Mr. Speaker, I appreciate being recognized to address you here on the floor of the United States House of Representatives. And I want to say, at the departure of the chairman of the Financial…
Mr. Speaker, I appreciate being recognized to address you here on the floor of the United States House of Representatives. And I want to say, at the departure of the chairman of the Financial Services Committee, I appreciate his yielding to each of us who have differing opinions on his presentation this evening. And that is something that I'm prepared to do should the gentleman raise an issue with statements I make. I know that Mr. Frank is competitive and very willing to engage in debate. And I know that he had a lot of things he wanted to get off his chest tonight. I was here to listen to it all. And I heard every word.
I thank the gentleman, and I will say into the Record tonight, that is a request that I would be happy to meet with, and I will be looking forward to the time when we come back on the other side of Easter. I appreciate it.
Again, Mr. Speaker, I listened to the statements made on the part of the chairman of the Financial Services Committee tonight. And it occurs to me that a man who has the full attention of the entire committee on any day he decides to choose to hold a hearing or a markup, a man who has full attention of the floor when he decides to speak here, it seems to me that since we have been through 2 days of budget debate, Mr. Speaker, that there must have been a lot of things that the chairman of the Financial Services needed to get off of his chest. And I heard a lot of them tonight. It occurs to me, though, that there is a high degree of sensitivity. And where I come from, when you throw a rock into the pigpen, the one that squeals is the one that you hit.
So I think what I heard is a rejection of the concept that the gentleman from Massachusetts and many of the Democrats that followed him in his leadership on these financial services issues, a rejection that he resisted the idea of regulating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, resisted the idea that the Community Reinvestment Act was a component of the financial meltdown that we had. And I heard the gentleman say to us that there were three Republican amendments on the legislation that would have and could have regulated Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. I raised the issue of one. And I do remember the day. It was October 26, 2005. It was an amendment that was offered by Mr. Leach of Iowa that would have regulated Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac down the same lines as the regular lending institutions who are providing mortgage loans and real estate. I think that would have been a good thing to do. And I recall that debate. And it was a compelling argument made on the part of Mr. Leach that Fannie and Freddie were underregulated and undercapitalized, and they needed to be capitalized more and regulated more. Now I have just heard the gentleman from Massachusetts say that Republicans are afraid of regulation. In fact, it is the ``fear of regulation,'' he has said, that drives Republicans to reject changes in the control of the financial institutions in this country.
I would submit that we are for regulation. We are for the kind of smart, responsible regulation that ensures that we have viable lending institutions. In fact, we came to this floor and supported amendments that would have capitalized and regulated Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. I have introduced legislation that would repeal the Community Reinvestment Act. And I have introduced legislation that would capitalize Fannie and Freddie Mac like the other lending institutions and move them towards privatization. I recall the debate that evening on October 26, 2005, when the gentleman who is now the chairman of the Financial Services Committee, and I don't disagree with his characterization here, it is a matter of emphasis, it is not a matter of accuracy, at least the disagreement on the accuracy, but I recall that. And it was that he would not support a bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because he didn't believe that they were undercapitalized, underregulated or in trouble.
Well, it turns out that was October of 2005, and easily, by the late fall of 2008, we can all see that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were in trouble. In fact, they have been nationalized. And the risk and the liability that comes to the American taxpayers was calculated at the time to be about $5.5 trillion. Now the taxpayers own Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. And regardless of whether there was a majority of Republicans that supported or opposed the amendment that would have regulated and capitalized Fannie and Freddie, it is true that the chairman of the Financial Services Committee opposed those amendments. And I think he underestimates has own persuasive powers. In fact, he must have gotten here for some reason. I think persuasive powers are part of it. I compliment him on that. I think he is an engaging fellow who has a very nimble ability to engage in this debate. And I look forward to those kind of debates, and I know I will be tested. But it remains a fact that some of us wanted to regulate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Some of us wanted to move them towards privatization. Some of us wanted to capitalize them more. Some of us wanted to regulate them more. I am among those people. The voting record and the Congressional Record indicates something else on the part of the current chair of the Financial Services Committee. I don't think the Republicans have been opposed at all to regulations of our financial institutions. We have been in favor of smart regulations of our financial institutions, to essentially fix this problem ourselves.
So there is not a fear of the right wing that regulation is coming. There is a fear that we had an underregulation, and that is why we brought those amendments and brought that legislation. That is why the gentleman from New Jersey brings up the issue of Mr. Baker from Louisiana.
I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.
