S. 1528Senate111th Congress (2009-2011)In Committee

Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission Act

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SenateIntro Referral Latest Action

Read twice and referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence.

Intelligence (Select) Committee

July 28, 2009

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SenateIntro Referral

Introduced in Senate

July 28, 2009

SenateIntro Referral

Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR S8202-8203)

July 28, 2009

SenateIntro Referral

Read twice and referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence.

Intelligence (Select) Committee

July 28, 2009

Floor Debate

7 members

What members said about S. 1528 on the floor

1 Republican6 Democrats

Sen. Richard G. LugarR-IN · Jul 28, 2009

Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague, Senator John Kerry, in introducing the Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act of 2009. Our colleagues, Senators Corker, Menendez,…

The role of foreign assistance in achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives has come into sharper focus since 2001. President Bush elevated development as a third pillar of the U.S. National Security Strategy. President Obama pledged to double foreign assistance, and announced new initiatives on global food security and health. Secretary Clinton announced a quadrennial review of diplomacy and development. These initiatives are likely to have far reaching implications for foreign assistance policy and organization.

For development to play its full role in our national security structure, the U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID, must be a strong agency with the resources to accomplish the missions we give it. Earlier this month, Secretary Clinton stated: ``I want USAID to be seen as the premier development agency in the world, both governmental and NGO. I want people coming here to consult with us about the best way to do anything having to do with development.'' I share the sentiments expressed by Secretary Clinton, and I have confidence in the extraordinary development expertise housed at USAID.

But during the last two decades, decision-makers have not made it easy for USAID to perform its vital function. Even as we have rediscovered the importance of foreign assistance, we find ourselves with a frail foundation to support a robust development strategy. We have increased funds for development and elevated its priority, while allowing USAID to atrophy. Many new programs have been located outside USAID with roughly two dozen departments and agencies having taken over some aspects of foreign assistance, including the Department of Defense. Each of these agencies naturally considers itself the lead agency in its sector, provoking competition among agencies rather than coordination and coherence. We do not really know whether these programs are complementary or working at cross-purposes.

USAID's staffing and expertise have declined markedly since the 1980s. There are only five engineers left; 23 education officers are tasked with overseeing different programs in 84 countries. Decisions to reorganize in pursuit of better coordination between the Department of State and USAID resulted in the latter's loss of evaluation, budget, and policy capacity. Much of the work of running America's development programs is now farmed out to private contractors.

I believe the starting point for any future design of our assistance programs and organization should not be the status quo, but rather the period in which we had a well-functioning and well-resourced aid agency. To be a full partner in support of foreign policy objectives, USAID must have the capacity to participate in policy, planning, and budgeting. The migration of these functions to the State Department has fed the impression that an independent aid agency no longer exists.

It the administration pursues the goal of doubling foreign assistance over time, it is crucial that Congress has confidence that these funds will be used efficiently. USAID must have the capacity to evaluate programs and disseminate information about best practices and methods and it must have a central role in development policy decisions.

The legislation that we introduce today promotes capacity, accountability, and transparency in U.S. foreign assistance programs. It has received strong initial support from outside groups led by the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network. There are three deficiencies we are trying to address.

First, the evaluation of assistance programs and the dissemination of knowledge have deteriorated in the last couple of decades. While USAID was a respected voice in this regard during the 1980s, its evaluation capacity has been allowed to wither. The bill strengthens USAID's monitoring and

evaluation capacity with the creation of an internal evaluation and knowledge center. The bill also re-establishes a policy and planning bureau. It is crucial that USAID be able to fully partner with the State Department in decisions relating to development.

Second, U.S. foreign assistance programs are littered among some two dozen agencies with little or no coordination. We do not have adequate knowledge of whether programs are complementary or working at cross- purposes. The bill requires all government agencies with a foreign assistance role to make information about its activities publicly available in a timely fashion. It designates the USAID Mission Director as responsible for coordinating all development and humanitarian assistance in-country. It creates an independent evaluation and research organization that can analyze and evaluate foreign assistance programs across government.

Third, staffing and expertise at USAID have declined since the early 1990s, even as funding for foreign assistance programs has increased. This decline in capacity has resulted in other agencies stepping in to fill the gap. While Congress has begun to provide the necessary resources to rebuild this capacity, the agency does not have a human resources strategy to guide hiring and deployment decisions. The bill would require such a strategy and a high-level task force to advise on critical personnel issues. The bill also encourages increased training and inter-agency rotations to build expertise and effectiveness.

It is especially important that Congress weigh in on this issue because the Administration has yet to appoint a USAID Administrator or fill any confirmable positions in the agency. Without an Administrator in place, USAID is likely to have less of a role in the current State Department review than it should have. The State Department review process should include strong voices advocating for an independent aid agency.

Both Congress and the State Department should be offering proposals on how to improve development assistance. Our legislation does not rule out any options that the State Department may propose as a result of its review. But ultimately, Congress will have to make decisions on resources for development programs. Given budget constraints, it is essential that Congress has confidence in how development resources are spent. Building capacity at USAID will be an important part of this calculation.

The issues that we face today--from chronic poverty and hunger to violent acts of terrorism--require that we work seamlessly toward identifiable goals. I look forward to working with colleagues to improve and support the development mission that benefits our long-term security.

Sen. Robert MenendezD-NJ · Jul 28, 2009

Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce today, with my colleagues Senators Kerry, Lugar, and Corker, legislation that will help strengthen the foreign assistance efforts of the United States. We…

Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce today, with my colleagues Senators Kerry, Lugar, and Corker, legislation that will help strengthen the foreign assistance efforts of the United States. We have put together a piece of legislation that helps move our collective foreign assistance efforts in the right direction.

