Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 2009

Mr. President, the very first bill debated on the floor of the Senate after the 2006 elections was S. 1, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, HLOGA. About 9 months later, President Bush signed that bill into law as Public Law Number 110-81. It was the most sweeping ethics reform legislation since Watergate, and it passed both houses of Congress by a wide margin--the final votes were 411-8 in the House and 83-14 in the Senate.

The new law contained, among many other provisions, significant reforms to the lobbying disclosure laws, a tough new prohibition on gifts from lobbyists, improvements to the revolving door rules, and new restrictions on privately funded fact-finding trips. It also contained new rules on personal, official, and campaign travel on non-commercial aircraft, often known as ``corporate jets.'' Prior to HLOGA, members who flew on corporate jets, often accompanied by corporate lobbyists, were required to reimburse the owner of the aircraft only the amount that they would have paid to fly first class between the origin and destination of the flight. HLOGA provided that Senators and presidential candidates would have to reimburse such travel at the charter rate. House members were prohibited from flying on non- commercial aircraft altogether.

Because Senators travel in different capacities, HLOGA addressed the issue in separate sections. Section 544(c) of the bill amended the Senate Rules XXXV and XXXVIII to address official and personal travel by Senators. The House had already amended its rules at the very beginning of the year. Section 601 dealt with campaign travel for both House and Senate candidates by amending the Federal Election Campaign Act, ``FECA''.

Both the House and the Senate have been living under these new rules for over two years. No House member has flown on a corporate jet, as far as we know. Senators, whether they were traveling in personal, official, or campaign capacity, and regardless of who was paying for the trip, have flown on them only if they were prepared to pay the charter rate for these trips. Presidential candidates in the last campaign abided by the new rules as well.

Because HLOGA made amendments to the FECA on this issue, the FEC started a rulemaking shortly after its enactment to implement the new provision. But at the end of 2007, just as the agency was poised to put new regulations in place, the terms of several recess-appointed Commissioners expired. A stalemate ensued that left the agency without a quorum to do business until the summer of 2008. Once a full slate of Commissioners was in place, the agency deadlocked on issuing final regulations. The three new Republican commissioners refused to sign off on the rules that the Commission had been prepared to adopt in December 2007. The deadlock was resolved only a few weeks ago, when a Democratic Commissioner reluctantly agreed to go along with modifications that the Republicans proposed. See Statement of Chairman Steven T. Walther, Campaign Travel Regulations, Nov. 19, 2009. The new rule was published in the Federal Register on December 7, 2009. Federal Election Commission, Notice 2009-27, Campaign Travel, 74 Fed. Reg. 63951, Dec. 7, 2009.

I will put this as simply as I can. The new FEC rule relating to travel on non-commercial aircraft is an outrage. Rather than respecting the intent of Congress in HLOGA to address all travel on corporate jets by members of Congress and presidential candidates, the FEC has carved a loophole in the statute for travel by candidates on behalf of someone other than their own campaigns. No one in the House or the Senate contemplated this exception when the bill was passed. No one discussed it. No one considered it. The FEC just made it up. Now we in Congress have no choice but to take action to correct it if the FEC refuses to do so.

We cannot let a lawless agency undermine our effort to police ourselves, to end a practice that exposed Congress to public criticism and even ridicule. Some Senators and House members may have agreed to kick the corporate jet habit reluctantly, but they have learned to live with it. There is no need for the loophole the FEC has opened. It is contrary to the statutory language and to the legislative history. It must be closed.

So today, I will introduce, along with my colleagues from Arizona, Connecticut, and New York, Senators McCain, Lieberman, and Schumer, all of whom played a key role in the enactment of HLOGA, a resolution of disapproval under the Congressional Review Act. This resolution, if passed by the House and signed by the President, will send the FEC back to the drawing board. After a rebuke of this kind, one can only hope that the Commission will craft a regulation that does not so completely ignore the letter and spirit of the provision we passed in HLOGA.

