Madam Speaker, I rise today in opposition to this rule and to the underlying legislation. This structured rule does not call for the open and honest debate that has been promised by my Democratic…
Madam Speaker, I rise today in opposition to this rule and to the underlying legislation.
This structured rule does not call for the open and honest debate that has been promised by my Democratic colleagues time after time.
Today's action by my friends on the other side of the aisle is another example of the Federal Government overstepping its boundaries into the private marketplace. And I think it's important for us to note that people who get credit cards get this as an extension of their opportunity and their credit, and they have a responsibility when they sign a contract to live up to that responsibility. It is not a right that is being extended, I believe, today for us to go into the free market and to tinker with on a Federal basis what is a right that is reserved to the States today. We disagree with what is happening today.
Not even 6 months ago, Madam Speaker, the Federal Reserve passed new credit card rules that would protect consumers and provide for more transparency and accountability in the marketplace. These new regulations are set to take effect in July 2010, an agreed-upon date to ensure the necessary time for banks and credit card companies to make crucial and critical adjustments to their business practices without making mistakes and without harming consumers.
Part of what the gentleman from Colorado just described, some of the 60,000 letters of feedback to the industry, took place in that regard. It took place to the Federal Reserve taking information, working with credit card consumer groups to try and alleviate problems or perceived problems in the marketplace. However, with the growing Federal deficit, the current economic crisis, and the growing number of unemployed people, I would simply ask why is Congress passing legislation that already exists? Let's give those statutes and those rules and regulations which are going to be in place time to work.
This legislation allows for the Federal Government to micromanage the way credit card companies and the banking industry does its business. Those hearings have already been held. Decisions have already been made by the Fed. Decisions with credit card companies and consumer groups to understand what changes needed to be made, they've already happened.
If enacted into law, it is not credit card companies that will suffer. It will be every single person that has a credit card and for those who even want to have a credit card in the future. Every American will see an increase in their interest rates, and some of the current benefits that encourage responsible lending will most likely disappear. For example, cash advances, over-the-limit protection, would be just one example.
My friends on the other side of the aisle not only remove any incentive for using credit cards responsibly, but they punish those managing their credit responsibly to subsidize those who are irresponsible. Madam Speaker, the Democrats also want to limit the amount of credit that is available to the middle class and low-income individuals. The very Americans that take the most advantage of credit will be harmed by what we're doing here today.
This legislation prevents credit history from being used to price risk, as an example, meaning that some individuals may not now be able to get a credit card, especially if they are lower-income or they have blemished credit histories or are trying to establish credit for the first time, like college students.
Additionally, the strain of this legislation could have a direct and adverse effect on small businesses which use this credit, especially in times like these where economic and job growth in this country are threatened. For individuals starting in a small business, this legislation means increased interest rates, reduced benefit, and shrinks the availability of credit, potentially limiting their options to even succeed in the marketplace.
Meredith Whitney, a prominent banking analyst, in speaking as a result of this legislation, remarked in The Wall Street Journal that she expects a $2.7 trillion decrease in credit by the end of 2010 out of the current $5 trillion credit line available in this country.
Madam Speaker, at a time when we're in economic downturns, the option of credit that is available for people--notwithstanding that they may have to pay a little bit more but will have the flexibility to have that credit--is important.
In the current state of our economy, we urgently would say we need to increase liquidity and lower the cost of credit to stimulate more lending--not raise rates and reduce the availability of credit.
This is not a solution for the ailing economy.
This type of government control of private markets is really what my Democrat colleagues and this new administration have been exploring for quite some time. Whether it is federalizing our banks, federalizing our credit market, federalizing our health care system, federalizing the energy sector, this is what this new administration and my friends in the majority party wish to do.
That said, this administration has taken their power grab a step further, first of all, in this legislation, to write contracts, to hire and fire executives, and to guarantee muffler warranties. They won't let banks pay back their loans. And now they are plotting a hostile takeover of the financial services industry, converting preferred shares into common equity shares, a drastic shift towards a government strategy of long-term ownership and involvement in some of our banks.
Millions of Americans are outraged at the mismanagement of TARP and the reckless use of their tax dollars, and I believe that taxpayers are increasingly uneasy with the Federal Government's growing involvement in financial markets that we see on the floor today.
In an effort to provide more protections to consumers and to taxpayers, I offered an amendment yesterday in the Rules Committee--a Rules Committee of which I have served for 11 years--that was defeated by a party-line vote of 7-3.
Madam Speaker, I would like to insert in the Congressional Record a copy of that amendment.
Amendment to H.R. 627, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Sessions of Texas
Add at the end the following new section:
Madam Speaker, I referred to an article in The Wall Street Journal on March 10 of this year by Meredith Whitney. I would like to insert that into the Record, also.
