WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2012

        [Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2356 Reported in House (RH)]

Union Calendar No. 510
112th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 2356

[Report No. 112-665, Part I]

To enhance homeland security by improving efforts to prevent, protect
against, respond to, and recover from an attack with a weapon of mass
destruction, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

June 24, 2011

Mr. Pascrell (for himself, Mr. King of New York, Mr. Thompson of
Mississippi, Mr. Daniel E. Lungren of California, Ms. Clarke of New
York, Mr. Rogers of Alabama, Ms. Richardson, Mr. Bilirakis, Mr. Clarke
of Michigan, Mrs. Miller of Michigan, and Mr. Meehan) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Homeland
Security, and in addition to the Committees on Energy and Commerce,
Transportation and Infrastructure, Foreign Affairs, and Select
Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently
determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such
provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

September 12, 2012

Reported from the Committee on Homeland Security with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
in italic]

September 12, 2012

Referral to the Committees on Energy and Commerce, Transportation and
Infrastructure, Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence extended for a period ending not later than November 30,
2012

September 12, 2012

Referred to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology for a
period ending not later than November 30, 2012, for consideration of
such provisions of the bill and amendment as fall within the
jurisdiction of that committee pursuant to clause 1(p), rule X

November 30, 2012

The Committees on Energy and Commerce, Transportation and
Infrastructure, Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, and Science, Space, and Technology discharged; committed
to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and
ordered to be printed
[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on June
24, 2011]

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To enhance homeland security by improving efforts to prevent, protect
against, respond to, and recover from an attack with a weapon of mass
destruction, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``WMD Prevention and
Preparedness Act of 2012''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

TITLE I--A NATIONAL BIODEFENSE ENTERPRISE

Sec. 101. Special Assistant for Biodefense.
Sec. 102. National Biodefense Plan.
Sec. 103. National Biosurveillance Strategy.
Sec. 104. Comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis.

TITLE II--INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Sec. 201. National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Sec. 202. National Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological
Threats.
Sec. 203. State, local, and tribal defined.

TITLE III--HOMELAND SECURITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Weapons of mass destruction prevention and preparedness.

``TITLE XXI--WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS

``Subtitle A--Prevention

``Sec. 2101. Weapons of mass destruction intelligence and
information sharing.
``Sec. 2102. Risk assessments.
``Sec. 2103. National Export Enforcement Coordination.
``Sec. 2104. Communication of threat information.
``Sec. 2105. Individual and community preparedness for
chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear attacks.

``Subtitle B--Protection

``Sec. 2121. Detection of biological attacks.
``Sec. 2122. Rapid biological threat detection and
identification at ports of entry.
``Sec. 2123. Evaluating detection technology.
``Sec. 2124. Domestic implementation of the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture.

``Subtitle C--Response

``Sec. 2131. First responder guidance concerning chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear
attacks.
``Sec. 2132. Integrated plume modeling for collective response.
``Sec. 2133. Establishment of the system assessment and
validation for emergency responders (SAVER)
program.
``Sec. 2134. Payment for laboratory response services.
``Sec. 2135. Bioforensics capabilities.
``Sec. 2136. Metropolitan Medical Response System Program.

``Subtitle D--Recovery

``Sec. 2141. Identifying and addressing gaps in recovery
capabilities.
``Sec. 2142. Recovery from a chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear attack or
incident.
``Sec. 2143. Exercises.
Sec. 302. Enhancing laboratory biosecurity.
Sec. 303. Definitions.
Sec. 304. Dual-use terrorist risks from synthetic biology.
Sec. 305. Dissemination of information analyzed by the Department to
State, local, tribal, and private entities
with responsibilities relating to homeland
security.

TITLE IV--PUBLIC HEALTH MATTERS

Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding Federal coordination on medical
countermeasures.
Sec. 402. National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy.
``Sec. 319F-5. National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing
Strategy.
Sec. 403. National pre-event vaccination and antimicrobial dispensing
policy review.
Sec. 404. Management of short shelf life vaccine and antimicrobial
stockpiles.
Sec. 405. Material threat determinations reviews.
Sec. 406. Background checks.
Sec. 407. State, local, and tribal defined.

TITLE V--FOREIGN RELATIONS MATTERS

Sec. 501. International engagement to enhance biodefense and laboratory
biosecurity.
Sec. 502. International collaboration and information sharing relating
to biosecurity.
Sec. 503. Interagency task force on best practices for global
biopreparedness.
Sec. 504. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means
the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives and any committee of the House of
Representatives or the Senate having legislative jurisdiction
under the rules of the House of Representatives or Senate,
respectively, over the matter concerned.
(2) The term ``Intelligence Community'' has the meaning
given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
(3) The term ``national biosecurity and biodefense
stakeholders'' means officials from the Federal, State, local,
and tribal authorities and individuals and other persons from
the private sector who are involved in efforts to prevent,
protect against, respond to, and recover from a biological
attack or other phenomena that may have serious health
consequences for the United States, including wide-scale
fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks.

TITLE I--A NATIONAL BIODEFENSE ENTERPRISE

SEC. 101. SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR BIODEFENSE.

(a) In General.--The President shall assign a member of the
National Security Council to serve as Special Assistant to the
President for Biodefense, who shall--
(1) serve as the principal advisor to the President
regarding coordination of Federal biodefense policy including
prevention, protection, response, and recovery from biological
attacks or other phenomena that may have serious health
consequences for the United States, including wide-scale
fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks;
(2) identify gaps, duplication, and other inefficiencies in
existing biodefense activities and the actions necessary to
overcome these obstacles;
(3) lead the development of a coordinated National
Biodefense Plan, in accordance with section 102;
(4) lead the development of a coordinated National
Biosurveillance Strategy, in accordance with section 103;
(5) lead the development of a coordinated national research
and development strategy and implementation plan for microbial
forensics, the latter to be updated not less than once every 4
years;
(6) oversee, in coordination with the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, the development of a
comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis to
inform prioritization of resources and ensure that biodefense
challenges are adequately addressed, in accordance with section
104; and
(7) conduct ongoing oversight and evaluation of
implementation of Federal biodefense activities by relevant
Government departments and agencies.
(b) Access by Congress.--The appointment of the Special Assistant
to the President for Biodefense shall not be construed as affecting
access by Congress or committees of either House of Congress to
information, documents, and studies in the possession of, or conducted
by or at the direction of, the Special Assistant.

SEC. 102. NATIONAL BIODEFENSE PLAN.

The Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense shall submit
to the President a National Biodefense Plan that--
(1) defines the scope and purpose of a national biodefense
capability;
(2) identifies biological risks to the Nation to be
addressed by the Plan, consistent with section 2102 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by this Act;
(3) delineates activities and tasks to be performed,
including prevention, protection, response, and recovery
activities, to address the risks identified under paragraph
(2);
(4) defines research and development needs for improving
the capacity for threat awareness and prevention, protection,
response, and recovery;
(5) identifies biodefense assets, interdependencies,
capability gaps, and gaps in the integration of capabilities;
(6) provides goals, activities, milestones, and performance
measures;
(7) identifies resource and investment needs;
(8) defines organizational roles, responsibilities , and
coordination of Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities
(as those terms are defined in the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.)) with respect to the activities and
tasks delineated in paragraph (3);
(9) integrates and supports the strategies outlined in
Presidential Policy Directives 2 and 8 and Homeland Security
Presidential Directives 5, 9, 10, 18, 21, and their successors,
the National Biosurveillance Strategy published under section
103 of this Act, the National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing
Strategy developed under section 319F-5 of the Public Health
Service Act, as amended by this Act, and other strategy
documents as appropriate;
(10) is consistent with the National Response Framework as
published by the Secretary of Homeland Security in January
2008, and any successors thereof;
(11) incorporates input from Federal, State, local, and
tribal stakeholders;
(12) provides planning guidance to biosecurity and
biodefense stakeholders, including leveraging of existing
guidance; and
(13) shall be submitted to the President and the Congress
within 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act,
and updated as necessary.

SEC. 103. NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE STRATEGY.

(a) Strategy for Biosurveillance.--The Special Assistant to the
President for Biodefense shall publish a National Biosurveillance
Strategy that shall--
(1) identify the purpose and scope of a nationally
integrated biosurveillance capability;
(2) establish goals, objectives, priorities, milestones,
and performance measures to guide the development of such
capability;
(3) define and prioritize costs, benefits, and resource and
investment needs, with particular attention to leveraging
existing resources;
(4) delineate Federal, State, local, tribal, and private
roles and responsibilities; and
(5) describe how the Strategy is integrated with related
national strategies.
(b) Matters for Consideration.--In developing the strategy required
under subsection (a), the Special Assistant shall take into
consideration--
(1) the state of biosurveillance domestically and
internationally;
(2) material threat assessments and determinations
developed by the Secretary of Homeland Security in accordance
with the Project BioShield Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-276) and
the amendments made by that Act;
(3) risk assessments consistent with section 2102 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by this Act;
(4) reports on global trends produced by the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence regarding the biological
threat;
(5) Intelligence Community needs as articulated in relevant
intelligence strategies;
(6) information available in biosurveillance systems and
changes to information technology including systems used
commercially to allow for the incorporation and integration of
this information; and
(7) costs associated with establishing and maintaining the
necessary infrastructure to integrate biosurveillance systems.
(c) Implementation Plan.--In addition to the strategy required
under subsection (a), the Special Assistant shall publish an
implementation plan for such strategy that includes benchmarks for
measuring the success of the Strategy. The implementation plan shall--
(1) include a plan for advancing situational awareness of
biological threats, by rapid detection and dissemination of
biosurveillance information in real time, and through other
means;
(2) include a plan for fostering information sharing among
national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders--
(A) to identify potential threats, reduce
vulnerabilities, and improve collective response
activities to, and investigations of, suspected
biological attacks;
(B) that addresses the type of information to be
shared and how it will be shared; and
(C) that identifies critical sensitivities to be
protected; and
(3) include a plan for enhancing the capability of the
Federal Government to rapidly identify, characterize, localize,
and track a biological event of national concern by integrating
and analyzing data relating to human health, animal, plant,
food, and environmental monitoring systems (both national and
international).
(d) Deadline; Submission; Updates.--The Special Assistant shall--
(1) publish the strategy, and submit it to the appropriate
congressional committees, by not later than 1 year after the
date of enactment of this Act; and
(2) publish an implementation plan for such strategy not
later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, and
update the implementation plan at least once every 4 years.