Let me take a minute to explain what the FEC has done and what it must do to correct its error. The new regulation takes the position that the key fact in determining what rate must be paid for a corporate jet flight is not who is flying, but who is paying for the flight. The explanation and justification, ``E&J'', adopted by the commission states:

[W]hen a presidential, vice-presidential, or Senate

candidate, or a representative of the candidate, is traveling

on behalf of another

political committee (such as a political party committee or

Senate leadership PAC, rather than on behalf of the

candidate's own authorized committee, the reimbursement for

that travel is the responsibility of the political committee

on whose behalf the travel occurs. If the political committee

is other than an authorized committee or House candidate's

leadership PAC, then the appropriate reimbursement rate for

that political committee is set forth in new 11 CFR

100.93(c)(3), discussed below. In such cases, the

presidential, vice-presidential, or Senate candidate or

candidate's representative, is treated the same as any other

person traveling on behalf of the political committee.

74 Fed. Reg. at 63955. That rate for such a trip, under an FEC regulation promulgated in 2003, is the first class rate unless regularly scheduled commercial air service is not available between the origin and the destination of the flight. The E&J also reiterates that leadership PACs of Senators and Presidential candidates can continue to pay the first class rate, even for the candidates themselves.

In addition, although House leadership PACs are prohibited from taking advantage of this loophole, the E&J makes clear that House candidates can do so if they are traveling on behalf of a political party committee or a Senate or presidential candidate, even though they are otherwise completely prohibited from traveling on a corporate jet. The loophole seems to apply to House members even if they are traveling on behalf of a corporate PAC.

In a recent article in the Capitol Hill newspaper Roll Call, FEC Commissioner Matthew Peterson attempted to explain the FEC's decision. He argues that the loophole is compelled by the statutory language, which is structured to prohibit an expenditure for any flight by a Senate candidate or the candidate's authorized committee unless the charter rate is paid for that flight. This interpretation ignores specific language in section 601 that requires payment of the charter rate by ``the candidate, the authorized committee, or other political committee'' and the lack of any language in the statute or the legislative history suggesting that Congress meant to leave open a way for Senators to travel on corporate jets without paying the charter rate.

Moreover, it ignores the clear intent of the two provisions of HLOGA concerning travel on private aircraft--to prohibit all corporate jet flights by Senators unless the charter rate is paid. There are literally more than a dozen statements by supporters of the bill that make this intent clear. The FEC chose to ignore the clear purpose of the bill in favor of a strained interpretation of the statutory language that flies in the face of that purpose. That is unacceptable. The FEC's duty is to implement the statute as Congress intended it. Its job is to give guidance to candidates and others who want to follow the law, not to provide a roadmap for evading it.

For the convenience of my colleagues, my staff has collected statements from the floor debate on HLOGA that show beyond any doubt that the corporate jet provisions were intended to apply to all travel on corporate jets by Senators without regard to who is reimbursing the jet owner. One Senator said the following:

I understand that for many Members, these jets are an issue

of convenience. They allow us to get home to our

constituents, to our families, and to the events that are

often necessary for our jobs. But in November, the American

people told us very clearly they are tired of the influence

special interest wields over the legislative process. The

vast majority of Americans can't afford to buy cheap rides on

corporate jets. They don't get to sit with us on 3-hour

flights and talk about the heating bills they can't pay, or

the health care costs that keep rising, or the taxes they

can't afford, or their concerns about college tuition. They

can't buy our attention, and they shouldn't have to. And the

corporation lobbyists shouldn't be able to either. That is

why we need to end this corporate jet perk if we are to pass

real, meaningful ethics reform.

Cong. Rec. at S263, Jan. 9, 2007. The speaker of those words, which make plain that the intent of the provision was to completely eliminate subsidized travel on corporate jets, was then-Senator Barack Obama. This strongly suggests that the President of the United States will sign the resolution of disapproval once we pass it.

Notwithstanding my strong feelings about the part of the FEC rule I have just discussed, significant portions of the rule are unexceptional. The intent of this resolution of disapproval under the Congressional Review Act is solely to reverse the FEC's decision to open a loophole in the requirements for corporate jet travel by members of Congress and their staffs. So we do not intend to disable the FEC from putting out a new regulation, only from including a gaping loophole in it.

I note this because the Congressional Review Act only allows Congress to disapprove, and therefore make ineffective, an entire regulation. It states that the agency may not promulgate a rule that is ``substantially the same'' as the old one without new congressional authorization. I want to be clear that the loophole created by the FEC's recent rule is so significant that a rule that is otherwise identical to the entire campaign travel regulation, but that does not contain the loophole that this resolution is designed to disapprove, should not be considered to be ``substantially the same'' as the previous rule, even though other portions of that rule may be re- promulgated unchanged.