[From the Wall Street Journal, Mar. 10, 2009]
Credit Cards Are the Next Credit Crunch
(By Meredith Whitney)
Few doubt the importance of consumer spending to the U.S.
economy and its multiplier effect on the global economy, but
what is under-appreciated is the role of credit-card
availability in that spending. Currently, there is roughly $5
trillion in credit-card lines outstanding in the U.S., and a
little more than $800 billion is currently drawn upon. While
those numbers look small relative to total mortgage debt of
over $10.5 trillion, credit-card debt is revolving and
accordingly being paid off and drawn down over and over,
creating a critical role in commerce in America.
Just six months ago, I estimated that at least $2 trillion
of available credit-card lines would be expunged from the
system by the end of 2010. However, today, that estimate now
looks optimistic, as available lines were reduced by nearly
$500 billion in the fourth quarter of 2008 alone. My revised
estimates are that over $2 trillion of credit-card lines will
be cut inside of 2009, and $2.7 trillion by the end of 2010.
Inevitably, credit lines will continue to be reduced across
the system, but the velocity at which it is already occurring
and will continue to occur will result in unintended
consequences for consumer confidence, spending and the
overall economy. Lenders, regulators and politicians need to
show thoughtful leadership now on this issue in order to
derail what I believe will be at least a 57% contraction in
credit-card lines.
There are several factors that are playing into this swift
contraction in credit well beyond the scope of the current
credit market disruption. First, the very foundation of
credit-card lending over the past 15 years has been
misguided. In order to facilitate national expansion and vast
pools of consumer loans, lenders became overly reliant on
FICO scores that have borne out to be simply unreliable.
Further, the bulk of credit lines were extended during a time
when unemployment averaged well below 6%. Overly optimistic
underwriting standards made more borrowers appear
creditworthy. As we return to more realistic underwriting
standards, certain borrowers will no longer appear worth the
risk, and therefore lines will continue to be pulled from
those borrowers.
Second, home price depreciation has been a more reliable
determinant of consumer behavior than FICO scores. Hence,
lenders have reduced credit lines based upon ``zip codes,''
or where home price depreciation has been most acute. Such a
strategy carries the obvious hazard of putting good customers
in more vulnerable liquidity positions simply because they
live in a higher risk zip code. With this, frequency of
default is increased. In other words, as lines are pulled and
borrowing capacity is reduced, paying borrowers are pushed
into vulnerable financial positions along with nonpaying
borrowers, and therefore a greater number of defaults in fact
occur.
Third, credit-card lenders are currently playing a game of
``hot potato,'' in which no one wants to be the last one
holding an open credit-card line to an individual or
business. While a mortgage loan is largely a ``monogamous''
relationship between borrower and lender, an individual has
multiple relationships with credit-card providers. Thus, as
lines are cut, risk exposure increases to the remaining
lender with the biggest line outstanding.
Here, such a negative spiral strategy necessitates
immediate action. Currently five lenders dominate two thirds
of the market. These lenders need to work together to protect
one another and preserve credit lines to able paying
borrowers by setting consortium guidelines on credit. We, as
Americans, are all in the same soup here, and desperate times
are requiring of radical and cooperative measures.
And fourth, along with many important and necessary
mandates regarding fairness to consumers, impending changes
to Unfair and Deceptive Acts or Practices (UDAP) regulations
risk the very real unintended consequence of cutting off vast
amounts of credit to consumers. Specifically, the new UDAP
provisions would restrict repricing of risk, which could in
turn restrict the availability of credit. If a lender cannot
reprice for changing risk on an unsecured loan, the lender
simply will not make the loan. This proposal is set to be
effective by mid-2010, but talk now is of accelerating its
adoption date. Politicians and regulators need to seriously
consider what unintended consequences could occur from the
implementation of this proposal in current form. Short of the
U.S. government becoming a direct credit-card lender,
invariably credit will come out of the system.
Over the past 20 years, Americans have also grown to use
their credit card as a cash-flow management tool. For
example, 90% of credit-card users revolve a balance (i.e.,
don't pay it off in full) at least once a year, and over 45%
of credit-card users revolve every month. Undeniably,
consumers look at their unused credit balances as a ``what
if' reserve. ``What if' my kid needs braces? ``What if' my
dog gets sick? ``What if' I lose one of my jobs? This unused
credit portion has grown to be relied on as a source of
liquidity and a liquidity management tool for many U.S.
consumers. In fact, a relatively small portion of U.S.
consumers have actually maxed out their credit cards, and
most currently have ample room to spare on their unused
credit lines. For example, the industry credit line
utilization rate (or percentage of total credit lines
outstanding drawn upon) was just 17% at the end of 2008.