SEC. 104. COMPREHENSIVE CROSS-CUTTING BIODEFENSE BUDGET ANALYSIS.

(a) In General.--In order to enhance strategic planning, eliminate
redundancies, identify capability gaps, and provide for greater
transparency, the Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense, in
coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees, concurrent
with the submission of the President's annual budget to the Congress, a
comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis that delineates
and integrates the biodefense expenditure requests for the departments
and agencies headed by the officials listed in subsection (c).
(b) Contents.--
(1) In general.--The comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense
budget analysis shall provide a detailed, separate analysis, by
budget function, by department or agency, and by initiative
area (as determined by the Administration), for the prior
fiscal year, the current fiscal year, and the fiscal years for
which the budget is submitted, identifying the amounts of gross
and net appropriations or obligational authority and outlays
that contribute to biodefense, with separate displays for
mandatory and discretionary amounts, including--
(A) summaries of the total amount of such
appropriations or obligational authority and outlays
requested for biodefense;
(B) an estimate of the current service levels of
biodefense spending; and
(C) an indication of how the Federal activities or
accounts covered by the analysis support the activities
delineated in the National Biodefense Plan under
section 102(2).
(2) Account-level amounts.--With respect to subparagraphs
(A) through (C) of paragraph (1), amounts shall be provided by
account for each program, project, and activity.
(c) Coordination.--
(1) Submission to special assistant.--Each official listed
in paragraph (2) shall, by not later than 30 days before
submitting the annual appropriations request for the agency
under section 1108 of title 31, United States Code, submit to
the Special Assistant--
(A) the proposed appropriations request; and
(B) a progress report on how the department or
agency under the official's authority agency has met
the responsibilities of the official under the National
Biodefense Plan under section 102.
(2) Covered official.--The officials referred to in
paragraph (1) are--
(A) the Secretary of Agriculture;
(B) the Secretary of Commerce;
(C) the Secretary of Defense;
(D) the Secretary of Energy;
(E) the Secretary of Health and Human Services;
(F) the Secretary of Homeland Security;
(G) the Secretary of State;
(H) the Secretary of Veterans Affairs;
(I) the Attorney General;
(J) the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency;
(K) the Director of the National Science
Foundation;
(L) the Postmaster General of the United States;
and
(M) heads of other Federal departments and agencies
as considered appropriate by the Special Assistant.
(d) Consultation With Congress.--Periodically, but at least
annually, the Special Assistant for Biodefense shall consult with the
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate,
the Budget Committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate,
the Appropriations Committees of the House of Representatives and the
Senate, and the Congressional Budget Office.

TITLE II--INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

SEC. 201. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING THE THREAT FROM
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

(a) Strategy.--
(1) Development.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies,
shall develop and implement--
(A) a strategy designed to improve the capabilities
of the United States to collect, analyze, and
disseminate intelligence related to weapons of mass
destruction; and
(B) a plan to implement such strategy.
(2) Title.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall
be known as the ``National Intelligence Strategy for Countering
the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction''.
(b) Contents.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall--
(1) identify and address core capabilities needed for
successful intelligence collection on weapons of mass
destruction;
(2) include methods for the recruitment, training, and
retention of a workforce with expertise in the collection,
analysis, and dissemination of intelligence related to all
types of weapons of mass destruction and science and technology
related to weapons of mass destruction, as well as expertise in
science and technology relating to risks posed by weapons of
mass destruction; and
(3) include methods for information sharing and
collaboration, as appropriate, with non-Federal national
biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders.
(c) Implementation Plan.--The plan for implementing the strategy
required under subsection (a) shall include--
(1) actions necessary to increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of the sharing of intelligence on weapons of mass
destruction throughout the Intelligence Community and with
other Federal partners, including a description of statutory,
regulatory, policy, technical, security, or other barriers that
impede such sharing, and, as appropriate, the development of
uniform standards across the Intelligence Community for such
sharing;
(2) methods to disseminate intelligence products to
national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders in classified
and unclassified formats to increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of the sharing of information;
(3) actions necessary to provide open-source intelligence
relating to weapons of mass destruction to--
(A) appropriate Federal departments and agencies;
(B) State, local, and tribal authorities; and
(C) private entities;
(4) specific objectives to be accomplished, with
corresponding schedule, for each year of the 5-year period that
begins on the date on which the strategy is submitted to the
appropriate congressional committees under subsection (e) and
tasks to accomplish such objectives, including--
(A) a list prioritizing such objectives and such
tasks; and
(B) a schedule for meeting such objectives and
carrying out such tasks;
(5) assignments of roles and responsibilities to elements
of the Intelligence Community to implement the strategy; and
(6) a schedule for assessment of the effectiveness and
efficiency of the strategy, including metrics, and a
description of the components of the assessment.
(d) Coordination.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
coordinate with State, local, and tribal government authorities, the
private sector, and nongovernmental organizations in the development of
the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
(e) Deadline for Submission.--Not later than 6 months after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
the strategy and plan required under subsection (a). The submission
shall be in unclassified form but with a classified annex, as
appropriate.
(f) Updates.--The Director of National Intelligence shall update
the implementation plan at least once every 4 years.

SEC. 202. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING BIOLOGICAL
THREATS.

(a) Strategy.--
(1) Development.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of
Agriculture, the Special Assistant to the President for
Biodefense, and the heads of other appropriate Federal
departments and agencies, shall develop and implement a
strategy and a plan for implementing the strategy that is
integrated into the National Intelligence Strategy for
Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction, as
required under this title.
(2) Title.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall
be known as the ``National Intelligence Strategy for Countering
Biological Threats''.
(b) Contents.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall--
(1) identify and address target capabilities needed for
successful intelligence collection on biological threats;
(2) include a plan for establishing in the Intelligence
Community a cadre of collectors and analysts in all relevant
agencies in the Intelligence Community that are familiar with
biological threats, biological science, and biotechnology,
including--
(A) biological scientists;
(B) biotechnologists; and
(C) experts with knowledge of the current state of
technologies that could be used to develop a weapon of
mass destruction;
(3) include a plan for defining the functions,
capabilities, and gaps in the Intelligence Community workforce
with respect to assessing the biological threat;
(4) include methods for collaboration--
(A) with non-Intelligence Community technical
experts within Federal departments and agencies; and
(B) as appropriate, with individuals with expertise
described in paragraph (2) who are not employed by the
Federal Government, in particular with State and local
biodefense stakeholders;
(5) include a plan for defining, integrating, focusing, and
enhancing existing capabilities in the Intelligence Community
dedicated to current and strategic biological threats; and
(6) include a plan for ensuring the prioritization and
sustained commitment of intelligence personnel and resources to
address biological threats.
(c) Implementation Plan.--The implementation plan for the strategy
required under subsection (a) shall--
(1) include actions necessary to increase the effectiveness
and efficiency of the sharing of intelligence throughout the
Intelligence Community on biological weapons and organisms that
could be used for biological terrorism, including a description
of statutory, regulatory, policy, technical, security, or other
barriers that prevent such sharing, and, as appropriate, the
development of uniform standards across the Intelligence
Community for such sharing;
(2) address strategic and tactical human intelligence,
measurement and signature intelligence, technical intelligence,
medical intelligence, and open-source intelligence activities
necessary to implement the strategy;
(3) identify specific objectives to be accomplished during
each year of the 5-year period that begins on the date on which
the strategy is submitted to the appropriate congressional
committees under subsection (d) and tasks to accomplish such
objectives, including--
(A) a list prioritizing such objectives and such
tasks; and
(B) a schedule for meeting such objectives and
carrying out such tasks;
(4) assign roles and responsibilities to elements of the
Intelligence Community to implement the strategy;
(5) a schedule for assessment of the effectiveness and
efficiency of the strategy, including metrics; and
(6) a schedule for evaluating on a regular basis the
efforts of the Intelligence Community and progress on
understanding and countering biological threats.
(d) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees the strategy and plan required
under subsection (a). The report shall be in unclassified form but with
a classified annex, as appropriate.
(e) Updates.--The Director of National Intelligence shall update
the implementation plan at least once every 4 years.

SEC. 203. STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL DEFINED.

In this title, the term ``State, local, and tribal'' has the same
meaning that term has in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
101 et seq.).

TITLE III--HOMELAND SECURITY MATTERS

SEC. 301. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS.

(a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et
seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new title:

``TITLE XXI--WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS

``Subtitle A--Prevention

``SEC. 2101. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION
SHARING.