The Congressional Review Act has only once been successfully used to overturn an agency regulation. Thus, there is little experience to fall back on to determine the consequences for future agency action of a successful disapproval resolution. Morton Rosenberg, a long time analyst at the Congressional Research Service, includes the following useful analysis in his 2008 assessment of the CRA:

A review of the CRA's statutory scheme and structure, the

contemporaneous congressional explanation of the legislative

intent with respect to the provisions in question, the

lessons learned from the experience of the March 2001

disapproval of the OSHA ergonomics rule, and the application

of pertinent case law and statutory construction principles

suggests that (1) It is doubtful that Congress intended that

all disapproved rules would require statutory reauthorization

before further agency action could take place. For example,

it appears that Congress anticipated further rulemaking,

without new authorization, where the statute in question

established a deadline for promulgating implementing rules in

a particular area. In such instances, the CRA extends the

deadline for promulgation for one year from the date of

disapproval. (2) A close reading of the statute, together

with its contemporaneous congressional explication, arguably

provides workable standards for agencies to reform

disapproved regulations that are likely to be taken into

account by reviewing courts. Those standards would require a

reviewing court to assess both the nature of the rulemaking

authority vested in the agency that promulgated the

disapproved rule and the specificity with which the Congress

identified the objectionable portions of a rule during the

floor debates on disapproval. An important factor in a

judicial assessment may be the CRA's recognition of the

continued efficacy of statutory deadlines for promulgating

specified rules by extending such deadlines for one year

after disapproval.

Congressional Research Service, Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Update and Assessment of The Congressional Review Act after a Decade, RL30116, May 8, 2008, at 30. Rosenberg notes that the fact that Congress specifically provided in the CRA for a one year extension of any statutory deadline for a rule that has been overturned by the CRA shows that Congress did not intend to disable an agency from issuing regulations on the same topic. Indeed, a Joint Explanatory Statement by the principal sponsors of the CRA in the House and Senate states the following:

The authors intend the debate on any resolution of

disapproval to focus on the law that authorized the rule and

make the congressional intent clear regarding the agency's

options or lack thereof after enactment of a joint resolution

of disapproval. It will be the agency's responsibility in the

first instance when promulgating the rule to determine the

range of discretion afforded under the original law and

whether the law authorizes the agency to issue a

substantially different rule. Then, the agency must give

effect to the resolution of disapproval.

Joint Explanatory Statement of House and Senate Sponsors, 142 Cong. Rec. E 571, at E 577, daily ed. April 19, 1996; 142 Cong. Rec. S 3683, at S 3686 daily ed. April 18, 1996. It is the intent of this resolution of disapproval to invalidate the loophole that the FEC created in the E&J, but not to disable the FEC from issuing a new rule that properly implements Congress's intent in passing HLOGA.

My displeasure with the actions of the FEC over the past 7 years is well known. The agency has repeatedly failed to properly implement provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, BCRA, leading to its regulations being overturned by the courts numerous times. Indeed, because of the

agency's dismal record in the courts, some important BCRA regulations are still not in place 7\1/2\ years after BCRA's enactment. But the FEC's recent action on corporate jets may be its worst yet. Congress passed HLOGA with wide bipartisan support and clear intent. Because of the FEC's failure to issue rules promptly, members of Congress have been living under the terms of the statute alone with no misunderstanding of what it means. And yet, over two years after its enactment, the FEC has now created an unnecessary and wholly unjustified loophole in the statute. Congress must act to correct this egregious mistake.

I urge my colleagues to support this resolution of disapproval.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a collection of quotations concerning corporate jet provisions of HLOGA be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Renewable Energy Incentive Act of 2009, which is cosponsored by Senator Jeff Merkley.

This act would extend, expand, and improve existing tax incentives and grant programs for renewable energy, especially for solar energy.

Provisions of this act are widely supported by public power utilities, environmental groups, renewable energy companies, renewable energy industry associations, and labor unions.

