Mr. Speaker, I claim time in opposition. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, what we are saying is that in my friend's interest of making sure that there is an opportunity for Members to…
Mr. Speaker, I claim time in opposition.
Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, what we are saying is that in my friend's interest of making sure that there is an opportunity for Members to speak on the various sides here, you want to make sure the time is evenly divided for the underlying bill and also for the extension of time?
The additional time is going to be evenly distributed.
Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation.
I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).
Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas, Ron Paul.
I'll reserve the time.
I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lynch).
MR. LYNCH. I thank the gentleman. I also come here with enormous respect for Mr. Berman, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, and my friends. And if I thought for 1 minute that this bill would help the United States or protect Israel or undermine Mr. Ahmadinejad, I would support it. But I do not. I do, however, take great comfort in the chairman's and the chief sponsor's earlier comments that in the conference process he is open and willing to adjust the bill. And perhaps if these adjustments and improvements are made, I can support it at that time, but I am faced with the bill before me.
And let me just say that I think that this bill will help Ahmadinejad, that this will have the same effect as we have seen with other embargoes and other sanctions. I point to a couple of examples, one being the example in Cuba where we put in an embargo there, and ever since then, the Castro regime has been able to blame everything that has gone wrong in Cuba, including tropical storms and hurricanes, on the U.S. embargo. It has helped that regime stay in power. We see the same effect happening in Gaza. I have been there a couple of times. The fact that we've got an embargo there and a blockade has caused many in Gaza to rally around the flag--in this case, Hamas--and the blockade has helped them. That is the effect that this bill will have in Iran.
We have watched very closely. This past week, tens of thousands of students in Iran in the Green Revolution have come to oppose and call for the ousting of Ahmadinejad and his regime. What this will do, however, is this will undermine that opposition. This bill is focused on cutting off gasoline supply to the poor, to the working class, to the middle class and families, the very people who are supporting the revolutionary movement there to get rid of Ahmadinejad.
We are, in a way, I think, substituting a plan that will not work for one that could very well work. We are snatching defeat from the jaws of victory with this bill. I hope earnestly that as the sponsor of this bill has indicated, the chairman, Mr. Berman, that there will be important changes perhaps made during the conference process. I hope that does happen, and I hope that I am able to support this bill when it comes back from conference based on those changes.
I yield myself 3 minutes.
This legislation obstructs the Obama administration's ongoing negotiations with Iran, amounts to economic warfare against the Iranian people, and brings us closer to an unnecessary military confrontation. I would like to delineate point by point the objections to this bill.
First of all, I agree with Mr. Paul that the bill is opposed to our national security. I have a letter here, as Mr. Blumenauer submitted to the Record, from the Deputy Secretary of State which points out the ``serious substantive concerns of the administration, including the lack of flexibility, inefficient monetary thresholds and penalty levels, and blacklisting that could cause unintended foreign policy consequences.'' This letter is from the Obama administration, December 11, 2009. I would like it be included in the Record.
Second, I would like to include an article from the National Journal Online, dated November 2, 2009, in the record of debate. In this article, it points out that a gas shortage will be created in Iran, that Iran subsidizes its gasoline,
and that the regime wants to shrink the program. So here the U.S. will be creating the gas shortage, and the regime, which wanted to shrink the program, is going to blame the U.S.
Third, the Revolutionary Guard has already been able to build its coffers by being able to sell things on the black market. It's widely understood that these sanctions would put the Revolutionary Guard in a position where they can make more money selling oil on the black market.
Number 4, this proposal would throw energy politics of the region into chaos, and the broader geopolitical landscape is thrown into chaos. Russia, Venezuela, and our European allies all come into play in ways at odds with stated U.S. policies.
Number 5, it undermines our diplomacy. It isolates us from our allies. It isolates us from our trading partners.
Number 6, it undercuts international energy companies who work in a back-channel role to try to help us with our diplomacy.
Number 7, it undermines democracy in Iran. All of us have seen those pictures. They have been all over the TV and the Internet in the last few months about a growing democratic movement in Iran. This sanction will force all people to close around the Iran's leadership. It will strengthen the hard-liners and will undermine democracy.
