Mr. President, I seek recognition today on behalf of myself, Senator Grassley and Senator Tester, to offer the Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2009. The purpose of this bill is to regulate the…
Mr. President, I seek recognition today on behalf of myself, Senator Grassley and Senator Tester, to offer the Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2009. The purpose of this bill is to regulate the use of Presidential Signing Statements in the interpretation of Acts of Congress. This bill is similar in substance to two prior versions of this legislation: the Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2007, which I introduced on June 29, 2007; and the Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2006, which I introduced on July 26, 2006.
As I have stated before, I believe that this legislation is necessary to protect our constitutional system of checks and balances. This bill achieves that goal in the following ways.
First, it prevents the President from issuing a signing statement that alters the meaning of a statute by instructing federal and state courts not to rely on, or defer to, presidential signing statements as a source of authority when determining the meaning of any Act of Congress.
Second, it grants Congress the power to participate in any case where the construction or constitutionality of any Act of Congress is in question and a presidential signing statement for that Act was issued by allowing Congress to file an amicus brief and present oral argument in such a case; instructing that, if Congress passes a joint resolution declaring its view of the correct interpretation of the statute, the Court must admit that resolution into the case record; and providing for expedited review in such a case.
Since the days of President James Monroe, Presidents have issued statements when signing bills. It is widely agreed that there are legitimate uses for signing statements. For example, Presidents may use signing statements to instruct executive branch officials how to administer a law or to explain to the public the likely effect of a law. There may be a host of other legitimate uses.
It is clear, however, that the President cannot use a signing statement to rewrite the words of a statute, nor can he use a signing statement to selectively nullify those provisions he does not like. This much is clear from our Constitution. The Constitution grants the President a specific, defined role in enacting legislation. Article I, section 1 of the Constitution vests ``all legislative powers . . . in a Congress.'' Article I, section 7 of the Constitution provides that, when a bill is presented to the President, he may either sign it or veto it with his objections. He may also choose to do nothing, thus rendering a so-called pocket veto. But the President cannot veto part of a bill--he cannot veto certain provisions he does not like.
The Framers had good reason for constructing the legislative process as they did. According to The Records of the Constitutional Convention, the veto power was designed to protect citizens from a particular Congress that might enact oppressive legislation. However, the Framers did not want the veto power to be unchecked, and so, in Article I, section 7, they balanced it by allowing Congress to override a veto by 2/3 vote.
As I stated when I initially introduced this legislation in 2006, this is a finely structured constitutional procedure that goes straight to the heart of our system of checks and balances. Any action by the President that circumvents this procedure is an unconstitutional attempt to usurp legislative authority. If the President is permitted to re-write the bills that Congress passes and cherry pick which provisions he likes and does not like, he subverts the constitutional process designed by the Framers. The Supreme Court has affirmed that the Constitutional process for enacting legislation must be safeguarded. As the Court explained in INS v. Chahda, ``It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action in Article I, Section 1 and 7 represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.'' 462 U.S. 919, 951, 1982.
It is well within Congress's power to enact rules of statutory interpretation intended to preserve this constitutional structure. This power flows from Article I, section 8, clause 18 of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power ``To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the U.S., or in any department or officer thereof.'' Rules of statutory interpretation are ``necessary and proper'' to execute the legislative power.
Several scholars have agreed: Jefferson B. Fordham, a former Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School said, ``[I]t is within the legislative power to lay down rules of interpretation for the future;'' Mark Tushnet, a Professor at Harvard Law School explained, ``In light of the obvious congressional power to prescribe a statute's terms (and so its meaning), congressional power to prescribe interpretive methods seems to me to follow;'' Michael Stokes Paulsen, an Associate Dean of the University of Minnesota Law School noted, ``Congress is the master of its own statutes and can prescribe rules of interpretation governing its own statutes as surely as it may alter or amend the statutes directly.'' Finally, J. Sutherland, the author of the leading multi- volume treatise for the rules of statutory construction has said, ``There should be no question that an interpretive clause operating prospectively is within legislative power.''