These include, for example: the American Public Power Association; the Solar Energy Industries Association; the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power; the Northern California Power Agency; the Southern California Public Power Agency; the Large Public Power Council, LPPC; solar companies including Brightsource, Solyndra, Tessera Solar, and Stirling Energy Systems and many others.

First, the bill would allow renewable energy companies to claim grants from the Treasury department, in lieu of renewable energy tax credits, through 2012 instead of 2010.

Second, it would permit public power utilities to claim these same Treasury Grants.

Third, it expands the solar investment tax credit to include manufacturing equipment and solar water heaters for commercial and community pools.

Finally, it establishes a new tax credit for solar companies who consolidate and develop disturbed private land instead of developing our more pristine public lands.

The most significant provision in this bill would extend the Treasury Grants Program established in the stimulus by two years, allowing renewable energy developers to continue claiming these grants.

Section 1603 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act established ``payments in lieu of tax credits for specified energy property'' in order to support renewable energy development.

The program allows renewable energy developers to take grants, or payments, from the Treasury department instead of claiming tax credits in order to help build projects that require a great deal of capital upfront.

The provision has reduced the impact of the financial crisis on renewable energy development.

Before the grants program was established, most renewable energy developers had to partner with profitable banks, or ``tax equity partners,'' in order to take advantage of renewable energy tax incentives.

These big financial institutions would apply tax credits against their large profits, taking a cut for themselves along the way.

But in 2008, when financial sector profits sank, the $8 billion ``tax equity'' market largely evaporated.

Renewable energy development ground to a halt because developers could not find tax equity partners.

Major players in the space, such as AIG and Lehman Brothers, disappeared. The banks that still had profits began demanding a much higher cut.

That's when Congress stepped in.

The stimulus created the Treasury Grants, which allow developers to claim their tax benefits directly, instead of partnering with profitable banks.

The U.S. wind industry installed 1,649 megawatts of new capacity in the third quarter of this year alone, a boost from the previous two quarters and in excess of 2008 levels. Experts credit the Treasury grants program.

Solar is also getting back on track. For instance, SunEdison used a Treasury grant in lieu of tax credits to accelerate construction of an 18 megawatt photovoltaic array--one of the largest in the U.S.

The firm's CEO told the press: ``That could not have been done without this program.''

The Treasury program is also allowing renewable energy developers to attract significantly more debt backing for projects than would otherwise be possible, according to recent statements by the managing director of energy investments at J.P. Morgan Capital.

But the grants program is set to expire in 2010, far before most utility scale solar projects will begin construction or financial analysts predict tax equity markets will recover.

If the grant program is not extended, bank profits will again become the limiting factor on renewable energy development in the U.S., and that makes no sense.

That is why I propose to extend the program two years.

This legislation would also level the playing field between public power and for-profit companies by allowing public power utilities to receive Treasury Grants for renewable energy projects.

Public power utilities serve 45 million American consumers, but they are currently prohibited from receiving grants for their renewable energy development.

The basis for this prohibition is that public power utilities are tax exempt, non-profit corporations owned by local governments, who therefore have not been able to claim tax credits directly on their income tax returns.

But excluding public power from the grants program does not make sense.

Congress created the Treasury grants program specifically to assist firms that lacked the ability to claim the full benefits of renewable energy tax incentives.

If we are going to allow for-profit companies to claim these direct grants, why would we exclude our non-profit public power utilities?

So leveling the playing field for public power is fair.

This provision is also necessary to protect our local community utility companies who want to deploy renewable energy.

The federal grants make building renewable energy projects cost effective for rate payers.

Because public power utilities lack access to these grants, they are now frequently establishing complex financial arrangements with private developers in order to build renewable energy projects that qualify for federal help.

This is in direct conflict with public power's historic, proven business model as a vertically integrated, non-profit.

It requires our cities and towns to negotiate unnecessarily complex deals with Wall Street.

Let me give you an example.

Turlock Irrigation District, TID, a public power utility in my state, decided to build a 137 megawatt wind farm in 2007.

They wanted to build and own.

But to make it cost effective, Turlock signed a contract to buy the power, but a tax equity partner would ``own'' the project and receive the benefit of the federal production tax credit.

