A concurrent resolution supporting the goals and ideals of National Better Hearing and Speech Month.

Reserving the right to object, Mr. President.

Mr. President, if this were the first time that a 60-vote requirement were made, I would have some sympathy for the Senator from Illinois. I am having staff compile the number of times when the other side of the aisle was in the minority, they demanded 60 votes as well. You cannot do it with a straight face.

You cannot say that all we are going to do here in the Senate is have us govern by 51 votes; otherwise, we may as well be unicameral because we would have the Senate and the House exactly the same.

So, of course, I will object, Mr. President. I wish we would get off this horse of saying that somehow the other side never employed the 60- vote requirement in the Senate, because they did. It is a tradition in the Senate, and it is within the rules of the Senate. It may be frustrating. It certainly was to us when we were in the majority and the Democrats were in the minority and they employed it. But to somehow act as if what is being done is unprecedented--I will tell you what is unprecedented; it is taking a Defense authorization bill that is there for the training and equipping and pay raises and necessities of life for the men and women serving in the military, when we should be passing this--we all know it is going to come up in September. We should be passing this so the men and women can get what they need and deserve in order to defend the security of this Nation. Instead, Mr. President, what we are doing is having, again, for the eighth or ninth time, without having passed one appropriations bill, including the Military Construction appropriations bill, which is ready to be passed--instead, we will have this ``argument'' against the filibuster.

Mr. President, it doesn't pass the smell test. I object.

Mr. President, I am pleased to give that to the distinguished chairman.

The Senator from Nevada, the distinguished majority leader and my friend for many years, points out that in previous years, the Defense authorization bill was passed without requirements for a 60-vote majority. There is a simple answer to that. We never took up an issue such as this on the Defense authorization bill.

In fact, our focus and our attention was, for 45 years, providing men and women who are serving in the military with what they needed to defend this Nation. Instead--instead, of doing what is necessary, including the 3.5-percent pay raise, including the Wounded Warriors legislation on it to take care of our veterans--we are now gridlocked in the Senate because the Senator from Nevada knows he is not going to pass a withdrawal from Iraq on this bill. If he did, the President would veto the bill, because the President has said it. We all know that in September this issue is going to come to a head, whether I happen to favor that or not.

Most people believe that September is a time where we could make the kinds of judgments necessary to see whether we are making the kind of progress that will justify continued effort in this new strategy, which I, of course, would remind my colleagues again, the last part of which was put in place a few weeks ago.

Of course, we did not have requirements for 60-vote majorities in the past few years because no one had the temerity to put an issue such as this on the very vital needs of the men and women in the military to do their job. So, of course, there was not a controversial necessity for a 60-vote majority.

I am happy to tell my friend from Mississippi that Senator Levin and I are moving forward with clearing amendments so we can, we hope, wrap up this bill by the end of this week. I hope that once this display that is going to take place tonight, all night, is concluded, and there is not sufficient votes in order to get the Levin-Reed amendment passed, at some point we can go back to the Defense authorization bill and get them the 3.5 percent pay raise they have earned; get them that MRAP equipment that they need; get this Wounded Warrior legislation through the Senate and to the desk of the President of the United States.

We never grow tired, nor should we, of praising the men and women in the military, particularly those who have sacrificed so much. All of us are embarrassed and ashamed at what happened at Walter Reed. Well, let's pass this Wounded Warrior legislation on this bill and get it done.

Who is holding up passage of the Defense authorization bill? Who is requiring us to stay up all night to discuss it? My friends, this is not necessary. We all know that General Petraeus was affirmed in his position by the Senate by an overwhelming vote. General Petraeus, at the time of his hearings, said we were going to have a new strategy-- that strategy is called surge--and that it would require additional troops.

He also said at that time it would take time, that it would take a period of time before we would know whether it succeeded. Here we are, literally weeks after the last part of this new strategy is in place, the last detachment of an increase in troops, and we are telling them to set a date for withdrawal.

Now, you know, I share the frustration that my friend from Nevada stated about a failed policy. It was a failed policy. The Rumsfeld- Casey policy strategy was doomed to failure, and some of us recognized that and stated that at the time. We said we had to have a new strategy. It has to be the classic counterinsurgency strategy if we are going to succeed in Iraq.

Well, we got a new general. We got a new strategy. There are signs of success. There are clearly some signs of progress, and those are readily apparent. Now, is the Maliki Government acting in the way we want them to? No, they are not. Is it disappointing that they are not? Absolutely, it is disappointing.

But as far as Anbar Province is concerned, as far as some parts of Baghdad are concerned, yes, there is some progress which has been purchased at great and tragic cost, the sacrifice of young American's lives.

I would like to again assure my friend of many years, from Nevada, I understand the frustration that he shows is shared by many Americans. Our failure and our employment of a failed strategy for more than 3 years is well articulated. But I also would plead with my colleagues to at least know that we are not going to stop this now. We are not going stop it now. Even if the majority leader got the 60 votes and got this included in the bill in some way, the President of the United States would veto it. We do not want that to happen. We do not want that to happen.

We know that in September, whether I happen to like it or not--I would like to personally give it more time than September--we know that in September this whole issue is going to come to a head. Here we are in the middle of July. Can't we sit down and work out the amendments in a way that Senator Levin and I and Senator Warner and previous chairmen and ranking members have for the last 20 years, get this bill done, get it out and get it to the President's desk? Then we go into recess. We come back in September. I think that that is not an unreasonable path to follow.

So, my friends, we will continue to debate this issue all night tonight. I understand that. Hopefully, when the majority sees that, the leader sees there is not the votes, maybe we could then get down to the nuts and bolts of the Defense authorization bill of which at last count there are over 100 amendments pending that Members have on both sides of the aisle, they want to be considered and voted on.

I fear--I fear--that the majority leader, because of a lack of time, may feel it necessary to pull the bill from the floor. I think that would not be in any way helpful to our Nation's national security interests.

My friends, if we could lower the rhetoric around here a bit, let us sit down and talk about the best way to proceed, recognizing that September will be a very important point, and pass this authorization bill and not for

the first time in 45 years have us not do what we need to do for our Nation's security and the men and women who are serving.

I yield the floor.

Madam President, I was just given information by my staff. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

Passed after a cloture vote and/or other 60-vote requirement in 2005, seven; passed after a cloture vote and/or a 60- vote requirement in 2006, 10; defeated by cloture or 60-vote requirement, also in 2006, 10.

It is clear that when the Senator from Illinois was in the minority, they used the 60-vote provision as well, and that is their right to do so. I don't in any way object to their having done that. I do object strenuously to somehow conveying the impression that this is a ``filibuster'' because we require 60 votes, that this is some Earth- shattering, precedent-shattering procedure. In fact, it is not. In fact, the Senator from Illinois knows very well that 60 votes is often required, whether it be a budget point of order or whether a cloture vote, and it has been used quite often by the minority as a tool to assert their rights as the minority. I understand that.

The Senator from Illinois talks about the bill that this has to be on. This is either the eighth or ninth time we have brought up Iraq. He didn't need the authorization bill to do it then. It is the right of the majority to bring up whatever they want, whenever they want. I can assure my colleagues, the Defense authorization bill will probably not be on the floor in September, and one thing I am pretty confident of is that we will be taking up the issue of Iraq in September. So to somehow say that this is appropriate, it is not appropriate because it is controversial, and we know it will not be passed with a provision that requires what the Senator from Illinois wants on it. It will never become law because the President will veto it in the unlikely--in fact, highly unlikely--situation where this bill was passed by both Houses of Congress.

What we are doing--have no doubt about it--is keeping the 3.5-percent pay raise from going into law. We are keeping the wounded warrior legislation from being enacted by both Houses and us acting as quickly as possible. The Senator from Illinois, I believe, and all other Senators voted on behalf of the nomination of General Petraeus in February, knowing full well what General Petraeus's strategy was. That was

very well articulated. So now we find ourselves some months later saying: Well, we have to end it.

The distinguished majority leader, who is no longer on the floor, declared the war lost. I was astonished. Because if we lost the war, then somebody won. Does that mean that al-Qaida has won the war? I don't think the 160,000 young men and women who are serving in Iraq, whom I visited about a week ago, think the war is lost. I don't think the majority of Americans do either. Are they frustrated by what has happened here? Of course, they are frustrated. They want to bring it to an end. But it is the obligation of people such as me to point out what happens when we withdraw in 120 days.

Literally, in the view of every expert on national security, we will pay a much heavier price in the long run. Chaos, genocide will ensue. Quite often I hear from the other side: What is plan B, if the surge doesn't work?

What is plan B if the withdrawal results in chaos and genocide in the region? According to most experts--including Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, General Zinni according to most people who have spent their lives on national security issues, it will be chaos and genocide. What is plan B there?

I hope after the show is over tomorrow morning sometime--and it is clear to all that we will not set a 120-day withdrawal date from Iraq on this legislation--we will then be able to sit down and move forward on the bill so that we can get it passed into law. That is what we should be doing. To somehow think that we have not required, as the majority leader on many occasions required, 60 votes for passage of an amendment or legislation, of course, flies in the face of the clear record which I have just asked to be printed in the Congressional Record.

America is now at a crossroads. America is now at a point where, according to Natan Sharansky:

A precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces could lead to a

bloodbath . . .

From Anthony Zinni, who was opposed to us going into Iraq:

. . . reality is that we simply cannot pull out [of Iraq],

as much as we may want to. The consequences of a destabilized

and chaotic Iraq, sitting in a critical region of the world,

could have catastrophic implications . . . there is no short-

term solution.

We have a system of government where the military is subordinate to the civilian leadership, and it should be. It is the most appropriate way. But to completely ignore, as apparently my friend from Illinois is, the leaders whom we have appointed to fight over there and do the dying and carry out the leadership responsibilities, to completely ignore their advice and counsel, they are on the ground. They know what is going on.

General Lynch, 3rd ID commander, says:

[pulling out before the mission was accomplished] would be a

mess.

By the way, these will be the guys who will be required to clean up the mess, if we pass this resolution and we have a mess.

Continuing from General Lynch:

. . . you'd find the enemy regaining ground, reestablishing

sanctuaries, building more IEDs . . . and the violence would

escalate.

I have already quoted before from Henry Kissinger.

General Lynch:

[our soldiers] want to fight terrorists here, so they don't

have to fight terrorists back home . . . I now have the

forces I need to conduct that mission.

General Lynch, the 3rd ID commander, says he has the troops and the wherewithal and the success to get the job done.

The Senator from Illinois wants to say, no, you have to come home in 120 days. I don't think that is right. I don't think General Lynch is reading any polls. I think General Lynch and General Petraeus are fighting an enemy that, according to them, they will be fighting here if we have a precipitous withdrawal.

General Lynch:

. . . surge forces are giving us the capability we have now

to take the fight to the enemy . . . the enemy only responds

to force, and we now have that force.

That is the force that the Senator from Illinois wants to withdraw within 120 days.

We can conduct detailed kinetic strikes, we can do cordon

and searches, and we can deny the enemy sanctuaries . . . If

those surge forces go away that capability goes away, and the

Iraqi security forces aren't ready yet to do that [mission].

Brent Scowcroft, who opposed our entry into the Iraq conflict:

[reduction of American presence in Iraq] should follow

success in our efforts, not the calendar or the performance

of others.

I hope that sometime my friends who were involved in this debate will listen to the people we have delegated to lead the best Armed Forces in the history of mankind who are doing one of the most difficult jobs in history.

I yield the floor.

Reserving the right to object, Madam President.