I am pleased that we have worked very closely and in a bipartisan fashion on this legislation and I want to thank my colleagues for their work. Foreign assistance is something that is of great interest to many members of the Foreign Relations Committee. While we may disagree on the overall resources that should be devoted to development assistance, I think we all agree that the resources we do provide should be used in the best way possible.

I also want to thank the broader community of people who have been supportive of these efforts for years. I cannot tell you how many letters from people in New Jersey and from around the country I have received on these issues. These individuals, and the groups who help advocate for these issues are an important voice in the process.

President Obama has pledged to double foreign assistance by 2012. In this context, it is now more important than ever for the Congress to know which U.S. Government programs are the best investments. Right now, we have too little evidence that is objective and independent about which U.S. Government Agencies should have their budgets increased and which should be held constant or decreased. This legislation will help provide a more objective basis for this kind of decisionmaking. It will help both the Congress and the administration to make smarter, more analytical decisions about which agencies should carry out what programs, and help build more rigorous analysis across U.S. Government programs that may be working on similar issues.

Foreign assistance is not just an issue of morality or an issue that is driven by a sense of doing what is right for the most disenfranchised around the world--these issues are directly in our national interests and our national security interests. Every time we provide credit to a farmer who is displaced or training to a woman who wants to run a business out of her home, we are making inroads to the bread and butter issues that people care about. When we provide an effective alternative to illicit economic activity, we are dealing a blow against drugs coming to the streets of New Jersey, and helping to build the institutions around the world that will provide the framework for stable and prosperous societies. We all want to live in a community where we can walk freely without fear of persecution, and without fear of our personal safety. No matter where you come from, these are a basic set of principles that resonate with all of us.

Congress needs to see results, the American people need to see results, and so do the millions of people around the world whose lives literally depend on our ability to carry out these programs in the smartest way possible. This is why we have included an independent monitoring mechanism to evaluate the impact of our foreign assistance programs. It's one thing to say that we handed out 500 textbooks or trained 200 teachers, but it's far different to say that we improved the aptitude of school children and that these improvements help connect them to meaningful employment, which raised their household income, which allowed them to eat better, access medical services, and so on . . . it's the difference between outputs and outcomes that we are trying to get at with the independent evaluation unit, as outlined in the legislation we are introducing today.

I have long believed that foreign assistance is a critical part of our overall engagement overseas and I have been a consistent advocate of stepping up our efforts in this area. In recent years, I have focused on building up the United States Agency for International Development, USAID, from the inside out--I have called for building-up the staff of USAID in a coherent and strategic manner--this bill will help do that.

Now that USAID is working alongside the Department of Defense in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, and immersed in complex situations like those in Pakistan, Sudan, or Sri Lanka, we need an agency that is nimble, responsive, and ahead of the curve. From staffing, resources, and training, our development tools need to be, at the very least at par, if not ahead of our diplomatic and defense efforts.

One way to start us along this path is to focus on USAID's leadership. It needs credible and high-profile leadership that can work in partnership with the Congress, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council. The ``development voice'' in our Government needs to be a ``heavyweight voice'' that commands respect both in Washington and around the world.

I believe USAID needs to take back resources and programs that have slowly been moved over to the Department of Defense. Having the Department of State or the Department of Defense control development strategy and resources, with USAID simply serving as an implementing agency, has caused confusion and ambiguity. We ask our military to plan and execute a lot of missions; development should not be one of them. Civilian resources should be appropriated to civilian agencies.

Staff at USAID needs to be rebuilt--not just with more people, but we need to make sure we have the right people and make sure we are attracting and retaining the best possible candidates. This bill will help us get there with the comprehensive human resource strategy that is mandated for human resources. We need to build up our foreign assistance programs not just where they used to be, but to where they need to be.

I look forward to continuing our work on these programs. This legislation is a start, but there is much more work to be done. Let me be clear--this bill, combined with additional resources is not going to fix everything--foreign assistance has its limits. However, I believe we have not yet approached this limit. More resources, and better-spent resources, combined with active diplomatic and economic engagement will help build the institutions that will create more stable political, social, and economic systems.

Only until we recognize that the success of those systems is deeply connected to the success of our own, will we begin to adequately address the joint challenges that threaten our national security, our economy, our way of life.

Sen. Russell D. FeingoldD-WI · Jul 28, 2009

Mr. President, the legislation I am introducing today would establish an independent, bipartisan Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission to significantly reform and improve our intelligence capabilities. On July 16, the bill was approved, on a bipartisan basis, by the Senate Intelligence Committee as an amendment to the Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence Authorization bill. The bill is similar to the one I introduced in the last Congress with Senator Hagel, which also had bipartisan support in the Intelligence Committee, and it is my hope and expectation that it will soon become law. The New York Times has also expressed its support for the commission.

The work of this commission is critical to our national security. For years, our intelligence officials have acknowledged that we lack adequate coverage around the world and that we have gaps in our ability to anticipate threats and crises before they emerge. The 2006 Annual Report of the Intelligence Community described how current crises divert resources from emerging and strategic issues. In 2007, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Collection testified that we need to ``pay attention to places that we are not.'' In 2008, the DNI testified that current crisis support ``takes a disproportionate share'' of intelligence resources over emerging and strategic issues. Earlier this year, during his confirmation process, the current CIA Director expressed his concern about the broad set of issues to which insufficient resources are being devoted. The problem, in other words, is not new, nor is it unique to any administration. It is systematic and it results from structural problems in how we develop priorities and allocate resources.