Next, it will make the U.S. presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan even more dangerous for our troops.
Number 9, it's a path to military escalation, and I will be discussing that later.
The Deputy Secretary of State,
Washington, December 11, 2009.
Hon. John F. Kerry,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I wanted to follow up on our
conversations regarding Iran, and possible sanctions
legislation to be taken up by the Senate (S. 2799). We share
Congress's concerns on Iran and its nuclear program, and the
need to take decisive action. One of the top national
security priorities for the Obama Administration is to deny
Iran a nuclear weapons capability. As we discussed, we are
pursuing this objective through a dual track strategy of
engagement and pressure; and we are engaged in intensive
multilateral efforts to develop pressure track measures now.
It is in the spirit of these shared objectives that I write
to express my concern about the timing and content of this
legislation.
As I testified before the Congress in October, it is our
hope that any legislative initiative would preserve and
maximize the President's flexibility, secure greater
cooperation from our partners in taking effective action, and
ultimately facilitate a change in Iranian policies. However,
we are entering a critical period of intense diplomacy to
impose significant international pressure on Iran. This
requires that we keep the focus on Iran. At this juncture, I
am concerned that this legislation, it its current form,
might weaken rather than strengthen international unity and
support for our efforts. In addition to the timing, we have
serious substantive concerns, including the lack of
flexibility, inefficient monetary thresholds and penalty
levels, and blacklisting that could cause unintended foreign
policy consequences.
I have asked Department staff to prepare for and discuss
with your staff revisions that could address these concerns
on timing and content. I am hopeful that we can work together
to achieve our common goals.
I hope that consideration of this bill could be delayed to
the new year so as not to undermine the Administration's
diplomacy at this critical juncture. I look forward to
working together to achieve our common goals, and I will stay
in close contact with you as our diplomatic efforts proceed.
Sincerely,
James B. Steinberg.
I will yield to Mr. Paul 3 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.
I would like to point out that the organization of Iranians in the United States known as the National Iranian American Council have issued a statement in a staff report dated Monday, the 14th of December, 2009 that this sanctions act ``will only contribute to the Iranian people's suffering by seeking to restrict Iran's supply of heating oil and gasoline. Prominent members of Iran's opposition movement, such as Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi, as well as human rights defenders like Shirin Ebadi and Akbar Ganji, have all spoken out strongly against such sanctions that punish innocent Iranians.''
I enter this report from the National Iranian Council into the Record.
IRPSA Hurts Iranian People, Undermines International Unity on Iran
NIAC released the following statement today in response to
yesterday's news that the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions
Act (H.R. 2194) will be brought up for a floor vote on the
suspension calendar within the next two weeks.
The National Iranian American Council is deeply concerned
that the House of Representatives' plan to bring H.R. 2194,
the Iranian Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, IRPSA, to a vote
the week of December 14,
2009, is a move in the direction of punishing the Iranian
people instead of the Iranian government.
NIAC supports the Obama Administration's ongoing engagement
efforts and, though the Iranian government's response has
thus far been frustrating, the U.S. must remain committed to
working in concert with its international partners.
Considering unilateral sanctions at this time threatens to
preempt and undermine the President's multilateral efforts.
A successful strategy for dealing with Iran must have
diplomatic engagement as its basis. Sanctions can play a
constructive role within that process, but in order to be
effective they must target the Iranian government and the
individuals responsible for the government's reprehensible
behavior, with a special emphasis on those guilty of human
rights violations.
As Congress moves forward, NIAC encourages Congressional
action to meet the following standards:
Do not harm the Iranian people--No one has suffered under
the repressive rule of the Iranian Government more than the
Iranian people. Unilateral sanctions such as those included
in IRPSA will hurt the people of Iran immensely and do little
to target the actions such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
who have consolidated power under the shadow of outside
threats and profited under the sanctions economy.
As the Iranian people continue to stand up to their
government, prominent members of Iran's opposition movement,
such as Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi, along with
human rights defenders like Shirin Ebadi and Akbar Ganji,
have all spoken out strongly against broad, untargeted
sanctions such as those contained in IRPSA.
