Mr. President, I am pleased to be joined by my good friend the senior Senator from Arizona, Mr. McCain, in introducing legislation to reduce the number of presidential political appointees.…
Mr. President, I am pleased to be joined by my good friend the senior Senator from Arizona, Mr. McCain, in introducing legislation to reduce the number of presidential political appointees. Specifically, the bill caps the number of political appointees at 2,000. When I previously introduced this legislation, the Congressional Budget Office estimates it would save $382 million over the next 5 years and over $872 over the next 10 years.
The bill is based on recommendations of a number of distinguished panels, including the 1996 Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Presidential Appointment Process. The Task Force findings, which are still very relevant today, are part of a long line of recommendations that we reduce the number of political appointees in the Executive Branch. For many years, the proposal has been included in CBO's annual publication Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options, and it was one of the central recommendations of the National Commission on the Public Service, chaired by former Federal Reserve Board Chairman and current economic advisor to President Obama, Paul Volcker.
This proposal is also consistent with the recommendations of former Vice President Al Gore's National Performance Review, which called for reductions in the number of federal managers and supervisors, arguing that ``over-control and micro management'' not only ``stifle the creativity of line managers and workers, they consume billions per year in salary, benefits, and administrative costs.''
Those sentiments were also expressed in the 1989 and 2003 Volcker Commission reports, which argued the growing number of presidential appointees may ``actually undermine effective presidential control of the executive branch.'' The first Volcker Commission recommended limiting the number of political appointees to 2,000, as this legislation does.
It is essential that any administration be able to implement the policies that brought it into office in the first place. Government must be responsive to the priorities of the electorate. But as the Volcker Commissions noted, the great increase in the number of political appointees in recent years has not made government more effective or more responsive to political leadership.
Between 1980 and 2008 the ranks of political appointees rose by more than 27 percent whereas between that same period, excluding the defense sector, the civilian workforce remained consistent at about 1.1 to 1.2 million.
In recommending a cap on political appointees, the 1989 and 2003 Volcker Commission reports noted that the large number of presidential appointees simply cannot be managed effectively by any President or White House. The 1989 Commission argued that this lack of control and political focus ``may actually dilute the President's ability to develop and enforce a coherent, coordinated program and to hold cabinet secretaries accountable.''
Adding organizational layers of political appointees can also restrict access to important resources, while doing nothing to reduce bureaucratic impediments.
In commenting on this problem, author Paul Light noted, ``As this sediment has thickened over the decades, presidents have grown increasingly distant from the lines of government, and the front lines from them.'' Light added that ``Presidential leadership, therefore, may reside in stripping government of the barriers to doing its job effectively. . .''
The Volcker Commission also asserted that this thickening barrier of temporary appointees between the President and career officials can undermine development of a proficient civil service by discouraging talented individuals from remaining in government service or even pursuing a career in government in the first place.
Former Attorney General Elliot Richardson put it well when he noted:
But a White House personnel assistant sees the position of
deputy assistant secretary as a fourth-echelon slot. In his
eyes that makes it an ideal reward for a fourth-echelon
political type--a campaign advance man, or a regional
political organizer. For a senior civil servant, it's irksome
to see a position one has spent 20-30 years preparing for
pre-empted by an outsider who doesn't know the difference
between an audit exception and an authorizing bill.
The 2003 Volcker Commission report identified another problem aggravated by the mushrooming number of political appointees, namely the increasingly lengthy process of filling these thousands of positions. As the Commission reported, both President Bush and President Clinton were into their presidencies for many months before their leadership teams were fully in place. The Commission noted that on average, appointees in both administrations were confirmed more than eight months after the inauguration, one-sixth of an entire presidential term. By contrast, the report noted that in the presidential transition of 1960, Kennedy appointees were confirmed, on average, 2\1/2\ months after the inauguration.
In addition to leaving vacancies among key leadership positions in government, the appointment process delays can have a detrimental effect on potential appointees. The 2003 Volcker Commission reported that, ``Potential appointees sometimes decline to enter government service when confronted by this process. Others drop out along the way. But the principal impact of the modern appointments process is the delay it imposes on the staffing of new administrations.''
The Clinton administration made modest reductions in the number of political appointees but the numbers have steadily increased in the past decade.
As we scour the Federal budget for wasteful or unnecessary spending, we can't overlook spending that many in Washington may well wish to retain. The test of commitment to deficit reduction is not simply to support measures that impact someone else. By reducing the number of political appointees, we can ensure a sufficient number remain to implement the policies of any administration without burdening the Federal budget with unnecessary, possibly counterproductive political jobs.
Reducing the Federal deficit and balancing the budget is something that has been central to my Senate career, from the 82 point plan I brought to the Senate in 1993 to my most recent Control Spending Now Act, which would cut the deficit by around $500 billion.
The legislation I am introducing today reflects one of the points included on the original 82 point plan calling for streamlining various Federal agencies and reducing agency overhead costs, and it will be added to my Control Spending Now Act. I urge my colleagues to join me in reducing the deficit and reforming government.
