ADA Amendments Act of 2008

in enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Congress intended that the Act provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities and provide broad coverage;

in enacting the ADA, Congress recognized that physical and mental disabilities in no way diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society, but that people with physical or mental disabilities are frequently precluded from doing so because of prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the failure to remove societal and institutional barriers;

while Congress expected that the definition of disability under the ADA would be interpreted consistently with how courts had applied the definition of a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that expectation has not been fulfilled;

the holdings of the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect;

the holding of the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) further narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA;

as a result of these Supreme Court cases, lower courts have incorrectly found in individual cases that people with a range of substantially limiting impairments are not people with disabilities;

in particular, the Supreme Court, in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), interpreted the term substantially limits to require a greater degree of limitation than was intended by Congress; and

Congress finds that the current Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ADA regulations defining the term substantially limits as significantly restricted are inconsistent with congressional intent, by expressing too high a standard.

to carry out the ADA’s objectives of providing a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination and clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination by reinstating a broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA;

to reject the requirement enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures;

to reject the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) with regard to coverage under the third prong of the definition of disability and to reinstate the reasoning of the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) which set forth a broad view of the third prong of the definition of handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973;

to reject the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), that the terms substantially and major in the definition of disability under the ADA need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled, and that to be substantially limited in performing a major life activity under the ADA an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives;

to convey congressional intent that the standard created by the Supreme Court in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) for substantially limits, and applied by lower courts in numerous decisions, has created an inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA, to convey that it is the intent of Congress that the primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to convey that the question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis; and

to express Congress’ expectation that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will revise that portion of its current regulations that defines the term substantially limits as significantly restricted to be consistent with this Act, including the amendments made by this Act.

in subsection (a), by striking with a disability because of the disability of such individual and inserting on the basis of disability; and

in subsection (b) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking discriminate and inserting discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.

Section 101(8) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12111(8)) is amended—

Section 104(a) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12114(a)) is amended by striking the term qualified individual with a disability shall and inserting a qualified individual with a disability shall.

by adding at the end of section 501 the following:

by redesignating section 506 through 514 as sections 507 through 515, respectively, and adding after section 505 the following:

in section 511 (as redesignated by paragraph (2)) (42 U.S.C. 12211), in subsection (c), by striking 511(b)(3) and inserting 512(b)(3).