These structural problems afflict the Intelligence Community, but they are also much broader. Around the world, information our government needs to inform our foreign policy and protect our country is obtained openly by State Department officials. Yet there is no interagency strategy that integrates the capabilities of our diplomats and other embassy personnel with the activities of our clandestine collectors. The result is big gaps in what we know about the world-- gaps that don't necessarily require more spying.

This information pertains to instability and civil conflict, threats to democratic institutions, human rights abuses and corruption, and whether we can count on the support of a country for our policies. This information is also directly related to the threat from al Qaeda, its affiliates and other terrorist organizations. The 9/11 Commission recommended that our government identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. Yet, as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee, ``much of the information about the instability that can lead to safe havens or ideological radicalization comes not from covert collection but from open collection, best done by Foreign Service Officers.'' The solution, then, is to ensure that, if State Department or other U.S. officials are best suited to gather this kind of critical information, they have the capabilities and resources to do so.

At the core of the commission's mandate is the need for an interagency strategy that asks and answers four key questions: ``What is it that the U.S. Government needs to know?'' ``How do we best anticipate threats and crises around the world, before they emerge?'' ``Who in our government, within and outside of the Intelligence Community, is best equipped to get this information, report on it, and analyze it?'' ``And how do we develop missions and provide resources so that we are using all of our capabilities on behalf of our national security?'' The commission will provide recommendations on how the government can and should develop this strategy and whether new legislation is needed to clarify the authority of existing executive branch entities or create a new one. And it will provide recommendations on how to ensure that the budget process reflects the best and most efficient means to collect, report on and analyze intelligence and information, rather than the influence of individual bureaucracies.

The reform recommendations made by this commission will provide a critical and welcome boost to everyone, in the executive branch and in Congress, responsible for defending our national security. The Intelligence Community, as its own leadership has attested, needs guidance if it is to reprioritize global coverage and long-term threats. It also needs help in areas that need not be its top priorities: if State Department or other U.S. officials outside the Intelligence Community are best equipped to obtain certain information and are given sufficient resources, the IC can focus on areas where clandestine collection is most needed. The State Department will benefit from an interagency process that recognizes the critical reporting capabilities of the diplomatic service and allocates resources accordingly. The President will be provided with recommendations on interagency reforms that extend beyond the purview of any one department or agency.

Implementation of the commission's recommendations will allow the congressional intelligence and foreign relations committees to conduct oversight of the Intelligence Community and the State Department in the context of a clearly defined strategy. The

budget committees and the appropriators as well as authorizers will have an interagency strategy that explains the rationale for the President's budget request. Congress as a whole will be provided recommendations on whether new legislation is needed to reform the process.

This is not just a step toward good governance. It will ensure that taxpayer dollars are used more efficiently and effectively. Most of all, it will make us safer. This bill is not partisan, and it has nothing to do with who is in the White House. The commission will not investigate anyone, nor cast blame for long-standing structural problems. It seeks only to identify the reforms still needed and to provide recommendations, to the executive branch and to Congress, on how to achieve them.

Sen. Russell D. FeingoldD-WI · Jul 28, 2009

Sen. John F. KerryD-MA · Jul 28, 2009

Mr. President, for the past 6 months, the administration has been busy laying the groundwork for a new development agenda. First, the President issued a bold 2010 international affairs budget that…

Mr. President, for the past 6 months, the administration has been busy laying the groundwork for a new development agenda.

First, the President issued a bold 2010 international affairs budget that significantly increases funding for vital programs in Pakistan and Afghanistan, begins to rebuild our diplomatic and development capacity, and renews our commitment to essential programs from education to HIV/ AIDS and hunger.

Then, earlier this month, President Obama and other G8 leaders announced a $20 billion food security partnership to provide small farmers in poor countries with the seeds, fertilizers, and equipment they need to break a decades-long cycle of hunger, malnutrition and dependency. Finally, the State Department unveiled plans for a ``Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review,'' a comprehensive assessment designed to improve policy, strategy, and planning at the State Department.

While we are still awaiting a nominee to head the U.S. Agency for International Development I am confident that a name will soon be forthcoming.

These are welcome changes that demonstrate this Administration's commitment to a vigorous reform process and a bold development plan. Congress will be a strong partner in those efforts--providing the resources, legislation, and authorities to ensure that our development programs are funded and designed to meet our priorities.

While there is some debate on what form foreign aid reform should take, there is a broad consensus in the development community about why reform matters.

Experts agree that the strength of our development programs is directly linked to success or failure in front-line states like Afghanistan and Pakistan.

They agree that USAID is more critical to achieving our foreign policy objectives than ever before--yet it lacks the tools, capacity and expertise to fulfill its mission.

They agree that too often decision-makers lack basic information about the actual impact of our development programs.

They also agree that excessive bureaucracy and regulations and fragmented coordination are hampering our efforts to swiftly and effectively deliver assistance.

And they agree that even as we plan for broad, fundamental reform, there are many steps we can take in the interim to dramatically improve the effectiveness of our foreign aid efforts.

We assembled a small bipartisan Senate working group to formulate legislation that makes short-term improvements while setting the stage for longer-term reform. Senators Lugar, Menendez, Corker and I have been developing initial reform legislation that we believe goes a long way towards improving our short-term capacity to deliver foreign aid in a more accountable, thoughtful and strategic manner.

One provision in the bill that we believe is particularly important establishes an independent evaluation group, based in the executive branch, to measure and evaluate the impact and results of all U.S. foreign aid programs, across all departments and agencies. This new institution--the Council on Research and Evaluation of Foreign Assistance--can address a fundamental knowledge gap in our foreign aid programs--quite simply, it will help us understand which programs work, which do not, and why.