I thank the gentleman. Reclaiming my time, as I listen to that, and you lived in the middle of the Financial Services Committee for these years into the seventh year, and that is background and experience that hardly anybody in America has shared with you, Mr. Garrett, and so I just ask you if you could, in the middle of this, throughout those, beginning into the seventh year at least, characterize the general philosophy that you gathered with regard to the thrust now of the committee and the majority within the committee as to whether before this financial meltdown, this economic crisis that we have, did you sense that there was any initiative on the part of the Democrats in the Financial Services Committee to regulate Fannie and Freddie, to capitalize Fannie and Freddie and move them towards any kind of privatization, or would it have been more or less business as usual with Fannie and Freddie? Which way was that line going from the Democrat side on the Financial Services Committee? And I yield.
Reclaiming, from the gentleman, if he would further examine this question, I understand their response that the Bush administration was very much focused on increasing the percentage of homeownership. And I recall a State of the Union address made by President Bush here in this Chamber one of those Januarys that made the statement that we had the highest homeownership of a free country in the world, or at least the United States, that 68 percent of the people in America lived in a home that was owned by themselves or one of the people that lived in the home with them. It does sound like it is a laudable goal. And it is certainly a goal that would be reached for, that was reached for by the Bush administration. It would be something that would be reached for I think by all of us, Democrats and Republicans alike.
But from the restraint side of this, from those who were lending a voice of caution, that were saying Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the secondary market for mortgages, are getting out of control, they are undercapitalized. They are underregulated, and we need to rein them in before we have a problem that is far bigger than the one that is apparent today. If you had to give credit or blame to Republicans or Democrats in the Financial Services Committee, Mr. Garrett, where was the predominant voice for caution? Where was the predominant voice for capitalization? Where was the predominant voice for regulation? Where was the predominant voice for privatization of Fannie and Freddie during those years before the crisis was evident to all of us?
And reclaiming my time from the gentleman from New Jersey, and I thank him for his historical rendition of what's taken place within the committee. And I would take this a little further and ask this question, and that would be, did the subject of reform of the Community Reinvestment Act or the repeal of the Community Reinvestment Act come up in the Financial Services Committee in the years prior to the financial crisis that emerged here in this Congress, I
am going to pick a date, September 19 of last year? Was there discussion dialogue in the committee, and did it take place in a way that would have illuminated the circumstances we have today, and does the gentleman from New Jersey accept the premise that was delivered by the Chair of the Financial Services Committee that only 1 out of 25 lenders were affected by restraints in Community Reinvestment Act? Does that seem to be a balanced delivery, or would there be a particularly different viewpoint that the gentleman would like to discuss?
I thank the gentleman. Reclaiming, I think this might be a good time for me to lay out how I think the sequence of events took place with the economic crisis that we are in. And I'd ask the gentleman's indulgence and analysis of whether he would agree with this particular analysis.
But I would take us back, Mr. Speaker, to 1978, to the inception of the Community Reinvestment Act. The Community Reinvestment Act, I think, was passed for the right motivations, and the idea was that we had lenders that were redlining districts. They were drawing a red line around districts in particular cities and refusing to loan for real estate in those districts because the value of that real estate was not being sustained, and it was declining. That was maybe the right kind of motive to do that. But as we moved on from 1978 until the nineties, when the Community Reinvestment Act was refreshed under the Clinton administration, and it got a little tighter, it essentially said this, that if you're going to be a lending institution that will--that is inclined to want to expand, you're going to have to make loans into these neighborhoods that were heretofore redlined. And we're going to need you to have a certain percentage of the loan portfolios go into these communities that were red-lined around them and provide those loans to lower-income people. So the bottom line was, the Community Reinvestment Act was a regulation that put an incentive in place to give loans to people that didn't have a record of being able to pay it back and provided a merit for the lenders to do that if they were going to expand. So it was a perverse incentive. It essentially was an incentive that said to lending institutions, if you want to grow, you're going to have to make bad loans. That was the Community Reinvestment Act. Fresh, new 1978, refreshed in the early nineties, about 1993 or 1994 under Bill Clinton. And that became a foundational piece of legislation that didn't seem to be a very big problem except for a couple of things. One of them was, during the last years of the Clinton administration, Mr. Speaker, the technology that we've developed, the ability to store and transfer information more efficiently than ever before created the dot-com bubble. That existed because investors understood this ability to store and transfer information more effectively and more efficiently than ever before. And they invested in that ability. And they didn't make the corrections for