Indeed, recent experience shows why such legislation is ``necessary.'' The use of signing statements has risen dramatically in recent years. President Clinton issued 105 signing statements; President Bush issued 161. What is more alarming than the sheer numbers, is that President Bush's signing statements often raised constitutional concerns and other objections to several provisions of a law. The President used those statements in a way that threatened to render the legislative process a virtual nullity, making it completely unpredictable how certain laws will be enforced. Even where Congress managed to negotiate checks on executive power, the President used signing statements to override the legislative language and defy congressional intent.
Two prominent examples make the point. In 2006, I spearheaded the delicate negotiations on the PATRIOT Act Reauthorization, which included months of painstaking efforts to balance national security and civil liberties, disrupted by the dramatic disclosure of the Terrorist Surveillance Program. The final version of the bill featured a carefully crafted compromise necessary to secure the act's passage. Among other things, it included several oversight provisions designed to ensure that the FBI did not abuse special terrorism-related powers permitting it to make secret demands for business records. The President dutifully signed the measure into law, only to then enter a signing statement insisting he could withhold any information from Congress required by the oversight provisions if he decided that disclosure would ``impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative process of the executive, or the performance of the executive's constitutional duties.''
The second example arose in 2005. Congress overwhelmingly passed Senator John McCain's amendment to ban all U.S. personnel from inflicting ``cruel, inhuman or degrading'' treatment on any prisoner held by the United States. There was no ambiguity in Congress's intent; in fact, the Senate approved it 90 to 9. However, after signing the bill into law, the President quietly issued a signing statement asserting that his Administration would construe it ``in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power.''
Many understood this signing statement to undermine the legislation. In a January 4, 2006 article titled, ``Bush could bypass new torture ban: Waiver right is reserved,'' the Boston Globe cited an anonymous ``senior administration official'' as saying, ``the president intended to reserve the right to use harsher methods in special situations involving national security.''
As outrageous as these signing statements are, intruding on the Constitution's delegation of ``all legislative powers'' to the Congress, it is even more outrageous that Congress has done nothing to protect its constitutional powers. In 2006 and 2007, the legislation I introduced giving Congress standing to challenge the constitutionality of these signing statements failed to muster the veto-proof majority it would have surely required.
With a new administration, I believe the time has come to pass this important legislation. This bill does not seek to limit the President's power, and it does not seek to expand Congress's power. Rather, this bill simply seeks to safeguard our Constitution. In this Congress, it has a better chance of mustering a majority vote and being signed into law by the new President.
That said, two days after criticizing President Bush's signing statements, President Obama issued one of his own regarding the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009. Citing among others his ``commander in chief'' and ``foreign affairs'' powers, he refused to be bound by at least eleven specific provisions of the bill including one long- standing rider to appropriations bills designed to aid congressional oversight. As I told The Wall Street Journal, ``We are having a repeat of what Democrats bitterly complained about under President Bush.'' I hope this will be the exception rather than the rule.
In the meantime, this bill seeks to implement measures that will safeguard the constitutional structure of enacting legislation. In preserving this structure, this bill reinforces the system of checks and balances and separation of powers set out in our Constitution.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, I have sought recognition to reintroduce legislation that would substitute the United States in the place of electronic communications service providers who were sued for violating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, and other statutory and constitutional provisions.
FISA reform legislation passed the Senate in February and July of 2008, both times by a vote of 68 to 29, before being signed into law by President Bush on July 10, 2008. This legislation made many necessary changes to FISA to enhance our intelligence collection capabilities, but it also included a controversial provision giving retroactive immunity to telecommunications companies for their alleged cooperation with the warrantless surveillance program authorized by the President after September 11, 2001. The legislation stripped the Federal courts of jurisdiction to decide more than 40 consolidated cases involving claims of violations of FISA and related statutes, even though most Members of Congress had not been briefed on the program, and despite the fact that the judge handling the cases, Chief Judge Vaughn Walker of the Northern District of California, had questioned the legality of the program in a related opinion issued just days before the final Senate debate.
During the February and July FISA debates, I sought to keep the courts open as a way to check executive branch excesses. Through both a stand-alone bill, S. 2402, considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee and an amendment, SA 3927 to S. 2248, offered during the Senate's February debate on the FISA reform bill, I proposed to substitute the U.S. Government for the telephone companies facing lawsuits for their alleged cooperation with the Terrorist Surveillance Program, TSP. Just as in 2008, I propose legislation that would place the Government in the shoes of the telephone companies, with the same defenses no more and no less. Thus, under the bill, plaintiffs get their day in court and may hold the Government accountable for unlawful activity, if any, related to the surveillance program. At the same time, the carriers themselves avoid liability stemming from their efforts to be good citizens.
