I thank the gentleman for yielding. I rise in support of the Obey amendment, amendment No. 2 to H.R. 4899, Supplemental Appropriations for FY 2010. However, I do so with significant reservation…
I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I rise in support of the Obey amendment, amendment No. 2 to H.R. 4899, Supplemental Appropriations for FY 2010. However, I do so with significant reservation because of the $9 billion in nuclear loan guarantees that have been inserted into this bill of otherwise badly needed funding.
The nuclear power industry has already received $51 billion in loan guarantee authority. The guarantees leave the taxpayer on the hook for energy policy so fiscally irresponsible, it has attracted bipartisan opposition. Indeed, private investment in new plants is nearly impossible to come by because the investment is so unattractive. The Congressional Budget Office characterized the risk of default on such projects as ``well above 50 percent.'' Even plants under construction are being abandoned. If private firms won't invest, should we be putting taxpayers on the hook?
Energy from wind and solar makes more financial sense and creates many more jobs when compared with nuclear power sans massive subsidies. But the loan guarantees for clean energy sources, which were added to make the nuclear loan giveaways easier to swallow, are not an industry priority. They need more direct subsidies to get started with the urgency required to address global warming.
This amendment also contains otherwise valuable funding for teacher's jobs, Pell grants, and Gulf Coast oil spill clean-up. I voted for this amendment because of the dire needs in these areas and others. But slipping in $9 billion in nuclear loan guarantees when we struggle to find money to extend unemployment compensation and create new green jobs is not acceptable.
The Economics of Nuclear Reactors: Renaissance or Relapse?
(By Mark Cooper, Senior Fellow for Economic Analysis, Institute for
Energy and the Environment, Vermont Law School--June 2009)
Just a few days before his dismissal, General McChrystal wrote what has been described as a devastating report on his mission. He pointed out that he faced a resilient and growing insurgency with too few troops, and he expected no progress in the coming months. Why are we continuing to send our troops into a mission impossible? Why are we committing our troops to a situation which is certainly bound to bring about more casualties, both of our troops and innocent civilians?
General Petraeus is promising an escalation of the war which will put more American lives on the line and more innocent civilians killed. Do we support our troops? If we do, and if we really paid attention to what's going on in Afghanistan, if we really supported our troops, we'd bring them home. And that's exactly what the Barbara Lee amendment is designed to do, and that's why we should support it.
As related by William Polk in his recent article in ``Counterpunch''--Just a few days before his dismissal, General McChrystal wrote what has been described as a ``devastating report on his mission.'' He pointed out that he faced a ``resilient and growing insurgency'' with too few troops and he expected no progress in the coming months.
Why are we continuing to send our troops into a mission impossible? Why are we committing our troops to a situation which is certainly bound to bring about more casualties, both of our troops and innocent civilians? General Petraeus is promising an escalation of the war which will put more American lives on the line and more innocent civilians killed.
Do we support our troops? If we do, and if we really paid attention to what's going on in Afghanistan, if we really supported our troops we would bring them home. That's exactly what the Barbara Lee Amendment is designed to do, and that's why we should support it.
What Now?
Afghanistan Sitrep
(By William R. Polk)
On June 24, the International Herald Tribune published an
editorial from its parent, The New York Times, entitled
``Obama's Decision.'' Both the attribution--printing in the
two newspapers which ensures that the editorial will reach
both directly and through subsidiary reprinting almost every
``decision maker'' in the world--and the date--just before
the appointment of David Petraeus to succeed Stanley
McChrystal--are significant. They could have suggested a
momentary lull in which basic questions on the Afghan war
might have been reconsidered.
That did not happen. The President made clear his belief
that the strategy of the war was sound and his commitment to
continue it even if the general responsible for it had to be
changed.
The editorial sounded a different note arising from the
events surrounding the fall of General McChrystal: Mr. Obama,
said The Times, ``must order all of his top advisers to stop
their sniping and maneuvering'' and come up with a coherent
political and military plan for driving back the Taliban and
building a minimally effective Afghan government.''