The Senator from Illinois--and this is growing a little wearisome, it really is. The fact is, 60 votes have been invoked by the minority time after time after time, whether it be a district judge or an appellate court judge, or most any other issue that is controversial. The Senator from Illinois knows that, and that is why it is very disappointing to see him using this kind of rhetoric when he is willing to have 60 votes be required for some judge but somehow feels-- which they did invoke when they were in the minority--and yet feels that it is not appropriate to have 60 votes on an issue of this importance.

The Senator from Illinois talks about beginning the withdrawal in 120 days, beginning the withdrawal in 120 days. The day that is signed into law would be the day--would be the day, in the view of every military expert, that al-Qaida would sit back and wait until we left.

The Senator from Illinois continues to call it a civil war. There is sectarian violence. There is very little doubt in the minds--of course, perhaps the Senator from Illinois and others know more than literally every expert I know. It has become, in the words of General Petraeus, a center for al-Qaida and a central front in the war on terror, according to our leading generals.

Now, I resent a little bit this comment by the Senator from Illinois about he has heard the generals before. I heard the generals before, and I disagreed with the generals, and that is our right to do. But to denigrate their opinion I don't think is appropriate to people who spend their lives in the service of the military, defending this Nation. General Petraeus, it is my understanding, has been wounded three times in different wars fighting for this Nation. I think he deserves respect rather than being dismissed by saying: Well, I have heard the generals say that before. We should pay attention to the generals. We should have paid attention to the generals at other times in our history, including those who disagreed with the former Secretary of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld.

Again, I repeat, since we seem to be going in a certain circularity, conditions in Iraq today are terrible, but they become way worse as the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, a career foreign service officer, recently told the New York Times. I am quoting from the Washington Post editorial of just a few days ago:

The generals who have devised--

The generals whom the Senator from Illinois derides--

The generals who have devised a new strategy believe they

are making fitful progress in calming Baghdad, training the

Iraqi Army, and encouraging anti-al-Qaida coalitions. Before

Congress begins managing rotation schedules and ordering

withdrawals, it should at least give those generals the

months they ask for to see whether their strategy can offer

some new hope.

Why do you think the Washington Post and literally most every national security expert feels that this ought to be given an opportunity, remembering that the last part of it has just been put in place a short time ago? Because the consequences of failure, as I have just quoted from many military experts, are a catastrophe.

General Lynch says:

What the Iraqis are worried about is our leaving. And our

answer is: We are staying, because my order from the Corps

Commander is that we don't leave the battle space until we

can hand over to the Iraqi security forces. Everybody wants

things to happen overnight, and that is not going to happen.

So when the amendment of the Senator from Illinois and the Senator from Rhode Island and the Senator from Michigan is passed, then the word is spread and General Lynch can no longer say to the Iraqis we are staying, because we will be leaving.

General Odierno says:

My assessment right now is, I need more time to understand

how the current offensive targeting al-Qaida and Iraq

terrorists is working and how it could lead to political

progress in the months ahead.

Odierno said:

I am seeing some progress now here in Iraq. We have really

just started what the Iraqis term ``liberating'' them from

al-Qaida. What I've got to determine is what do I need in

order to continue that progress so that the political peace

can take hold and Iraqi sources can hold this for the long

term.

I want to point out to my colleagues that I am not guaranteeing success. I wish it had gone better. I think there are areas, particularly as far as the government is concerned, where dramatic improvement has to take place. But I do know the consequences of failure, and that view of setting a date for withdrawal is a clear recipe for a much larger conflict with much greater involvement in the region over time.

So when the Senator from Illinois and my friends on the other side of the aisle talk about how this won't be withdrawal if this is passed, I say: My friends, this is withdrawal. This is the message to those people who have to remain in the neighborhood: We are leaving and you are going to have to make adjustments to the neighborhood and the new big guys on the block.

Again, I wish we could take up this issue in September. I wish we could pass the necessary legislation to care for the men and women who are wounded. I wish we could pass the necessary legislation in order to take care of the needs of the men and women in the military. If we pass this bill this week--I tell my colleagues we are going to be going into the August recess. We will be coming back in September with probably a very contentious conference with the House. The chances right now of us getting final passage and the President's signature on this bill by the first of October is not good. So the sooner we get this bill off the floor and to the President, the better off we are going to be.

I certainly hope we will take into consideration the great needs that are existing in the military today.

I yield the floor.

Madam President, yesterday a man whom I had the opportunity of meeting and knowing a little bit, British Army Lieutenant General Jim Lamb--General Lamb is the Deputy Commander of Multinational Forces Iraq and senior British military representative in Iraq--was asked by Jamie McIntyre of CNN about how ``the growing sentiment in our Congress to bring U.S. troops home sooner'' affected the mood of his troops deployed in Iraq, meaning the British troops. Lieutenant General Lamb responded that those troops find it ``a touch difficult.'' I think that is a very interesting phrase, ``a touch difficult,'' because while it is so clear to them that we are making progress, it is not reflected by those who are not in the fight but are sitting back and making judgment upon what they, the troops, can see with absolute clarity.

Lieutenant General Lamb noted that those making such judgments and not taking note of the progress ``are not going out every day in a humvee.'' Moreover, he further noted that the progress the troops see is seldom reported. They see provincial counselors,

they see water going to people who didn't have it before, they see electricity coming online, they see stability to the networks. They see all this stuff that no one portrays.

I say to my friend from Michigan and the Senator from Illinois and others, I hope they pay a little attention to General Lamb's statement or reject it out of hand, of course, as apparently is being done.

I have to repeat, General Lamb responded that his troops find it ``a touch difficult.'' While it is so clear to them we are making progress, it is not reflected by those who are not in the fight but are sitting back and making judgment upon what they, the troops, can see with absolute clarity.

I don't think I have to editorialize anymore on General Lamb's, I think, totally accurate statements.

The New York Post reported on July 10 an interview with General Petraeus. He is asked by Ralph Peters, a person for whom I have enormous respect:

The current military operations in Iraq appear

comprehensive and tenacious, part of a long-term, integrated

plan. What can we realistically expect to achieve?

Petraeus: Our primary goal is to work with our Iraqi

counterparts to improve security for the Iraqi people. This

is intended to give the Iraqi leaders the time to resolve the

tough political issues they face and to pursue internal

reconciliation.

He goes on to say:

As to reasonable expectations, we can expect a reduction in

sectarian deaths and the gradual spread of Iraqi government

authority. The level of sectarian deaths in Baghdad in June

was the lowest in about a year. Nevertheless, the extremists

still have been able to carry out car bomb and other attacks.

Wherever we operate, we try to reconnect Iraqi ministries

and local governments to meet the needs of the people.

Finally, we provide opportunities for Iraqis to use their

local knowledge to help root out al Qaeda. Successful

operations of this nature have played out in recent months in

Ramadi, Hit and Baquba. In each case, Iraqis turned against

al Qaeda and sided with the Coalition.

Question:

Now that the surge is fully in place, what's your sense of

the positives and negatives thus far? If you could have more

of any one item, what would it be? Troops? Time? Iraqi unity?

General Petraeus's answer:

I can think of few commanders in history who wouldn't have

wanted more troops, more time or more unity among their

partners; however, if I could only have one at this point in

Iraq, it would be more time.

I repeat, General Petraeus said:

. . . if I could only have one at this point in Iraq, it

would be more time. This is an exceedingly tough endeavor

that faces countless challenges.

So what does the Levin-Reed amendment do? Deny General Petraeus exactly that. As Senator Levin points out in his statement, the announced withdrawal would force the Iraqi Government to act and, therefore, then we would see progress. What if, I say to my colleagues who support this amendment, what if instead the situation deteriorates into a chaotic situation, then what do we do? Then what do we do if the situation gets worse? Do we come back in? Do we sit on the sidelines and watch another genocide? What if, I say to my colleague who often asks me what is plan B, the surge doesn't work? What is plan B if the withdrawal doesn't work?

I don't think that most people would believe that an international mediator is exactly a solution that is viable.

I wish to talk a minute about the region. Finally, after our stunning military victory and shock and awe and the invasion side of the conflict was over, America was in pretty good shape in the region. The Syrians were trying to be cooperative. There were efforts on the part of the Iranians to join with us in efforts to bring about an end to terrorism in the region. Then we began to fail, and that failure has, obviously, been chronicled in many books. I recommend to my colleagues the book ``Fiasco'' or ``Cobra II'' or a number of other books that have been written that describe the failed Rumsfeld strategy. We paid a very heavy price for it. All of us know that. It has been the sacrifice of our most precious asset.

What has happened since? We find the Syrians continuing to intervene in northern Lebanon. We find the Syrians, according to many experts, transporting suicide bombers through the airport in Damascus into Iraq. We find the Iranians not only orchestrating attacks and providing intelligence and even money and funding, in some cases, but there is clear and compelling evidence that the IEDs, the most lethal IEDs are exported from Iran into Iraq, those that have the lethality even of going through the armor of a tank. We find the Iranians more aggressive in the region with Iranian support for Hezbollah and Hamas. The Syrians continue to try to unsettle the Government of Lebanon, and the Government of Lebanon is having great difficulties.

There is a U.N. Security Council resolution that calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. There has been no effort whatsoever to achieve the goals set forth in that U.N. Security Council resolution. In fact, there is strong evidence that Hezbollah in southern Lebanon is being resupplied with the rockets they expended in their latest attack on Israel which provoked an attack on Israel. We find the Saudis becoming more and more uneasy. We once had a report-- that fortunately turned out to be false--that the Turks had crossed over into the Kurdish areas because of Kurdish insurgents who are operating out of the Turkish areas, at least according to the Turks. So we have seen, because of our failure in Iraq, more strife, more conflict, and more threats to the State of Israel.

Meanwhile, the Iranians continue on the path to develop nuclear weapons. A great fear of many of us is not a nuclear weapon aimed at Israel from Iran. One of our great fears is a nuclear weapon passed to a terrorist organization by the Iranian Government, which has stated through its President and its policies their dedication to the extinction of the State of Israel. I could argue that the State of Israel is probably in more jeopardy from a national security standpoint than at any time in its history, since that very young nation achieved its independence.

So what happens in the region when we adopt the Levin-Reed resolution, and the signal is sent throughout the region ``don't worry, the Americans are leaving.'' I think the consequences are fairly obvious. So we are not just talking about Iraq, as serious and consequential as that situation is. We are talking about the region. It is hard for me to believe the Sunnis would not intervene to protect Sunnis if there is a bloodletting in Baghdad, where 2 million Sunni reside and 4 million Shia. But according to the premise of the Levin- Reed amendment, this will force the Iraqi Government to act and to control their own destiny.

My question is: What do we do if they can't? What do we do if they can't?

Some of my colleagues have talked about this ``gradual withdrawal.'' A gradual withdrawal. I think most military experts would tell you that the most difficult operation in military tactics and strategy is a ``gradual withdrawal.'' It is fraught with difficulty. When an army is defeated, and an army tries to come home, it is the most difficult of all military operations.

So I think that as we discuss this specific amendment and the issue of whether we stay or go in Iraq, whether we allow the new strategy of General Petraeus and the Joint Chiefs of Staff a chance to succeed, which calls for a surge in Iraq, while we debate this, I don't think we should ignore the larger implications for the region. I believe, and I cannot absolutely predict the future, but a failure in Iraq, according to most experts, would lead to a chaotic and unsettled situation in the region.

