Mr. President, our intelligence community should never be forced to question whether our priority is protecting America's safety or protecting the privacy of terrorists. This bill makes clear to…
Mr. President, our intelligence community should never be forced to question whether our priority is protecting America's safety or protecting the privacy of terrorists. This bill makes clear to intelligence professionals that keeping our Nation safe is their highest responsibility and assures they have the tools needed to get the job done. That is why I am so pleased to join with my colleagues, Senators Lieberman and Sessions, in reauthorizing three FISA provisions--lone wolf, wiretap, and section 215--which would otherwise expire.
This legislation we have introduced today, without change, reauthorizes these three national vital security tools for 4 more years. While I believe each of these tools should be made permanent and Congress plays a dangerous game with national security every time we impose arbitrary sunsets, it is essential that the community's ability to collect lifesaving foreign intelligence should continue unimpeded.
Our bill also makes conforming changes to the disclosure requirements for national security letters in light of the Second Circuit's decision last year. These issues are so critical and so urgent to our well-being and security as a nation, nothing else will matter, even the current health care debate, if we fail in national security.
I have spoken before on this floor about the need for President Obama to make a decision about Afghanistan. I will not repeat those points today. But as our military, intelligence, and law enforcement professionals defend the United States and its allies in Washington, there is an effort afoot to make this fight much harder than it needs to be.
The U.S. PATRIOT Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act were passed overwhelmingly in the aftermath of the September 11 terror attacks. For years, terrorism was treated as a law enforcement matter.
Our Nation responded to terrorist attack after terrorist attack, to the deaths of our servicemembers and embassy personnel, with indictments and arrest warrants. As Congress failed to give our intelligence operators the tools they needed to act quickly, our terrorist enemies became even more emboldened and determined to strike our homeland. September 11 was a wake-up call.
Our driving mission appropriately, after that, became prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks at home against our troops overseas and against
our allies. That is why the legislation we passed provided the necessary tools. In 2005, the PATRIOT Act was reauthorized with minor changes, but three FISA provisions remained subject to sunset. Here is an opportunity for us to reauthorize these three vital provisions. There is little disagreement among people who know that these provisions should and must be reauthorized.
FBI Director Mueller testified before the Judiciary Committee that each is important to the FBI's work in national security and criminal investigation. But because of the enhanced information sharing rules and procedures, other community entities, such as the Counterterrorism Center, are often dependent upon information collected under these authorities. Their loss would adversely impact their ability to analyze and share important national intelligence information. As an example, if the FBI obtains a court order under FISA for a roving wiretap targeting a terrorist subject in New York, foreign intelligence information obtained there may be shared with the CIA, enabling them in turn to target associates overseas.
Events over the past few months underscore the importance of giving the FBI and other agencies all the tools and authorities they need to stay ahead. From the disrupted terror plots in New York and Colorado to those in Illinois, Texas, and North Carolina, we have seen firsthand why the FBI must have the flexibility to get the information they need as quickly as possible to prevent these attacks.
The benefit of our intelligence collection authorities, however, does not just benefit our own citizens. Just as overseas terror threats may impact our safety, threats posed by some within our country do not always end here. We learned two men in Chicago were conspiring with associates to commit terrorist attacks in Denmark. This case is a good example of how FISA authorities can save lives in allied countries. There is a belief among some that as long as the intelligence community eventually gets the information it needs, time is not of the essence. That is not true. Timing was everything, whether it was introducing an undercover agent to a target at the right moment or conducting surveillance at the right time. No intelligence collector is going to say that getting the same information 3 weeks later is good enough.
I cannot comment on specific tools that were used in foiling all of these plots. We know both from public and classified testimony and information that the tools provided that we are authorizing today have been invaluable to our efforts to stay ahead of the terrorists. As I mentioned earlier, the FBI's ability to obtain a roving wiretap under FISA will end this year unless Congress acts.
