I rise in opposition to the bill and to the underlying rule. To put it simply in the minute that I have, this bill needlessly puts in jeopardy the health and safety of workers and residents who live…
I rise in opposition to the bill and to the underlying rule.
To put it simply in the minute that I have, this bill needlessly puts in jeopardy the health and safety of workers and residents who live near nuclear weapons facilities. Congressman Visclosky, Congresswoman Sanchez, and I offered an amendment to fix these dangerous flaws. But today's rule will not allow that amendment onto the floor.
Our amendment recognized that these facilities pose unique challenges when it comes to health and safety. They are ultrahazardous. They make plutonium pits, handle bomb-grade uranium, and manage high explosives. If the worst were to happen, the American taxpayer is on the hook for any nuclear event, even if the contractor that operates the facility engages in gross misconduct. To protect workers, residents, and taxpayers, we need to ask that contractors live up to the highest standards of safety. This legislation does not do that.
I want to commend the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern) for trying to get this amendment made in order in the Rules Committee. It's an important amendment. We're hearing from workers in these facilities all
across the country that we're removing a critical margin of safety for them, that we're turning this over to contractors and lessening the safety standards across these plants and removing the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Energy. This bill should be rejected for what it does to these workers.
These are some groups submitting letters opposing changes to nuclear safety protections in H.R. 4310:
1. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
2. Alliance of Nuclear Worker Advocacy Groups
3. Alliance for Nuclear Accountability
4. Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL CIO
5. Metal Trades Department, AFL CIO
6. United Steelworkers
7. Laborers International Union of North America
8. Communications Workers of America
9. National Treasury Employees Union
10. Project on Government Oversight
Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board,
Washington, DC, May 7, 2012.
Hon. Loretta Sanchez,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee
on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Rayburn
House Office Bldg., Washington, DC.
Dear Congresswoman Sanchez: Thank you for the opportunity
to provide input and comments on HR4310, the FY 2013 National
Defense Authorization bill, particularly with regard to the
sections in Title 32 that affect nuclear safety, and the
Board's oversight mission, operations and budget capacity.
I'm convinced that the legislation, if enacted, will weaken
current independent nuclear safety oversight and enforcement
at DOE's defense nuclear facilities. I have spent my entire
career spanning more than 40 years supporting the national
security programs of the United States. Nothing would sadden
me more than seeing that mission compromised by threats to
public and worker safety resulting from lapses in safety.
As you know, I presently serve as Chairman of the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board), having been
appointed by President Bush to the Board in 2006 and later
reappointed as its Chairman by President Obama in 2010. I
have 43 years of experience as a scientist and engineer in
the field of radiation effects science, technology, and
hardness assurance in support of military and space systems.
I was elected a Fellow of the Institute of Electrical and
Electronic Engineers and the American Physical Society, and
was selected as one of the most highly cited researchers in
Engineering by the Institute for Scientific Information,
which lists the 250 most highly cited researchers in the
world in given scientific fields. I have been honored with
the 2000 IEEE Millennium Medal, IEEE Nuclear & Plasma
Sciences Merit and Shea Award, R&D 100 Awards, Industry
Week's Top 25 Technologies of Year, and Discover Award, and
many prize-winning papers. I have authored 140 publications
in the open refereed literature, including more than 30
invited papers, book chapters, and presentations.
The Board provides the only independent safety oversight at
DOE's defense nuclear facilities. As Chairman of the Board I
am proud of the safety record of the DOE and the role that
the Board has played over the last 23 years. There is no
question that the defense nuclear facilities complex is in a
safer posture now than when the Board commenced operations in
the late 1980's. However, we cannot ignore the current and
emerging challenges that will define the future of DOE's
defense nuclear facilities, the need for federal stewardship
of this enterprise, and the federal commitment to protect the
health and safety of the workers and the public. Today's
challenges of aged infrastructure, design and construction of
new and replacement facilities, and the undertaking of a wide
variety of new activities in defense nuclear facilities
coupled with ongoing mission support activities require
continued vigilance in safety oversight to assure public and
worker protection. A nuclear safety incident cannot be
tolerated and would do irreparable harm to the stockpile
stewardship and legacy waste missions of the Department of
Energy.
This legislation contains significant changes to the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Act and the
Board's Enabling Statute that would put NNSA and DOE's
national security mission in jeopardy. The proposed changes,
if enacted, would amount to Congress concluding that NNSA
does not need independent safety oversight. It would all but
erase the Board's independence and authority with respect to
safety oversight of NNSA defense nuclear facilities and
activities. Changes to the Atomic Energy Act would lower the
standard used to ensure adequate protection of public safety.
The legislation endorses a strong shift toward contractor
self-regulation, which is not justified based on the present
maturity of contractor assurance systems but, even more
importantly, neuters the inherent responsibility of the
government to ensure public and worker safety. This
responsibility cannot be delegated by NNSA to its
contractors. Finally, the President's ability to direct
NNSA's operations through the Secretary of Energy would also
be much reduced. Let me address a few of these concerns in
more detail.