The contract was extremely complex and costly, requiring the participation of an investment bank to find a tax equity partner, an equity group to be the tax equity partner, legal counsel for the equity group, experts to provide risk advice and engineering advice to the equity group; bond counsel to provide renewable asset specialists; an operator to run the plant for the equity group; and an asset manager, to advise the equity group on the performance of the operator.

After 2 years and millions of dollars spent trying to finalize this deal,

Turlock learned that the supposedly profitable equity partner, American International Group, AIG, wasn't profitable at all.

AIG backed out and the entire deal collapsed.

After much analysis, Turlock Irrigation District decided to own and operate the wind farm, giving up on receiving any Federal support.

Larry Weis, the General Manager, explained in a letter to me:

The bottom line is that TID made a business decision to

forego working with a private developer to develop a project,

because the complexity of the deal and the dollars spent to

arrange it meant that much of the value of the tax credit

would go to the equity partners and not pass through to our

consumers. Given the facts and the absence of a comparable

incentive for consumer-owned utilities, TID made the best

choice it could under the circumstances, even though it means

our customers will pay more.

This legislation is necessary to prevent other public power utilities from being forced to make this difficult, unnecessary choice.

Public power utilities deserve access to renewable energy incentives comparable to those awarded to the private sector, and this legislation will assure that happens.

This legislation also expands the solar investment tax credit to include manufacturing equipment and solar water heaters for commercial and community pools.

The bill would allow equipment that makes solar panels to qualify for the 30 percent solar investment tax credit.

Solar panel manufacturing is moving offshore, to Germany and Asia, where support is considerable.

This financial incentive could jumpstart solar manufacturing in this country, and could lead to thousands of new jobs, such as those being created at Solyndra's new factory in Fremont, CA. Or those proposed by Applied Materials at their proposed facility near Los Angeles.

The bill would allow commercial pool solar hot water heaters to qualify for the solar tax credit.

Approximately 189,000 commercial pools nationwide--at hotels/motels, health clubs, and schools--use fossil fuel or electricity to heat an estimated 27 billion gallons of water.

If the heating systems were replaced with solar hot water systems, there would be 1.23 million metric tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions avoided annually.

That is the equivalent of taking 237,000 cars off the road.

In California, which has 26 percent of all commercial pools in the U.S., this provision could significantly reduce pollution.

Finally, the legislation would establish a new tax credit for the purchase, consolidation, and use of multiple, 100 acre or less blocks of high solarity, disturbed private lands for solar development.

Solar developers have focused development proposals on pristine public land because it is very difficult, costly, and time intensive to consolidate large blocks of disturbed private land from many different owners.

This tax credit will financially reward those firms that are willing to go through the trouble of land consolidation, thereby making the increased burden of private lands development more appealing.

Over the last few years, the renewable energy industry has grown dramatically.

Last year the U.S. added more new capacity to produce renewable electricity than it did to produce electricity from natural gas.

A great deal of this growth can be attributed to our renewable energy tax policies.

This legislation, I believe, would continue this growth into the future.

Mr. President, along with Senators McCaskill and Bennett, I rise to introduce two bills that would lay a strong foundation to improve the Federal acquisition system.

The first bill, the Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 2009, would create a federal acquisition management fellows program to develop a new generation of acquisition leaders with government-wide perspective, skills, and experience.

The second bill, the Federal Acquisition Institute Improvement Act of 2009, would institute much-needed organizational clarity to enable the Federal Acquisition Institute, FAI, to fulfill its mission of facilitating career development and strategic human capital management for the federal acquisition workforce.

The federal acquisition system is under tremendous stress. Between fiscal years 2000 and 2008, acquisition spending by the Federal Government expanded by 163 percent, from $205 billion to $539 billion. The rising costs of military operations, natural disasters, homeland security precautions, and other vital programs will drive those expenditures to even higher levels in the years ahead.

This prodigious level of purchasing creates abundant opportunities for fraud, waste, and abuse. We have seen far too many outrageous failures in government contracting, such as unusable trailers for hurricane victims, shoddy construction of schools and clinics in Afghanistan, or the installation of showers in Iraq for our troops that pose electric-shock hazards. These and other failures demand strong steps to protect taxpayer dollars and deliver better acquisition outcomes.