So I would at least ask for my colleagues' consideration of an article by Stephen Biddle in the Washington Post on July 11, entitled ``Iraq: Go Deep or Get Out.'' I think perhaps we ought to start looking at this situation from that respect. Mr. Biddle, in his piece, says:

The result has been a search for some kind of politically

moderate ``Plan B'' that would split the difference between

surge and withdrawal.

I think that adequately describes the Reed-Levin amendment.

The problem is that these politics do not fit the military

reality of Iraq. Many would like to reduce the U.S.

commitment to something like half of today's troop presence

there. But it is much harder to find a mission for the

remaining 60,000 to 80,000 soldiers that makes any sense

militarily.

Perhaps the most popular centrist option today is drawn

from the Baker-Hamilton commission recommendations of last

December. This would withdraw U.S. combat brigades, shift the

American mission from one of training and supporting the

Iraqi security forces, and cut total U.S. troop levels in the

country by about half. This idea is at the heart of the

proposed legislative effort that Domenici threw his support

behind last week, and support is growing on both sides of the

aisle on Capitol Hill.

The politics make sense, but the compromise leaves us with an untenable military mission. Without a major U.S. combat effort to keep the violence down, the American training effort would face challenges even bigger than those our troops are confronting today. An ineffective training effort would leave tens of thousands of American trainers, advisers, and supporting troops exposed to that violence in the meantime. The net result is likely to be continued U.S. casualties with little positive effect on Iraq's ongoing civil war.

It is unrealistic to expect that we can pull back to some

safe yet productive mission of training but not fighting--

this would be neither safe nor productive.

So, Madam President, I think we ought to look at what we are discussing here not only from the standpoint of Iraq but the implications for our presence in the region. And I will say something that is very seldom stated on the floor of the Senate: as long as we are dependent on oil in the region, our greater national security interests are at stake in what happens with the outcome of Iraq. The possibility of success in Iraq, of seeing the world's third largest oil reserves being modernized and used, and those revenues used for the betterment of the American people, also presents a goal that I think is worth striving for.

I would like to again return to the fact that I am deeply disappointed in the Maliki government. Their failure to act unhinges the very important aspect of the military, political, social, and economic aspects of any successful counterinsurgency operation. But I also believe that nothing would embolden the Iranians more, nothing would embolden the Syrians more, nothing would frighten the Jordanians and the Saudis more, not to mention the Egyptians, than the passage of legislation which would require the withdrawal of the United States.

So I urge my colleagues not only to look at how this legislation and this debate affects America vis-a-vis Iraq but affects our western and national interests and values in the entire Middle East.

Madam President, I note the patience of my friend from Rhode Island, who is a thoughtful and valued member of the Armed Services Committee whose friendship I appreciate a great deal.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to engage in a short colloquy with my colleague from Michigan, the distinguished chairman.

I say to my colleague that we have one individual, and we do have some 26 amendments that I think are cleared that we could get out of the way. I am working on that right now. I thank my colleague and most of all the staffs for their close cooperation.

Mr. President, how much time remains?

Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.

Mr. President, I think everybody in this body would like to leave Iraq better than we found it. That is not the current situation. The current situation is chaos and violence in Iraq. It is an Iraq that is torn apart by sectarian violence. When you have group slaughtering group in a civil war, a sectarian type of war, it requires that the Iraqi political leaders take action to end the violence. The only way to end the violence is if the Iraqi political leaders will reach a political settlement. I think almost everybody agrees with that. I think our uniformed military agrees with that, our civilian leaders agree, and almost everybody agrees that there is no military solution in Iraq, and that the only solution, the only way to end this violence is if the Iraqi political leaders accept the responsibility to work out political agreements on a number of disagreements they have identified for themselves.

We talk a lot about benchmarks, and the President said the other day that on eight benchmarks we are making progress, and on eight we are not--to make it sound like we have a glass that is half full. But that is not what the facts sustain or support. The facts are that we have a glass called Iraq which has a hole in the bottom. Whatever we pour into Iraq goes right through that hole. It is going to continue to do that until one thing happens, and that is that the Iraqi political leaders decide they are going to work out a political settlement. There is a consensus about that, I believe, among almost all of us.

The Iraqi Prime Minister made the following statement, and every one of us, when we vote on Levin-Reed, ought to keep this one statement in mind, I believe, first and foremost. This is what Prime Minister Maliki said:

The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the

cycle of bloodletting of innocents are the politicians.

Well, it is long overdue that the politicians in Iraq step up to their responsibility. The amendment before us, it seems to me, states something which is clear. I believe it is obvious that it is in everyone's interest that Iraq not be a failed state. I agree with my friend from Texas. That should be a goal of everybody. The problem is that Iraq is the No. 2 most unstable state in the world right now. That is the status quo. That is what we have to end. The only way to end it is with a political settlement by the Iraqis.

There was an article a few days ago in Foreign Policy magazine called ``The States That Fail Us.'' It is about failed states. It has a list of about 60 states, and they give all of the indicators of instability. Iraq is No. 2 on the list, right after Sudan. That is the status quo. That is what we are trying to end--the failure of a policy in Iraq which has led the Iraqi leaders to believe that there is an open-ended commitment on the part of the United States to give them protection in that green zone to the extent that it exists. It is that open-ended commitment of the United States that must end--if we are going to prod the Iraqi leaders to finally step up, look into the abyss and make a decision, do they want a civil war or do they want a nation?

Mr. President, we cannot save them from themselves. To say that we don't want a failed state in Iraq is to say we don't want the status quo to continue, that the course must change in Iraq.

So I will vote for the Cornyn amendment because I think it states, in general terms at least, what I hope Members of the Senate would all agree on--that a failed state in Iraq is not in the interest of this Nation.

Mr. President, I have a unanimous consent request. I need Senator McCain to listen. Apparently, the time the Senator from Arizona took on his reservation came out of our time, and I am wondering if he would give us a minute.

Mr. President, on the question of the 60 votes, there is a procedural roadblock which is being placed here. It is not the first time in history, of course, but a decision has to be made here whether the verdict of the American people last November that there be a change in policy is going to be thwarted by that procedural roadblock, and the Republican leader has apparently decided it will be.

In terms of precedent, last year on the Defense authorization bill, there

were at least two votes on Iraq, both majority votes. That is the precedent. Last year, there was a Levin-Reed amendment that received 39 votes and a Kerry amendment, both on Iraq on the Defense authorization bill, the most recent experience. This issue is so vital. It is so much in the minds of the American people that we should not throw up procedural roadblocks to allowing the Senate to vote. That is why we have asked that we be allowed to vote up or down on this amendment, and that apparently has now been objected to.

Madam President, tomorrow's vote in the Senate is not a vote on the Levin-Reed amendment. It is a vote on whether the Senate will allow us to vote on the Levin-Reed amendment. It is a vote on whether the Senate will break a filibuster so that the Senate can express its will, which I think is totally clear and reflects the will of the American people as expressed last November.

A change in course in Iraq is critical for our national security. If you think the present course is working, if you think we are making progress, as the President has said month after month, year after year, then presumably you are going to vote against the Levin-Reed amendment--if we can ever get to a vote on the Levin-Reed amendment. But if you believe that changing course is the only hope of success in Iraq, that forcing the political leaders of Iraq to accept responsibility for their nation and to work out the political settlements that could prevent this violence from continuing and lead to the ultimate success in Iraq, and if we can get to the Levin-Reed amendment and break the filibuster, then you will be voting yes.

Madam President, it has been more than 4 years since the United States invaded Iraq. Despite a military victory that toppled Saddam Hussein and routed his army, Iraq soon became victim to a Sunni insurgency, to Shiite militias bent on revenge, and became victim to an incursion of al-Qaida terrorists whose actions were aimed and are aimed at promoting an Iraqi civil war.

As the situation on the ground has shifted, so has President Bush's rationale for our involvement. He took us into Iraq to get rid of Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction. When no weapons of mass destruction were found, the President said we needed to create a democracy in Iraq. Now the President says we must stay on to fight al- Qaida.

The President had a pre-surge strategy, a surge strategy, and now he has offered a post-surge strategy. What has remained constant in all of these strategies is one thing: They all have an open-ended commitment of U.S. forces in the middle of Iraq's civil war.

That open-ended commitment of a Muslim country by the West has played right into the hands of al-Qaida. Indeed, the intelligence community is recently reported to have concluded that the years of our occupation of Iraq have seen a surge of al-Qaida in Iraq.

It has come at a staggering cost--the loss of more than 3,600 of America's best and bravest, seven times that many wounded, and a price of $10 billion each month. In spite of the heroic efforts of the U.S. service men and women, chaos and destruction have deepened in Iraq.

Yet, month after month, year after year, the President has touted progress in Iraq and called for patience. It has been a litany of delusion. Just listen to President Bush's repeated claims of progress.

In October of 2003, President Bush said:

We are making progress about improving the lives of the

people there in Iraq.

On September 25, 2004, the President said:

We're making steady progress in implementing our five-step

plan toward the goal we all want: completing the mission so

that Iraq is stable and self-governing, and American troops

can come home. . . .

On April 28, 2005, the President said:

I believe we're really making progress in Iraq. . . .

On October 28, 2005, the President said:

Iraq has made incredible political progress. . . .

On November 14, 2005, the President said:

Iraqis are making inspiring progress toward building a

democracy.

On May 25, 2006, the President said:

We are making progress on all fronts.

On March 19, 2007, the President said:

There has been good progress.

The exaggeration and the hype continues to this day. On June 28, a few weeks ago, the White House press release stated:

The Iraqi security forces are growing in number, becoming

more capable, and coming closer to the day when they can

assume responsibility for defending their own country.

But in the benchmark assessment report released last week we read:

There has been a slight reduction in units assessed as

capable of independent operations since January 2007.

That is referring to Iraqi units. Even that turned out to be an exaggeration. Just 2 days later, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, told the press that the number of Iraqi Army brigades that were capable of independent operations had fallen from 10 to 6--quite a difference from a ``slight reduction.''

Madam President, one merely has to take note of recent incidents in Iraq as reported in our newspapers to know that things are not going well in Iraq and that the administration's assessments of progress have been consistently overblown through the years and continue to be overblown.

Consider the headline in USA Today on July 12: ``Iraqi police assist gunmen.'' The story described our Army investigation into a January attack in Karbala that killed five U.S. soldiers. Our investigation concluded that the Iraqi police who were supposed to be partners with American troops colluded with insurgents.

Then there was this story in the New York Times on July 14: ``U.S. Troops Battle Iraqi Police in East Baghdad.'' Those are the police who are supposed to be on our side trying to quell the violence in Baghdad, not attacking American troops.

On the all-important area of political benchmarks, consider this headline from the Financial Times of June 18: ``U.S. Military Frustrated at Lack of Iraqi Reconciliation.'' The story reports that General Petraeus said there has not been any ``real substantial achievements in terms of political reform in progress.''

Reuters reported on June 18 that Iraq was ranked the second most unstable country in the world behind Sudan in the 2007 Failed States Index, produced by Foreign Policy magazine. Failed state? Obviously, we don't want Iraq to be left as a failed state. It is failing. It is on a failing course. If we don't change that course, it is going to continue to descend into that failed status.

The administration's recent self-assessment of benchmarks that there is progress on 8 of the 18 benchmarks would have us believe that the cup in Iraq is half full rather than being half empty. Eight of eighteen--that sounds pretty good, like progress. But as a matter of fact, Iraq is a cup with a hole in its bottom. We keep pouring in our men and women and resources, and there is a hole in the bottom of that cup through which they go.