Section 3113 of the bill gives the NNSA Administrator
complete authority to establish and conduct oversight of NNSA
activities outside of that already established by the
Secretary of Energy. The Administrator develops a system of
governance, management, and oversight, of covered contractors
and ensures that any and all Federal Agencies comply with
this system. Clearly, this vacates the notion of independent
oversight, which should be of grave concern to the Congress.
Other agencies that presently provide oversight include the
Board, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Environmental
Protection Agency, Department of Transportation, and the
Occupational and Safety Health Agency (OSHA). Some examples
of undesirable consequences of the proposed language include:
The Board will be unable to provide effective safety
oversight.
The NRC will be precluded from conducting license-related
oversight activities associated with operation of the MOX
facility.
NNSA itself will be precluded from conducting Operational
Readiness Reviews, Integrated Safety Management System
Verifications, and Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies.
Section 3113 of the Bill further directs the NNSA
Administrator to ``conduct oversight based on outcomes and
performance-based standards rather than transactional
oversight.'' I am convinced this model is inappropriate for
oversight of complex, high-hazard nuclear operations at
defense nuclear facilities. NNSA defines ``transactional
oversight'' as activities that assess contractor performance
through evaluating contractor activities at the work, task,
or facility level; direct interaction with personnel at any
level within the contractor organization; and direct
independent Federal staff evaluation of activities, physical
conditions, and contractor documentation. [NA 1 SD 226.1A,
NNSA Line Oversight and Contractor Assurance System
Supplemental Directive] Clearly, transactional oversight is
essential at the Pantex Plant where nuclear weapons are
assembled, disassembled, and undergo surveillance. It is
also essential for plutonium operations at the Los Alamos
Plutonium Facility, highly-enriched uranium operations at
the Y 12 National Security Complex, and for complex, high-
hazard nuclear operations at the Nevada National Security
Site, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Sandia
National Laboratories. For these activities, anything
other than transactional oversight is irresponsible and
will jeopardize the NNSA mission. The government cannot
delegate its responsibility to ensure public and worker
safety to its contractors.
I think it is important to understand that a system based
on ``outcomes'' is inappropriate in safety space. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission uses performance-based regulation to
improve effectiveness and efficiency, but not where failure
to meet a performance criterion can result in an immediate
safety concern. For safety, a system of ``leading
indicators'' to prevent accidents is required. For complex,
high-hazard nuclear operations, a performance-based outcome
approach may appear successful on the surface, but underlying
weaknesses in processes can eventually lead to serious
accidents and unwanted results. A significant body of
information on this subject is available in both the
commercial and academic sectors; it was also explored in the
series of public meetings and hearings that led to issuance
of the Board's Recommendation 2004 1, Oversight of Complex,
High-Hazard Nuclear Operations.
The Board has devoted considerable resources in the past
few years to understand activity-level work planning and
control. We have teamed with the Department and NNSA to
understand the challenges of writing and implementing
procedures that account for hazards in the workplace and the
controls necessary to mitigate those hazards. There are many
challenges to implementing those procedures that must account
for a wide range of human factors. The inescapable conclusion
is that the key to worker safety is the ability to faithfully
and repeatedly execute procedures. A procedure is only the
starting point. A system of transactional oversight is the
only way to ensure the safe execution of work through the
effective implementation of procedures.
I believe one of the contributing factors that lead the
House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee to propose
this legislation was a basic misunderstanding of the
testimony it received at the its February 16, 2012 hearing on
``Governance, Oversight, and Management of the Nuclear
Security Enterprise.'' At that hearing, Dr. Shank, Co-Chair
of the Committee to Review the Quality of the Management and
of the Science and Engineering Research at the Department of
Energy's National Security Laboratories, testified about the
scope of this review and its conclusions. One concern and
associated conclusion is embodied in this legislation, i.e.,
the need to ``conduct oversight based on outcomes and
performance-based standards rather than transactional
oversight.'' However, when the Board subsequently met with
Dr. Shank, it became clear that his review committee did not
look at defense nuclear facilities at any of the
laboratories. Dr. Shank explained that the committee focused
on management of science, not safety, and not production
facilities. The review was focused on the need for the
laboratories to do research more efficiently and effectively,
and improve morale at the laboratories. The
committee did not review complex, high-hazard nuclear
operations or any high-consequence operations. In my opinion,
this testimony should not be used as the basis to argue
against the need for independent oversight or eliminate
transactional oversight at defense nuclear facilities.
For the record, the Board's staff asked about the
significance of Appendix 3 to the Committee's report,
``Review of Relevant Studies and Reports 1995 2010.''