As a long-time advocate for stronger competition, accountability, and transparency in government contracting, I recognize and appreciate the steps the administration has taken recently to improve Federal contracting. Many of these initiatives originated from legislation I co-authored with Senator Lieberman during the last Congress.

But no matter how many laws we pass or OMB guidance documents are issued, the effectiveness of our Federal acquisition system depends on a vital human component--the acquisition workforce.

While contract spending has risen dramatically, the number of acquisition professionals who help plan, award, and oversee these contracts has been stagnant. With roughly half of the current acquisition workforce eligible to retire over the next decade, the difficulties of strengthening that workforce will become increasingly acute. A well-trained and well-resourced acquisition workforce is critical to keeping pace with increased Federal spending and much more complex procurements of services and goods.

The two pieces of legislation I am introducing today would help to address these important long-term problems that we must solve to make our acquisition system healthy again.

First, the Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 2009 would create a centrally-managed Government-wide Acquisition Management Fellows Program that combines both a Master's degree-level academic curriculum and on-the-job training in multiple federal agencies. By partnering with leading universities that have specialized government acquisition programs, the government can attract top-caliber students who are interested in pursuing both academic advancement and public service.

Compared to the several existing agency-specific intern programs, this government-wide program would provide a unique and much-needed skill set that we currently do not have in sufficient number, that is, acquisition professionals with multi-agency and multi-disciplinary training who can understand and manage government-wide acquisition needs and perspectives.

Considering that interagency acquisition now accounts for approximately 40 percent of the entire contract spending and that GAO has designated the management of interagency contracting a high-risk area since 2005, it is without question that we need to develop future acquisition leaders who can understand government-wide needs and perspectives.

Specifically, the program would include the following: one academic year of full-time, on-campus training followed by 2 years of on-the-job and part-time training toward a Masters or equivalent graduate degree in related fields; and a curriculum that would include rotational assignments at three or more executive agencies covering, among other issues, acquisition planning, cost-estimating, formation and

post-award administration of ``high risk'' contract types, and interagency contracts.

Upon graduation, participants will have completed all required non- agency-specific training courses necessary for a basic contracting officer warrant.

In addition, participants would be required to enter into a service commitment appropriate in length to ensure the Federal Government receives a proper return on its investment. The service commitment would be no less than one year for each year in the program, and would require reimbursement of funds for those who do not successfully complete the program or do not fulfill the minimum service requirements.

It is also important to note that this program would be less expensive than its current alternative. Typically, existing agency career intern programs like those run by DHS or GSA hire interns at GS- 5, -7, or -9 level, which pays between $33,000 and $66,000, for Washington, DC area. These interns also receive benefits and free training during this internship period.

The proposed program would not pay salaries during the training, but unlike the other programs, would award a graduate degree. Based on market research, this alternative money-saving arrangement would be able to attract top-notch candidates with both public and academic interests.

Second, the Federal Acquisition Institute Improvement Act of 2009 would strengthen the Federal Acquisition Institute, FAI, whose key responsibilities are to promote career development and strategic human capital management for the entire civilian acquisition workforce.

In part due to the lack of organizational clarity and the disproportionate funding compared to its counterpart in the Department of Defense, the FAI has remained largely underutilized.

The proposed legislation would establish a clear line of responsibility and accountability for the Institute by requiring that the Federal Acquisition Institute, through its Board of Directors, directly reports to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy; the director of FAI be appointed by the OFPP Administrator and report directly to the Associate Administrator for Acquisition Workforce at

Mr. President, along with Senators McCaskill and Bennett, I rise to introduce two bills that would lay a strong foundation to improve the Federal acquisition system.

The first bill, the Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 2009, would create a federal acquisition management fellows program to develop a new generation of acquisition leaders with government-wide perspective, skills, and experience.

The second bill, the Federal Acquisition Institute Improvement Act of 2009, would institute much-needed organizational clarity to enable the Federal Acquisition Institute, FAI, to fulfill its mission of facilitating career development and strategic human capital management for the federal acquisition workforce.

The federal acquisition system is under tremendous stress. Between fiscal years 2000 and 2008, acquisition spending by the Federal Government expanded by 163 percent, from $205 billion to $539 billion. The rising costs of military operations, natural disasters, homeland security precautions, and other vital programs will drive those expenditures to even higher levels in the years ahead.