I fought hard in 2008 to keep the courts open on the question of the TSP, and urged my colleagues to improve the FISA bill. I continue that fight today with a new Administration in office. During the prior floor debate I said: ``Although I am prepared to stomach this bill, if I must, I am not yet ready to concede that the debate is over. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I don't believe it is too late to make this bill better.''
As I observed on the floor last year, it is necessary for Congress to support intelligence collection efforts because of the continuing terrorist threat. No one wants to be blamed for another 9-11. Indeed, as I acknowledged during the debate, my own briefings on the telephone companies' cooperation with the Government convinced me of the program's value. Nevertheless, I tried to impress upon my colleagues the importance and historical context of our actions. I said:
We are dealing here with a matter that is of historic
importance. I believe that years from now, historians will
look back on this period from 9/11 to the present as the
greatest expansion of Executive authority in history--
unchecked expansion of authority. The President disregards
the National Security Act of 1947 mandating notice to the
Intelligence Committee; he doesn't do it. The President takes
legislation that is presented by Congress and he signs it,
and then he issues a signing statement disagreeing with key
provisions. There is nothing Congress can do about it.
The Supreme Court of the United States has gone absent
without leave on the issue, in my legal opinion. When the
Detroit Federal judge found the terrorist surveillance
program unconstitutional, it was [reversed] by the Sixth
Circuit on a 2-to-1 opinion on grounds of lack of standing.
Then the Supreme Court refused to review the case. But the
very formidable dissenting opinion laid out all of the
grounds where there was ample basis to grant standing. Now we
have Chief Judge Walker declaring the [surveillance illegal].
The Congress ought to let the courts fulfill their
constitutional function.
It is not too late to provide for judicial review of controversial post-9/11 intelligence surveillance activities. The cases before Judge Vaughn Walker are still pending and, even if he were to dismiss them under the statutory defenses dubbed retroactive immunity, Congress can and should permit the cases to be refiled against the Government, standing in the shoes of the carriers.
This legislation substitutes the U.S. in place of any electronic communication service provider who provided communications in connection with an intelligence activity that was: authorized by the President between September 11, 2001, and January 17, 2007; and designed to detect or prevent a terrorist attack against the U.S. In order for substitution to apply, the electronic communications service provider must have received a written request from the Attorney General or the head of an element of the intelligence community indicating that the activity was authorized by the President and determined to be lawful. If the provider assisted the Government beyond what was requested in writing, this legislation will provide no relief to the service provider.
The legislation also establishes a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that only applies to ``covered civil actions'' essentially, the 40 cases currently pending before the U.S. District Court in the Northern District of California. This is to prevent the Government from asserting immunity in the event it is substituted for the current defendants.
We can still pass legislation substituting the Government for the various telecom defendants and have a judicial assessment of the constitutionality and legality of the controversial surveillance. Such a judicial assessment is necessary to resolve the clash between the Executive and Legislative branches over the legality and constitutionality of the surveillance program.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, I have sought recognition to introduce legislation that will mandate Supreme Court review of challenges to the warrantless wiretapping program authorized by President Bush after 9/ 11, commonly known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program or TSP.
While the Supreme Court generally exercises discretion as to whether it will review a case or grant ``certiorari,'' there are precedents for Congress to direct Supreme Court review on constitutional issues-- including the statutes forbidding flag burning and requiring Congress to abide by Federal employment laws--and the gravity of this issue merits Congressional action.
In August 2006, Judge Anna Diggs Taylor of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan issued a 43-page opinion finding the TSP unconstitutional. At the time, many applauded and many others criticized her decision, but we have yet to see appellate review on the merits. Instead, in July 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit overturned the district court's decision on other grounds. By a 2-1 vote, in ACLU v. NSA, it declined to rule on the legality of the program, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit. The Supreme Court then declined to hear the case, even though the doctrine of standing has enough flexibility, as demonstrated by the dissent in the 6th Circuit, to have enabled it to take up this fundamental clash between Congress and the President.