In short, Mr. Obama must get his team together and evolve a
plan.
Unfortunately, the task he faces is not that simple.
First, consider the ``team.'' It has two major components,
the military officers whom McChrystal gathered in Kabul. As
they made clear in the Rolling Stone interview, they think of
themselves as ``Team America'' and hold in contempt everyone
else. Those who don't fully subscribe to their approach to
the war are unpatriotic, stupid or cowardly. Those officers
are not alone. Agreeing with them is apparently now a large
part of the professional military establishment. They are the
junior officers whom David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal
have selected, promoted and with whom they take their stand.
The other ``component'' is not a group but many groups with
different agendas and constituencies. The most crucial for my
purposes here are the advisers to the President; they were
dismissed out of hand as ``the wimps in the White House.''
Most, but not all, were civilians. Other senior military
officers, now retired, who are not part of ``Team America''
and its adherents were also disparaged. Famously, General Jim
Jones, the director of the National Security Council staff,
was called a ``clown.''
These were the comments that forced Mr. Obama's hand and
were what the press latched upon to explain the events. But
many missed the point that McChrystal had just a few days
before his dismissal written a devastating report on his
mission. Confidential copies of it were obtained by the
London newspaper, The Independent on Sunday, which published
it today, but of course
the President had seen it earlier. Essentially, its message
boiled down to failure.
McChrystal pointed out that he faced a ``resilient and
growing insurgency,'' with too few troops and expected no
progress in the coming six months. Despite expenditures of at
least $7 billion a month, his politico-military strategy
wasn't working. Within weeks of the ``victory'' over the
Taliban in the agricultural district of Marja, the Taliban
were back and the box full of government he had announced
proved to be nearly empty. As the expression went in the days
of the Vietnam war, whatever happened during the day, the
guerrillas ``owned the night.'' As he described it, Marja was
the ``bleeding ulcer'' of the American campaign.
Behind McChrystal's words, the figures were even more
devastating: Marja, despite the descriptions in the press is
not a town, much less a city; it is a hundred or so square
miles of farm land with dispersed hamlets in which about
35,000 people live and work. Into that small and lightly
populated area, McChrystal poured some 15,000 troops, and
they failed to secure it.
To appreciate what those figures mean, consider them in
context of Petraeus's counterinsurgency theory, on which
McChrystal was basing his strategy. As he had explained it,
Marja should be taken, secured and held. Then an
administration--McChrystal's ``government in a box''--should
be imposed upon it. Despite all the hoopla about the
brilliant new strategy, it was hardly new. In fact it was a
replay of the strategy the French General Lyautey called the
tache d'huile (the oil spot) and applied in Indochina over a
century ago. We also tried it in Vietnam, renaming it the
``ink spot.'' The hope was that the ``spot,'' once fixed on
the Marja, would smudge into adjoining areas and so
eventually spread across the country. Clear and simple, but
unfortunately, like so much in counterinsurgency theory, it
never seemed to work.
Petraeus's counterinsurgency theory also illuminated how to
create the ``spot.'' What was required was a commitment of
forces in proportion to native population size. Various
numbers have been put forth but a common number is about one
soldier for each 50 inhabitants. Marja was the area chosen
for the ``spot.'' The people living there, after all, were
farmers, wedded to the land, and so should be more tractable
than the wild warriors along the tribal frontier. Moreover,
it was the place where the first significant American aid
program, the Helmand Valley Authority, had been undertaken in
the late 1950s. So, if an area were to be favorable to
Americans, it ought to be Marja. But, to take no chances,
General McChrystal decided to employ overwhelming force. So,
what is particularly stunning about the failure in Marja is
that the force applied was not the counterinsurgency model of
1 soldier for each 50 inhabitants but nearly 1 soldier for
each 2 inhabitants.
If these numbers were projected to the planned offensive in
the much larger city of Kandahar, which has a population of
nearly 500,000, they become impossibly large. Such an attack
would require at least four times as many U.S. and NATO as in
Marja. That is virtually the entire fighting force and what
little control over Marja and most other areas, perhaps
even the capital, Kabul, that now exists would have to be
given up or else large numbers of additional American
troops would have to be engaged. Moreover, in response to
such an attack, it would be possible for the insurgents
also to redeploy so the numbers would again increase.