This prodigious level of purchasing creates abundant opportunities for fraud, waste, and abuse. We have seen far too many outrageous failures in government contracting, such as unusable trailers for hurricane victims, shoddy construction of schools and clinics in Afghanistan, or the installation of showers in Iraq for our troops that pose electric-shock hazards. These and other failures demand strong steps to protect taxpayer dollars and deliver better acquisition outcomes.

As a long-time advocate for stronger competition, accountability, and transparency in government contracting, I recognize and appreciate the steps the administration has taken recently to improve Federal contracting. Many of these initiatives originated from legislation I co-authored with Senator Lieberman during the last Congress.

But no matter how many laws we pass or OMB guidance documents are issued, the effectiveness of our Federal acquisition system depends on a vital human component--the acquisition workforce.

While contract spending has risen dramatically, the number of acquisition professionals who help plan, award, and oversee these contracts has been stagnant. With roughly half of the current acquisition workforce eligible to retire over the next decade, the difficulties of strengthening that workforce will become increasingly acute. A well-trained and well-resourced acquisition workforce is critical to keeping pace with increased Federal spending and much more complex procurements of services and goods.

The two pieces of legislation I am introducing today would help to address these important long-term problems that we must solve to make our acquisition system healthy again.

First, the Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 2009 would create a centrally-managed Government-wide Acquisition Management Fellows Program that combines both a Master's degree-level academic curriculum and on-the-job training in multiple federal agencies. By partnering with leading universities that have specialized government acquisition programs, the government can attract top-caliber students who are interested in pursuing both academic advancement and public service.

Compared to the several existing agency-specific intern programs, this government-wide program would provide a unique and much-needed skill set that we currently do not have in sufficient number, that is, acquisition professionals with multi-agency and multi-disciplinary training who can understand and manage government-wide acquisition needs and perspectives.

Considering that interagency acquisition now accounts for approximately 40 percent of the entire contract spending and that GAO has designated the management of interagency contracting a high-risk area since 2005, it is without question that we need to develop future acquisition leaders who can understand government-wide needs and perspectives.

Specifically, the program would include the following: one academic year of full-time, on-campus training followed by 2 years of on-the-job and part-time training toward a Masters or equivalent graduate degree in related fields; and a curriculum that would include rotational assignments at three or more executive agencies covering, among other issues, acquisition planning, cost-estimating, formation and

post-award administration of ``high risk'' contract types, and interagency contracts.

Upon graduation, participants will have completed all required non- agency-specific training courses necessary for a basic contracting officer warrant.

In addition, participants would be required to enter into a service commitment appropriate in length to ensure the Federal Government receives a proper return on its investment. The service commitment would be no less than one year for each year in the program, and would require reimbursement of funds for those who do not successfully complete the program or do not fulfill the minimum service requirements.

It is also important to note that this program would be less expensive than its current alternative. Typically, existing agency career intern programs like those run by DHS or GSA hire interns at GS- 5, -7, or -9 level, which pays between $33,000 and $66,000, for Washington, DC area. These interns also receive benefits and free training during this internship period.

The proposed program would not pay salaries during the training, but unlike the other programs, would award a graduate degree. Based on market research, this alternative money-saving arrangement would be able to attract top-notch candidates with both public and academic interests.

Second, the Federal Acquisition Institute Improvement Act of 2009 would strengthen the Federal Acquisition Institute, FAI, whose key responsibilities are to promote career development and strategic human capital management for the entire civilian acquisition workforce.

In part due to the lack of organizational clarity and the disproportionate funding compared to its counterpart in the Department of Defense, the FAI has remained largely underutilized.

The proposed legislation would establish a clear line of responsibility and accountability for the Institute by requiring that the Federal Acquisition Institute, through its Board of Directors, directly reports to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy; the director of FAI be appointed by the OFPP Administrator and report directly to the Associate Administrator for Acquisition Workforce at

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce critical forest legislation for my home State of Oregon.

For too many decades, Oregon has been at war with itself over the fate of one of our most abundant--and most threatened--resources, our forests.

Nowhere has the negative impact of this battle been greater than in Oregon's eastside forests.

Over-logging and disastrous fire suppression policies of the past gave way over time to excessive litigation and gridlock.