According to Director Mueller, the FBI has used the authority 140 times in the past 5 years. The ability to track terrorists even when they repeatedly use and dump their cell phones to avoid interception is, as Director Mueller testified, ``tremendously important.'' He also noted with all the new technology, it is nothing for a target to buy four or five cell phones and use them in quick succession. I couldn't agree more.
Our enemies know our laws better than some of us do. They understand the hoops and hurdles government must clear to catch up or stay ahead. Roving wiretap authority sends a clear message that the time-honored trick of frequently changing a cell phone will not work like it used to.
Obtaining a roving wiretap requires, first and foremost, that the FBI establish probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power. Some critics of this provision claim it allows the FBI to avoid meeting this standard as surveillance moves from phone to phone. That is not true. Each wiretap application is approved by a FISA Court judge. If a target changes his cell phone and the FBI moves to surveil the new phone, the court is notified. All of the protections for U.S. person information that apply to any other FISA wiretap also apply to roving wiretaps.
In short, while the authority is a tremendous asset for the FBI, it poses no additional civil liberties concerns. It should be renewed.
On business records, over the past 5 years, a rallying cry against these measures has centered on section 215, allowing the FBI to obtain business records such as hotel information or travel records upon a showing of the requisite burden of proof to a FISA Court judge. We have heard time and again the FBI is using this authority to spy on people's reading habits at the local library. This is simply highly charged rhetoric not supported by facts. While the FBI has used section 215 more than 250 times in the past 5 years, no library records have been obtained. But we do know that terrorists and their associates have used library Internet access to communicate with each other and, in the appropriate case, the FBI must have the ability to obtain any relevant records relating to that usage.
Congress should not pass any legislation that would allow terrorists to use libraries or any other public facility as a safe haven for their illegal activities. If we did that, guess where all the terrorists would congregate. Do you want them all in your libraries? I don't think so.
The inspector general of the Department of Justice conducted several audits of the FBI's use of section 215 and found no abuse of authority. These audits also considered the time it takes for the FBI to obtain a 215 order. The Director has testified that business records sought by terrorism investigations by the FBI are ``absolutely essential to identifying other persons who may be involved in terrorist activities.'' The records obtained under this authority are no different from what the FBI could obtain in a criminal investigation using grand jury subpoena authority. There is rarely any delay in obtaining a grand jury subpoena. DOJ should strive to ensure that section 215 court orders are obtained in a timely and expedient manner.
Given the vital information that can be obtained, I have asked the DOJ to take steps necessary to minimize future delays. As with roving wiretap authority, I believe section 215 has adequate measures already built in to ensure that the private interests of U.S. persons are protected. I have not heard any reasonable critique of this authority, and I believe it should be authorized without changes, without delay.
The sole expiring provision that has not been used by the FBI is the lone wolf definition of an agent of a foreign power, prompting some critics to demand its repeal. Under this definition, the FBI can obtain a FISA Act search or electronic surveillance against a non-U.S. person who is not readily identifiable with a particular foreign power.
We all should be familiar with the story of Zacarias Moussaoui, the 9/11 coconspirator who was identified prior to the 9/11 attacks. But the FBI could not connect him with a particular terrorist organization and, therefore, did not submit a formal request for a FISA search order. We know Moussaoui was ultimately convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia and is now serving a life sentence for his part in the 9/11 conspiracy.
If FISA had included a lone wolf provision, the FBI could have searched his belongings and possibly gained advanced intelligence about the 9/11 plot. Once again, Director Mueller has emphasized in his recent testimony that the FBI must retain the ability to target an individual who cannot be specifically tied to a particular foreign power. The Director specifically cited the Moussaoui case as a prime example. We should never again take the risk that another Moussaoui will be identified by the FBI but escape scrutiny to prevent an attack because he could not be tied to a specific terrorist organization.
I see the ``lone wolf'' provision as a necessary tool that will only need to be used in limited circumstances. It is kind of like those ``in case of emergency, break glass'' boxes that cover certain fire alarms and equipment. We need to keep these tools available for the rare situations where they would be needed.