the necessity that that ability to store and transfer information needed to translate into more efficiency in our economy, the ability to produce goods and services or deliver them more effectively. That was, Mr. Speaker, the dot-com bubble. So the dot-com bubble came about because of technological success, and let me call it an irrational exuberant optimism about the benefits that would come from that ability to store and transfer information more effectively than ever before. So we had a dot com bubble through the second half the Clinton administration. Part of the reason there was a balanced budget in this Congress was because, 1, the Republican majority here was determined to slow down and shut down spending and the growth in Federal Government, and they did that effectively. The new revolutionaries that arrived here, elected in 1994 and sworn in in January of 1995, were determined to produce a balanced budget, and they did. Part of it was out of fiscal conservatism, and part of it was out of resistance to the Clinton administration. But whatever those proportions were, we had a budget surplus for a number of those years. And we had a dot com bubble in the market that was not adjusted to rationality. And when the lawsuit was brought against Microsoft, that was the needle that penetrated the dot-com bubble until it burst. And when it did, we had a declining economy. A declining economy because of the aftermath of the collapse of the dot-com bubble, translated into the beginning of the George W. Bush administration, the first administration of his, when he was elected in 2000. And Mr. Speaker, when that took place, we needed to do some adjustments to recover this economy and we had Alan Greenspan look at this and concluded, I believe, and by reports that I've read, not characterizing his inner thoughts necessarily, that we needed to stimulate the economy. That brought about decisions made that resulted in unnaturally low interest rates, especially on mortgage lending, which created an unnaturally exuberant housing economy. This unnaturally exuberant housing economy that came about from unusually low interest rates was something that helped bring us out of the decline in our economy that resulted in the burst of the dot-com bubble, Mr. Speaker. And as that was finding its place in this economy, we were attacked on September 11, 2001. Our financial centers literally collapsed. We lost 3,000 American lives all in the matter of a few hours. And we needed to do something to stimulate the economy.
And so the President of the United States, George Bush, this Congress came together and decided to quickly enact some tax cuts and a stimulus policy. That was 2001. That bridged a small gap, and they weren't all that particularly effective.
But on May 28 of 2003, the real Bush tax cuts were enacted, and they were the reduction in capital gains, the reduction in interest and dividend income, and that resulted in a real economic growth. But as this economic growth came from the Bush tax cuts, we also had economic growth that came from the unnaturally low interest rates and this housing market that was created by those low interest rates, and we found our way through to this point now where the foundation of our economic difficulty, rooted in the Community Reinvestment Act, flowing through from, as I didn't mention, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, a refusal of this Congress to regulate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, even though we had legislation that was brought before the Financial Services Committee, as Mr. Garrett has described, even though there were amendments brought to this floor, which I actively worked for and supported, that would have capitalized Fannie and Freddie, and regulated Fannie and Freddie, those things were resisted by the current leadership, the people that say it wasn't their fault, it was somebody's else fault, seems to be always Republicans fault. But this is a historical document. It can all be read. It all flows through.
In the end, we got to this point where not only was there a dot-com bubble
that burst that I think stimulated the unnaturally low interest rates that put us in the place where we had the housing bubble that burst, but the housing bubble was created not just because of unnaturally low interest rates, but because lending institutions were given an incentive under the Community Reinvestment Act to give bad loans in bad neighborhoods, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were undercapitalized and under-regulated, and there was a perverse incentive for them to pick up these secondary market loans and tranche those and roll them on up the chain.
And while that was going on, we had mark to market accounting, which is a good process when you have a market that's going up, and if you have a market that's going down, it accelerates the decline. It was a brutal and horrible self-inflicted wound, the mark to market accounting component of this.
While this was going on, additionally, we had a Congress that again refused to regulate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and you had AIG that was insuring these mortgage-backed securities and these bundles of securities, and they had such a large market share there was nobody in the country that could look over their shoulder and pass judgment upon their evaluation of the risk.
And so we had a market that was under-regulated, a market that wasn't indexed back to the real estate value that underlined the bundles of toxic debt that we call it today, the mortgage-backed securities. That's how we got here.
There were many people that made mistakes along the way. And there was a failure to be clairvoyant on the part of all of us. But the voices that I have heard, there's been many voices that said, from my side of the aisle, capitalize Fannie and Freddie, regulate Fannie and Freddie. The Community Reinvestment Act is a perverse incentive, and mark to market accounting was a self-inflicted wound, a hideous self- inflicted wound on this country.