The more fundamental question, which needs to be addressed,
is why didn't this relatively massive introduction of troops
with awesome and overwhelming fire power succeed. Just a few
days before he was fired, as I have mentioned, General
McChrystal posed, but could not answer, that question. I hope
President Obama is also pondering it.
For those who read history, the answer is evident. But, as
I have quoted in my book Understanding Iraq, the great German
philosopher, Georg Willhelm Friedrich Hegel, despaired that
``Peoples and governments never have learned anything from
history or acted on principles deduced from it'' and,
therefore, as the American philosopher George Santayana
warned us, not having learned from history, we are doomed to
repeat it. Indeed, it seems that each generation of Americans
has to start all over again to find the answers. Who among
our leaders and certainly among college students now really
remembers Vietnam? So, consider these simple facts:
The first fact, whether we like it or not, is that nearly
everyone in the world has a deep aversion to foreigners on
his land. As far as we know, this feeling goes back to the
very beginning of our species because we are territorial
animals. Dedication to the protection of homeland permeates
history. And the sentiment has never died out. Today we call
it nationalism. Nationalism in various guises is the most
powerful political idea of our times. Protecting land,
culture, religion and people from foreigners is the central
issue in insurgency. The former head of the Pakistani
intelligence service, who has had unparallelled experience
with the Taliban over many years, advised us that we should
open our eyes to seeing the Afghan insurgents as they see
themselves: ``They are freedom fighters fighting for their
country and fighting for their faith.'' We agreed when they
were fighting the Russians; now, when many of the same people
are fighting us, we see them only as terrorists. That label
does not help us understand why they are fighting.
Instead of asking why they are fighting, counterinsurgents
think they can overcome aversion to foreign invaders by
``renting'' the natives. In Marja, we not only put in a large
military contingent but, as Rajiv Chandrasekaran reported
this month in The Washington Post, we offered to employ
virtually the entire adult population, some 10,000 people.
Unquestionably such efforts do persuade some of the people
for some of the time. But not all or permanently. In Marja,
only 1,200 people signed up for the jobs we offered.
Why so few? After all, the Afghans, as I wrote in an
earlier article, have suffered through virtually continuous
war for thirty years. Many are wounded or sick, with some
even on the brink of starvation. More than one in three
subsists on the equivalent of less than 45 cents a day,
almost one in two lives below the poverty line and more than
one in two preschool children is stunted because of
malnutrition. They are the lucky ones; one in five dies
before the age of 5. Obviously, the Afghans need help, so we
think they should welcome our efforts to aid them. But Marja
shows that they do not. Nation-wide, independent observers
have found that attitude is common: most do not want us
there, even giving them aid. And even those who do are fairly
easily dissuaded by the insurgents.
Threats or attacks by the insurgents have brought them into
our gunsights. In Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, we have tried
to so weaken the insurgents that they cannot effectively
block our programs. Our ``body counts'' in Vietnam showed
that we killed off the entire Viet Minh several times over
and today we are told that the ranks of the Taliban have been
severely depleted. But, because the motivation that energized
the first group of insurgents is widely shared, and is
usually intensified by foreign military action, which by its
nature is regarded by many of the natives as unjustified and
brutal, new insurgents as well as supporters of the
temporarily evicted insurgents will emerge from among the
inhabitants of the oil/ink spot. Outsiders may have come in,
but, according to U.S. military intelligence about three in
four insurgents fight within five miles of their homes. They
were ``home'' and taking up arms within a month in Marja.
Indeed, the campaign may have been, to use that cumbersome
locution of governmentese, ``counter-productive.'' According
to the former British counter-terrorism chief and current
head of the U.N. monitoring mission, Richard Barnett, as
cited in The Guardian/The Observer last week, ``Attempts by
British and American forces to expand their control over
Afghan territory over the past 12 months have been counter-
productive and led to a worsening security situation.''