Do not undermine the President--The Obama Administration
has invested in a strategy of engagement with Iran because it
is the best option to change the Iranian Government's
behavior. While this process has been predictably difficult,
Congress must not rush to pass legislation that will
undermine multilateral efforts and tie the President's hands.
The President has been consistent in stating that he will
evaluate progress on the engagement process once the year has
ended. This commitment was reiterated on December 3 by White
House spokesman Robert Gibbs, who stated that the
Administration's deadline for Iran is the end of the year. If
the House passes IRPSA now, they send the world a signal that
the U.S. Congress does not support the President's plan and
is taking steps to preempt it.
Do not undermine the unity among U.S. partners--On November
26, the IAEA voted overwhelmingly to approve a resolution
censuring Iran. Significantly, all five veto-wielding members
of the Security Council voted in favor of the measure, which
opens up the potential for another round of Security Council
sanctions. The significant progress is uniting the Security
Council is attributable to President Obama's investment in
diplomacy. If Congress moves forward with sanctions that
target our allies, that unity will collapse. Trying to coerce
the support of the rest of the world with threats and
penalties will not isolate Iran; in fact, it may only isolate
the United States.
I have here an analysis that has been done by Americans for Peace Now, which is a strong group in support of Israel. At the same time, they did an analysis and summary of concerns about H.R. 2194. One of the points that they make is that ``the focus on crippling refined petroleum sanctions leads to the very problematic conclusion that the U.S. is seeking to inflict widespread suffering on the Iranian people in order to force them to put pressure on their government. It is an approach few believe will achieve the desired goal and many believe could well backfire to the benefit of the regime and sow anger at the U.S., not the Iranian Government.''
I will submit this analysis for the Record.
Proposed Amendments to H.R. 2194--The Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions
Act--December 2009
For further information, go to www.peacenow.org.
I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Paul).
Could I ask how much time remains.
I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Flake).
I yield myself 2 minutes.
Though this bill claims to express international diplomatic efforts to halt Iran's uranium enrichment program, it actually undermines those efforts. Passing legislation effectively forces our President's hand in one direction, diminishing the power of the President and his diplomatic team by significantly limiting the tools the administration can utilize.
Furthermore, it projects a negative image of the United States in a region at a time when we need broad international support to succeed in our negotiations.
Former International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei has repeatedly stated that sanctions against Iran will be ineffective in forcing Iran to halt its uranium enrichment program. In a speech to the Board of Governors in September of this year, Mohamed ElBaradei recognized the important developments with respect to Iran's compliance with IAEA inspections, stating that, We are not in a state of panic because we have not seen diversion of nuclear material. We have not seen components of nuclear weapons.
In addition, he states, We went through this during the time of Iraq, when the Agency went exactly through that hype, fabrication, and it took a war based on fiction and not fact. It took a war and thousands of people dying for the Agency to become strong and more credible because we were sticking to the facts.
Subsection A(1) of section 2 of this bill says, The illicit nuclear activities of the government of Iran, combined with its development of unconventional weapons and ballistic missiles in support of international terrorism, represents a serious threat to the security of the United States and allies in Europe, the Middle East, and around the world.
This language makes dangerous accusations that have been repudiated by the IAEA and paves the way for the same mistakes we have made in Iraq. We cannot afford to make the same mistakes at the cost of the innocent lives of the people in Iran.
May I ask how much time is remaining for all sides?
I yield myself 2 minutes.
One of our colleagues talked about, well, what are our alternatives here, as though the only alternative we have is to impose sanctions. We know from a report 2 days ago in The New York Times that Iran's foreign minister has said that his country was willing to exchange most of the uranium for processed nuclear fuel from abroad, as the United Nations has proposed. The article goes along to say, but only according to the timetable Western powers appear to have rejected.
Well, we need to get back into those negotiations. I have some points here I want to share with Members of Congress. Here is what we can do.
The debate in Iran is focused on two shipments of 400 kilograms each of low-enriched uranium. What is being proposed by Tehran is a phased delivery to the IAEA control of Iran's low-enriched uranium within 3 to 5 months of each other, for a total of 800 kilograms.