However, this is in the process of changing dramatically.
Without doubt, credit was extended too freely over the past
15 years, and a rationalization of lending is unavoidable.
What is avoidable, however, is taking credit away from people
who have the ability to pay their bills. If credit is taken
away from what otherwise is an able borrower, that borrower's
financial position weakens considerably. With two-thirds of
the U.S. economy dependent upon consumer spending, we should
tread carefully and act collectively.
Essentially what this person is arguing, a person who looks at the markets
every day, credit in this country, and I quote from this, ``Currently, there is roughly $5 trillion in credit card lines outstanding in the United States, and a little bit more than $800 billion is currently drawn upon.''
What we are saying is that people do have the ability to utilize more of their credit with credit cards. And I believe the vast majority of consumers are carefully and thoughtfully understanding that when they sign an agreement with a credit card company, that they understand that what they need to do is pay that back, and if not, that there will be a penalty, a fee, or interest that will be charged as a result of that.
The free market today has lots of credit cards, lots of different companies, lots of different options that are available to people. But with what we are doing here today, that is going to change the way people do business for the vast majority of credit card users. It means that, today, if you follow all the rules, you pay either the first month or, properly what you're doing, that you are willing to keep that credit card because you need it without having to pay the penalty or the associated penalty to the risk that you have. Tomorrow, we are going to take risk out of the risky people and put the risk on everybody. And that is really what Meredith Whitney is trying to say here. Of the trillions of dollars that are available, credit card companies only draw down $800 billion. That is because the vast majority of people, very effectively and properly, use the credit that is available to them.
The system does and did need tinkering; but when we tinker with that system, we should make sure that what we do is to add transparency, not rules and regulations that inflict what they do, and the changes, onto a contract willingly signed by a consumer.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.
Madam Speaker, one of the amendments that was talked about earlier that was denied in the Rules Committee deals with an issue that Secretary Geithner and the Treasury Department have openly talked about, and that is their decision to look at the possibility of taking that preferred stock which TARP funds were bought into and converting that to common stock. On April 21 there was an article in The Wall Street Journal that talked about this. It's entitled ``A Backdoor Nationalization.''
The bottom line is that immediately after this appeared in the press, the stock market promptly tumbled by 3.5 percent, meaning once again bad news to the marketplace, with J.P. Morgan falling 10 percent and financial stocks as a group more than 9 percent. This was on April 20.
What this is about is that it would be a wholesale conversion, which would mean that the government would own a larger portion of banks, even more and even in a different way than they would with preferred stock. The Wall Street Journal says this is a back door to nationalization. That is because it would create uncertainty, not more certainty, by offering the specter of even greater lengths of periods of Federal control over the banking system.
Perhaps even worse than that, what they would do is they would seek to transfer and force banks to do this because of the frailty of the banks at this point. It means that the government would force a change of a contract from a bank that they may have.
Madam Speaker, that amendment should have been made in order. This Congress should be out on this as a policy, and we should be speaking up about this. Even though the amendment was not made in order, I encourage the Financial Services Committee of this Congress to make sure that they hold hearings on this exact issue.
[From the Wall Street Journal, Apr. 21, 2009]
A Backdoor Nationalization--The Latest Treasury Brainstorm Will Retard
a Banking Recovery
Just when you think the political class may have learned
something in months of trying to fix the banking system, the
ghost of Hank Paulson returns to haunt the Treasury. The
latest Beltway blunder--and it would be a big one--is the
Obama Administration's weekend news leak that it may insist
on converting its preferred shares in some of the nation's
largest banks into common equity.
The stock market promptly tumbled by more than 3.5%
yesterday, with J.P. Morgan falling 10% and financial stocks
as a group off 9%, as measured by the NYSE Financials index.
Note to White House: Sneaky nationalizations aren't any more
popular with investors than the straightforward kind.
The occasion for this latest nationalization trial balloon
is the looming result of the Treasury's bank strip-tease--
a.k.a. ``stress tests.'' Treasury is worried, with cause,
that some of the largest banks lack the capital to ride out
future credit losses. Yet Secretary Timothy Geithner and the
White House have concluded that they can't risk asking
Congress for more bailout cash.
Voila, they propose a preferred-for-common swap, which can
conjure up an extra $100 billion in bank tangible common
equity, a core measure of bank capital. Not that this really
adds any new capital; it merely shifts the deck chairs on
bank balance sheets. Why Treasury thinks anyone would find
this reassuring is a mystery. The opposite is the more likely
result, since it signals that Treasury no longer believes it
can tap more public capital to support the financial system
if the losses keep building.