With each passing month, our inability to take action, our inability to address the needs of Oregon's declining forests means that they are growing more at risk of preventable fire and disease.

With each passing month and each attempted timber sale and threatened lawsuit, the relationship between the environmental community and the timber industry has grown increasingly bitter.

Each side in these disputes has thoroughly armed itself politically enough to survive, but never enough to succeed.

The end result is that today, across Oregon's Federal forest landscape, we have around 9.5 million acres of choked, at-risk forest in desperate need of management, and millions of acres of old growth, species habitat, and watersheds face an uncertain future.

Unless something fundamental changes, that number and that peril will grow, not shrink, in coming years.

Today, good and decent people on both sides of these difficult issues have come together with me to craft legislation that will bring peace, jobs, and a healthier tomorrow to 8.3 million acres of Federal forest in eastern and central Oregon.

Today, for the first time in memory, timber executives are standing shoulder-to-shoulder with leaders of the Oregon environmental community to take shared responsibility for saving our endangered forests.

These folks have been a part of negotiations with my office for over 8 months, and have made difficult concessions in order to save our threatened Eastside forests.

Today in eastern Oregon we are down to only a small handful of surviving mills. Without far greater certainty of supply and an immediate increase in merchantable timber, more mills will close.

If that happens our Eastside forests will pay the price.

Without mills to process saw logs and other merchantable material from forest restoration projects, there will be no restoration of our Eastside forests.

The folks my office worked with to come to an agreement set aside their differences and found common ground that will prevent that from happening.

The legislation that we are rolling out today, the Oregon Eastside Forests Restoration, Old Growth Protection and Jobs Act of 2009, will provide an immediate supply of logs in the short term to jump-start restoration efforts and keep our timber mills alive.

Job One must be saving our remaining forest management infrastructure in central and eastern Oregon while preserving our old growth and watersheds.

Over the long term--in 3 years from its passage to be precise--this legislation will also provide the long-term certainty required to restore each of the six Eastside national forests, protect our most sensitive environmental assets, and restore countless jobs to rural communities.

I want to make clear that the road ahead is likely to see some challenges. Our coalition will be tested. But I have great faith that the decent people who helped to put this bill together will honor the components of this agreement and will fight to preserve its many elements as we move through the process.

I also want to point out that none of our efforts will succeed unless Oregon Federal forests are also adequately funded to properly manage and restore these valuable Federal assets.

Together, we have entered a partnership that goes beyond the four corners of this legislation. Together, as a team, we will fight for the funding to put our people back to work and restore the health of our forests.

Together, we have demonstrated something that I think my colleagues here in the Senate will appreciate: working together on a difficult issue is not only possible, it yields far greater results than working apart.

Later today, and tomorrow, I will be sitting down with key members of the Obama administration and the timber industry so that the administration can better understand the peril and opportunity in Oregon's Eastside forests. This is a united front that has not been witnessed by a White House since the onset of the timber wars.

It is my hope we will learn to work together, we will develop real trust, and that we will use these new experiences to tackle the difficult issues that await us on the west side of the Cascades.

I also want to single out a few individuals who have endured thousands, of hours of difficult work and negotiations to reach this point: John Shelk, president of Ochoco Lumber; Andy Kerr; the American Forest Resource Council, represented by Heath Heikkila and Tom Partin, who spearheaded negotiations.

I also want to recognize others that joined me earlier today to rollout this legislation Tim Lillebo with Oregon Wild; Tom Insko with Boise Cascade;

Mary Scurlock, with Pacific Rivers Council; Randi Spivak, with the National Center for Conservation Science and Policy; Ben Bendick with the Nature Conservancy; and Bob Irvin with Defenders of Wildlife.

I also want to recognize back in the State, their colleagues that could not join me earlier today; Rick Brown with Defenders of Wildlife, Joseph Vaile of Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center, Steve Pedry with Oregon Wild, and Michael Powelson with the Nature Conservancy, as well as the other members and mill owners of AFRC.

I want to thank my staff, Michele Miranda, Mary Gautreaux, and Josh Kardon, who gave their nights and weekends to get us to this point.

I am proud to introduce this legislation today, and I am going to keep working with all the folks in my State who are willing to talk in good faith about restoring our eastside forests.