I want to emphasize, this legislation only represents the first step in a longer reform process. But we believe it sends an important bipartisan signal that foreign aid reform will be a priority for this committee in the years ahead. I am pleased that Senators Risch and Cardin will join as original cosponsors to the bill.

When John F. Kennedy spoke at the founding of USAID, in 1961, he articulated a basic truth about our foreign policy. We cannot escape our moral obligation to be a wise leader in the community of free nations. Kennedy warned that--``To fail to meet those obligations now would be disastrous; and, in the long run, more expensive. For widespread poverty and chaos lead to a collapse of existing political and social structures which would inevitably invite the advance of totalitarianism into every weak and unstable area. Thus our own security would be endangered and our prosperity imperiled.''

Just substitute violent extremism for totalitarianism and the quote is as accurate today as it was then. Just as we did in Marshall's time and Kennedy's time, America today has a chance to return to a foreign policy that is not just seen by people everywhere, but felt and lived, one that translates our promises into real value and real progress on the ground--one that improves people's daily lives, inspires them, and earns their respect.

The good news is that, as we rebuild our civilian institutions, there will so many chances to lead in the process. We are living in a moment of volatility, but also--emphatically--a moment of possibility.

Infant mortality rates dropped by 27 percent worldwide since 1990. By 2015, let us cut under-five mortality by 2/3. Life expectancy is eight years higher than it was in 1990--but we can do better by cutting hunger and poverty in half and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDs, malaria and other major diseases. Primary school enrollment has increased by 10 percent--it is time we made it universal. While we are at it, let us eliminate gender disparity in education once and for all.

History teaches us that America is safest and strongest when we understand that our security will not be protected by military means alone. It must be protected as well by our generosity, by our example, by powerful outreach, and by instilling a palpable sense in the people of the world that we understand--and share their destiny. That has always inspired people, and it always will. It undercuts our enemies, it empowers our friends--and it keeps us safer.

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Sen. Dianne FeinsteinD-CA · Jul 28, 2009

Mr. President, today I am pleased to introduce the No Firearms for Foreign Felons Act of 2009. This bill would close a loophole that currently exists in law, by ensuring that people convicted of…

Mr. President, today I am pleased to introduce the No Firearms for Foreign Felons Act of 2009. This bill would close a loophole that currently exists in law, by ensuring that people convicted of foreign felonies and crimes involving domestic violence cannot possess firearms. I imagine that most Americans may be surprised--as I was--to learn that foreign felons actually have greater gun rights than American citizens convicted of felonies and crimes of domestic violence in our own courts.

In 1968, Congress passed the landmark Gun Control Act, ensuring that it was illegal for felons to possess firearms. I have been working since 1994 to build upon that legacy and protect American families from senseless gun violence.

Unfortunately, in 2005 the Supreme Court created a gaping loophole in this longstanding felon-in-possession law. In the case of Small v. United States, a majority of the Court held that foreign felony is not a bar to gun possession when those felons come to the U.S.

At the time, the Supreme Court was very much aware that its ruling could lead to unintended consequences. Justice Clarence Thomas noted in his dissent, ``the majority's interpretation permits those convicted overseas of murder, rape, assault, kidnapping, terrorism and other dangerous crimes to possess firearms freely in the United States.''

The majority of the Court identified a fundamental flaw in the Gun Control Act of 1968. Simply put, Congress was not clear enough. Although the law states that a person convicted of a felony ``in any court'' could not possess a firearm, the Court said that the phrase, ``any court,'' applied only to American courts.

The federal felon-in-possession laws outlined in the Gun Control Act of 1968 has been applied to foreign felons from 1968 until the Small decision in 2005. However, the Court found these arguments unpersuasive.

In their dissent, Justices Thomas, Scalia and Kennedy accused the majority of creating a novel legal construction that would ``wreak havoc'' with established rules of extraterritorial construction. But whatever we may think of the Court's legal analysis, there is no doubt that the Small decision is now the law of the land.

We must now make every effort to close this dangerous loophole and the only way to do that is to pass the No Firearms for Foreign Fellons Act of 2009. The bill I am introducing today would do just that. Under this bill, the Gun Control Act of 1968 is amended to ensure that convictions in foreign courts are included. Similar changes would be made in other sections of the Gun Control Act, where there are references to ``state offenses'' or ``offenses under state law''--the bill would expand these terms to include convictions for felony offenses committed abroad.

In other words, the bill would make it clear that if someone is convicted in a foreign court of an offense that would have disqualified him from possessing a firearm in the U.S. the same laws relating to gun possession would be applied.

As introduced, the only exception would involve a conviction in a foreign court that was invalid. In that specific situation, this bill would allow a person convicted in a foreign court to challenge its validity. Under the bill, a foreign conviction will not constitute a ``conviction'' for purposes of the felon-in-possession laws, if the foreign conviction either: resulted from a denial of fundamental fairness that would violate due process if committed in the United States, or, if the conduct on which the foreign conviction was based would be legal if committed in the U.S.

I expect that these circumstances will be fairly rare, but the bill does take them into account, and will provide a complete defense to anyone with an invalid foreign conviction under these specific circumstances.

The need for action is clear. In 2001, U.S. law enforcement outfitted in bullet proof vests raided the New York City hotel room of Rohan Ingram. Ingram was found with 13 different firearms, had an extensive criminal background, including at least 18 convictions for crimes such as assault and use of deadly weapon. He was known to law enforcement as ``armed and dangerous'' and they rightfully took all of the necessary precautions to protect themselves. However, because all of his crimes had occurred in Canada, his felon-in-possession of a firearm charge was eventually thrown out of court. This is a direct result of the Supreme Court case and illustrates a very dangerous loophole in our criminal justice system.