It is that Iraqi hole that Secretary Gates addressed on June 14 in Baghdad when he said the message he was delivering to the Iraqi people was that ``our troops are buying them time to pursue reconciliation and that, frankly, we are disappointed in the progress thus far.'' Secretary Gates was accurate in saying that ``our troops are buying [the Iraqis] time to pursue reconciliation.'' But what he left unsaid is that our troops and our Nation have paid, and continue to pay, far too high a price to give the Iraqis that opportunity, and the time is long past due for the Iraqi political leaders to accept responsibility for their own future.

Secretary Gates' statement that we are ``disappointed in the progress'' was surely an immense understatement. The American people are downright incensed at the failure of the Iraqi leaders.

Everybody agrees there is no military solution in Iraq and that the only way to end the violence is for the Iraqi political leaders to settle their differences. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki acknowledged that last November when he said--and these words should be seared, I believe, into the consciousness of each of us as we vote, if we are ever allowed to vote on the Levin-Reed amendment. Here is what he said:

The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the

cycle of . . . bloodletting of innocents are the [Iraqi]

politicians.

Our service men and women are dying and being wounded while Iraqi leaders dawdle. The Iraqis themselves made commitments to share resources and power, amend their constitution, hold provincial elections, and take over responsibility for their own security in many more places than they have. They made the commitments last year in writing, but they have not kept them.

Secretary of State Rice recently confirmed in a letter to me that Iraqi leaders themselves, including their Presidency Council, had approved those benchmarks and the associated timeline. Secretary Rice wrote me:

We have confirmed with Iraqi President Talabani's chief of

staff that the benchmarks were formally approved last fall by

the Iraqi political committee on national security. This

committee includes the presidency council, the President, and

the two vice presidents, as well as the leaders of all the

major political blocs in Iraq.

Well, the Iraqi leaders' record on meeting the political timelines, which they approved themselves with a timeline, is abysmal.

For example, they said they would approve provincial elections and set a date for those elections by October of 2006. That has not been accomplished. They didn't do what they promised they would do.

The Iraqi political leaders said they would approve the hydrocarbon law by October 2006. That was not done. That has not been accomplished. They didn't do what they said they would do. The Iraqi leaders said they would approve a debaathification law by November 2006. They didn't do what they promised to do. The Iraqi political leaders said the Constitutional Review Committee would complete its work by January 2007 and hold a constitutional amendment referendum by March of this year. They did not do what they promised they would do.

This is not us imposing our benchmarks on them, this is the Iraqi political leaders who adopted their benchmarks, and have not met them.

I ask unanimous consent that my letter to Secretary Rice and her response be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Madam President, while our troops have done everything, and more, of what has been asked of them, while they have risked their all and given their all, the Iraqi political leaders remain frozen by their own history, unwilling to take the political risks that only they can take.

If there is any hope of forcing the Iraqi political leaders to take responsibility for their own country and to keep the commitments they made to meet the political benchmarks that they set and to make the compromises that only they can make, it is to have a timetable to begin reducing American forces and to redeploy those forces to a more limited support mission instead of being everybody's target in the middle of a civil war.

We need to send a clear message to the Iraqi leaders that we will not be in Iraq indefinitely, that we will not be their security blanket forever. That is what the Levin-Reed amendment would do if we are allowed to vote on it. Our amendment would require the President to begin reducing the number of American troops in Iraq within 4 months of enactment.

It would require transitioning the mission of our remaining military forces to force protection, training of Iraqi security forces, and targeted counterterrorism missions. Our amendment would require that the transition to those limited missions be completed by April 30 of next year. Finally, and importantly, it would call for a comprehensive diplomatic, political, and economic strategy, including sustained engagement with Iraq's neighbors and seeking an appointment of an international mediator under the auspices of the U.N. Security Council in order to try to bring stability to Iraq.

Some have criticized our amendment because it contains a timeline for the completion of the transition to new missions. We received similar criticism in the past about the timeline for the commencement of the transition. Timelines need to be established as the only way to force a change of course in Iraq and to force the Iraqis to accept responsibility for their own future. It is human nature to put off difficult decisions. Passage of our amendment would serve as a forcing mechanism and serve to stimulate action by the Iraqi Government to reach a political settlement.

Delaying action until the receipt of the administration's plan in September would only delay the time when Congress applies the needed pressure. There is no indication that Iraqi political leaders will compromise without our pressure. Indeed, there is every indication they will not. As Secretary Gates stated in April:

Debate in Congress . . . has been helpful in demonstrating

to the Iraqis that American patience is limited . . . The

debate itself and . . . the strong feelings expressed in the

Congress about the timetable probably has had a positive

effect in terms of communicating to the Iraqis that this is

not an open-ended commitment.

There is no indication the administration is willing to change course. For years, they have deluded themselves and the Nation with claims of progress while Iraqis descended into sectarian violence and chaos. On July 4, President Bush repeated his call for patience which he has made so many times over the years.

After more than 4 years, over 3,600 U.S. deaths, seven times that many wounded, and expenditures of $10 billion a month that we are borrowing from the future to finance this war in Iraq, the President's pleas for patience not only have a hollow ring, it is exactly the wrong message to the Iraqi leaders. Our message should be we are out of patience, and the refusal of the Iraqi leaders to work out their political differences is something which is no longer acceptable.

Congress attempted to respond to last November's election with a vote that we made on April 26. We adopted a bill that did provide a timetable to begin the reduction of U.S. forces in Iraq, the beginning of a phased troop reduction, redeployment in no more than 120 days, and a transition to a more limited mission focusing on counterterrorism, force protection, and training and logistical support for the Iraqi Army. President Bush vetoed our bill shortly thereafter.

Senator McConnell made a statement which was, I believe, very direct and very accurate, when he assessed not too long ago that ``the handwriting is on the wall that we are going in a different direction in the fall.'' That Presidential veto does not wash away the handwriting on the wall. It only makes the handwriting clearer and firmer that there is going to be a change of direction in Iraq.

So the question is: Why wait? Why not decide on a change of course now to save months of lost and wounded lives and huge additional expenditure of funds?

The clearer the handwriting on the wall is to the Iraqi political leaders and the quicker they read it and accept it, the greater the prospect for political settlement.

The clearer the handwriting on the wall is that the open-ended commitment of President Bush is over, not just rhetorically but in reality, the greater chance that an even wider civil war can be avoided.

There are some who acknowledge that a change of course is needed in Iraq, including U.S. troop reductions but who then say not now. But surely time is not working for us in Iraq. The sooner we shift strategy to force Iraqis to take responsibility, the better.

If we wish to improve the chance of a positive report on political progress in September, we need to put great pressure on Iraqi political leaders in July. We cannot and must not continue to have the lives of American servicemembers held hostage to Iraqi political intrigue and intransigence.

If we can get to the Levin-Reed amendment, if we can overcome the filibuster, and if we can adopt the Levin-Reed amendment which provides for the beginning of the reduction of our forces in Iraq in 120 days and transitioning to more limited missions, no more than 120 days after enactment, if we can adopt an amendment which says we will complete that transition by April 30, 2008, if we can adopt our amendment which provides for the appointment of an international mediator under U.N. auspices, we believe we will have passed the best chance of success in Iraq, and we will have adopted the only course of action which has a chance of pressuring the Iraqi leaders to do what only they can do.

The clock is ticking. We are losing more American lives and more American resources every day we delay. The time has come to set deadlines, to reduce our forces in Iraq, to transition to the new limited missions, and to embark on a comprehensive, diplomatic, political, and economic strategy to bring stability to Iraq.

I yield the floor.

Exhibit 1

U.S. Senate,

Committee on Armed Services,

Washington, DC, May 9, 2007.

Hon. Condoleezza Rice,

Secretary of State,

Washington, DC.

Dear Madam Secretary: I am writing in connection with your

letter of January 20, 2007 in which you advised me regarding

a set of benchmarks that the Government of Iraq has set for

itself.

You wrote that ``Iraq's Policy Committee on National

Security agreed upon a set of political, security, and

economic benchmarks and an associated timeline in September

2006. These were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on

October 16, 2006, and referenced by the Iraq Study Group; the

relevant document (enclosed) was posted at that time on the

President of Iraq's website.''

Yesterday, I met with Mowaffak al-Rubaie, Prime Minister

Maliki's national security adviser. During the course of our

meeting, Dr. Rubaie stated that the Presidency Council never

reaffirmed the benchmarks. He was adamant on this point even

after I showed him the statement in your letter.

This is an important point as the Presidency Council, whose

three members, President Jalal Talabani (Kurd), Deputy

President `Adil `Abd al-Mahdi (Shia Muslim) and Deputy

President Tariq al-Hashimi (Sunni Muslim), are elected by the

Council of Representatives and represent the three major

ethnic groups of the country.

Earlier today, State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack

stated ``These are the benchmarks that they've laid out for

themselves. We didn't come up with them. They came up with

them. And they need to be seen in the eyes of the Iraqi

people as delivering for the Iraqi people.''

It seems to me that it would make a difference if the

benchmarks and associated timeline were only approved by an

advisory group as compared to the Presidency Council.

Accordingly, please confirm that the benchmarks and

associated timeline, which you attached to your January 30,

2007 letter, were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council after

being agreed upon by the Policy Committee on National

Security, as stated in your letter.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Carl Levin,

Chairman.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I understand our staffs have reached a point where we were able to clear something like 26 amendments on this bill but that there is one last hurdle on the Republican side. I am wondering whether my good friend from Arizona feels there may be a possibility that we can jump over that hurdle in the next couple hours.

I thank my friend.

I understand the Senator from Nebraska wants the floor, and I yield the floor.

Reserving the right to object, I wonder if the Senator will repeat that.

Objection.

Will the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request?

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after the Senator from Maryland finishes her remarks, then on the Republican side, I understand Senator Warner will be the next speaker, and then that Senator Schumer be recognized on our side.

I thank my friend from Maryland.

If I can respond to my good friend's question.

We know what we hope will happen, and there are some things we can predict that will happen.

What do we know? We know that Iraq is in chaos. We know that the Iraqi President, or Prime Minister more accurately, has said the only way to end the bloodletting of innocents in Iraq is if the Iraqi leaders reach a political settlement. We know that. We know there is no military solution in Iraq. We know there is only a political solution and that the violence cannot end unless Iraqi leaders reach a political settlement.

I think those are consensus points. Those are things we know. We know how many of our troops have been killed and how many are killed every

month and how many are wounded and come home. We know those things.

Then the question is: Since there is no military solution, there is only a political solution--that is the only hope of succeeding in Iraq--how do you promote a political settlement in Iraq? Is the current course we are on succeeding or do we need to change the course?

We all have the same goal. We all want to maximize the chances of success in Iraq. If you believe we are succeeding in Iraq now, then you vote to stay the course. If you believe after all these years and all these deaths and all these wounded and all these expenditures, now over $10 billion a month, that we need to change course because we are not succeeding in Iraq, you have to ask yourself: How do we change course? How do we change what is going on in Iraq?

So those are the things that we, each of us, I think in our own conscience, are trying to figure what is the best way to maximize the chances of success in Iraq. I believe the only hope in getting the Iraqi leaders to reach the political settlement, which everybody agrees is the only hope, is to force them to accept responsibility for their own nation, to work out the political differences on revenue-sharing, on elections, on debaathification amendments, and on constitutional changes.

They have been dithering for years. They made a promise to their people, to the American people, and to the world last year. It is on their Web site, 16 of their benchmarks--not ours, their benchmarks. They have not carried out the commitments they have made. There was a timetable attached to those benchmarks. I put that timetable in the Record. It was part of a letter that Secretary Rice sent to me.