Officially, we know Iran's foreign minister said they would put 400 kilograms of low-enriched uranium in Kish Island--that's in the Persian Gulf--under IAEA custody. The Iranians want objective guarantees, the guaranteed delivery of highly enriched uranium from Russia and France.
Once it's delivered to Iran for medical purposes, they would then send another 400 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to the IAEA control at Kish Island. The simultaneous shipment of high-enriched uranium to Iran and low-enriched for medical purposes, and low-enriched uranium from Iran to Kish Island, are confidence-building measures which can form the basis for further cooperation.
Second, we need to pledge a guaranteed delivery by the U.S. and other P-5-plus-1 participants.
Third, the U.S. offer of assistance with modernizing the instruments for the Tehran reactor.
Fourth, Iran's willingness to continue with its nuclear transparency and full-scope IAEA safeguards, including short-notice inspections.
Five, Iran's willingness to participate in Geneva II.
Six, Iran's willingness to participate in multilateral expert meetings on nuclear, non-nuclear, that is, regional issues, and consideration of a broad range of confidence-building steps.
We don't need these sanctions. We need diplomacy.
Madam Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
One of my colleagues cited The Washington Post, but if you read The Post article, they couldn't authenticate where the information came from. So after a while it has the ring of uranium from Niger.
We have to be careful that this sanctions debate doesn't put us on the path of a military escalation. We have to think why is the Obama administration, as has been quoted several times in this debate, expressing concern about this legislation, that this legislation might weaken, rather than strengthen, international unity and support for our efforts, that there are serious substantive concerns, the lack of flexibility that this would put on our President in his negotiations?
I submit for the Record Mohamed ElBaradei's September 9 comments as Director General about the Iran situation.
We've got to be careful that we're not making a situation worse and we're not giving our President the time that he says he needs for diplomacy.
Summary of the Director General's Comments Made at the End of the Board
of Governors' Discussion on Agenda Item 6(d)
(``Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007),
1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran'')
Vienna, September 9, 2009.
Thank you, Chairperson.
A few comments on the debate this morning and on what has
been transpiring over the past few days. Clearly, we all need
to break the logjam. Merely giving speeches here is not going
to do that. We have to put our heads together. There is
stalemate, as I have said. Iran has made some positive
progress and I recognize that. It was partly, I hope, as a
result of my private and public appeal to them to move in a
positive direction. That is the only way to move.
I don't think that talking about formalities--whether the
work plan has been fully implemented or not, how we should
write our reports, or whether to have an annex, or whether
something is routine or not routine--that is not the issue.
The issue is to clarify the substance and to make sure that
all outstanding issues are dealt with. It has been six years
and I don't want this to continue, as in the case of the
DPRK, for 17 years. One lesson I learned from the DPRK is
that it is only through dialogue that you can move forward.
There is no other way.
There is a positive development. Iran has agreed to our
visiting the heavy water reactor and to strengthen
verification in Natanz. These are all positive. But there is
a lot more Iran can do. As Ambassador Soltanieh knows, I put
a lot of premium on the Additional Protocol. I know it is not
considered legally binding. But for us at the Secretariat, as
we have repeatedly said, the Protocol is key for us to build
confidence, not only about declared activities, but also
about undeclared activities. And you (Iran) have implemented
the Protocol before. I know Iran can do it again. I know you
have been reacting to others, but frankly, you are not
penalizing others, you are penalizing yourself. The Protocol
will help us to move forward with the process.
Iran implemented the Code (3.1), before. I don't see any
impediment to Iran doing it again.
There are a number of checkable facts, such as procurements
by military establishments, and production by military
establishments. These are issues, as Iran has said before,
that Iran can help work with us to clarify. I hope you will
do that because we need, both of us, to work together in a
constructive, positive direction.
Coming to the alleged studies: they are alleged because the
whole question is not really about assessment or analysis, it
is about the accuracy and authenticity of the information
about the alleged studies. That it is the 64,000 dollar
question, frankly, and that is where we are stuck. We have
limited ability to authenticate the allegations. It is one
word against another. When we deal with nuclear material, we
are very comfortable; we know the litmus test. We do
measurements, we do environmental sampling. When it comes to
paperwork, that is quite different for us because we have
very limited tools.