What we need to do as an institution is clear. We cannot keep in place a policy that allows felons convicted overseas to possess firearms. It simply makes no sense. In a country filled with senseless gun violence, we cannot continue to give foreign-convicted murderers, rapists and even terrorists an unlimited right to buy firearms and U.S. assault weapons in the U.S. I urge my colleagues to support this important legislation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Sen. Tom UdallD-NM · Jul 28, 2009

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Unsafe Meat and Poultry Recall Act, to grant the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to order the recall of meat and poultry that is adulterated,…

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Unsafe Meat and Poultry Recall Act, to grant the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to order the recall of meat and poultry that is adulterated, misbranded, or otherwise unsafe.

Sadly, and in some cases tragically, in recent years recalls of unsafe food products has seemingly become a regular occurrence in our Nation. Last week, a Denver-based grocery chain recalled 466,236 pounds of ground beef products that were distributed to stores in Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Utah, Wyoming, and my State of New Mexico. The tainted meat is blamed for fourteen cases of salmonella and 6 hospitalizations.

Last year, the USDA requested a recall of 143 million pounds of beef from a slaughterhouse that was being investigated for unsafe practices. In this instance, like most, the recalled beef had been distributed throughout the country, including to my state of New Mexico where the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Commodity Foods Program had sent 3,000 cases of the questionable beef to the state's Human Services Department to be distributed to school lunch programs. Luckily, most of the beef was found before it was served, but putting New Mexico's children at such a risk is clearly unacceptable.

The number of people affected annually from ingesting tainted meat and poultry products illuminates this proposition: 5,000 people die from food-borne illnesses each year; nearly 76 million people get sick annually from eating tainted food, of these individuals, 325,000 require hospitalization.

Shockingly, the USDA does not have the authority to issue mandatory recalls of tainted meat and poultry products. Complying with agency recalls, therefore, is at the industry's discretion. The meat industry says that it has never failed to cooperate with a recall request from the USDA, rendering mandatory recalls of tainted meat unnecessary. However, when the USDA asks for a recall, a negotiation process ensues between the agency and the industry. Meanwhile, thousands of people are at risk of eating the potentially harmful meat in the marketplace during the ongoing negotiations.

It is the responsibility of the USDA to see that the poultry and meatpacking industry produces only safe meat products. It is the right of American consumers to feel safe purchasing the meat sold in their grocery stores. And it is the right of our cattle producers to know that the beef they produce is being handled properly and sent into the market safely.

My bill would finally give the Secretary of Agriculture the power to ensure that the meat in our Nation's markets is clean and safe.

Sen. Tom UdallD-NM · Jul 28, 2009

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Unsafe Meat and Poultry Recall Act, to grant the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to order the recall of meat and poultry that is adulterated,…

My bill would finally give the Secretary of Agriculture the power to ensure that the meat in our Nation's markets is clean and safe.

Sen. Jack ReedD-RI · Jul 28, 2009

Mr. President, today I join my colleague, Senator Burr, in reintroducing the Services for Ending Long-Term Homelessness Act,

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Introduced in SenateIssued July 28, 2009

111th CONGRESS

1st Session

S. 1528

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

July 28, 2009

Mr. Feingold introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence

A BILL

To establish a Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission, and for other purposes.

Short title

This Act may be cited as the Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission Act.

Definitions

In this Act:

(1)

2005 National Intelligence Strategy

The term 2005 National Intelligence Strategy means the National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America released by the Director of National Intelligence on October 26, 2005.

(2)

2006 Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community and 2006 Annual Report

The terms 2006 Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community and 2006 Annual Report mean the 2006 Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community released by the Director of National Intelligence in February 2007.

(3)

Commission

The term Commission means the Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission established in section 4(a).

(4)

Foreign intelligence, intelligence

The terms foreign intelligence and intelligence have the meaning given those terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a).

(5)

Information

The term information includes information of relevance to the foreign policy of the United States collected and conveyed through diplomatic reporting and other reporting by personnel of the Government of the United States who are not employed by an element of the intelligence community, including public and open-source information.

(6)

Strategic Plan of the Department of State

The term Strategic Plan of the Department of State means the Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2007–2012 of the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development revised on May 7, 2007.

Findings

Congress makes the following findings:

(1)

Accurate, timely, and comprehensive foreign intelligence and information are critical to the national security of United States and the furtherance of the foreign policy goals of the United States.

(2)

It is in the national security and foreign policy interest of the United States to ensure the global deployment of personnel of the Government of the United States who are responsible for collecting and reporting foreign intelligence and information, including personnel from the intelligence community, the Department of State, and other agencies and departments of the Government of the United States, and that adequate resources are committed to effect such collection and reporting.

(3)

The 2005 National Intelligence Strategy and the 2006 Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community identified 5 major missions of the intelligence community to support the national security requirements of the United States, the first 2 of which, defeating terrorism and preventing and countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction, are global and transnational in nature.

(4)

The third major mission identified by the 2005 National Intelligence Strategy and the 2006 Annual Report, bolstering the growth of democracy and sustaining peaceful democratic states, requires a global commitment of collection, reporting, and analytical capabilities.

(5)

The 2005 National Intelligence Strategy and the 2006 Annual Report identify as a major mission the need to anticipate developments of strategic concern and identify opportunities as well as vulnerabilities for decision makers.

(6)

The 2006 Annual Report provides the following:

(A)

In a world in which developments in distant reaches of the globe can quickly affect American citizens and interests at home and abroad, the Intelligence Community must alert policy makers to problems before they escalate and provide insights into their causes and effects. Analysis must do more than just describe what is happening and why; it must identify a range of opportunities for (and likely consequences of) diplomatic, military, law enforcement, economic, financial, or homeland security action. To support policymakers, the Intelligence Community should develop, sustain, and maintain access to expertise on every region, every transnational security issue, and every threat to the American people..