With the Supreme Court abstaining, another lone district judge took a stand. In In re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, Chief Judge Vaughn Walker in the Northern District of California considered a case brought by an Islamic charity that claims to have been a subject of the surveillance program. In a 56-page opinion he held that Congress's enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, FISA, had constrained the President's inherent authority--if any--to conduct warrantless wiretapping: ``Congress appears clearly to have intended to--and did--establish the exclusive means for foreign intelligence surveillance activities to be conducted. Whatever power the executive may otherwise have had in this regard, FISA limits the power of the executive branch to conduct such activities.'' Nevertheless, this finding is preliminary.
Whatever Chief Judge Walker ultimately decides, my bill will permit any party who is disaffected by a subsequent decision in the Ninth Circuit to have the case heard by the Supreme Court by eliminating discretionary review. Under my bill, the Supreme Court would also have to review appeals concerning the constitutionality or legality of: the Terrorist Surveillance Program writ large; the statutory immunity for telecommunications providers created by Title II of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008; and any other intelligence activity involving communications that was authorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending at such time as the activity was approved by a Federal court.
Relying on similar precedents, the bill requires the High Court to expedite its consideration of such cases. The bill, however, is limited to circumstances where the Court has not previously decided the question at issue. Thus, it does not create a permanent right of review for all similarly situated parties, but it does require the Court to take up the matter in the first instance.
Congress clearly has the power to require appellate review by the Supreme Court under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, and it has exercised this prerogative. For example, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 3904 provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court of decisions ``upon the constitutionality'' of the Congressional Accountability Act if the Court ``has not previously ruled on the question'' and requires the Court to ``expedite the appeal.'' Congress used nearly identical language to provide for direct appeal and expedited Supreme Court review of the constitutionality of a ban on flag burning in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 700.
I propose similar action here. It is hard to conceive of a better case to have finally decided in the Supreme Court than one which challenges the legality of warrantless wiretapping--or the constitutionality of the retroactive statutory defenses passed by Congress last year.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, I seek recognition to speak on legislation I am introducing with Senator Casey that will require the Secretary of Agriculture to determine the price of all manufactured milk, classified as Class II milk, using the national average cost of production. At a time when the dairy farmers in Pennsylvania and across the country are seeing record low prices for their milk, this legislation is necessary to bring the price of milk back to a level where farmers can earn a living and provide for their families.
Over the past year, farmers in my state have seen the average price for a hundredweight, cwt, of milk drop from around $24 in July 2008, to hovering around $10 this February. This dramatic price decrease has been the result of a perfect storm of factors, including record high fuel prices last summer, which increased the cost of feed and other supplies, and a decrease in demand for dairy products abroad, where cases of melamine in milk have caused a severe drop in demand.
Last year, Sen. Casey and I worked diligently to increase the Milk Income Loss Contract, MILC, Program in the 2008 Farm Bill. We were successful in
including a cost of production increase to all MILC payments. These direct payments from the federal government are triggered when the price of milk per cwt falls below $16.94. When the average price of milk for a given month falls below this trigger, farmers are paid 45 percent of the difference between the actual price of milk and the trigger price. With the 2008 Farm bill's inclusion of the cost of production to these payments, farmers are seeing higher MILC payments than they otherwise would.
However, this is not enough. I have heard numerous reports from my constituents that the price of milk has fallen so low that they are fearful of having to sell their farms in order to provide for their families. Many of the dairy farms in Pennsylvania are small, family- owned farms, which, once sold, will be lost forever. We cannot let this happen. The dairy industry is critical not only to Pennsylvania's economy, but to the economy of the U.S. and to the security of our nation.
The Federal Milk Marketing Improvement Act will not only use a national average cost of production to determine Class II milk, but will also keep the Secretary of Agriculture engaged in protecting farmers from falling milk prices. This legislation would require the Secretary to adjust the value of milk four times a year, ensuring that price volatilities in the fuel sector will not unfairly hurt this industry, as we have seen it do in the past year.
Finally, this legislation provides an exemption for new dairy producers, up to 3 million pounds of milk during the first year of production, to encourage growth in the industry. With recent losses across the country of so many dairy farms, this provision is important to spurring new farmers and producers to enter the dairy industry.
I look forward to working with my colleagues to advance this and other legislation which will help a vital industry to this country. Our dairy farmers are the backbone of the agricultural community, and they deserve our support.