``(a) In General.--The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department shall--
``(1) conduct intelligence and information sharing
activities consistent with the National Intelligence Strategy
for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction
under section 201 of the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of
2012 and the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering
Biological Threats under section 202 of that Act;
``(2) support homeland security-focused intelligence
analysis of terrorist actors, their claims, and their plans to
conduct attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear materials against the Nation;
``(3) support homeland security-focused intelligence
analysis of global infectious disease, public health, food,
agricultural, and veterinary issues;
``(4) support homeland security-focused risk analysis and
risk assessments of the homeland security hazards described in
paragraphs (2) and (3), by providing relevant quantitative and
nonquantitative threat information;
``(5) leverage existing and emerging homeland security
capabilities and structures, including fusion centers
established pursuant to section 210A, to enhance prevention,
protection, response, and recovery efforts with respect to a
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack;
``(6) share information and provide tailored analytical
support on these threats to State, local, and tribal
authorities as well as other national biosecurity and
biodefense stakeholders; and
``(7) perform other responsibilities, as assigned by the
Secretary.
``(b) Coordination.--Where appropriate, the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis shall coordinate with other relevant Department
components, others in the Intelligence Community, including the
National Counter Proliferation Center, and other Federal, State, local,
and tribal authorities, including officials from high-threat areas, and
enable such entities to provide recommendations on optimal information
sharing mechanisms, including expeditious sharing of classified
information, and on how they can provide information to the Department.
``(c) Report.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this section and annually thereafter, the
Secretary shall report to the appropriate congressional
committees on--
``(A) the intelligence and information sharing
activities under subsection (a) and of all relevant
entities within the Department to counter the threat
from weapons of mass destruction; and
``(B) the Department's activities in accordance
with relevant intelligence strategies, including the
National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the
Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction and the
National Intelligence Strategy for Countering
Biological Threats.
``(2) Assessment of implementation.--The report shall
include--
``(A) a description of methods established to
assess progress of the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis in implementing this section; and
``(B) such assessment.

``SEC. 2102. RISK ASSESSMENTS.

``(a) In General.--The Secretary, acting through the Under
Secretary for Science and Technology, shall, in coordination with
relevant Department components and other appropriate Federal
departments and agencies--
``(1) produce and update periodically a terrorism risk
assessment of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
threats; and
``(2) produce and update periodically an integrated
terrorism risk assessment that assesses all of those threats
and compares them against one another according to their
relative risk.
``(b) Methodology.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall--
``(A) convene an interagency task force of relevant
subject matter experts to assess the proposed
methodology to be used for assessments required under
subsection (a), and to provide recommendations to the
Secretary as to the adequacy of such methodology;
``(B) conduct sensitivity analysis on each
assessment to identify and prioritize research
activities to close knowledge gaps; and
``(C) consider the evolving threat from an
intelligent adversary.
``(2) Inclusion in assessment.--Each assessment under
subsection (a) shall include a description of the methodology
used for the assessment.
``(c) Usage.--The assessments required under subsection (a) shall
be used to inform and guide risk management decisions, including--
``(1) the threat assessments and determinations by the
Secretary regarding agents and toxins pursuant to section 319F-
2 of the Public Health Service Act;
``(2) allocation of resources for research and development
for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attack
prevention, protection, response, and recovery;
``(3) prioritization of medical countermeasure research,
development, acquisition, and distribution activities and other
national strategic biodefense research;
``(4) tailored risk assessments and risk mitigation
studies, as appropriate, on topics such as radiological
materials security or the economic risks of a biological
attack; and
``(5) other homeland security activities as determined
appropriate by the Secretary and the heads of other agencies.
``(d) Input and Sharing.--The Secretary shall, for each assessment
required under subsection (a)--
``(1) seek input from national biosecurity and biodefense
stakeholders, and other Federal, State, local, and tribal
officials involved in efforts to prevent, protect, respond to,
and recover from chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear threats;
``(2) ensure that written procedures are in place to guide
the interagency development of the assessments, including for
input, review, and implementation purposes, among relevant
Federal partners;
``(3) share the risk assessments with Federal, State, local
and tribal officials with appropriate security clearances and a
need for the information in the classified version; and
``(4) to the maximum extent practicable, make available an
unclassified version for Federal, State, local, and tribal
officials involved in prevention and preparedness for chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear events.
``(e) Written Procedures.--The Secretary shall establish written
procedures for appropriate usage of the assessments required under
subsection (a), including--
``(1) a description of the types of departmental activities
for which the assessments should be considered;
``(2) the extent to which the findings of the assessments
should play a role in such activities;
``(3) the point in planning processes at which the
assessments should be considered; and
``(4) how users can access expertise within the Department
to aid in interpretation of the results of the assessments.

``SEC. 2103. NATIONAL EXPORT ENFORCEMENT COORDINATION.

``(a) Establishment.--There shall be maintained in the Department
the Export Enforcement Coordination Center, with capability for
national export enforcement coordination that is managed by the
Secretary and coordinates the export enforcement activities among the
Department, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce,
the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of
Justice, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the
Intelligence Community, and other Federal agencies as appropriate.
``(b) Responsibilities.--The Center shall--
``(1) enhance Federal coordination for law enforcement
counterproliferation investigations, including coordination and
deconfliction with intelligence counterproliferation
activities;
``(2) address licensing inquiries, reviews, requests,
checks, and verifications; and
``(3) conduct outreach and provide training to the export
trade community.

``SEC. 2104. COMMUNICATION OF THREAT INFORMATION.

``(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
``(1) The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism recommended that `the
Federal Government should practice greater openness of public
information so that citizens better understand the threat and
the risk this threat poses to them'.
``(2) There are unique challenges for community
preparedness for attacks from weapons of mass destruction.
``(b) Communications Plan.--
``(1) In general.--The Administrator of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency shall develop a communications plan
designed to provide information to the public related to
preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks;
``(2) Consultation.--As appropriate, the Administrator of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall consult with
State, local, and tribal authorities and coordinate with other
Federal departments and agencies in developing the
communications plans under paragraph (1).
``(3) Pre-scripted messages and message templates.--
``(A) In general.--The Administrator of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency shall develop and
disseminate, through an alerts and warnings system,
pre-scripted messages and message templates for State,
local, and tribal authorities so that those authorities
can quickly and rapidly disseminate critical
information to the public in anticipation of, during,
or in the immediate aftermath of a chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear attack, and to be
included in the Department of Homeland Security's
lessons learned information sharing system.
``(B) Development and design.--The pre-scripted
messages or message templates shall--
``(i) be developed in consultation with
State, local, and tribal authorities and in
coordination with other appropriate Federal
departments and agencies;
``(ii) be designed to provide accurate,
essential, and appropriate information and
instructions to the population directly
affected by an incident, including information
regarding an evacuation, sheltering in place,
hospital surge operations, health, and safety;
``(iii) be designed to provide accurate,
essential, and appropriate information and
instructions to children and other special
needs populations within the population
directly affected by an incident;
``(iv) be designed to provide accurate,
essential, and appropriate information and
instructions to emergency response providers
and medical personnel responding to an
incident; and
``(v) include direction for the
coordination of Federal, State, local, and
tribal communications teams.
``(C) Communications formats.--The Administrator
shall develop pre-scripted messages or message
templates under this paragraph in multiple formats to
ensure delivery--
``(i) in cases where the usual
communications infrastructure is unusable;
``(ii) to individuals with disabilities or
other special needs and individuals with
limited English proficiency; and
``(iii) to educational and childcare
facilities, including daycare centers, grade
schools, universities, hospitals, and elderly
care facilities.
``(D) Dissemination and technical assistance.--The
Administrator shall ensure that all pre-scripted
messages and message templates developed under this
paragraph are made available to State, local, and
tribal authorities so that those authorities may
incorporate them, as appropriate, into their emergency
plans. The Administrator shall also make available
relevant technical assistance to those authorities to
support communications planning.
``(E) Exercises.--To ensure that the pre-scripted
messages or message templates developed under this
paragraph can be effectively utilized in a disaster or
incident, the Administrator shall incorporate Federal,
State, local, and tribal communications teams that
deliver such pre-scripted messages or message templates
into exercises, including those conducted under the
National Exercise Program.
``(4) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this subsection, the Administrator of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees the communications plans required to
be developed under this subsection, including pre-scripted
messages or message templates developed in conjunction with the
plans and a description of the means that will be used to
deliver these messages during such incidents.
``(c) Terrorism Threat Awareness.--
``(1) Terrorism threat awareness.--The Secretary, in
coordination with the Attorney General and heads of appropriate
Federal agencies, shall for purposes of preparedness and
collective response to terrorism and for other purposes--
``(A) ensure that homeland security information
concerning terrorist threats is provided to State,
local, and tribal authorities and the public within the
United States, as appropriate; and
``(B) establish a process to optimize opportunities
for qualified heads of State, local, and tribal
government entities to obtain appropriate security
clearances so that they may receive classified threat
information when appropriate.
``(2) Threat bulletins.--
``(A) In general.--Consistent with the requirements
of paragraph (1), the Secretary shall, on a timely
basis, prepare unclassified threat bulletins on
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
threats.
``(B) Requirements.--Each assessment required under
subparagraph (A) shall--
``(i) include guidance to the public for
preventing and responding to acts of terrorism
arising from such threats; and
``(ii) be made available on the Internet
Web site of the Department and other publicly
accessible Internet Web sites, communication
systems, and information networks.
``(3) Guidance to state, local, and tribal authorities.--
The Secretary, using information provided by the terrorism risk
assessments under section 2102 and material threat assessments
and determinations under the Project BioShield Act of 2004
(Public Law 108-276) and the amendments made by that Act--
``(A) shall provide to State, local, and tribal
authorities written guidance on communicating
terrorism-related threats and risks to the public
within their jurisdictions; and
``(B) shall identify and articulate the
governmental rationale for identifying particular
communities as being at heightened risk of
exploitation.
``(4) Use of existing resources.--The Secretary shall use
Internet Web sites, communication systems, and information
networks in operation on the date of an assessment under this
subsection, and shall coordinate with other heads of Federal
departments and agencies to provide information through
existing channels to satisfy the requirements of paragraph
(2)(B)(ii). The Secretary shall provide guidance on how State,
local, tribal, and private entities can partner with public
television stations to disseminate information provided by the
Department and shall provide information on best practices on
disseminating information to residents of local communities,
including leveraging public television stations.