(B)

We still need to re-balance, integrate, and optimize collection capabilities to meet current and future customer and analytic priorities. Collection is . . . what gives the [Intelligence Community] its competitive advantage in protecting the United States and its interests..

(C)

One challenge to improving the coverage of emerging and strategic issues across the Intelligence Community has been the diversion of resources to current crisis support ….

(D)

Collection against terrorists in places like Iraq and Afghanistan took a substantial share of the [Intelligence Community's] resources and efforts in FY 2006..

(E)

With so many [Intelligence Community] resources dedicated to the War on Terror and WMD programs in closed regimes, the [Intelligence] Community's collection efforts still have to devote significant attention to potential or emerging threats of strategic consequence..

(7)

On January 23, 2007, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Collection testified to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that there is a need to get the Intelligence Community back to what I grew up calling global reach, stating that we don't have that today. She further testified that our challenge is … with [Congress] help [to get back] to a place where we can do global reach, and pay attention to places that we are not..

(8)

On February 14, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence testified to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that certainly current crisis support takes a disproportionate share of intelligence resources over emerging and strategic issues.

(9)

In responses to questions posed by the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate in advance of the February 5, 2009, hearing on the nomination of Leon Panetta to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Panetta stated that I am also concerned that we have not devoted sufficient resources to a broader set of national intelligence challenges—such as Russia, China, the global economic downturn, as well as unstable and weak governments in places such as Africa and Latin America..

(10)

On February 12, 2009, the Director of National Intelligence testified to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that I'd say the most significant gaps are the areas that are not traditional State threats, that we have not figured out the right way to collect information and we have not grown the analysts to do it. … We’re not as good with non-state actors..

(11)

On March 26, 2009, the Director of National Intelligence stated that We re-evaluate that National Intelligence Priority Framework formally ever six months and informally, as we have. And its quite remarkable, if you—you know those time-lapse pictures where things change? If you showed a time-lapse picture of that National Intelligence Priority Framework, you’d see, sort of, colors shifting over time as things came up, in terms of their threat or in terms of an opportunity that they—so I just, I think it’s a mistake to tie us down to, this is my important priority. There are enduring things we have to spend a lot of time on because you can’t instantly generate intelligence about a country that’s very good at keeping its secrets that you know is going to be a factor for a long time. And we have to work on those—we have to work on those every time. We have to keep an excellent baseline understanding of what’s going on in the world, but then we need to be able to flex..

(12)

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (hereinafter referred to as the 9/11 Commission) reported that To find sanctuary, terrorist organizations have fled to some of the least governed, most lawless places in the world. The intelligence community has prepared a world map that highlights possible terrorist havens, using no secret intelligence—just indicating areas that combine rugged terrain, weak governance, room to hide or receive supplies, and low population density with a town or city near enough to allow necessary interaction with the outside world. Large areas scattered around the world meet these criteria..

(13)

The 9/11 Commission recommended that the U.S. Government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power. We should reach out, listen to, and work with other countries that can help..

(14)

On May 6, 2008, the Acting Director of the National Counterterrorism Center testified to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that I wish I had more resources to dedicate to longer-term threats, absolutely, that much of the information about the instability that can lead to safe havens or ideological radicalization comes not from covert collection but from open collection, best done by Foreign Service officers, and that there should be ways to direct resources toward whoever is best positioned to learn about safe-haven conditions.

(15)

On November 1, 2005, the Director of National Intelligence Open Source Center was established with functions that include collection, analysis and research, training, and information technology management to facilitate government-wide access and use of openly available information.

(16)

The Strategic Plan of the Department of State provides as a strategic goal that Our diplomatic and development activities will reduce the threat or impact of violent conflict by developing early warning … capability..

(17)

On January 22, 2009, James Steinberg, a nominee to be Deputy Secretary of State, testified to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that if we're going to be effective in this move towards smart power, then we have to understand how we reprioritize our resources to be able to achieve that … If we only think about the crisis of the moment, then we're not prepared as new challenges emerge. And we've seen this time and time again, that issues that were not immediately on the radar screen don't get the attention they deserve. … So the idea of looking forward and trying to figure out over the long-term where our priorities need to be, how do we anticipate some of these challenges, and then judge how we have sort of assigned resources to take care of not only those current needs but also those long-term challenges I think has to be very important and part of a strategic planning strategy … although we have a very strong intelligence community, that there is a tremendous resource of people who've lived and worked out in the countries that we're dealing with and that, for a variety of reasons, the intelligence community is not always the best equipped to do that. They bring their own special skills. But the Foreign Service officers, and also people from outside the government, are enormous sources of information and value. And we need to find better ways, in my judgment, to have more contact with people in the private sector, from the NGOs, from the business community, from universities and the like, as part of our being able to touch and feel what's going on the ground..

(18)

On January 22, 2009, Jacob Lew, a nominee to be Deputy Secretary of State, testified to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that I believe strongly that resources have to follow priorities. The decision of where we need to be and what kinds of skills we need have to fit into a comprehensive strategy. … We need to work with our other Cabinet agency partners. There are 20 government agencies that have resources that work in or through our embassies. We don't need to recreate the wheel; we need to cooperate with each other and make sure that we have enough Foreign Service, civil service and locally engaged staff so that we can effectively coordinate the efforts that the United States puts on the ground. I think that it all begins with the strategic planning process. If we don't have a clear vision of what we need and what we want, were not going to be able to make the right resource allocation decisions. And we have to be able to look beyond this week, next week, or even next year. … We need to reach not just into the building but all the way into the field and make it clear that we have every intention of bringing the resources of the State Department to bear as we deal with these kinds of problems and challenges abroad, that we have knowledge in our embassies, in our consulates, about a range of issues, not just political issues—economic issues, scientific issues, cultural issues—that give us the broadest understanding of what's going on in an increasingly global world..