All of those things, put together, none of us are without fault in this. But there is no one that laid out the clarity of this in the beginning that can look back to the record and say, I got it all right; you just wouldn't listen to me. Some did. Some got parts of it right and we've talked to some them of them tonight.
Mr. Speaker, I would be very happy to yield to the gentleman from Texas, my friend, Mr. Gohmert, East Texas I might say, and an ``Aggie.''
Reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman from Texas for that measured response to, I think, the very long response that was delivered by the chairman of the Financial Services Committee.
Mr. Speaker, I sat here for an hour and took notes on that because I thought it was important that I listen carefully to that presentation, as unusual as it is to have the Chair of the Financial Services Committee come and ask for a late hour after the adjournment, after the break for Easter recess, when most of the Members have gone and have caught flights for home. To have the chairman of the Financial Services Committee come to the floor and ask for an hour to be able to make his case to the American people after a budget is passed, after we've had this intensive 2 days of debate on the finances of this country, I think, is relatively unusual.
In my pages of notes that I took during that 55- or 60-minute period of time, as I scanned those notes after the fact. There seems, to me, to be a lot of things in these notes that are somewhat repetitive, and there are not a lot of significant points that can be raised out to be rebutted. The subject boils down to this, Mr. Speaker, and that is:
Who was in favor of the regulation of our financial industry and who was not? Who is on record as opposing the capitalization and regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? Who is on record of supporting the Community Reinvestment Act? Who is on record as advocating the irresponsible financial activities here in this country? Who seems to be, I think, unusually defensive about his position and consistently making the charge that Republicans have a fear of regulation?
Here is another one: ``the fear of the right wing that regulation is coming.'' Another statement would be: ``It was a lack of regulation that did it.''
There is an emphasis on fear of regulation when we have Members who have consistently supported wise and smart fundamental regulation. In fact, we want to see businesses that are able to operate, function, profit, and thrive within the tax and regulatory environment that we give them.
By the same token, Mr. Speaker, we're opposed to the idea that we should leave holes there that will be perverse incentives that would allow Fannie and Freddie to collapse and to put that entire liability on the backs of the American taxpayers--yes, maybe $100 billion for each of those entities, Fannie and Freddie, but $5.5 trillion of potential liability wrapped up in those two. Now it's a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Federal Government. Fannie and Freddie are nationalized, and that's a fact, Mr. Speaker, and they're nationalized because we didn't have the right kind of regulations which I supported and voted for on this floor and that others, who seemed to be very defensive, opposed directly. It's a matter of the Congressional Record. It's a matter of the quotes that have been delivered by Mr. Gohmert of Texas and those that I've pulled out of my memory in the dialogue with the chairman. That's just Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
If you go down through the rest of the list of these flaws that we have in our financial structure, where were these clairvoyant gurus in 2007 when mark-to-market accounting slid through without objection? It's something that didn't show up on very many radar screens. It's something that remains a foundation to the hideously self-inflicted wound that we have in our economy.
That's the regulation of mark-to-market accounting. Additionally, the
AIG, which I spoke of, AIG sitting there as a large insurance company, essentially a bonding company that laid out the premiums to guarantee bundles of mortgage-backed securities in their performance not based upon the value of the real estate that was the collateral that underlined those bundles of mortgages but based upon what their judgment was of the performance, the anticipated performance of these bundles of mortgage-backed securities. Based upon speculation but not oversight over the shoulder of AIG.
Another perverse incentive which was that AIG executives, the people who were actually the executives and the front-line people who were marketing these insurance policies that ensured the bundles of mortgage-backed securities were getting their commission out up front, Mr. Speaker. And so once they cashed their check, they didn't have any responsibility any longer or they didn't have any accountability to what would be the result of whether those loans were performed on or whether they were not.
I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from Texas.
I very much thank the gentleman from Texas.
I am starting my seventh year here, and I have watched some sea changes politically. I have watched some things shift. I have watched the majority change. I have watched the Presidency change, and I have watched the majority change in the United States Senate. I don't think that I have worked within every possible configuration out of those three entities but a number of different ones.
And one of the things that I have observed is that the voice that I heard from the Democrats consistently over those first 4 years that I was here, and then to some degree over the next two, was especially, especially from the Blue Dogs, Mr. Speaker, that came to this floor and said, We've got to have PAYGO, pay-as-you-go accounting. We've got to have a balanced budget every year. We have to have a fiscally responsible government. And I would make the argument that they would want to tighten down the spending, that we were spending too much money. They always wanted to spend a little more money than we wanted to spend, but they thought we were spending too much in relation to the tax revenue that was coming in.