``SEC. 2105. INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS FOR CHEMICAL,
BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR ATTACKS.

``(a) In General.--The Secretary, acting through the Administrator
for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall assist State, local,
and tribal authorities in improving and promoting individual and
community preparedness and collective response to terrorist attacks
involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials
against the United States by--
``(1) developing guidance and checklists of recommended
actions for individual and community prevention and
preparedness efforts and disseminating such guidance and
checklists to communities and individuals;
``(2) updating new and existing guidance and checklists as
appropriate;
``(3) disseminating to communities and individuals the
guidance developed under section 2131, as appropriate;
``(4) providing information and training materials in
support of individual and community preparedness efforts;
``(5) conducting individual and community preparedness
outreach efforts; and
``(6) such other actions as the Secretary determines
appropriate.
``(b) Coordination.--The Secretary shall coordinate with Federal
departments and agencies and with private sector and nongovernmental
organizations to promote individual and community preparedness and
collective response to terrorist attacks involving chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear materials against the United
States.
``(c) Best Practices.--In compiling guidance for individual and
community preparedness in order to carry out subsection (a)(4), the
Secretary shall give due regard to best practices based on the
experience of other agencies and countries and the expertise of
academic institutions and nongovernmental organizations.

``Subtitle B--Protection

``SEC. 2121. DETECTION OF BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS.

``(a) Program.--The Secretary shall carry out a program to detect a
biological attack or event that poses a high risk to homeland security.
Through such program, the Secretary shall--
``(1) deploy detection capabilities to areas, based on high
risks identified by Department assessments, to indicate the
presence of biological agents;
``(2) consider multiple deployment strategies including
surge capability;
``(3) provide information to participating laboratories and
programs for their use in monitoring public health, and
biological material or other data from those detectors to
participating laboratories and programs for testing and
evaluation;
``(4) regularly communicate with, and provide information
about the presence of biological agents to, appropriate
Federal, State, and local agencies responsible for public
health, law enforcement, and emergency services, in a manner
that ensures transparency with the governments served by such
personnel;
``(5) provide advanced planning tools, concepts of
operations (including alarm resolution protocols and response
guidance), standard operating procedures, and training
exercises (including in collaboration with relevant national
level exercises) for collective response to and recovery from
biological attacks; and
``(6) provide technical assistance to jurisdictions hosting
the program to improve their ability to respond to a detected
pathogen.
``(b) Program Requirements.--Under the program required under
subsection (a), the Secretary shall--
``(1) enter into memoranda of agreement or interagency
agreements under the Economy Act of 1933 (31 U.S.C. 1535 et
seq.) with the Director of the Centers of Disease Control and
Prevention and the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the heads of other Federal departments
and agencies, setting forth roles and responsibilities,
including with respect to validating performance and developing
testing protocols for participating laboratories and
coordination with appropriate State, local, and tribal
agencies;
``(2) establish criteria for determining whether plans for
biological detector capabilities and coverage sufficiently
protect the United States population, and make such
determinations on an annual basis;
``(3) acting through the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, and in consultation with the Director of the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, implement a process
for establishing assay performance standards and evaluation for
equivalency for biological threat assays, that--
``(A) evaluates biological threat detection assays,
their protocols for use, and their associated response
algorithms for confirmation of biological threat
agents, taking performance measures and concepts of
operation into consideration;
``(B) develops interagency peer-reviewed assay
performance and equivalency standards based on the
findings of the evaluation under subparagraph (A);
``(C) requires implementation of the standards
developed under subparagraph (B) for all Department
biological detection programs;
``(D) promotes use of such standards among all
other Federal biological detection programs and makes
them available to the private sector and other end-
users as appropriate; and
``(E) is updated as necessary;
``(4) prior to obligating funds to acquire biodetection
systems for purposes of operational testing and evaluation,
require--
``(A) a determination of the sensitivity and
specificity of the currently deployed biodetection
system;
``(B) an assessment of the sensitivity and
specificity of the next generation biodetection system
or systems under consideration for acquisition and
whether it meets established operational requirements;
``(C) provision of all raw data to the Science and
Technology Directorate to enable the Under Secretary
to--
``(i) conduct a trade-off study comparing
the results of subparagraphs (A) and (B); and
``(ii) perform a technical readiness
assessment in accordance with section 308(b);
and
``(D) that the findings under subparagraph (C)
inform the cost-benefit analysis under paragraph (5)(A)
and any Departmental acquisition review board decision
regarding the biodetection system or systems under
consideration; and
``(5) prior to acquiring and deploying biodetection
technology, require--
``(A) a cost-benefit analysis, including an
analysis of alternatives, that shall be informed by the
terrorism risk assessments under section 2102;
``(B) operational testing and evaluation;
``(C) operational assessment by the end users of
the technology; and
``(D) the Department, other relevant executive
agencies, and local jurisdictions intended to host the
systems to agree on concepts of operations for
resolving alarms.
``(c) Contract Authority.--The Secretary may enter into contracts
with participating laboratories and programs for--
``(1) the provision of laboratory services or other
biosurveillance activities as appropriate for purposes of this
section on a fee-for-service basis or on a prepayment or other
similar basis; and
``(2) administrative and other costs related to hosting
program personnel and equipment in these laboratories or
programs.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) The term `participating laboratory' means a
laboratory that has been accepted as a member of the Laboratory
Response Network for Biological Terrorism that--
``(A) is fully equipped to detect and respond
quickly to acts of biological terrorism;
``(B) provides biocontainment and microbiological
analysis in support of the Department and relevant law
enforcement agencies with responsibilities for
investigating biological incidents; and
``(C) supports assay evaluation, research and
development.
``(2) The term `assay' means any scientific test that is
designed to detect the presence of a biological threat agent
that is of a type selected under criteria established by the
Secretary.

``SEC. 2122. RAPID BIOLOGICAL THREAT DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION AT
PORTS OF ENTRY.

``(a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall require
the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, in consultation with
the heads of other relevant operational components of the Department of
Homeland Security, to assess whether the development of technological
screening capabilities for biological agents, pandemic influenza, and
other infectious diseases should be undertaken by the Directorate of
Science and Technology to support entry and exit screening at ports of
entry and for other homeland security purposes.
``(b) Development of Methods.--If the Under Secretary determines
that the development of such screening capabilities should be
undertaken, the Secretary shall, to the extent possible, initiate
development of safe and effective methods to--
``(1) rapidly screen incoming persons at ports of entry for
biological agents, pandemic influenza, and other infectious
diseases; and
``(2) obtain results of such screening near the point of
entry.

``SEC. 2123. EVALUATING DETECTION TECHNOLOGY.

``To inform the purchase of detection technology, the Secretary, in
coordination with the Director of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, may carry out a program to--
``(1) establish near-term minimum performance metrics to
support public safety actionable activities, based to the
greatest extent practicable on voluntary consensus standards,
to evaluate the effectiveness of detection technology for high-
priority biological agents and toxins and high-priority
chemical agents;
``(2) establish a process for voluntary testing and
evaluation of technology by an accredited laboratory to
demonstrate conformance to such consensus standards, or
performance metrics if standards do not exist, for the
effective detection of high-priority biological agents and
toxins and high-priority chemical agents, including
incentivization for the program through potential cost sharing
with technology manufacturers and for SAFETY Act certification
or placement on the authorized equipment list, or both; and
``(3) with permission from the detection technology
manufacturer, make available to Federal departments and
agencies, State, territorial, local, and tribal entities, and
the private sector the results of detection system testing and
evaluation under paragraph (2).

``SEC. 2124. DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION
ARCHITECTURE.

``(a) Securing the Cities.--The Director of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office shall establish and maintain a multilayered system of
detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance
the Nation's ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear
attack in high-risk United States cities, as determined by the
Secretary.
``(b) Surge Capabilities.--The Director shall develop a surge
capability for radiological and nuclear detection systems that can be
deployed within the United States rapidly in response to actionable
intelligence or warnings, and includes procurement of appropriate
technology, training, and exercises.
``(c) Integration.--The programs under subsections (a) and (b)
shall be integrated into the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and
shall inform architecture studies, technology gaps, and research
activities of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.

``Subtitle C--Response

``SEC. 2131. FIRST RESPONDER GUIDANCE CONCERNING CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,
RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR ATTACKS.

``(a) Establishment of Voluntary Guidance.--Not later than 1 year
after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary, in
coordination with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the
Secretary of Agriculture, the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Attorney General, and the heads of other Federal
departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall--
``(1) develop for police, fire, emergency medical services,
emergency management, and medical and public health personnel,
voluntary guidance for responding to a release of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear material;
``(2) make such guidance available to State, local, and
tribal authorities, including primary and secondary schools and
other educational institutions, nongovernmental organizations,
the private sector, and the public; and
``(3) in developing the guidance under paragraph (1)--
``(A) review the experiences of other countries and
the expertise of academic institutions and
nongovernmental organizations; and
``(B) consider the unique needs of children and
other vulnerable populations.
``(b) Contents.--The guidance developed under subsection (a)(1)
shall be voluntary, risk-based guidance that shall include--
``(1) protective action guidance for ensuring the security,
health, and safety of emergency response providers and their
families and household contacts;
``(2) specific information regarding the effects of the
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material on
those exposed to the agent; and
``(3) best practices for emergency response providers to
effectively diagnose, handle, and otherwise manage individuals
affected by an incident involving chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear material.
``(c) Review and Revision of Guidance.--The Secretary shall--
``(1) review the guidance developed under subsection (a)(1)
at least once every 2 years;
``(2) make revisions to the guidance as appropriate; and
``(3) make any revised guidance available to State, local,
and tribal authorities, nongovernmental organizations, the
private sector, and the public.
``(d) Procedures for Developing and Revising Guidance.--In carrying
out the requirements of this section, the Secretary shall establish
procedures to--
``(1) enable members of the first responder and first
provider community to submit recommendations of areas in which
guidance is needed and could be developed under subsection
(a)(1);
``(2) determine which entities should be consulted in
developing or revising the guidance;
``(3) prioritize, on a regular basis, guidance that should
be developed or revised; and
``(4) develop and disseminate the guidance in accordance
with the prioritization under paragraph (3).