(19)

The Legal Attache offices and sub-offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are currently located in 75 cities around the world, providing coverage for more than 200 countries, territories, and islands.

(20)

On October 4, 2007, Thomas V. Fuentes, Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Office of International Operations, testified to the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism of the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives that the core mission of the Legal Attache offices is to establish and maintain liaison with principal law enforcement and security services in designated foreign countries … enabl[ing] the FBI to effectively and expeditiously conduct its responsibilities in combating international terrorism, organized crime, cyber crime, and general criminal matters, and that while they do not conduct foreign intelligence gathering,typical duties include … conducting investigations in coordination with the host government; sharing investigative leads and information; briefing Embassy counterparts from other agencies, including law enforcement agencies, as appropriate, and Ambassadors … providing situation reports concerning cultural protocol; [and] assessing political and security climates..

(21)

The July 2008 Preliminary Findings by the Project on National Security Reform, entitled Enduring Security in an Unpredictable World: the Urgent Need for National Security Reform, included the following:

(A)

The lack of a national security strategy that clearly links ends, ways, and means and assigned roles and responsibilities to each department has encouraged a proliferation of department-level strategies. These department strategies are uncoordinated and do not systematically generate capabilities required for national objectives.

(B)

The resource allocation process is not driven by any overall national plan or strategy for achieving broad objectives, and the results or effectiveness of the budgeting process cannot be measured against such objectives.

(C)

The national security system tends to overemphasize traditional security threats and under emphasize emerging challenges.

Establishment and functions of the Commission

(a)

Establishment

There is established in the legislative branch a Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission.

(b)

Functions

The Commission shall—

(1)

evaluate any current processes or systems for the strategic integration of the intelligence community, including the Open Source Center, and other elements of the United States Government, including the Department of State, with regard to the collection, reporting and analysis of foreign intelligence and information;

(2)

provide recommendations to improve or develop such processes or systems to include the development of an inter-agency strategy that identifies—

(A)

the collection, reporting, and analysis requirements of the United States Government;

(B)

the elements of the United States Government best positioned to meet collection and reporting requirements;

(C)

collection and reporting missions for the intelligence community and other elements of the United States Government based on the requirements of the United States Government, comparative institutional advantages, and other relevant factors;

(D)

analytical capabilities needed to achieve the requirements of the United States Government; and

(E)

inter-agency budget and resource allocations necessary to achieve such collection, reporting, and analytical requirements;

(3)

evaluate the extent to which current intelligence collection, reporting, and analysis strategies are aimed at providing global coverage and anticipating future threats, challenges, and crises;

(4)

provide recommendations on how to incorporate into the inter-agency strategy the means to anticipate future threats, challenges, and crises, including by identifying and supporting collection, reporting, and analytical capabilities which are global in scope and which are directed at emerging, long-term, and strategic targets;

(5)

provide recommendations on strategies for sustaining human and budgetary resources to effect the global collection and reporting missions identified in the inter-agency strategy, including the prepositioning of collection and reporting capabilities;

(6)

provide recommendations for developing, clarifying, and, if necessary, bolstering current and future collection and reporting roles and capabilities of elements of the United States Government outside the intelligence community deployed overseas;

(7)

provide recommendations related to the role of individual country missions in contributing to the inter-agency strategy;

(8)

evaluate the extent to which the establishment of new embassies and out-of-embassy posts are able to contribute to expanded global coverage and increased collection and reporting and provide recommendations related to the establishment of new embassies and out-of-embassy posts;

(9)

provide recommendations related to the establishment of any new executive branch entity, or the expansion of the authorities of any existing executive branch entity, as needed to improve the strategic integration described in paragraph (1) and develop and oversee the implementation of the inter-agency strategy;

(10)

provide recommendations on any legislative changes necessary to establish any new entity or to expand the authorities of any existing entity, as described in paragraph (9);

(11)

provide recommendations on processes for developing and presenting to Congress budget requests for each relevant element of the United States Government that reflect the allocations identified in the inter-agency strategy and for congressional oversight of the development and implementation of the strategy; and

(12)

provide recommendations on any institutional reforms related to the collection and reporting roles of individual elements of the United States Government outside the intelligence community, as well as any budgetary, legislative, or other changes needed to achieve such reforms.

Members and staff of the Commission

(a)

Members of the Commission

(1)

Appointment

The Commission shall be composed of 10 members as follows:

(A)

Two members appointed by the majority leader of the Senate.

(B)

Two members appointed by the minority leader of the Senate.

(C)

Two members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(D)

Two members appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(E)

One nonvoting member appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.

(F)

One nonvoting member appointed by the Secretary of State.

(2)

Selection

(A)

In general

Members of the Commission shall be individuals who—

(i)

are private citizens; and

(ii)

have—

(I)

knowledge and experience in foreign information and intelligence collection, reporting, and analysis, including clandestine collection and classified analysis, diplomatic reporting and analysis, and collection of public and open source information;

(II)

knowledge and experience in issues related to the national security and foreign policy of the United States gained by serving as a senior official of the Department of State, a member of the Foreign Service, an employee or officer of an appropriate agency or department of the United States, or an independent organization with expertise in the field of international affairs; or

(III)

knowledge and experience with foreign policy decisionmaking.

(B)

Diversity of experience

The individuals appointed to the Commission should be selected with a view to establishing diversity of experience with regard to various geographic regions, functions, and issues.

