith? How does one show that? How does one imagine that?
I have been through this, this whole question of what the companies get from it, and it is the thing that bothers me so much. They get nothing but grief. They get suits. They get costs. They get a diminished reputation. They begin to pull away. Their shareholders lose confidence. Do they get money? No. They get nothing. So why would they want to continue to cooperate would be my question.
The answer to these questions are at the heart of the Intelligence Committee's determination that it is essential that Congress protect private companies that assisted the Government after the terrorist acts of 9/11.
Mr. President, I will complete this part of my presentation and yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 3:05 p.m. today the Senate return to the Cardin amendment No. 3930, with the time from 3:05 until 3:15 equally divided and controlled in the usual form; that the Senate then proceed to vote in relation to the amendment, with other provisions of the previous order remaining in effect.
This is a total of 10 minutes or less amendment, but we will not start until 3:05. The Senator can call it up.
I say to the Presiding Officer, I find myself in disagreement with my vice chairman. I originally wanted 4 years and we went to 6 years because of accommodations that yielded other results. In the wisdom of the joint Intelligence Committee and Judiciary Committee, settling on 4 years makes a lot of sense. I urge the adoption of the amendment.
Madam President, I am reluctant to ask, but I must, how much time remains before 4:30?
Wonderful.
Madam President, I simply rise to say I will oppose this amendment and I will oppose it strongly and I think for a series of very good reasons. But in spite of my eloquence and the ability to talk very quickly, I simply cannot do the task in 1\1/2\ minutes. So I ask unanimous consent to reserve my right to speak further at the appropriate time before the vote.