So we have a situation--

They are different.

Some are the same, some are different, but they are political benchmarks which the Iraqi leaders said they would meet. They made those benchmarks. We didn't impose them, those are their benchmarks. The letter from Secretary Rice makes it explicit that the Presidency Council, which represents all the factions in Iraq, formally adopted those benchmarks. They were supposed to have been adopted in October, November, December, January, and in February. They have not been met.

How are we going to get them to meet them, to keep an open-ended commitment, which is what the President wants us to do. Another delay and then patience. The President asks us to be patient? We should be downright impatient with the Iraqi leaders. The message to the Iraqi leaders shouldn't be, for heaven sakes, after all these casualties, that we are going to be patient with them when it is in their hands as to whether this civil strife is going to end.

If the Senator will yield for an answer.

I think the Senate spoke also prior to adopting your amendment. We voted 51 to 48, adopted an amendment which said we will begin to reduce our forces and to transition to the new mission, and that we would begin that transition within 120 days. That was vetoed by the President.

The Senate spoke even before it adopted the amendment of the Senator from Virginia. So we have spoken in many ways over the years. But now it is our belief, those of us who support this amendment, that the earlier we put pressure on the Iraqi leaders to reach a political solution, which everybody agrees is the only hope, the earlier we put that pressure on them, the better.

Mr. President, I ask that the Chair notify me when I have spoken for 5 minutes.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Texas for explaining his amendment. But when I hear him describe the Levin-Reed amendment, I am afraid I don't recognize it because, unfortunately, the Senator from Texas has failed to include some of the most important elements of this Levin-Reed amendment.

This is the only amendment the Senate will consider during debate on this bill which will change the policy of the war in Iraq. It is the only amendment which establishes a timetable to bring this war to a responsible end. It is the only amendment which in law will require American troops to start to come home, the Levin-Reed amendment.

The amendment offered by the Senator from Texas is a sense-of-the- Senate resolution. A sense-of-the-Senate resolution is done on a regular basis on the floor of the Senate. It does not have the power and impact of law. It is an observation made by the Senate. That is all. It is not binding on the President. It won't change the policy. There is no suggestion that it even could.

What the Senator from Texas brings to us is the possibility that things could get worse in Iraq than they are today, and that is a possibility. But let's be very honest about the state of Iraq today. It is a nation in chaos. It is a nation that is engulfed by its own civil war. It is struggling to decide which faction within its nation will govern. Frankkly, some question whether it will be a nation. I think the Kurds, for example, given their way, would be independent of Iraq as we know it today. This struggle to define Iraq is part of the chaos and consternation we find in that country.

Finally, of course, this civil war is driven by so many elements-- criminal elements, al-Qaida elements, Ba'athist elements, Iranian elements, and, yes, a civil war generated by a division within Islam that has gone on for more than 14 centuries. It is into this crucible of hate and killing that we have sent 170,000 American troops who each morning get up, strap on their armor, and go out and pray to God they will live for another day. Is that what we bargained for when President Bush said we had to rid ourselves of Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction?

The Senator from Texas makes the argument that if we leave, things could get worse. It is possible. But I will tell you this: Stabilization will occur on Iraqi terms whenever the American military departs, and it is likely to be chaotic. We have to acknowledge that. Whether we leave in 10 months or 10 years, the Iraqis have to decide their own future.

The elements of the Levin-Reed amendment which the Senator from Texas does not acknowledge are absolutely essential. He will find, when he reads the Levin-Reed amendment, on page 3, paragraph 3, we will still have troops engaged in targeted counterterrorism operations against al- Qaida and al-Qaida-affiliated organizations and other international terrorist organizations.

The Senator from Texas suggests that we will leave and walk away from the scene and hope for the best. That is not true. Under Levin-Reed, we will continue to fight al-Qaida, the fight which we should have been dedicated to from 9/11 forward and a fight which by this time should have brought us Osama bin Laden and his major lieutenants.

Secondly, the argument made by the Senator from Texas is that the Levin-Reed amendment is going to lead to a broader regional conflict as American troops start to come home. I recommend for reading by the Senator from Texas page 2 of the amendment, which goes into graphic detail about our hope that as we start to withdraw, as our troops start to withdraw from Iraq, we will initiate a comprehensive, diplomatic, political, and economic strategy that includes sustained engagement with Iraq's neighbors and the international community for working out collective stability in that country.

I would say to my friend from Texas, what he has suggested as part and parcel of the result of Levin-Reed is already taken care of. We want to start bringing American troops home. Losing 100 American soldiers every month, 1,000 seriously wounded, $12 billion in taxpayers' money, put into a situation which is nothing short of a civil war, is unacceptable.

The future of Iraq is in the hands of the Iraqis. They have to stand up and defend their own country. They have to decide their own future. Is it likely to be smooth sailing as we leave? No. But it is a process which will take place whether we leave within a few months or a year or wait much longer.

I encourage my colleagues to look honestly at this Cornyn amendment. As I reflect on it, I don't think it offers any serious challenge. None of us want to see a failed Iraq. But let's remember that the bottom line is the only

amendment which will change the policy in Iraq is the amendment by Senators Levin and Reed which we will vote on, after an all-night session, first thing tomorrow morning.

I yield the floor.

Will the Senator yield for a question?

I will make this very brief. Isn't it a fact that over the weekend, the Prime Minister of Iraq invited us to leave at any time?

How much time remains?

Mr. President, I would like to address two comments made earlier by the Senator from Texas. He referred to the possibility of an all-night session in the Senate as a so-called Senate slumber party. Trust me, that is not what this is about. What we are facing on the Republican side of the aisle is an objection to an up-or-down vote, a majority vote, on the Levin-Reed amendment. That amendment is the only amendment which establishes a time line and a timetable for ending this war responsibly and beginning to bring our troops home within 120 days. It is the only amendment before us that will achieve that. Other amendments are interesting. None of them have the power of law.

The Levin-Reed amendment has the power of law. The President will have to follow it or veto it. Those are his choices. That is why it is so serious. That is why the Republican leadership has opposed our having a majority vote on this in the Senate. They are filibustering it, trying to stop us from getting to a vote on that amendment.

Ordinarily, when you filibuster something, it is so sanitized and civilized, you don't even know it is happening. Members of the Senate file a cloture motion and go out for dinner and say: We'll see you in the morning for the vote. Tonight they will stick around. If they want to filibuster this amendment that will change the policy in Iraq, they will have to stay and debate it. It will be a real filibuster. If they believe this is still right, we will see if they feel that way at 4 a.m. tomorrow morning. That is what this is about. It is not a slumber party.

The Senator from Texas said, ``We are ready to vote.'' Therefore, I ask unanimous consent to vote on the Levin-Reed amendment No. 2087 at 6 p.m., with the time between 3:05 and then equally divided in the usual form.

I announce that the Senator from Delaware (Mr. Biden), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Inouye), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Johnson) are necessarily absent.

I ask the majority leader, first, he has focused on the most important part of this debate, the war that is claiming American lives. But, unfortunately, this debate also focuses on the rules of the Senate. I ask the Senate majority leader if he is aware of the fact that in the last 7 years that the Defense authorization bill has been brought to the floor, every amendment which has been offered was subject to a majority vote, simple majority vote, except in five instances which required a budget waiver, a specific provision in our Senate rules when there were budget waivers required as with the minimum wage and so forth, 60 votes. But is the majority leader aware of the fact that in every authorization bill, Defense authorization bill, in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, that every amendment has been judged by a majority vote and that the decision by the Republicans to obstruct the majority vote on this is the first time in this long period of time that we have ever done this on a Defense authorization bill?

Madam President, I have the greatest respect for the Senator from Arizona. We disagree on a number of issues. We have worked together on many others. I would like to respond to several things he said. Senator McCain asked us who is holding up this bill? Well, those who followed the debate know that a few minutes ago the majority leader, Senator Reid of Nevada, asked to move to vote on the amendment by Senators Levin and Reed. He asked for unanimous consent to move to a vote within a matter of hours.

Where did the objection come from? From the Republican side of the aisle. So in answering Senator McCain's question, who is holding up this bill, it is your side of the aisle, and specifically the Senator sitting next to you who objected to moving to a vote. That is what is holding up this bill.

The second question asked by the Senator from Arizona: Why are we debating the war on this bill? This bill happens to be the authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 2007 for military activities of the Department of Defense. If you do not debate the war in Iraq on the bill authorizing appropriations for the Department of Defense, where would you turn, the agriculture bill? I don't think so. This is the appropriate bill.

The Senator from Arizona has made that point. Included within the amendments to this bill are provision for our warriors who are coming home wounded. I have been part of putting that together. I thank Senator Levin, I thank Senator McCain. It is an important provision. But let's be very honest. The reason they are coming home wounded is because there is a war. It is fit and proper for us to ask whether that war is being waged effectively and whether our policy should be changed in this bill? If not on this bill, what bill would we use? I think, frankly, that many would rather we did not debate this at all; give permission to the President to wage the war as he wants as long as he wants: step out of the way, Congress, the President is in charge.

I don't accept that. Each of us represents our own State, represents people who expect us to articulate their point of view and speak for them. We do not cede all power in this Government to one branch, not to the executive branch. We have our own responsibility.

Let me say a word about waiting until September. Waiting until September, what difference would it make if we wait until September? What could it possibly cost us if we wait until September? Well, it is likely to cost us 200 American lives. We are losing 100 Americans, on average, every single month of this war. It is likely to cost us 2,000 more injured soldiers; that is what 2 months means.

It is likely to cost us $24 billion from America's Treasury. It is not a matter of waiting for a convenient moment chosen by some to make this decision. Many of us believe this decision should be made now and it should be made here, and it should be made with the Levin-Reed amendment which is a reasonable bipartisan amendment.

The Republican side objects. They are filibustering. We have said this will not be the most modern form of filibuster. This goes back to the roots of the Senate. We will stay in business during the period of time when we are supposed to be debating. Whether we go to this amendment, we will invite members from both said of the aisle to express their point of view. I will tell you this, the people I represent in my State, the ones whom I meet, as Senator Leahy said of his voters in Vermont, want us to change this policy in this war. They want us to bring this war to an end. They understand, as we must understand, we never bargained for where we are today. America was misled into this war. We were told there were weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons, they threatened the Middle East, they threatened America. Not a single one has been found.

We were told that this dictator, Saddam Hussein, was the reason for this invasion. He is long gone--dug out of a hole in the ground, put on trial, and executed by his own people. Yet we still stay in this war, a war that has changed so drastically to the point that it is now a civil war and our soldiers, as good as they are, are caught in the crossfire of sectarian violence, now victims of al-Qaida terrorism that did not exist when we invaded Iraq, not in that country.

They are the ones who are the victims of bad planning and bad decisions. It is interesting to me how many Republican Senators see how poorly executed this war has been.

We all know our military is the best. But when it comes to the Commander in Chief and the generals, so many bad decisions have been made at the expense of our troops. It is interesting to me, they concede that point and yet want to continue: Let's just wait a few more months, maybe another year, maybe a year and a half, and then see what happens.

I was one of 23 Senators who voted against this authorization to go to war.

Senator Byrd, I remember your leadership on this issue as well. I can tell you it was not the most popular position to be in at the time.