(3)

Time of appointment

The appointments under subsection (a) shall be made not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(4)

Term of appointment

Members shall be appointed for the life of the Commission.

(5)

Vacancies

Any vacancy of the Commission shall not affect the powers of the Commission and shall be filled in the manner in which the original appointment was made.

(6)

Chair

The members of the Commission shall designate 1 of the voting members to serve as the chair of the Commission.

(7)

Quorum

Six members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for purposes of transacting the business of the Commission.

(8)

Meetings

The Commission shall meet at the call of the chair and shall meet regularly, not less than once every 3 months, during the life of the Commission.

(b)

Staff

(1)

In general

The chair of the Commission may, without regard to the civil service laws and regulations, appoint and terminate an executive director and, in consultation with the executive director, appoint and terminate such other additional personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to perform its duties. In addition to the executive director and 1 full-time support staff for the executive director, there shall be additional staff with relevant intelligence and foreign policy experience to help support the Commission's work.

(2)

Selection of the executive director

The executive director shall be selected with the approval of a majority of the members of the Commission.

(3)

Compensation

(A)

Executive director

The executive director shall be compensated at the rate payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

(B)

Staff

The chair of the Commission may fix the compensation of other staff of the Commission without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, relating to classification of positions and General Schedule pay rates, except that the rate of pay for such personnel may not exceed the rate payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of such title.

(c)

Experts and consultants

This Commission is authorized to procure temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants as necessary to the extent authorized by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates not to exceed the maximum annual rate of basic pay payable under section 5376 of such title.

(d)

Staff and services of other agencies or department of the United States

Upon the request of the Commission, the head of an agency or department of the United States may detail, on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, any of the personnel of that department or agency to the Commission to assist it in carrying out this Act. The detail of any such personnel shall be without interruption or loss of civil service or Foreign Service status or privilege.

(e)

Security clearance

The appropriate agencies or departments of the United States shall cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to the members and staff of the Commission appropriate security clearances to the extent possible pursuant to existing procedures and requirements.

Powers and duties of the Commission

(a)

In general

(1)

Hearings and evidence

The Commission may, for the purpose of carrying out this Act—

(A)

hold hearings, sit and act at times and places in the United States and in countries in which the United States has a diplomatic presence, take testimony, and receive evidence as the Commission considers advisable to carry out this Act; and

(B)

subject to subsection (b)(1), require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda , papers, and documents, as the Commission considers necessary.

(b)

Subpoenas

(1)

Issuance

(A)

In general

A subpoena may be issued under this section only—

(i)

by the agreement of the chair of the Commission; and

(ii)

by the affirmative vote of 5 members of the Commission.

(B)

Signature

Subject to subparagraph (A), subpoenas issued under this section may be issued under the signature of the chair or any member designated by a majority of the Commission and may be served by any person designated by the chair or by a member designated by a majority of the Commission.

(2)

Enforcement

(A)

In general

In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena issued under this section, the United States district court for the judicial district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order requiring such person to appear at any designated place to testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt of that court.

(B)

Additional enforcement

In the case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section, the Commission may, by majority vote, certify a statement of fact constituting such failure to the appropriate United States attorney, who may bring the matter before the grand jury for its action, under the same statutory authority and procedures as if the United States attorney had received a certification under sections 102, 103, or 104 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192, 193, and 194).

(c)

Information from Federal agencies

The Commission may secure directly from any agency or department of the United States such information as the Commission considers necessary to carry out this Act. Upon request of the chair of the Commission, the head of such agency or department shall furnish such information to the Commission, subject to applicable law.

(d)

Postal services

The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as an agency or department of the United States.

(e)

Administrative support

The Administrator of the General Services Administration shall provide to the Commission on a reimbursable basis (or, in the discretion of the Administrator, on a nonreimbursable basis) such administrative support services as the Commission may request to carry out this Act.

(f)

Administrative procedures

The Commission may adopt such rules and regulations, relating to administrative procedure, as may be reasonably necessary to enable it to carry out this Act.

(g)

Travel

(1)

In general

The members and staff of the Commission may, with the approval of the Commission, conduct such travel as is necessary to carry out this Act.

(2)

Expenses

Members of the Commission shall serve without pay but shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission.

(h)

Gifts

No member of the Commission may receive a gift or benefit by reason of such member's service on the Commission.

Report of the Commission

(a)

In general

(1)

Interim report

Not later than 1 year after the members of the Commission are appointed under section 5(a), the Commission shall submit an interim report to the congressional intelligence committees setting forth the preliminary findings and recommendations of the Commission described in section 4(b).

(2)

Final report

Not later than 4 months after the submission of the report required by paragraph (1), the Commission shall submit a final report setting forth the final findings and recommendations of the Commission described in section 4(b) to the following:

(A)

The President.

(B)

The Director of National Intelligence.

(C)

The Secretary of State.

(D)

The congressional intelligence committees.

(E)

The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(F)

The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(b)

Individual or dissenting views

Each member of the Commission may include that member's dissenting views in a report required by paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a).

(c)

Form of report

The reports required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a), including any finding or recommendation of such report, shall be submitted in both an unclassified and a classified form.

Termination

The Commission shall terminate 60 days after the submission of the report required by section 7(a)(2).

Nonapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act

The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Commission.

10.

Funding

(a)

Transfer from the national intelligence program

Of the amounts available for the National Intelligence Program for fiscal year 2009, $4,000,000 shall be available for transfer to the Commission to carry out this Act.

(b)

Availability

The amounts made available to the Commission pursuant to subsection (a) shall remain available until the termination of the Commission.