As I mentioned earlier, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported a PATRIOT Act reauthorization bill that makes a number of changes to section 215 authorities and other national security tools. I believe the Judiciary bill is deeply flawed, and I hope my colleagues will listen carefully and support our bill instead. There will be ample time down the road to lay out in
detail all my objections to the Judiciary bill, but let me just make a few key points.
I disagree strongly that there should be a first time ever sunset for national security letters. It is irresponsible to risk letting the law revert back to pre-9/11 status, where NSLs were largely underutilized because the burden of proof and approval levels were too high for an investigative tool.
The so-called abuses that are so often cited were actually related to something called exigent letters. Exigent letters are essentially a request to third parties, usually phone companies or Internet service providers, for immediate access to records, contingent upon a promise to provide a grand jury subpoena or a national security letter promptly.
It is important to understand that these exigent letters are not national security letters or grand jury subpoenas. While there is statutory authority for carriers to voluntarily provide the FBI with the contents of the communication if the carrier has a good-faith belief that an emergency involving death or serious physical injury requires disclosure of the communication without delay, the DOJ IG found that these exigent letter requests were issued on a routine, rather than an exigent, basis.
Interestingly, the people relying on the now corrected exigent letter problem to justify their proposed restrictions on NSLs are not calling for similar restrictions to be placed on grand jury subpoenas. They know better than to try that because there would be immediate and overwhelming objections from the Department of Justice and nearly every U.S. attorney in the country. We cannot go back to pre-9/11 days, when national security investigative techniques were significantly more difficult to use than ordinary criminal investigative techniques.
Setting aside the problems with the exigent letters, I have said, time and time again, that the errors identified by the DOJ IG were almost exclusively administrative. The FBI has acted quickly to correct these errors, and we should not respond by hamstringing their investigations.
I also disagree with requiring minimization procedures for both pen registers/trap-and-trace devices and NSLs. The FBI has been clear about the operational harm that will likely result if minimization procedures are required for the type of preliminary data, such as telephone toll records, obtained by these tools.
Aside from the basic problem of how the FBI would even go about minimizing this type of information, I do not see why it is necessary. We certainly would never impose these types of restrictions on grand jury subpoenas or other types of administrative subpoenas.
Supporters claim we need minimization procedures to protect U.S. persons, but they conveniently overlook the fact that the records we are talking about here are in the hands of third parties and are not entitled to the same type of protections that other information is subject to.
The constitutional protections were discussed in Smith v. Maryland, and the Supreme Court held we simply do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to these sorts of third-party records.
Ironically, because the FBI cannot tell from the type of information obtained by these tools if someone is a U.S. person, they would actually have to do more investigation and be more intrusive before figuring out whether the information should be minimized.
Finally, I have significant concerns about the change the Judiciary Committee bill makes to the notification period for sneak-and-peak search warrants--down from 30 to 7 days. These warrants, which are approved by a court upon a finding of probable cause, are an important tool in drug and certain terrorism cases. We know from the FBI--and I am sure if we asked the DEA, they would agree--that 7 days is not enough time before giving a target notice that a search was carried out. In a terrorism investigation, likely involving many overseas associates and evidence, it is unreasonable to have to disclose the investigation within a week, when other activities connected to that may be just beginning to be collected.
Depending on the type of information recovered from a search, testing and analysis may not even be done within 7 days. Are we going to risk blowing these investigations because of a random conclusion that 30 days is too long? I understand the government can ask for more time after the 7 days, but we do not have unlimited resources. We should not make our law enforcement agencies jump through more hoops when a court has already found that a search is proper in the first place.
I have other concerns about this bill, including the wisdom of a separate standard for library records, which I view as an even greater invitation for terrorists to use libraries to communicate with each other, and new reporting and auditing requirements. I have to wonder what additional administrative burdens these requirements will put on the FBI at the same time they are trying to focus on preventing and disrupting further attacks on our Nation.