The overwhelming majority of the American people heard their President say weapons of mass destruction, ruthless and bloodthirsty dictator, and said: Yes, maybe we should invade. But it didn't add up. It didn't add up in terms of the threat or in terms of whether we were prepared to accept the reality that it is far easier to get into a war than it is to get out of one. Here we are in the fifth year of a war that has lasted longer than World War II, a war with no end in sight. This President's response: Send more American soldiers into harm's way in Iraq.

That is unacceptable. It is time for the Iraqis to stand and defend their own nation. They will not do that until American soldiers start coming home. That is what the Levin-Reed amendment is about.

I am sorry the Republican side has initiated this filibuster to block a vote on this important amendment. I am sorry they are insisting on a 60-vote margin which was rarely, if ever, used on a Defense authorization bill over the last 7 years. Those are the facts. They have done it because their ranks are starting to change. Three Republican Senators have now stepped out and said they will join us in this effort to change the policy of the war. Many more back home have said they have decided we need a new policy in Iraq. We want to give them a chance for a vote that is significant.

Will the President veto it if we pass it? Probably. But does that mean we shouldn't try? Don't we owe it to these soldiers and their families and to our Nation to change this failed policy before it claims more American lives, sends more American warriors back wounded from battle and costs Americans the treasure we have gathered in the taxes of our citizens?

I say to my friend from Arizona, we see this war differently, but I think it is clear who is holding up this bill: the Republican minority with their filibuster. Why this bill? Because if you didn't debate a war on a Defense authorization bill, where would you debate it? Should we wait until September? The cost is too high.

I yield the floor.

I object.

Madam President, since the minority whip is ready to vote, I ask unanimous consent to vote on the Levin-Reed amendment No. 2087 at 6 p.m. with the time between now and then equally divided in the usual form.

Madam President, the objection is heard, and I think it is very clear. You cannot object to the vote, say you are ready to vote, and then object to the vote. You cannot have it both ways.

The fact is, when you look at these past votes on the Defense authorization bill, they don't make the case that the Senator from Arizona and the Senator from Mississippi say. I will go through each one of them:

For the year 2000, considering the fiscal year 2001 Defense authorization bill, of 14 amendments on which there were rollcall votes, only 1 required 60 votes because it involved a budget waiver. In 2001, when we considered the fiscal year 2002 Defense authorization bill, of the 2 amendments on which there were rollcall votes, all were simple majorities; no 60-vote requirements. In 2002, for the 2003 Defense authorization bill, of the 5 amendments on which there were rollcall votes, only 1 60-vote requirement; again, a specific budget waiver, which is not the case with the pending amendment. In 2003, when we considered the 2004 Defense authorization, of the 10 amendments on which there were rollcall votes, all were simple majorities; no 60-vote requirements. In 2004, with the 2005 Defense authorization, of the 30 amendments on which there were rollcall votes, all were simple majorities; no 60-vote requirements. In 2004, with the 2005 Defense authorization, of the 30 amendments on which there were rollcall votes, only 2 required an extraordinary majority of 60 votes, both requiring budget waivers. In 2005 when we considered the Defense authorization bill for 2006, for 25 amendments they were simple majority votes. None required 60 votes. In 2006, when considering the fiscal year 2007 Defense authorization bill, 15 amendments, only 2 required 60 votes. They related to the minimum wage. They required budget waivers. Those are the only 2.

Let me also correct the record. When the Senator from Arizona says we don't take up the war in Iraq on the Defense authorization bill, I would remind him that in the last Defense authorization bill, there were two specific amendments offered relative to the conduct of the war in Iraq--on this very bill last year: one by Senator Levin and Senator Reed, another by Senator John Kerry, both of which only required a majority vote.

I would say from the Senator from Arizona's point of view, there is scant evidence to support his position that No. 1, we never considered Iraq on Defense authorization bills--we just did last year; No. 2, we always require 60 votes when it comes to amendments on the bills. Six times in 7 years we did, each one because of a budget issue that is not involved in the Levin amendment.

Let me say a word about the other things said by the Senator from Arizona before yielding the floor. I respect the men and women in uniform. I have been to Iraq twice. I have visited with them. I have been to send-offs in my State of Illinois as National Guard units have been activated. I have been there to welcome them home. I carry on many conversations with the Illinois soldiers overseas. I keep in touch with their families. I respect them very much. But to say this is the first time we have heard from generals in Iraq that they just need another 6 months or another year, I think the Senator from Arizona knows better. We have been told this over and over again: When they stand up, we will stand down. Do you remember that one? How many years have we been hearing that? How many hundreds of millions of dollars have we put into Iraq for training Iraqi Army soldiers? Yet we are still there with a larger force today than there we were just a year ago.

So when my colleague argues that just a little more time is all they need, I hope he will understand the skepticism of the American people and many Members of the Senate. We have heard this before over and over again.

I also want to take issue with one point the Senator from Arizona said--and I am sure he didn't mean to mislead anyone. We are not talking about withdrawing the troops in 120 days, which is what has been said over and over again. The Levin-Reed amendment begins the withdrawal of troops in 120 days, completing it on April 1 of next year--transitioning by April 1 to a different force; not the combat force we know now caught in the midst of a civil war but a force with the specified mission of fighting al-Qaida and other terrorism, of helping transition the Iraqi Army to self-defense, and protecting our own men and women and our assets and security during this transition. Those things are all included in this bill. So this notion that somehow in a matter of 120 days all the troops will be gone, that isn't even envisioned in the Levin-Reed amendment.

So I would say to my friend from Arizona: Yes, I guess my patience has worn thin. I guess I have heard from too many generals such as those quoted by the Senator from Arizona that they just need a little more time. I have seen what time has cost us. It has cost us American lives. It has cost us serious, debilitating injuries. It has cost us a great deal in terms of our national treasure and resources. I think it is time for a change of policy, and so do the American people. They said that in the last election. They don't want us to dream up procedural obstacles to keep us from this decision. They want us to vote up or down to change the policy or keep the policy. That is what we were sent here to do.

I hope the Republican side of the aisle, as they initiate this filibuster, as they try to stop us from coming to a majority vote on the Levin-Reed amendment, understand that America sees that clearly.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator for the kind words. And one of my first reactions was a bit of confusion. He referenced General Lamb, the British officer in Baghdad, expressing chagrin at the proposals to reduce the troop strength of the American forces. He must have been beside himself last February when Prime Minister Blair announced the reduction of British forces. In fact, Prime Minister Blair stated at that time that 7,100 troops would be drawn down to approximately 5,500. That is down from a level of 40,000.

So at the time that the British are withdrawing troops, we are trying to surge troops. I think the general's peak or discomfort is somewhat misplaced with the United States. I think it should more properly be directed to Prime Minister Blair.

But let me get on with issues that I want to address, and that is to try to clarify from my perspective some of the concepts and terms that have been talked about. One is a repeated reference to General Petraeus's plan. The President makes it, and my colleagues make it. This is the President's plan. General Petraeus was asked specifically in his confirmation hearing what role he played, and here was his answer.

I met with the Secretary of Defense a couple days after he

took office and before he left for his first trip to Iraq,

and we discussed the situation there during that meeting. We

subsequently talked after his trip. I also talked to the

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff several times in this

period, noting that a population and security emphasis in

Baghdad in particular was necessary to help the Iraqis gain

the time and space for tough decisions.

As the strategy was refined, I talked on several occasions

to General Odierno. I relayed my support for those levels

that General Odierno recommended to the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs. I also supported the additional emphasis in the

advisory effort.

This is not a precise quote, but paraphrases his remarks. General Petraeus is not the author of this plan. He, like many officers, participated, was asked questions; he had great experience. He was the head and led the 101st Air Mobile Division in Iraq and was head of our training effort. But this is not his plan.

Now, he has accepted this plan. He did that publicly. But this is the President's plan. And at the heart of the President's plan is the statement he made on January 10 when he announced it.

I have made it clear to the prime minister and Iraq's other

leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended. If the

Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it

will lose the support of the American people and lose the

support of the Iraqi people. Now is the time to act. The

prime minister understands this.

Well, apparently, the prime minister did not understand, because in the intervening months, exactly what the President feared has happened. There has been no adequate political progress in Iraq. That is key rationale for the increased forces in Iraq. And without this political decisiveness on the part of the Iraqis, our military efforts will not be decisive. And what has happened because of this failure to act is precisely as the President suggested? The American people have increasingly become critical of the policy in Iraq. Their support is eroding, and similarly the Iraqi people.

So you have a situation now where the logic and the premise for the surge, for the troop levels we are maintaining in Iraq, was the fact there would be political progress. Since January, to date there has not been political progress. I daresay there is very few, if any, of my colleagues that will argue that between now and September 15 we will see remarkable progress by the Iraqi Government. Indeed, it is suspected, confirmed practically, that the Iraqi Assembly will adjourn in August for the month. So the reality is that on these critical issues of political will and decisiveness and political progress, we will know nothing in September that we do not know now.

Given the incredibly complicated political system, the incredibly complicated institutional challenges facing the Iraqi Government, the notion that we will know more even at the end of this year or the beginning of next year is doubtful. Without this political progress, all our military efforts will not produce success. That is one reason I think we have to begin to change course. We have to begin to adjust our effort to protect our self-interests and our interests in the region, but no longer be the broker, if you will, for political progress in Iraq that does not materialize.

My colleagues have been on the Senate floor and said time and time again that there have been deadlines imposed, in many cases by the Iraqis themselves, that have not been met. The latest report, just a few days ago, suggested these political benchmarks have not been issued. Without that, our efforts and the brave sacrifice of our soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors, and every man and woman who is out there, are not producing the results we want and need. So we have to look again at this strategy.

But there is another factor, too, that I think is important to note. I was just in Iraq--as so many of my colleagues have traveled there, I have also--and I spoke with General Petraeus directly. He gave me every indication that he was not waiting for September; that he had been able to make an assessment over the several months he has been in command, and he is prepared to make a recommendation--unless I misunderstood him--before the end of August.

Now, he might be overruled by the White House in Washington, but he has a pretty good sense of what is happening on the ground, and we should have that same sense in the Congress.

The other factor that seems so critical when it is put next to the issue of no apparent progress by Iraqi political leaders is the fact that by April of next year, April 2008, our military forces will not be able to generate 160,000 troops on the ground in Iraq. The surge will come to an end regardless of what happens on the ground. Unless, of course, the President is prepared to

make Draconian personnel changes, extend deployments to 18 months or even longer, calling up Reserve and National Guard units that are not scheduled to be called up, continuing to rely upon the stop-loss practice, where individuals who are eligible to leave the service after honorable service are denied the opportunity to leave and in many cases are forced to deploy; picking reservists and people who are in the individual Ready Reserve, those are individuals who served their full active commitment, they have left, many of them have gone on with their lives and suddenly they are called up and told get back in uniform, you are going overseas.

Without such draconian decisions, then by next April we will not be able to field 160,000 troops in Iraq as we are doing today. So the reality is this policy will change. The question is, will it change now or then and will it change in a way that strengthens the national security of the United States? Also, will it change in a way it will gain the support of the American people?

One of the factors in a counterinsurgency is the fact that you need popular support. That is not something that is a special thing to have or a nice thing to have, it is essential to the strategy. We are losing--the President is losing--popular support with respect to these operations. Without that support, we will not be able to maintain our presence in Iraq.

We are seeing already Americans across the political divide, across the geographical divide, demanding that this Congress act. They have, frankly, little confidence in the President's ability, after all these years, to get it right. That is one of the major reasons we are here today debating, and we will be tonight debating, because the American people are looking for a new direction in Iraq.