``SEC. 2132. INTEGRATED PLUME MODELING FOR COLLECTIVE RESPONSE.

``(a) Development.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall acquire, use, and
disseminate the best available integrated plume models to
enable rapid response activities following a chemical,
biological, nuclear, or radiological attack or event.
``(2) Scope.--The Secretary shall--
``(A) identify Federal, State, and local needs
regarding plume models and ensure the rapid development
and distribution of integrated plume models that meet
those needs to appropriate officials of the Federal
Government and State, local, and tribal authorities to
enable immediate response to a chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear attack or event;
``(B) establish mechanisms for dissemination by
appropriate emergency response officials of the
integrated plume models described in paragraph (1) to
nongovernmental organizations and the public to enable
appropriate collective response activities;
``(C) ensure that guidance and training in how to
appropriately use such models are provided; and
``(D) ensure that lessons learned from assessing
the development and dissemination of integrated plume
models during exercises administered by the Department
are put into the lessons learned information sharing
system maintained by the Department.
``(b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
``(1) The term `plume model' means the assessment of the
location and prediction of the spread of agents following a
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack or event.
``(2) The term `integrated plume model' means a plume model
that integrates protective action guidance and other
information as the Secretary determines appropriate.

``SEC. 2133. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT AND VALIDATION FOR
EMERGENCY RESPONDERS (SAVER) PROGRAM.

``The Secretary shall carry out a program for system assessment and
validation of emergency response equipment at the Department, to be
known as the `SAVER Program'. The Secretary shall ensure that such
program--
``(1) conducts objective, impartial, practitioner-relevant,
and operationally oriented assessments and validations of
commercial emergency responder equipment and systems, including
hand-held detectors for chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear agents;
``(2) prioritizes such evaluation based on the technical
results obtained from the program established under section
2123, if available;
``(3) is supported by a network of scientists who, in
coordination with subject matter experts, perform the
assessment and validation activities using strict scientific
and testing protocols;
``(4) provides results along with other relevant equipment
information to the emergency response provider community in an
operationally useful form;
``(5) provides information on equipment that falls within
the categories listed in the Department's authorized equipment
list;
``(6) provides information that enables decision-makers and
responders to better select, procure, use, and maintain
emergency responder equipment; and
``(7) shares such information nationally with the emergency
response provider community.

``SEC. 2134. PAYMENT FOR LABORATORY RESPONSE SERVICES.

``In carrying out their functions, responsibilities, authorities,
and duties to counter biological terrorism, the Secretary, the Attorney
General, and the heads of other participating Federal agencies are
authorized, subject to the availability of appropriations, to enter
into contracts with laboratories that comprise the Laboratory Response
Network for Biological Terrorism and other federally networked
laboratories that agree to participate in such a contract, for the
provision of laboratory testing services on a fee-for-service basis or
on a prepayment or other similar basis. Prior to entering into such a
contract with any laboratory in the Laboratory Response Network for
Biological Terrorism, the Secretary, the Attorney General, or the head
of any other participating Federal agency shall inform the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention.

``SEC. 2135. BIOFORENSICS CAPABILITIES.

``(a) Bioforensics Analysis Center.--There is authorized in the
Department a bioforensics analysis center to provide support for law
enforcement and intelligence-related investigations and actions to--
``(1) provide definitive bioforensics analysis in support
of the executive agencies with primary responsibilities for
preventing, deterring, responding to, attributing, and
recovering from biological attacks; and
``(2) undertake other related bioforensics activities.
``(b) Payment for Services.--The center shall charge and retain
fees to reimburse the cost of any service provided to an executive
agency that requested such service.
``(c) Detailee Program.--Subject to the availability of
appropriations, the Secretary may implement a program under which
executive agencies as considered appropriate by the Secretary provide
personnel, on a reimbursable basis, to the center for the purpose of--
``(1) providing training and other educational benefits for
such stakeholders to help them to better understand the
policies, procedures, and laws governing national bioforensics
activities; and
``(2) bolstering the capabilities and information sharing
activities of the bioforensics analysis center authorized under
subsection (a) with national biosecurity and biodefense
stakeholders.

``SEC. 2136. METROPOLITAN MEDICAL RESPONSE SYSTEM PROGRAM.

``(a) In General.--The Secretary shall conduct a Metropolitan
Medical Response System Program, that shall assist State and local
governments in preparing for and responding to public health and mass
casualty incidents resulting from acts of terrorism, natural disasters,
and other man-made disasters.
``(b) Financial Assistance.--
``(1) Authorization of grants.--
``(A) In general.--The Secretary, through the
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, may make grants under this section to State and
local governments to assist in preparing for and
responding to mass casualty incidents resulting from
acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other man-
made disasters.
``(B) Consultation.--In developing guidance for
grants authorized under this section, the Administrator
shall consult with the Chief Medical Officer.
``(2) Use of funds.--A grant made under this section may be
used to support the integration of emergency management,
health, and medical systems into a coordinated response to mass
casualty incidents caused by any hazard, including--
``(A) to strengthen medical surge capacity;
``(B) to strengthen mass prophylaxis capabilities
including development and maintenance of an initial
pharmaceutical stockpile sufficient to protect first
responders, their families, and immediate victims from
a chemical or biological event, including the
procurement of home medical kits that are approved
pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.) or the Public Health Service
Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), as applicable;
``(C) to strengthen chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and explosive detection,
response, and decontamination capabilities;
``(D) to develop and maintain mass triage and pre-
hospital treatment plans and capabilities;
``(E) for planning;
``(F) to support efforts to strengthen information
sharing and collaboration capabilities of regional,
State, and urban areas in support of public health and
medical preparedness;
``(G) for medical supplies management and
distribution;
``(H) for training and exercises;
``(I) for integration and coordination of the
activities and capabilities of public health personnel
and medical care providers with those of other
emergency response providers as well as other Federal
agencies, the private sector, and nonprofit
organizations, for the forward movement of patients;
and
``(J) for such other activities as the
Administrator provides.
``(3) Eligibility.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (C), any jurisdiction that received funds
through the Metropolitan Medical Response System
Program in fiscal year 2009 shall be eligible to
receive a grant under this section.
``(B) Additional jurisdictions.--
``(i) Unrepresented states.--
``(I) In general.--Except as
provided in subparagraph (C), the
Administrator may make grants under
this section to the metropolitan
statistical area with the largest
population in any State in which no
jurisdiction received funds through the
Metropolitan Medical Response Program
in fiscal year 2009, or in which
funding was received only through
another State.
``(II) Limitation.--For each of
fiscal years 2012 through 2014, no
jurisdiction that would otherwise be
eligible to receive grants under
subclause (I) shall receive a grant
under this section if it would result
in any jurisdiction under subparagraph
(A) receiving less funding than such
jurisdiction received in fiscal year
2009.
``(ii) Other jurisdictions.--
``(I) In general.--Subject to
subparagraph (C), the Administrator may
determine that additional jurisdictions
are eligible to receive grants under
this section.
``(II) Limitation.--For each of
fiscal years 2012 through 2014, the
eligibility of any additional
jurisdiction to receive grants under
this section is subject to the
availability of appropriations beyond
that necessary to--
``(aa) ensure that each
jurisdiction eligible to
receive a grant under
subparagraph (A) does not
receive less funding than such
jurisdiction received in fiscal
year 2009; and
``(bb) provide grants to
jurisdictions eligible under
clause (i).
``(C) Performance requirement after fiscal year
2012.--A jurisdiction shall not be eligible for a grant
under this subsection from funds available after fiscal
year 2012 unless the Secretary determines that the
jurisdiction maintains a sufficient measured degree of
capability in accordance with the performance measures
issued under subsection (c).
``(4) Distribution of funds.--
``(A) In general.--The Administrator shall
distribute grant funds under this section to the State
in which the jurisdiction receiving a grant under this
section is located.
``(B) Pass through.--Subject to subparagraph (C),
not later than 45 days after the date on which a State
receives grant funds under subparagraph (A), the State
shall provide the jurisdiction receiving the grant 100
percent of the grant funds, and not later than 45 days
after the State releases the funds, all fiscal agents
shall make the grant funds available for expenditure.
``(C) Exception.--The Administrator may permit a
State to provide to a jurisdiction receiving a grant
under this section 97 percent of the grant funds
awarded if doing so would not result in any
jurisdiction eligible for a grant under paragraph
(3)(A) receiving less funding than such jurisdiction
received in fiscal year 2009.
``(5) Regional coordination.--The Administrator shall
ensure that each jurisdiction that receives a grant under this
section, as a condition of receiving such grant, is actively
coordinating its preparedness efforts with surrounding
jurisdictions, with the official with primary responsibility
for homeland security (other than the Governor) of the
government of the State in which the jurisdiction is located,
and with emergency response providers from all relevant
disciplines, as determined by the Administrator, to effectively
enhance regional preparedness.
``(c) Performance Measures.--The Administrator of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Chief Medical
Officer, and the National Metropolitan Medical Response System Working
Group, shall issue performance measures within 1 year after the date of
enactment of this section that enable objective evaluation of the
performance and effective use of funds provided under this section in
any jurisdiction.
``(d) Metropolitan Medical Response System Working Group Defined.--
In this section, the term `National Metropolitan Medical Response
System Working Group' means--
``(1) 10 Metropolitan Medical Response System Program grant
managers, who shall--
``(A) include 1 such grant manager from each region
of the Agency;
``(B) comprise a population-based cross section of
jurisdictions that are receiving grant funds under the
Metropolitan Medical Response System Program; and
``(C) include--
``(i) 3 selected by the Administrator of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency; and
``(ii) 3 selected by the Chief Medical
Officer; and
``(2) 3 State officials who are responsible for
administration of State programs that are carried out with
grants under this section, who shall be selected by the
Administrator.
``(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $42,000,000 to carry out the program for each of fiscal
years 2012 through 2016.