Worse, wholesale equity conversion would mean the
government owns a larger share of more banks and is more
entangled than ever in their operations. Giving Barney Frank
more voting power is more likely to induce panic than restore
confidence. Simply look at the reluctance of some banks--
notably J.P. Morgan Chase--to participate in Mr. Geithner's
private-public toxic asset sale plan. The plan is rigged so
taxpayers assume nearly all the downside risk, but the banks
still don't want to play lest Congress become even more
subject to political whim.
A backdoor nationalization also creates more uncertainty,
not less, by offering the specter of an even lengthier period
of federal control over the banking system. And it creates
the fear of even more intrusive government influence over
bank lending and the allocation of capital. These fears have
only been enhanced by the refusal of Treasury to let more
banks repay their Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) money.
As it stands, banks and their owners at least know how much
they owe Uncle Sam, and those preferred shares represent a
distinct and separate tier of bank capital. Once the
government is mixed in with the rest of the equity holders,
the value of its investments--and the cost to the banks of
buying out the Treasury--will fluctuate by the day.
Congress is also still trying to advance a mortgage-
cramdown bill that would hammer the value of already
distressed mortgage-backed securities, and now the
Administration is talking up legislation to curb credit-
card fees and interest. Both of these bills would damage bank
profits, but large government ownership stakes would leave
the banks helpless to oppose them. (See Citigroup, 36% owned
by the feds and now a pro-cramdown lobbyist.)
We've come to this pass in part because the Obama
Administration is afraid to ask Congress for the money for a
meaningful bank recapitalization. And it may need that money
now in part because Mr. Paulson's Treasury insisted on buying
preferred stock in all the big banks instead of looking at
each case on its merits. That decision last fall squandered
TARP money on banks that probably didn't need it and left the
Administration short of funds for banks that really do.
The sounder strategy--and the one we've recommended for two
years--is to address systemic financial problems the old-
fashioned way: bank by bank, through the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. and a resolution agency with the capacity to
hold troubled assets and work them off over time. If the
stress tests reveal that some of our largest institutions are
insolvent or nearly so, it's then time to seize the bank,
sell off assets and recapitalize the remainder. (Meanwhile,
the healthier institutions would get a vote of confidence and
could attract new private capital.)
Bondholders would take a haircut and shareholders may well
be wiped out. But converting preferred shares to equity does
nothing to help bondholders in the long run anyway. And
putting the taxpayer first in line for any losses alongside
equity holders offers shareholders little other than an
immediate dilution of their ownership stake. Treasury's
equity conversion proposal increases the political risks for
banks while imposing no discipline on shareholders,
bondholders or management at failed or failing institutions.
The proposal would also be one more example of how Treasury
isn't keeping its word. When he forced banks to accept public
capital whether they needed it or not, Mr. Paulson said the
deal was temporary and the terms wouldn't be onerous. To
renege on those promises now will only make a bank recovery
longer and more difficult.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from Virginia coming down and setting the record straight about how the Bush administration has caused all these problems and all these tax cuts. But I would remind the gentleman that the greatest economic boom in the history of the United States and the world occurred during the time that we encouraged and incentivized investors to be a part of growing our economy.
As I recall, the facts of the case are that 3 years ago when our friends, the Democrats, became the new majority, they announced quite openly that those tax cut days were over with, and that's when the investor left. And when the investor left, that's when our economy started going downhill.
Let's tell the truth here. What we just passed just yesterday was the largest spending budget in the history of the universe that will lead to a debt that will double and triple, double and triple, in the next few years. That is a national security issue. And that's part of what we are talking about here today. The interference in the marketplace by my friends, the Democrats, that not only wiped out, took the investor out of the equation, but today are going to create an even worse circumstance for credit cardholders at a time when the extension of credit is needed more than ever.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
I appreciate the gentleman, and I would allow him to proceed as just discussed.
Madam Speaker, the gentleman and I had previously spoken that I would have a late arrival.
I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Roskam).
Madam Speaker, in closing I would like to stress that while my friends on the other side of the aisle claim to be protecting consumers with this legislation, they have refused a bill, the opportunity for an amendment in this bill, that would protect all taxpayers from de facto nationalization of our financial system. The American taxpayers deserve the same accountability and transparencies with their dollars that this bill claims to do for consumers.
As a Nation, we have real problems, Madam Speaker, and they need to be solved through real solutions. And passing legislation that already exists in Federal statute, I believe, is wasting our time.
We need to provide jobs, we need to encourage economic growth, we need to get the investor back into the game and, perhaps most of all, we need to restore America's public faith in their Members of Congress and in this Congress that we are aiming at solving the problems that face this Nation.
While I encourage each of my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this structured rule, I would also advise them they need to equally understand the facts of the case, and that would drive them to a ``no'' vote.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.