The second fact is that those insurgents who don't get
killed are the ones who have learned three simple ways to
defeat the counterinsurgents.
The first of these ways to defeat counterinsurgents is to
use appropriate tactics--never stand and fight. Insurgents
can see that their enemies outgun, and usually far out-
number, them so they should hit and run--lay mines, ambush
patrols, disrupt logistics but never get caught. Drawing on a
Kenyan fable, this has been termed ``the war of the flea and
the lion.'' The flea bites and jumps away. The powerful lion
swats, occasionally hits, but eventually tires and moves
away. Lions don't defeat fleas.
The second way insurgents can defeat the counterinsurgent
is a form of jujitsu--using his strength against him. His
strength is his superiority in weapons. So the insurgent
seeks to incite him to use them. Inevitably, caught in the
middle, the people--who are after all the ``spoil'' in
insurgency warfare--get hurt. And when they get hurt, they
naturally come to hate those who fire the weapons. In
Vietnam, insurgents would sometimes enter a ``neutral''
village, shoot at an American airplane and then steal away.
The attacked airplane would call in troops or gunships. The
villagers would suffer and would be confirmed in their hatred
of the Americans. It was brutal but very effective.
Counterinsurgents think they can avoid this problem by
withholding as much as possible of their lethal power. But
doing so is very difficult. Their soldiers also get hurt and
angry. And they come to hate the locals--wogs, gooks, rag
heads, untermenschen--who appear to them dirty, slovenly,
corrupt and cowardly. No one can be trusted when even
children act as spies or carry bombs. Soldiers make bad
neighbors to civilians in the best of circumstances and
insurgency is not one of those circumstances. As I have
pointed out in my book, The Birth of America, it was the
presence of even superbly disciplined British troops in
Boston that touched off the American Revolution.
The third way insurgents can defeat invaders is by
destroying their local puppets. Ruling another country is, of
course, expensive and difficult so foreigners have almost
always and everywhere enrolled willing natives to help. In
the American Revolution we called those people ``the
Loyalists.'' In Vietnam, they were the government of the
South. In Afghanistan they are the ``Kabul government.''
So the insurgents regard collaborators--``Quislings'' as we
called them in the Second World War--as their prime target.
In America, the colonists threatened, tarred and feathered,
lashed, imprisoned, hanged or drove away tens of thousands of
the Loyalists. In Vietnam, French police records show
that in the 1950s, the Viet Minh virtually wiped out the
administration of the southern government, murdering
policemen, postmen, judges and other civil servants as well
as teachers and doctors. And today in Afghanistan, as Rod
Nordland reported in The New York Times on June 10, ``The
Taliban have been stepping up a campaign of assassinations in
recent months against officials and anyone else associated
with local government in an attempt to undermine
counterinsurgency operations in the south.''
One Afghan told Nordland, ``I know many people who are
afraid to take jobs with the government or the aid community
now. It's a very effective and very efficient campaign; the
armed opposition are using this tool because it works.'' Even
from a nationalist perspective, this is very rough justice.
But many Afghans appear to believe it is both ``justice'' and
Afghan justice.
To validate their actions, the insurgents must themselves
supply what the foreigners and their local supporters offer.
We have full records of how insurgents did this in Yugoslavia
and Greece during the Second World War. The records are not
so open for Afghanistan as yet. But, we know from a study by
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) that the
Taliban has set up a ``widespread paramilitary shadow
government . . . in a majority of Afghanistan's 34
provinces.''
One of the things these shadow governments do is administer
the law. For years, I have read reports contrasting what
happens in a government court and a Taliban court. In the
government court, cases languish for months or years while
bribes are collected. A U.N. study found earlier this year
that officials shake down their fellow citizens for an amount
that is nearly a quarter of the country's gross domestic
product. In a Taliban court, there is no bribery and no
delay: Islamic law as defined by Afghan custom is immediate.
From our point of view, this too is very rough justice, if
justice at all, but in insurgencies, people appear willing to
put aside the niceties of peaceful life. In our Revolution we
did too.