The other factor that I think should be mentioned is that, while we have pursued a strategy of increasing our forces, our adversaries--and they are multiple in a complicated theater of operations--have reacted. First of all, they have taken the battle, if you will, the battle we tried to orchestrate in Baghdad, and they have spread it around the country. They have moved where there are fewer troops. This has caused us to spread our operations around. The surge, if you will, the additional approximately 30,000 troops, were initially intended to go into Baghdad.

If you, as I did, listened closely to General Petraeus at his confirmation hearing, if you listened to the President in his January 10 speech, the concept was Baghdad was going to be locked down. It was going to be saturated with American and Iraqi forces. That has not happened because our tactical leaders have determined they must get out of Baghdad, they must go ahead and pursue some of these elements outside of Baghdad, and our adversaries have decided they would rather move on than take us in a head-to-head fight.

Time, regretfully, is always on the side of the insurgent. If they can survive a day, then that is a day that is in their favor. As a result, even with these additional 30,000 troops, there is a question of whether they are an adequate number to take over this population protection mission the President has announced. The population of Iraq is significant. That is another factor I think we have to consider when we look at the adequacy of even the President's proposal today.

The Levin-Reed proposal talks about doing what is not only necessary but frankly inevitable. We have to begin to redeploy our forces. We have to begin to reduce our forces. We cannot sustain this effort because of the structure of our military forces.

The President had an opportunity several years ago, in the wake of our success in Afghanistan and in the wake of the operations in Iraq, to dramatically increase the size of the Army and the Marine Corps. Senator Hagel and I came to the floor and we proposed an amendment, in 2003, to do that. This was opposed by the administration because, if you recall, back then this Iraq operation was basically all but over and they were getting out.

Now it is very difficult to increase the size of the military forces. The Army has missed, for the last 2 months, its recruiting objectives. But even if we stayed on track recruiting, we are still in a situation where we cannot grow the Army fast enough, the Marine Corps fast enough, to maintain indefinitely these forces in Iraq. So the strategy must change. If the strategy is not only not supported by our end strength, it certainly must change in the light of the American people.

I think the President made a significant mistake last January. After an election that sent a very strong signal all across this country that the American people wanted change, after the report of the Iraq Study Group, wise men and women on both sides of the aisle, with no particular special interest they were trying to protect or advance-- they were true patriots coming forward to give their best advice-- suggested that our strategy should be remarkably similar to what we are talking about today: the redeployment of the American forces; switching missions to training, force protection, counterterrorism; engaging in robust diplomatic activity in the region.

Those recommendations were cast aside by the President. At that point, if not earlier, the American public began to seriously question the direction of his policy in Iraq. Without public support, you cannot conduct military operations effectively or for any length of time.

So we face two realities in the United States. Ultimately, the inability to generate this force structure indefinitely and the fact that the American people are growing increasingly intolerant of our operations in Iraq--not our forces there, not those magnificent men and women who are fighting and sadly dying each day but our presence there and the lack each day, in their minds, of any real progress and the documented lack of political progress. It was documented a few days ago on the part of the Iraqi Government.

So we have to change. The question then is what is the best way to do it? We can debate about this. But certainly this amendment, offered by myself and Senator Levin, represents a change. Not a hortatory request for further assessment, not a discussion of possibilities or reference to another study group but a plan of change.

It begins by initiating a reduction of our forces 120 days after passage. That probably will be sometime toward the end of this year, given the nature of the legislative process. It doesn't specify any specific level of reductions. That is the President as Commander's prerogative. It doesn't specify a particular timetable when they can leave, who should go first. Again, that is his prerogative. But what it does suggest and, in fact, requires is that by April of next year, that we have transitioned to three missions--again, missions that were supported significantly by the Iraq Study Group: Force protection--we always have to protect our forces and facilities in the field; counterterrorism, because we never want to give up not only the option but the obligation to strike at terrorist cells wherever they may be, particularly in Iraq; and third, the continued training of the Iraqi security forces.

These I think are missions that are not only critical but they advance our national security interests. Again, this fight against terror cannot be given up. We have to continue it. To the extent that we can create effective Iraqi security forces, mitigates against the real concerns that have been expressed on this floor of the aftermath of what I think is almost an inevitable reduction in our presence. We have to be concerned about that.

One of the vexing things, though, about training the Iraqi security forces, is it is relatively easy to teach map reading and squad drills. It is relatively easy to teach calling for artillery fire. What is hard to teach, because you really can't teach it, is the political reliability, with a small ``p,'' the dedication to the country, the situation in which professional officers are truly professional. That is one of the nagging doubts that everyone has about the Iraqi security forces, particularly the Iraqi police, and to a less degree the Iraqi Army. There are many factors there, too, but we still have to, I think, press forward and try to train these forces.

Our amendment represents the only real possibility of change today, of all those that might be discussed on the floor. It represents not a precipitous withdrawal. It is a phased reduction to missions that are important and are

well within the capacity, I believe, of our military forces to sustain over time. They serve, I think, the much broader interests of the United States.

All of this, of course, has to be complemented by robust political activity, diplomatic activity in Iraq and around the region, something the President has been woefully lacking in his pursuit of, over the many months we have been engaged. We have to make the case--it is difficult to make, but we have to make the case to the neighbors, particularly, that an Iraq that becomes this caldron of instability and chaos that some of my colleagues fear--and, frankly, that we have to at least anticipate, in terms of our diplomacy and some of our military preparation--that this situation would be detrimental to them as much, if not more, than to us.

A chaotic, turbulent, anarchy on the border of any country spells serious problems for that country. That case should begin to be made immediately, not only by our diplomats but by the international community.

We suggest, also, we have to try again to involve others in this effort; not just the United States and Great Britain but others, the international actors. They, too, I think have an interest in a stable region, a stable Iraq.

It has been discussed on this floor that al-Qaida is sitting back and hoping we leave. It is an interesting concept because there is some contradictory evidence. Ayman Zawahiri, who is the second in command of al-Qaida, was quoted recently as suggesting that our departure would actually be something that would cause them some concern. Not because they don't wish us ill, they certainly do. Not because today they don't continue to try to attack us. But because they believe our presence in Iraq, in his words as translated, is a ``historic trap,'' that we are trapped there and that they can use their forces there--not the al- Qaida elements but all the sectarian groups, some of them operating against us because we are there--they can use these forces to attack our troops, diminish our presence, and effectively continue to apply pressure on us.

I think there is a suggestion there that our departure might, in fact, help us in our overall strategy. It certainly will help us to counteract the image which the propagandists, the Zawahiris of the world present, that the United States is committed to destroying the Muslim community by imperialistically invading holy territory. We are in a battle of ideas ultimately, and we are not doing a very good job because what they are able to show throughout the entire Islamic world is our forces in Iraq and our forces in Afghanistan but particularly in Iraq and try to validate their claim, their propaganda, that is why they exist, to resist us.

In the course of our strategy going forward, one should think at least about the efficacy of our presence there, not in terms of a bulwark of security in Iraq but as a way that we, in fact, are playing into the hands of many of these Iraqi terrorists, these international terrorists.

One of the other aspects we face as a reality on the ground is the complex situation in Iraq. Too often I think the President and others try to simplify this as this battle for Iraq is the central front in our battle against al-Qaida. I would argue the central front in our battle against al-Qaida is somewhere in Pakistan. That is where bin Laden is, where Zarqawi is, that is where it is reported that hundreds of Iraqis and others, Europeans, Chechens, are training to be jihadist terrorists across the globe. But regardless of where the central front is, the issue I think we have to recognize and grasp is that our presence in Iraq is something we cannot sustain indefinitely.

We have to focus, I think, on the other threats, focus more diligently on these other threats. Now, we have a situation in Iraq, a complicated situation of Kurds, Shia, and Sunni, together with criminals, together with terrorist elements, al-Qaida. Too often, as I said, we try to make the point it is just about al-Qaida.

We have made progress in Anbar Province because in that Sunni region, the Sunni tribal leaders have united against al-Qaida. But that does not define the most decisive factor in Iraq, and that is the conflict between the Sunni community and the Shia community; a community on one hand, the Sunnis, who feel profound entitlement, and on the other hand, the Shia, who feel a profound sense of paranoia.

I think we have to ask ourselves seriously, will that profound conflict between the two communities be resolved in 30 days, on September 15; will it be resolved in a week; more than that; October 1; will it be resolved 6 months from now?

It has lasted for hundreds and hundreds of years. It is the fuel that is generating the conflict we see in Iraq today. Without the political steps of the Iraqi Government leaders at least to attempt to deal with this issue, our presence will not deal with--I think in the short term--the solution.

Senator Levin and I have proposed what I believe is the most practical, feasible, realistic policy we can pursue today in Iraq; indeed, as I suggest, a policy which perhaps not in the same terms but in the same substance will inevitably be the policy of this country. I hope today, though, we can take decisive action to move to our bill, avoid a filibuster, to vote up or down and move forward with a new direction for Iraq, a new direction for our country.

I note the presence of the senior Senator from West Virginia.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I wish to propound a unanimous consent request, but I would be remiss if I did not recognize Senator Hagel's leadership on this issue and his articulate vision and years ago his brave service as a soldier in our Army.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Finance Committee be permitted to meet today at 7 p.m. in 215 Dirksen Senate Office Building to consider an original bill entitled the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, which will provide health care for needy children.

Mr. President, I rise this afternoon to support the Levin- Reed amendment. As we know, Iraq is the most important issue facing our country today. The core challenge in Iraq is the cycle of violence, despair, and retribution that is tearing Iraq apart and threatening wider regional instability. There is no significant progress in Iraq. By any measurement, the situation in Iraq is getting worse as each week passes. Prime Minister al-Maliki's Government is essentially paralyzed and dysfunctional, in part by boycotts and sectarian rivalries and an intense sectarian war.

The Interior Ministry in Iraq, which controls Iraq's police forces, is still a disaster and does not function as a national ministry. Horrific violence in Iraq is spreading beyond Baghdad. Yesterday, car bombs and attacks in Kirkuk and Diyala Province killed more than 100 and injured almost 200 Iraqis. Kirkuk is an area of Iraq in the northern part, Kurdistan, that has been considered by this administration as one of the most secure areas of Iraq. Recent events in Kurdistan over the last few months have shown otherwise. Increasingly, regions that were previously seen as relatively stable and secure, such as the Kurdish area, are now being engulfed by violence. The southern four provinces in Iraq near Basra, which contains most of Iraq's oil and Iraq's only port and outlet to the sea, are out of control. Shiite militias control the southern four provinces of Iraq, including the most significant oil reserves in Iraq's one outlet to the sea. Shiite militias and criminal gangs control these provinces and today even demand tribute, and we pay it. The Iraqi Government pays tribute to Shia militias to use Iraq's primary port. The last remaining pipeline into Baghdad has been blown up, crippling Baghdad's access to oil, and there are no operating refineries in Baghdad. Hence, the product that comes to Baghdad today is trucked in from Kuwait. This is the nation that has the third largest oil reserves in the world. The green zone is being attacked daily.

Last week, 9 people were killed, including Americans, and over 30 wounded inside the green zone. These daily attacks on the green zone by mortar fire, rocket fire increase.

I have listened today to some of my colleagues argue that the surge strategy--the surge strategy--has only just begun; why don't we give it a chance to work; we are at a very early stage; we must give the President more time.