We need Iran to help us to clarify these issues. We have
said that we are not in a position to say these allegations
are real, but we have serious concerns, because of what we've
described--the detail, the different sources. We need to work
with you to clarify these issues. I would be the first one to
want to bring this issue to closure. I would hope that you
would work with us and try to help us.
I would also hope that the suppliers of the information
would help us by providing us the authority to share with you
as much information as possible.
People talk about assessments. I am not a scientist, but I
can tell you this: if this information is real, there is a
high probability that nuclear weaponization activities have
taken place. But I should underline ``if'' three times.
With nuclear material, we can give you full assurance. With
certain documentation, it is quite difficult unless one side
or the other will help us to establish the facts. However,
there are other issues like procurement, like manufactures,
where Iran can work with us. These are checkable facts and we
need simply to clarify them.
We have in our reports always tried not to understate the
facts and not to overstate the facts. We have serious
concerns, but we are not in a state of panic because we have
not seen diversion of nuclear material, we have not seen
components of nuclear weapons.
We do not have any information to that effect. But I need
the Protocol in order to be on more solid ground to make such
a statement. That is why I say a Protocol is absolutely
essential for us to verify the absence of undeclared
activities.
When I hear Ambassador Davies and Ambassador Soltanieh, I
don't see where the problem is. The U.S. is making an offer
without preconditions on the basis of mutual respect.
Ambassador Soltanieh said they are
ready to have a comprehensive dialogue. The offer by the U.S.
is an offer that should not and cannot be refused, because it
has no conditions attached. I hope your response to that is
positive. We can spend days and nights talking about the
issues, but unless we talk to each other and not at each
other, we will not move forward. Dialogue is key. The Agency
can provide some confidence, but there are many other issues
that need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner and there
have been a lot of opportunities lost over the past six
years. We should not lose any more opportunities.
Finally, I will talk about this issue which has come to the
media about withholding information. I mentioned that in my
opening speech. Obviously, people are trying to undermine the
Agency, but they are really undermining an institution that
is absolutely essential to the maintenance of international
peace and security. All the information we got came from
people sitting in this room. If anybody has any information
that we have not shared, that has passed muster, that has
been critically assessed in accordance with our practice,
please step forward today. Otherwise, as a preacher would
say, ``You should forever hold your peace.''
This is where we are. If you have information, please step
forward. We have no more information. The assessment is in
our report. As I said, if this information on alleged studies
is true, the likelihood is high that military activities have
taken place in Iran. But, that hinges on the word ``if,''
which is where we are stuck right now.
As for the idea that we did not share all the information
and that we only gave information in a briefing--I can't for
the life of me understand how we can share information in a
briefing with 150 Member States and at the same time be told
that we have not shared information. That briefing is open to
all Member States, every single one. But the briefing is
simply to explain the report. It had nothing different from
what is in the report.
We went through this, I'm sorry to say, during the time of
Iraq, when the Agency went exactly through that--hype,
fabrication. And then it took a war based on fiction and not
fact, a war President Obama called euphemistically ``a war of
choice''. It took a war and hundreds of thousands of people
dying for the Agency to become stronger and more credible
because we were sticking to the facts. I don't want to go
through that process again; you do not want to go through
that process again.
So let us all work together on the basis of diplomacy, on
the basis of facts to be able to resolve the issues as early
as possible.
Mohamed ElBaradei,
Director General.
I will use the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, this is starting to sound like the debate over Iraq.
My concerns are that this resolution is opposed to our national security, that it undermines diplomatic initiatives, that it creates a gas shortage in Iran which, in a sense, the regime would blame on the United States. It will benefit the Revolutionary Guard in its effort to gain profit off of a black market. It will throw the energy politics of the world into chaos with Russia, Venezuela and our European allies all coming in to play. It will undermine our diplomacy. It will isolate us from our allies. It will isolate us from trading partners. It will undercut international energy companies which try to work with the United States in back channels in diplomacy. It will undermine democracy efforts in Iran, and it will strengthen the hardliners. It will make U.S. presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan more dangerous for our troops.
This sanctions resolution is, unfortunately, a path towards military escalation. As such, it should be defeated.
I yield back the balance of my time.