``Subtitle D--Recovery

``SEC. 2141. IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING GAPS IN RECOVERY CAPABILITIES.

``(a) Risk Assessment.--
``(1) Tailored risk assessment.--The Secretary, acting
through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology and in
coordination with the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, shall conduct tailored risk assessments to
inform prioritization of national recovery activities for
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents, to
be updated as necessary.
``(2) Considerations.--In conducting the risk assessments
under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall--
``(A) consult with the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, the Secretary of Agriculture, the
Secretary of the Interior, the Chairman of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, and the heads of other relevant
Federal departments and agencies;
``(B) consider recovery of both indoor areas and
outdoor environments; and
``(C) consider relevant studies previously prepared
by other Federal agencies, or other appropriate
stakeholders.
``(3) Collaboration.--Upon completion of the risk
assessments required by this section, the Secretary shall
provide the findings to the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency and heads of other relevant Federal agencies
in order to inform ongoing and future work, including research
and guidance development, undertaken by those agencies in
recovery and remediation from chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear incidents.
``(b) Research.--The results of the risk assessment under this
section shall inform appropriate Federal research to address the high-
risk capability gaps uncovered by each assessment.
``(c) Submission to Congress.--The results of each risk assessment
shall be submitted to the appropriate congressional committees within
30 days after completion of the assessment.

``SEC. 2142. RECOVERY FROM A CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND
NUCLEAR ATTACK OR INCIDENT.

``(a) Establishment of Guidance.--The Secretary shall develop and
issue guidance for clean-up and restoration of indoor and outdoor
areas, including subways and other mass transportation facilities, that
have been exposed to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
materials. The Secretary shall develop and issue the guidance, within
24 months after the date of enactment of this section, in consultation
with--
``(1) the Secretary of Agriculture;
``(2) the Secretary of Commerce;
``(3) the Secretary of Education;
``(4) the Secretary of the Interior;
``(5) the Attorney General;
``(6) the Secretary of Labor;
``(7) the Secretary of Transportation;
``(8) the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development;
``(9) the Secretary of Health and Human Services;
``(10) the Secretary of Veterans Affairs;
``(11) the Secretary of the Treasury;
``(12) the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency; and
``(13) the Administrator of the Small Business
Administration.
``(b) Contents.--The guidance developed under subsection (a) shall
clarify Federal roles and responsibilities for assisting State, local,
and tribal authorities and include risk-based recommendations for--
``(1) standards for effective decontamination of affected
sites;
``(2) standards for safe post-event occupancy of affected
sites, including for vulnerable populations such as children
and individuals with health concerns;
``(3) requirements to ensure that the decontamination
procedures for responding organizations do not conflict;
``(4) requirements that each responding organization uses a
uniform system for tracking costs and performance of clean-up
contractors;
``(5) maintenance of negative air pressure in buildings;
``(6) standards for proper selection and use of personal
protective equipment;
``(7) air sampling procedures;
``(8) development of occupational health and safety plans
that are appropriate for the specific risk to responder health;
and
``(9) waste disposal.
``(c) Review and Revision of Guidance.--The Secretary shall--
``(1) not less frequently than once every 2 years, review
the guidance developed under subsection (a);
``(2) make revisions to the guidance as appropriate; and
``(3) make the revised guidance available to the Federal
Government, State, local, and tribal authorities,
nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and the
public.
``(d) Procedures for Developing and Revising Guidance.--In carrying
out the requirements of this section, the Secretary shall establish
procedures to--
``(1) prioritize issuance of guidance based on the results
of the risk assessment under section 2131;
``(2) inventory existing relevant guidance;
``(3) enable the public to submit recommendations of areas
in which guidance is needed;
``(4) determine which entities should be consulted in
developing or revising the guidance;
``(5) prioritize, on a regular basis, guidance that should
be developed or revised; and
``(6) develop and disseminate the guidance in accordance
with the prioritization under paragraph (5).
``(e) Consultations.--The Secretary shall develop and revise the
guidance developed under subsection (a), and the procedures required
under subsection (d), in consultation with--
``(1) the heads of other Federal departments and agencies
that are not required to be consulted under subsection (a), as
the Secretary considers appropriate;
``(2) State, local, and tribal authorities; and
``(3) nongovernmental organizations and private industry.
``(f) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this section, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall
provide appropriate congressional committees with--
``(1) a description of the procedures established under
subsection (d);
``(2) any guidance in effect on the date of the report;
``(3) a list of entities to which the guidance described in
paragraph (2) was disseminated;
``(4) a plan for reviewing the guidance described in
paragraph (2), in accordance with subsection (e);
``(5) the prioritized list of the guidance required under
subsection (d)(4), and the methodology used by the Secretary
for such prioritization; and
``(6) a plan for developing, revising, and disseminating
the guidance.

``SEC. 2143. EXERCISES.

``(a) In General.--To facilitate recovery from a chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear attack or other incident involving
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials and to foster
collective response to terrorism, the Secretary shall develop exercises
in consultation with State, local, and tribal authorities and other
appropriate Federal agencies, and, as appropriate, in collaboration
with national level exercises, including exercises that address, to the
best knowledge available at the time, analysis, indoor environmental
cleanup methods, and decontamination standards, including those
published in the guidance issued under section 2142.
``(b) Lessons Learned for National Level Exercises.--The Secretary
shall provide electronically, to the maximum extent practicable,
lessons learned reports to each designated representative of State,
local, and tribal jurisdictions and private sector entities that
participate in National Level Exercises of the Department. Each lessons
learned report shall be tailored to convey information on that exercise
that could be leveraged to enhance preparedness and response.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of
such Act is amended by adding at the end the following new items:

``TITLE XXI--WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS

``Subtitle A--Prevention

``Sec. 2101. Weapons of mass destruction intelligence and information
sharing.
``Sec. 2102. Risk assessments.
``Sec. 2103. National Export Enforcement Coordination.
``Sec. 2104. Communication of threat information.
``Sec. 2105. Individual and community preparedness for chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear
attacks.

``Subtitle B--Protection

``Sec. 2121. Detection of biological attacks.
``Sec. 2122. Rapid biological threat detection and identification at
ports of entry.
``Sec. 2123. Evaluating detection technology.
``Sec. 2124. Domestic implementation of the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture.

``Subtitle C--Response

``Sec. 2131. First responder guidance concerning chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear attacks.
``Sec. 2132. Integrated plume modeling for collective response.
``Sec. 2133. Establishment of the system assessment and validation for
emergency responders (SAVER) program.
``Sec. 2134. Payment for laboratory response services.
``Sec. 2135. Bioforensics capabilities.
``Sec. 2136. Metropolitan Medical Response System Program.

``Subtitle D--Recovery

``Sec. 2141. Identifying and addressing gaps in recovery capabilities.
``Sec. 2142. Recovery from a chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear attack or incident.
``Sec. 2143. Exercises.''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 316 of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 195b), and the item relating to such section in
section 1(b) of such Act, are repealed.
(d) Metropolitan Medical Response Program Review.--
(1) In general.--The Administrator of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, the Chief Medical Officer of the Department
of Homeland Security, and the National Metropolitan Medical
Response System Working Group shall conduct a review of the
Metropolitan Medical Response System Program authorized under
section 2136 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by
this section, including an examination of--
(A) the extent to which the program goals and
objectives are being met;
(B) the performance metrics that can best help
assess whether the Metropolitan Medical Response System
Program is succeeding;
(C) how the Metropolitan Medical Response System
Program can be improved;
(D) how the Metropolitan Medical Response System
Program complements and enhances other preparedness
programs supported by the Department of Homeland
Security and the Department of Health and Human
Services;
(E) the degree to which the strategic goals,
objectives, and capabilities of the Metropolitan
Medical Response System Program are incorporated in
State and local homeland security plans;
(F) how eligibility for financial assistance, and
the allocation of financial assistance, under the
Metropolitan Medical Response System Program should be
determined, including how allocation of assistance
could be based on risk;
(G) implications for the Metropolitan Medical
Response System Program if it were managed as a
contractual agreement; and
(H) the resource requirements of the Metropolitan
Medical Response System Program.
(2) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator and the Chief Medical
Officer shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on the
results of the review under this section.
(3) Consultation.--The Administrator of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency shall consult with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services in the implementation of paragraph
(1)(E).
(4) Definition.--In this subsection the term ``National
Metropolitan Medical Response System Working Group'' has the
meaning that term has in section 2136 of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002, as added by this section.

SEC. 302. ENHANCING LABORATORY BIOSECURITY.