So their idea was hold down the Democrat spending idea and increase the taxes a little bit and get this thing to a pay-as-you-go equation. That's the mantra of the Blue Dogs. And we've gone through a long debate on this budget, Mr. Speaker, and it has been two intense days that this comes down to, but this debate has gone on several weeks now.
What I have noticed is the absence of the Blue Dogs. Where are they? Where is that voice of ``we must balance the budget''? Where is PAYGO? What has happened to the people that were the strongest advocates for fiscal responsibility among the Democrats? I heard the debate. I was impugned by your debate over these last 6 years. But where are you now?
Puts me in mind of Punxsutawney Phil. When he comes out of the hole up there in Pennsylvania, Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania, and the groundhog sees his shadow, he gets scared and goes back in the hole again for 6 more weeks of winter. I don't know that that's necessarily the case, but I think the Blue Dogs have become the groundhogs of politics. They have gone down in the hole, and they are going to stay in there until there is a little bit more favorable climate that comes out, maybe not quite so much bright light shining, not quite so much shadows that are cast by President Obama, Nancy Pelosi, Harry Reid, this troika that drives this irresponsible spending bill. But they feel compelled to support the President. But he's our President, too.
But I don't support an irresponsible budget, Mr. Speaker, and I would have been really regretful to come to this floor to see a President of the United States of my party that had offered the kind of spending that would double our debt in 5 years and triple it in 10 years. The kind of spending that grows this irresponsible socialization of America--we rejected for a long time the European socialization--the socialized economy of the Europeans, and now we have--the President's over in Europe and is being lobbied by the Germans and the French. They are saying, Get a grip, Mr. President. Don't be spending money so irresponsibly. The Germans are saying, Get a handle on this thing. We don't agree with you in this Keynesian, almost intoxicated Keynesian approach to spending. This is Keynesian.
And the President said to us on a day in early February that--well, he said to
America that spending is stimulus. And then he said that FDR's New Deal actually would have worked except FDR essentially lost his nerve and was concerned about spending too much money. And so what you had was, according to the President, was a recession within a depression. And if you look at the records, there was a little dip in the economy in the late 1930s, but he argued that along came the biggest stimulus plan ever, which was World War II, which brought us out of the Great Depression.
Mr. Speaker, I will argue that the New Deal wasn't a good deal. No amount of more government spending, more profligate spending was going to get us out of the Great Depression. If you look at the data, there is no Keynesian approach in free market history that you can demonstrate that prevailed or produced a positive result.
In fact, if you look at the New Deal in the 1930s, that Keynesian spending, which I think intoxicated FDR for the first half of that decade, doesn't show that the economy grew. It shows that it was flat and then it declined.
And if you look at the wild Keynesian spending that took place in Japan when they had their economic recession in the 1990s, the more money they spent, the deeper they went into debt and the less they had to show for it. That's odd. That's what Henry Morgenthau said back in the 1930s as well, Mr. Speaker.
So when you look at that data--and if the people on this side of the aisle and the people that are running this show out of the White House can't point to an economic time in history that their model, which is the New Deal, they can't point to a time in history when it works, the data is not there. It does not exist, Mr. Speaker. And yet the President was only critical of FDR to the extent that he lost his nerve and he should have spent more money in the 1930s.
Well, I can tell you this President has not lost his nerve. He is spending money hand-over-fist in a fashion that is unparalleled in American history and maybe unconceived by any world leader in American history. And the price that we are paying for this--we've said over and over again--goes into the next generations. And the best you can hope for with a New Deal, a new New Deal--because we had an old New Deal that was a failed New Deal--the best you can hope for with an uber new New Deal of President Obama's is it may diminish the depths to which we might otherwise decline.
But the price for it's a very, very long delayed recovery, Mr. Speaker. That's what we're faced with today.
This budget that's crossed the path of the floor of this House is an irresponsible budget. It's a budget that spends way beyond our means. It's a budget that doubles our deficit in 5 years and triples it in 10. It's a budget that's irresponsible. It's one that doesn't even meet the needs of the United States of America, and it's one that I don't want to see my children saddled with.
And I can tell you, it's one that my children--or now men--call me and send me e-mails on an almost daily basis and are saying, What are you letting happen to me? What is happening to me? And they are going to be paying the price. My grandchildren will be paying the price. And I fear, Mr. Speaker, that my great grandchildren, should I be blessed with any, will be paying the price.
The gentleman from Texas has a point to make before we adjourn. I will be happy to yield.
I will let that be the concluding word this evening.