Let me remind our colleagues it has been more than 6 months since the President of the United States announced to the Nation on January 10 the decision to send tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops into Iraq. That was the beginning of the surge, not now. It has been more than 5 months since these additional U.S. troops began arriving in Iraq in early February. We have had months to judge the situation in Iraq. Only last week, the President reported to Congress that there has been no progress--no progress--on any of the political benchmarks in Iraq. The violence that is tearing Iraq apart has intensified and spread over the last 6 months. The current strategy is failing, and the so-called surge that some of my colleagues refuse to recognize that began almost 6 months ago has cost 532 American men and women their lives since that began. We have lost more than 3,600 Americans who have died and over 26,000 wounded over the last 4\1/2\ years.

We must change our policy in Iraq. Central to our new strategy must be diplomacy, regional engagement, and the

involvement of the international community, all of these coming together within the framework of a new policy, using all of the instruments of power to help achieve Iraqi political accommodation-- political accommodation. We are captive to a cycle of violence. We cannot break out of the cycle of violence. More troops will not do that. We have put burdens on our troops and asked them to make sacrifices and do things they cannot achieve in the course of finding an answer to break the cycle of violence. It is bigger than the military. General Petraeus has said so. As a matter of fact, General Petraeus has said there will be no military solution in Iraq. Every general I have met in my five trips to Iraq, every general I have met here in and out of uniform, has said there will not be--cannot be--a military solution.

I have cosponsored the Levin-Reed amendment because it requires that the United States move toward a comprehensive policy on Iraq--a comprehensive policy on Iraq--not just continuing to feed American troops into the middle of a civil war, which is clearly not working, but something in addition to our military security. That new policy must be centered on diplomacy and helping achieve Iraqi political accommodation to get to political reconciliation.

This amendment is responsible. It is comprehensive, forward-looking, compelling, and not all that different, incidentally, from what my other colleagues are offering on the floor of the Senate as options. Yes, it requires a phased, responsible reduction of U.S. forces from Iraq. I say again, a reduction--not a withdrawal--of our forces. No one I know is calling for any sort of precipitous withdrawal or precipitous action to take America out of Iraq now. We couldn't do that anyway. Even if we wanted to withdraw precipitously or quickly, the reality of the logistics would prevent it. The fact is, we are where we are. We have national interests in the Middle East. We have national interests in Iraq. We should not confuse the issue that we debate today. We are not advocating a cut-and-run strategy. I am not sure what cut and run means. It is catchy. It is good sloganeering. But I have yet to hear anyone come to the Senate floor and say: I am for cutting and running. Those who use that term or accuse others of employing that term should define what that means.

Of all the resolutions I am aware of that have been introduced in the Senate on this issue, none that I am aware of is a so-called cut-and- run amendment.

We are talking about a transition in the mission being carried out by U.S. forces in Iraq. A policy, a strategy. Let's make something else clear. The military does not make policy. The military implements policy. The Congress is part of making that policy. Constitutionally we have a role with the President in helping frame and make policy. The military has input into that policy, as they must and as they should, but once the policy is given to the military, they can't alter the policy. They are captive to policy. That is constitutionally the way it is and the way it should be. We are talking about a new policy, a new strategy. We have a legitimate mission to carry out in Iraq, and those various missions are critical to our security, and hopefully, at some point, the stability of Iraq. The Levin-Reed amendment focuses solely on those missions and the transitions of those missions: Counterterrorism, targeting terrorists and other global organizations; training Iraqi forces, protecting U.S. and coalition personnel and facilities, helping maintain territorial integrity of Iraq.

As I have said, nearly all of the other significant amendments I am aware of that have been introduced on the floor of the Senate on Iraq, including the Warner-Lugar amendment, the Salazar-Alexander amendment focused largely on the same limited mission, as the Levin-Reed amendment, as does the Nelson-Collins amendment, on a limited mission. There is an emerging consensus on how our military mission should transition in Iraq as well. Our amendment includes a timeline and would require that this shift in our military mission be completed by April 30 of next year.

Our amendment is not alone in establishing a timeline. Again, the other significant amendments on Iraq also have timelines. The Warner- Lugar amendment recommends beginning the military transition no later than December 31, 2007. That is a timeline. The Salazar-Alexander amendment sets as the sense of the Congress that the transition be completed by the first quarter of 2008. Now, that is a timeline. There is yet another emerging consensus on establishing a timeline to transition our military mission in Iraq. Our amendment also respects that only military professionals--the generals, those who have the responsibility of carrying out the policy; not making the policy, but carrying it out--those professionals determine how many troops will be needed to carry out our limited military mission in Iraq.

So the talk I hear more than occasionally on the Senate floor that somehow the Congress is micromanaging the war is not correct; that we are micromanaging the army is not correct.

Once again, our amendment, the Levin-Reed amendment, sets policy of the military mission in Iraq. That is policy. What is the mission? What is the strategic, diplomatic mission of employing America's power and prestige in Iraq? That is the policy. But the scope of the reduction-- the reduction, not the withdrawal but the reduction--of U.S. forces in Iraq will be determined by, and needs to be determined by, our military professionals based on a troop-to-task analysis; not the Congress, not the committees telling the generals how to do anything.

Troop to task is a very simple concept. You connect the requirements of your mission with the force structure needed. We are way out of balance. We have been out of balance since we invaded Iraq in March of 2003. We never had enough force structure. Some of the same people on the floor of the Senate who are now saying: Well, let's listen to the generals, where were they when the generals warned this administration that we didn't have enough men and women and force before we went into Iraq, I didn't hear many of them talking about how much faith we should put in our generals then.

The former Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General Shinseki, said it. He said it openly in the Presiding Officer's Armed Services Committee. When asked the question: What would it take in manpower to remove Saddam Hussein from power and help stabilize and secure Iraq, General Shinseki said: It would take hundreds of thousands of American troops.

This administration completely dismissed that as wildly--I believe as the Deputy Secretary of Defense at the time said--wildly off the mark. Well, he wasn't off the mark, I say to my colleagues. He was exactly right. He was exactly right.

So we have never had the forces to match the mission. That is not new. Some of us may be coming to that conclusion for the first time, but it is not new. We have never had the force structure to match the mission. That is not the fault of the generals. That is not the fault of the military. That is the fault of policymakers.

Our amendment also respects that only military professionals can determine those numbers. The scope of the reduction would stay firmly in the hands of the military professionals. This approach is responsible. Not one U.S. general today will tell you that there can be, there will be, there is a military solution in Iraq.

Then the next question is--and a statement being made often on the floor of the Senate is: Well, we need to buy the Iraqis time. We need to give the Maliki government time. That is true. That is why we have benchmarks. That is why we have some sense of where this is going? Are we making progress or not making progress? Is it getting better or is it getting worse? Now, 4\1/2\ years into this, we should have some measurements of giving the government time, but time for what? What is the end game as more Americans sacrifice their lives and a half trillion dollars of America's taxpayers' money has sunk into the sands of Iraq? We are buying time for what? For a political reconciliation brought about by the Iraqis themselves to be able to functionally govern their country with some sense of stability and security. That is going the other way. That hasn't gotten better; it has gotten worse by every measure. So we continue to buy time with American blood and American treasure, for what? For

what? No one wants to answer that question, by the way. We end it with we have to buy time, but the additional part of that equation is: Buy time for what? Do we buy time for another 2, 3, or 4 years?

It is also clear that the generals have said when April comes, and there is a timeline already that is built in--whether we ever deal with it or not in the Congress--there is a timeline built in, and it is called manpower. It is called deployment rotations.

We are pushing our young men and women now to 18-month rotation, and some, by the way, are longer than that because of what is known as a stopgap measure where the Secretary of Defense can stop anyone from leaving a war zone based on the speciality of his or her MOS or job. So we are actually having people stay there longer than 18 months. But now it is 18 months, even though the Secretary of Defense testified in January before the Senate Armed Services Committee that we need to get back to 12 months.

Senator Webb and I and others, a bipartisan group of Senators / last week had two amendments on that issue. We couldn't get the required 60 votes to go back to a 12-month deployment. So now it is 15 months, and we are pushing even 18 months.

The generals have told us that when this spring comes, there is no more give in those deployment rotations. There is nothing left. So there is a timeline built in already. Whether any of us want to acknowledge that or introduce that, that is a reality.

Any change to policy in Iraq cannot be done in isolation, separate or disconnected, from the broader sense of dynamics in Iraq and the Middle East. That is why this amendment requires a phased reduction be conducted as part of a comprehensive, diplomatic, political, and economic strategy that includes sustained engagement to Iraq's neighbors and the international community.

I am very pleased to note that today the announcement came from the State Department that the United States is now prepared to hold new direct talks with Iran. That is progress, not because Iran wants to be our friend. Of course not. But Iran is a significant power in the Middle East. It is working against our interests in the Middle East. We must engage Iran. I have been calling for dialog with all Middle East nations, including Iran and Syria, or over 3 years. A constructive regional framework for Iraq can only be achieved through sustained diplomacy, not hit or miss, not ``if we have time.''

A vital element of this comprehensive diplomatic strategy must be to internationalize Iraq through an international mediator under the auspices of the U.N. to engage all of Iraq's political, religious, ethnic, and tribal leaders.

I first called for an international mediator in a letter to President Bush in May. Since then, I pressed this issue with Secretary Rice last week, our National Security Adviser, Steve Hadley, 2 weeks ago, and again today with the United Nations Secretary General. It is time to take the American face off Iraq's political process.

The United States is seen as the occupier in Iraq. We must have a new strategy that will further invest the region and the rest of the world to helping stabilize Iraq, reversing Iraq's slide into chaos. And it is chaos, Mr. President. I hear on the floor of the Senate, gee, if we changed our mission, if we moved in any different direction, if we reduced our forces, if we did anything different, Iraq would end in chaos. Some of my colleagues must not understand what is going on in Iraq. We have chaos. We have real chaos in Iraq today. That means there are no good options today. The optics here should be clear, and we should base our new policies and our new strategies on those clear optics that Iraq is in chaos today.

Creating an international mediator would help build some new common interests in the region and in the world. This amendment represents the core elements of a different U.S. strategy for Iraq, a strategy that more accurately understands the grim realities we face today, that we will face at the end of this year, that we will face next spring, and we will face next year. The question is whether the President and Congress will come together to present a new policy for Iraq that can be supported by the American people and protect and advance America's interests in Iraq and the Middle East.

We are coming dangerously close to the moment when the American people will demand that we leave Iraq and pullout of the Middle East. Almost 70 percent of the American people today, by every measurement, say enough is enough. This is not in the U.S. interest nor the world's to leave Iraq that way. That is why the United States needs a new strategy for Iraq now.

Well into our fifth year in Iraq, we are beyond nonbinding language of resolutions. We are beyond calling for new plans or new reports. We are beyond sense-of-the-Senate resolutions. We have to understand where we are today. We are in a very dangerous position in Iraq. Our policy in Iraq has been a disaster. Why are we kidding ourselves otherwise? By any measurement, it is a disaster. It must change now. The time for suggestions is over. If we do not believe our current policy is worthy of the sacrifices being made by our troops, then it is wrong to simply say we will wait until this fall to change course or let's hang on for 2 or 3 more months to see what happens.

We know what is happening. We know what is happening today, we know what has been happening, and we know what is going to happen tomorrow.

I am grateful for the opportunity to express myself on this amendment. I also appreciate the opportunity to cosponsor this responsible amendment with my colleagues. I note again it is a bipartisan amendment, and I hope all my colleagues in the Senate will take a look at all the different options and amendments and spend some time on each because they are each worthy of time, but in the end, the consistency of the amendments that have been presented so far are about one thing, and you can paint it any way you want, but that is a change of mission in Iraq and a new policy in Iraq.

I yield the floor.