(a) Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel.--
(1) Panel.--
(A) Establishment.--The President shall establish a
permanent advisory panel to be known as the Federal
Experts Security Advisory Panel to make technical and
substantive recommendations on biological agent and
toxin security.
(B) Membership.--The members of the Panel--
(i) shall consist of the voting members
appointed under subparagraph (D) and the
nonvoting members appointed under subparagraph
(E); and
(ii) except as provided in subparagraph
(E), shall each be an official or employee of
the Federal Government.
(C) Co-chairs.--The voting members of the Panel
appointed under clauses (i), (v), and (vi) of
subparagraph (D) shall serve jointly as the Co-Chairs
of the Panel.
(D) Voting members.--The voting members of the
Panel shall consist of 1 voting representative of each
of the following Government entities, appointed (except
with respect to the National Security Council) by the
head of the respective entity:
(i) The Department of Agriculture.
(ii) The Department of Commerce.
(iii) The Department of Defense.
(iv) The Department of Energy.
(v) The Department of Health and Human
Services.
(vi) The Department of Homeland Security.
(vii) The Department of Justice.
(viii) The Department of Labor.
(ix) The Department of State.
(x) The Department of Transportation.
(xi) The Department of Veterans Affairs.
(xii) The Environmental Protection Agency.
(xiii) The National Security Council, which
shall be represented by the Special Assistant
to the President for Biodefense.
(xiv) The Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
(xv) Any other department or agency
designated by the Co-Chairs.
(E) Nonvoting members.--The nonvoting members of
the Panel shall consist of--
(i) such additional representatives of the
Government entities listed in subparagraph (D)
as may be appointed by the heads of the
respective entities; and
(ii) a representative of the public health
laboratory community or biological laboratory
community (or both).
(F) Administrative support.--The Secretary of
Health and Human Services shall provide to the Panel
such facilities, staff, and support services as may be
necessary for the Panel to carry out its
responsibilities under paragraph (2).
(2) Responsibilities.--Not later than 6 months after the
date of the enactment of this section, the Panel shall, with
respect to biological agent and toxin security, deliver to the
Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and
Homeland Security plurality recommendations, including any
statements of dissent, concerning--
(A) the designation as highest risk of that subset
of biological agents and toxins listed pursuant to
section 351A(a)(1) of the Public Health Service Act (42
U.S.C. 262a(a)(1)) that presents the greatest risk of
deliberate misuse with significant potential for mass
casualties or devastating effects to the economy,
informed by--
(i) any biological or bioterrorism risk
assessments conducted by the Department of
Homeland Security and relevant assessments by
other agencies; and
(ii) determinations made by the Secretary
of Homeland Security pursuant to section 319F-
2(c)(2)(A) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 247d-
6b(c)(2)(A));
(B) the development of a set of minimum risk-based
prescriptive laboratory security performance standards
based on the risk at the lowest level, allowing for
enhancements as risk increases;
(C) the establishment of appropriate standards and
practices to improve vetting and monitoring of, and
ensure reliability of, personnel with access to highest
risk biological agents and toxins at facilities
registered under section 351A(d) of the Public Health
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262a(d));
(D) the establishment of appropriate practices for
physical security and cyber security for facilities
that possess highest risk biological agents or toxins;
(E) standards for training of laboratory personnel
in security measures;
(F) other emerging policy issues relevant to the
security of biological agents and toxins;
(G) adequacy of information sharing protocols with
biodefense and biosecurity stakeholders; and
(H) any other security standards determined
necessary.
(b) Revision of Rules and Regulations.--
(1) Proposed rules.--The Secretaries of Health and Human
Services and Agriculture, in coordination with the Secretary of
Homeland Security, no later than 1 year after the date of
receipt of recommendations under subsection (a)(2), shall, as
appropriate, propose rules under section 351A of the Public
Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262a) establishing security
standards and procedures that are specific to highest risk
biological agents and toxins.
(2) Final rules.--The Secretaries of Health and Human
Services and Agriculture, in coordination with the Secretary of
Homeland Security, no later than 24 months after the date of
the enactment of this section, shall promulgate final rules
described in paragraph (1).
(c) Coordination of Federal Oversight.--To ensure that the Federal
Government provides for comprehensive and effective oversight of
biological agents and toxins security, the heads of the Government
entities listed in subsection (a)(1)(D) shall for facilities in which
the entity supports biological agent or toxin laboratory activities and
by no later than 6 months after the submission of recommendations under
subsection (a)(2), develop and implement a plan for the coordination of
biological agents and toxins security oversight that--
(1) articulates a mechanism for coordinated inspections of
and harmonized administrative practices for facilities
registered under section 351A(d) of the Public Health Service
Act (42 U.S.C. 262a(d)), pursuant to subsection (d) of this
section; and
(2) ensures consistent and timely identification and
resolution of biological agents and toxins security and
compliance issues.
(d) Common Inspection Procedures.--The heads of the entities listed
in subsection (a)(1)(D) shall coordinate or consolidate laboratory
inspections and ensure that such inspections are conducted using a
common set of inspection procedures across such entities in order to
minimize the administrative burden on such laboratory.
(e) Inspection Reports.--Any inspection report resulting from an
inspection described in paragraph (1) shall be available to--
(1) each Federal agency that supports biological agent or
toxin laboratory activities at the laboratory that is the
subject of the inspection report; and
(2) the laboratories that are the object of inspection.
(f) Laboratory Biosecurity Information Sharing.--
(1) Federal sharing.--The Secretaries of Health and Human
Services and Agriculture shall--
(A) develop a process for sharing of information
pertaining to biological agents and toxins with
agencies that support biological agent or toxin
laboratory activities, that identifies the purpose for
sharing, and a mechanism for securing, such
information;
(B) share relevant information pertaining to
biological agents and toxins, including identification
of laboratories possessing highest risk biological
agents and toxins, and compliance issues with the
Secretary of Homeland Security; and
(C) share relevant information pertaining to
biological agents and toxins, including identification
of laboratories possessing highest risk biological
agents and toxins, with appropriate State, local, and
tribal government authorities, including law
enforcement authorities and emergency response
providers.
(2) Classified and sensitive information.--The Secretaries
of Agriculture and Health and Human Services shall ensure that
any information disseminated under this section is handled
consistently with--
(A) the authority of the Director of National
Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and
methods under the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and related procedures or similar
authorities of the Attorney General concerning
sensitive law enforcement information;
(B) section 552a of title 5, United States Code
(commonly referred to as the ``Privacy Act of 1974'');
and
(C) other relevant laws.
(g) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The terms ``biological agent'' and ``toxin'' refer to a
biological agent or toxin, respectively, listed pursuant to
section 351A(a)(1) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
262(a)(1)).
(2) The term ``highest risk'' means, with respect to a
biological agent or toxin, designated as highest risk as
described in subsection (a)(2)(A).
(3) The term ``Panel'' means the Federal Experts Security
Advisory Panel under subsection (a).
(4) The term ``State, local, and tribal'' has the same
meaning that term has in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 101 et seq.).

SEC. 303. DEFINITIONS.

Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101) is
amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(19) The term `Intelligence Community' has the meaning
given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
``(20) The term `national biosecurity and biodefense
stakeholders' means officials from the Federal, State, local,
and tribal authorities and individuals from the private sector
who are involved in efforts to prevent, protect against,
respond to, and recover from a biological attack or other
biological incidents that may have serious health or economic
consequences for the United States, including wide-scale
fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks.''.

SEC. 304. DUAL-USE TERRORIST RISKS FROM SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the field
of synthetic biology has the potential to facilitate enormous gains in
fundamental discovery, public health, and biotechnological
applications, but that it also presents inherent dual-use homeland
security risks that must be managed.
(b) Assessment of Risk.--Not less frequently than once every two
years, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under
Secretary for Science and Technology, shall undertake a risk assessment
of the dual-use and other risks associated with synthetic biology.
(c) Establishment of Guidance.--Not later than six months after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall develop and
provide to the heads of all departments and agencies that fund life
sciences research, guidance on compliance with United States laws, arms
control agreements to which the United States is a party or signatory,
and individual department and agency policy, including consideration
of--
(1) best practices for establishing a department or agency
process that achieves compliance for department or agency
research, development, or acquisition projects in the life
sciences;
(2) the types of projects that should be assessed;
(3) at what stage or stages such projects should be
assessed; and
(4) means for preventing the release of homeland or
national security information.
(d) Research and Development.--Based upon the findings of the risk
assessment undertaken in accordance with subsection (b), the Under
Secretary may conduct research into the risks and ways to mitigate such
risks of synthetic biology, including--
(1) determining the current capability of synthetic nucleic
acid providers to effectively differentiate a legitimate
customer from a potential terrorist or other malicious actor;
(2) determining the current capability of synthetic nucleic
acid providers to effectively screen orders for sequences of
homeland security concern; and
(3) making recommendations regarding screening software,
protocols, and other remaining capability gaps uncovered by
such risk assessment.

SEC. 305. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ANALYZED BY THE DEPARTMENT TO
STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL, AND PRIVATE ENTITIES WITH
RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO HOMELAND SECURITY.

Section 201(d)(8) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
121(d)(8)) is amended by striking ``and to agencies of State'' and all
that follows and inserting ``to State, local, tribal, and private
entities with such responsibilities, and, as appropriate, to the
public, in order to assist in preventing, deterring, or responding to
acts of terrorism against the United States.''.

TITLE IV--PUBLIC HEALTH MATTERS

SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING FEDERAL COORDINATION ON MEDICAL
COUNTERMEASURES.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) 10 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, and 7 years after enactment of the Project BioShield Act
of 2004 (Public Law 108-276), coordination among Federal
agencies involved in activities relating to researching,
developing, and acquiring medical countermeasures still needs
improvement; and
(2) aggressive action should be taken by the Department of
Health and Human Services (in particular, the heads of the
National Institutes of Health, the Biomedical Advanced Research
and Development Authority, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, and the Food and Drug Administration), the
Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense
to foster greater coordination with respect to such activities,
including adoption of an interagency agreement that sets forth
the relative areas of responsibility with respect to
establishing medical countermeasure requirements and
researching, developing, and acquiring medical countermeasures
to meet those requirements.

SEC. 402. NATIONAL MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURE DISPENSING STRATEGY.

Title III of the Public Health Service Act is amended by inserting
after section 319F-4 (42 U.S.C. 247d-6e) the following:

``SEC. 319F-5. NATIONAL MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURE DISPENSING STRATEGY.