Because of the significant operational concerns raised by the Judiciary Committee's bill, I believe that it should not be considered by the full Senate until the Intelligence Committee--as a whole--has had the opportunity to consider its implications for our national security, after hearing from Director Mueller about the impact of this entire bill on FBI operations.
There are many issues about the Judiciary bill--both classified and unclassified--that need to be addressed. The best venue in which to do that is the Intelligence Committee. Don't forget that three of the five crossover members from the Intelligence Committee voted against the Judiciary Committee bill. I would hardly call that a ringing endorsement. I believe full consideration by the Intelligence Committee would greatly improve the measures we will be acting on, on the floor.
Unfortunately, my efforts to give the Intelligence Committee the opportunity to weigh in on the Judiciary bill have thus far been unsuccessful. But at the same time, we cannot risk letting these crucial authorities lapse. For that reason, I have decided to cosponsor the legislation we are introducing today because, under this bill, I can categorically state it will have no provision that will have an adverse impact on intelligence community activities or operations.
It is not insignificant, in my opinion, that the bill we are introducing today is cosponsored by the chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, and by me, as vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee.
Each of these committees has a role to play in safeguarding our domestic security. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Sessions, and I all understand the stakes in failing to reauthorize these expiring provisions are high. The stakes in adding new and flawed provisions or creating unreasonable burdens are just as high. It serves no legitimate purpose to give the FBI or any other law enforcement or intelligence agency tools that are rendered ineffective because Congress imposes arbitrary conditions without fully appreciating their ramifications.
The sponsorship of this legislation is also noteworthy because it sends a clear and loud message that giving our law enforcement intelligence professionals the authorities and tools they need to keep the country safe is not and should not be a partisan issue.
In the last Congress, we saw firsthand the negative impact of partisanship and pandering to extreme special interests. The FISA Amendments Act was supported by a strong bipartisan margin out of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Unfortunately, as the bill wound its way through the Senate and eventually the House, it became a political football. As a result, we came too close for comfort to losing the intelligence collection authorities we had worked hard to preserve.
I am hopeful we can avoid similar partisanship and political interests to take over what should be a straightforward legislative process. The surest way of doing that is to pass the bill we introduce today.
For years, we have hammered away at the notion that there should be walls between criminal and national security investigations. We have embraced the idea that the same tools that are used to capture drug dealers and child molesters should be available
to track terrorists and spies. While the idea has been generally accepted, the execution has been lacking. Our laws still impose unnecessary divisions between administrative and grand jury subpoena authority and national security letters. Those divisions are exacerbated by the Judiciary Committee bill, which imposes new unheard of requirements on national security letters and the FISA pen register/ trap-and-trace information.
Over the past 8 years, Congress has placed heavy demands on the FBI to be a full participant in the intelligence community. While the transportation has not been without some hiccups, they have come a long way since the days leading up to 9/11, when the word ``FISA'' was foreign to much of the rank and file FBI.
Now is not the time to saddle them with additional administrative burdens or to impose conditions on the use of certain tools so drastic they become useless. There are so many current and clear-cut examples of domestic terror threats before us. I have to wonder why anyone thinks this would be a good time to experiment with the vital authorities used to keep us safe.
The legislation we are introducing today will ensure our intelligence and law enforcement professionals can continue doing what they do best, without any additional restrictions. Our Nation has been fortunate not to have suffered a sequel to the 9/11 attacks. Some may call it luck, but much of the credit goes to the dedicated work of our intelligence and law enforcement professionals and the availability of these tools that we are reauthorizing in this bill.
We owe our thanks to the personnel who use them. We also owe them the recognition that their jobs are as difficult as they are, and we should not be taking any steps that will make their profound responsibility to protect this country any more difficult. That is why I urge my colleagues to support this measure.
I thank my cosponsor and our lead sponsor.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.