``(a) Definitions.--In this section--
``(1) the term `dispense' means to provide medical
countermeasures to an affected population in response to a
threat or incident; and
``(2) the term `medical countermeasure' means a qualified
countermeasure (as defined in section 319F-1(a)(2)).
``(b) Strategy.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary, in coordination with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Agriculture,
and other appropriate Federal agencies, shall develop,
implement, and, as appropriate, periodically update a National
Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy to enhance
preparedness and collective response to a terrorist attack on
humans or animals with any chemical, biological, radiological,
or nuclear material, that delineates Federal, State, and local
responsibilities.
``(2) Considerations.--The strategy shall be sufficiently
flexible to meet the unique needs of different communities,
including first responders, and shall consider--
``(A) a variety of options for dispensing medical
countermeasures, including to individuals, schools,
universities, hospitals, and elderly care facilities;
``(B) post-incident requirements for emergency use
authorizations before countermeasures can be
distributed legally;
``(C) the inclusion of locally held caches of
countermeasures in event-specific authorizations
covering federally held countermeasures of the same
type; and
``(D) distribution to the public of home medical
kits for personal stockpiling purposes, within 30 days
after a domestic or international bioterrorist attack
resulting in human infection.
``(c) Coordination.--The Secretary shall coordinate with the
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, State, local,
and tribal authorities, representatives from the private sector, and
nongovernmental organizations on the National Medical Countermeasures
Dispensing Strategy.
``(d) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this section, the Secretary shall submit the National
Medical Countermeasures Dispensing Strategy to the appropriate
congressional committees.''.

SEC. 403. NATIONAL PRE-EVENT VACCINATION AND ANTIMICROBIAL DISPENSING
POLICY REVIEW.

(a) Requirement.--The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary
of Agriculture, shall review the adequacy of domestic vaccination and
antimicrobial dispensing policy, guidance, and information provided to
the public in light of any known terrorist risk of a biological attack
or other phenomena that may have serious health consequences for the
United States, including wide-scale fatalities or infectious disease
outbreaks including outbreaks associated with the avian flu. In
carrying out the review under this section, the Secretary shall
consider--
(1) terrorism risk assessments under section 2102 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by this Act, and
material threat assessments and determinations under the
Project Bioshield Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-276) and the
amendments made by that Act;
(2) reports on global trends and intelligence produced by
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the
Intelligence Community regarding biological threats;
(3) the availability of federally provided vaccines and
antimicrobials to dispense to first responders and the public,
on a voluntary basis, in anticipation of a biological attack;
(4) applicability of Federal shelf-life extension programs
to locally held stockpiles of medical countermeasures, to the
extent that information on local stockpiles is available;
(5) making expiring products available to appropriate
international organizations or foreign partners once the
requests of domestic stakeholders have been fulfilled;
(6) the implications of pre-event vaccination and
antimicrobial dispensing to livestock; and
(7) mechanisms to increase coordination between the
Strategic National Stockpile established under section 319F-2
of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247D-6b) and the
National Veterinary Stockpile that would enhance vaccination
and dispensing capabilities.
(b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall report to
the appropriate congressional committees on the review required by
subsection (a), together with any recommendations relating to the
availability of domestic vaccine and antimicrobials for disbursing to
the public and voluntary immunization by first responders.

SEC. 404. MANAGEMENT OF SHORT SHELF LIFE VACCINE AND ANTIMICROBIAL
STOCKPILES.

The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall make available
surplus vaccines and antimicrobials, and vaccines and antimicrobials
with short shelf lives, from the strategic national stockpile under
section 319F-2(a) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d-
6b(a)) to State, local, and tribal first responders, including health
care responders, for administration to such responders who voluntarily
consent to such administration, and shall--
(1) establish any necessary logistical and tracking systems
to facilitate making such vaccines and antimicrobials so
available; and
(2) distribute disclosures regarding associated risks to
end users.

SEC. 405. MATERIAL THREAT DETERMINATIONS REVIEWS.

Section 319F-2(c)(2)(A) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
Sec 247d-6b(c)(2)(A)) is amended--
(1) in clause (i), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii);
(3) by inserting after clause (i) the following:
``(ii) establish criteria for the issuance
of a material threat determination;'';
(4) in clause (iii), as so redesignated, by striking the
period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and
(5) by adding at the end the following:
``(iv) review and reassess determinations
under clause (iii) to determine whether agents
continue to present a material threat against
the United States population sufficient to
affect national security and homeland
security.''.

SEC. 406. BACKGROUND CHECKS.

Section 351A(e)(3)(A) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
262a(e)(3)(A)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``In
identifying whether an individual is within a category specified in
subparagraph (B)(ii)(II), the Attorney General shall consult with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Secretary of State to determine whether these officials possess any
information relevant to the identification of such an individual by the
Attorney General.''.

SEC. 407. STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL DEFINED.

In this title, the term ``State, local, and tribal'' has the same
meaning that term has in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
101 et seq.).

TITLE V--FOREIGN RELATIONS MATTERS

SEC. 501. INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT TO ENHANCE BIODEFENSE AND LABORATORY
BIOSECURITY.

The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Special Assistant
to the President for Biodefense, and the heads of appropriate Federal
agencies, shall, as appropriate--
(1) support efforts of other countries to establish and
build capacity to effectively implement legislation
criminalizing the development or use of biological weapons or
acts of bioterrorism;
(2) engage other countries and international
nongovernmental entities to develop and establish common
standards, guidance, and best practices for actions relevant to
preventing acts of bioterrorism and the illicit use of life
sciences;
(3) support the efforts of other countries to enhance
biosecurity and safety practices at laboratories and other
facilities with materials that could be used in biological
weapons or in an act of bioterrorism;
(4) promote the development and adoption of international
guidance for the safety and security of high-risk pathogens and
toxins; and
(5) promote information sharing relating to threats and
best practices between the intelligence community, Federal law
enforcement, and international law enforcement and security
officials.

SEC. 502. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION AND INFORMATION SHARING RELATING
TO BIOSECURITY.

The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, and the heads of other appropriate Federal
agencies, shall, as appropriate--
(1) support efforts in other countries and regions to
develop mechanisms and capabilities for reporting to United
Nations organizations validated data on biological attacks or
other phenomena that may have serious health consequences for
the United States, including wide-scale fatalities or
infectious disease outbreaks;
(2) engage other Federal and nongovernmental entities and
other countries to advance awareness and understanding of the
risk posed by information derived from the life sciences that
has the potential for misuse to cause harm, and advance
recommendations on how best to address such risk;
(3) engage such entities and countries to promote greater
awareness and understanding of the global availability of and
access to life science technologies and materials; and
(4) promote the development and use of mechanisms for
reporting, preserving, and sharing data on Federal programs and
investments in international scientific, agricultural, medical,
and public health collaborations in support of efforts to
enhance global biosecurity.

SEC. 503. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON BEST PRACTICES FOR GLOBAL
BIOPREPAREDNESS.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
preparedness for a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
incident must be undertaken not only domestically but also
internationally. Specifically, there is a need for a global
preparedness architecture for such an event. Congress supports efforts
to provide an international forum for discussion of key health security
policies with international dimensions, and the establishment of a
formal United States interagency task force to develop best practices
and recommendations for implementation of a global preparedness
architecture could enhance global preparedness.
(b) Establishment of Task Force.--The Secretary of State shall
convene and lead an interagency task force to examine--
(1) the state of global biopreparedness for a major
biological event;
(2) necessary components of a global biopreparedness
architecture that would advance international health security,
including considerations of--
(A) risk assessments;
(B) prevention;
(C) protection;
(D) regional stockpiling of medical
countermeasures, including considerations of--
(i) security of the stockpile;
(ii) preservation of the stockpile through
effective detection and diagnosis, shelf life
extension programs, and other means;
(iii) delivery planning; and
(iv) legal considerations for implementing
such an architecture;
(E) response and attribution;
(F) other elements that should be a component of
such an architecture; and
(G) obstacles to implementing such an architecture;
(3) best practices for preparedness based on lessons
learned from domestic efforts to address the above issues, and
that may be applicable internationally;
(4) activities undertaken through the National Intelligence
Strategy for Countering Biological Threats developed under
section 202 and the International Health Regulations 2005, as
well as other activities deemed relevant by the task force; and
(5) the utility of working through existing international
forums as a mechanism for distributing this information to the
international community.
(c) Membership.--Members of the task force shall include
representatives from--
(1) the Department of Homeland Security;
(2) the Department of Health and Human Services, including
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
(3) the Department of Agriculture;
(4) the Department of Defense;
(5) the Department of Justice;
(6) the Department of State;
(7) the Director of National Intelligence;
(8) other Federal departments and agencies, as determined
appropriate by the Secretary; and
(9) national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholder
community, including from the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries, and the diagnostic laboratory community, as
determined by the Secretary.
(d) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the findings of the task force
established under this section.

SEC. 504. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION.

The Secretary of State shall--
(1) promote confidence in effective implementation of and
compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction
(commonly referred to as the ``Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention'') by the States party to the Convention by
promoting transparency with respect to legitimate activities
and pursuing compliance diplomatically to address concerns;
(2) promote universal membership in the Convention;
(3) develop an action plan for increasing international
adherence to the Convention; and
(4) ensure that United States participation in Convention
meetings is broadly inclusive of representatives of relevant
Federal departments and agencies.
Union Calendar No. 510

112th CONGRESS

2d Session

H. R. 2356

[Report No. 112-665, Part I]

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To enhance homeland security by improving efforts to prevent, protect
against, respond to, and recover from an attack with a weapon of mass
destruction, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

November 30, 2012

The Committees on Energy and Commerce, Transportation and
Infrastructure, Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and Science, Space, and Technology discharged; committed
to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and
ordered to be printed