Appendix 3 is the only part of the report that discusses the
Board. Dr. Shank characterized Appendix 3 as an add-on and
not part of the report. The Board's staff followed up with
Mr. Shaw, Project Director, on April 20, 2012, to understand
this distinction. Mr. Shaw explained that he and his staff of
research assistants prepared Appendix 3 as background
material for the committee. The appendices are a compilation
of lines of inquiry or questions that the Committee members
raised as the study progressed, and items for which Mr. Shaw
and his staff thought they needed to provide more background
information to the Committee members to understand what had
been presented. He informed the Board's staff that, to comply
with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, that information
along withal! other such material provided to the committee
were included as appendices to the report. However, he
reiterated that they should not be viewed as the work of the
committee or representative of the Committee's conclusions.
The proposed legislation requires the Board and NNSA to use
a new health and safety standard. More specifically, Sections
3115 and 3202 of the legislation establish a new lower
standard for protection of the public in proximity to DOE's
defense nuclear facilities. (As discussed below, Section 3202
of the bill deals with ``Improvements to the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board.'') The new standard ``ensures that
risks to . . . the health and safety of the general public .
. . are as low as practicable and that adequate protection is
provided.'' (Please note that in Section 3115 the risks are
``as low as practical,'' while in Section 3202 the risks are
as low as reasonably practical.'') This standard lowers the
protections presently provided to the public by the NRC for
commercial nuclear power and by the Board in making
recommendations to the Secretary of Energy, which is to
``ensure adequate protection of the public.'' The legislation
proposes the Secretary or Administrator can perform a cost-
benefit analysis to determine the need to provide adequate
protection of the public. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, has always been clear that the Secretary must
provide adequate protection to the public and that cost is
not an element of adequate protection. However, cost can be
considered in determining the need for safety margin or
defense in depth, i.e., additional protections beyond the
need for adequate protection. The application of the ``as low
as [reasonably] practicable'' standard is unclear. It has
been used in British and European law as a modified cost-
benefit analysis, but has no standing in U.S. law. It is also
unclear why the public safety should be subjected to
considerations by the Secretary or Administrator of whether
risks are as low as [reasonably] practical.
The Board provides the only independent safety oversight at
DOE's defense nuclear facilities. In addition, the Board has
unique responsibilities under its statute to address ``severe
or imminent'' threats to the public. I would now like to
comment on Section 3202 of the bill: ``Improvements to the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.'' Let me say
categorically that these are not improvements. I believe
these provisions in the bill arise from a total
misunderstanding of the operation of the Board. I feel
strongly that these ``improvements'' to the Board's Enabling
Statute will degrade nuclear safety at DOE's defense nuclear
facilities. Let me once again detail my concerns.
To begin with, the Board is a collegial body composed of
five members appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate who are respected experts in the field of nuclear
safety. Since the Board's inception nearly 23 years ago,
every Board letter or recommendation has been voted on and
approved by each and every Board Member. Those familiar with
the scientific discipline will readily understand that this
involves a great deal of respect and camaraderie among the
Board members to enable them to unravel complex technical
issues and forcefully act on safety concerns. One aspect of
these bill's improvements is to allow Board members ``to
employ at least one technical advisor.'' This is unnecessary
on two counts. The first is that Board members have full
access to all the Board's staff. Board members already have
80 technical advisors. The second is that Board members are
technical experts who are able to independently weigh
technical evidence and make decisions important to safety at
DOE's defense nuclear facilities. A system of advisors will
simply place an unnecessary burden on Board resources and
create dissension.
A provision in Section 3202 requires that all Board members
``have full, simultaneous access to all information relating
to the performance of the Board's functions, powers and
mission.'' This provision is simply unworkable and argues
against the public interest and trust. For example, the
Technical Director must inform the Board Chairman about a
serious accident at a defense nuclear facility, even if other
Board members are not immediately available. The Board always
strives to share all available information with all Board
members. The Board members are always collectively briefed by
DOE and Board staff, but Board members sometimes have
conflicting schedules and aren't available for the
``simultaneous'' exchange of information . The origins of
this provision suggest a serious lack of knowledge about the
operation of the Board.
Under this legislation, the Board ``shall consider and
specifically assess the technical and economic feasibility,
the cost and benefits, and the practicability of implementing
[its Recommendations].'' Under its existing statute, the
Board must consider the technical and economic feasibility of
implementing its recommended measures. The Secretary of
Energy may ``accept'' a Board recommendation but make a
determination that its implementation is impracticable
because of budgetary considerations or because the
implementation would affect the Secretary's ability to meet
the annual nuclear weapons stockpile requirements. The
Secretary must report any such decision to the President and
Congress. The Secretary of Energy has never made a
determination that a Board Recommendation cannot be
implemented due to budget impracticability. I believe this is
strong evidence that we have executed our statute in a
faithful and responsible manner.
Issues of cost and benefit have historically been the
purview of the Secretary of Energy and should remain so. It
is important to note that the Board nominally identifies the
problem, but leaves selection of the solution to the
Secretary. In order to provide a cost-benefit analysis, the
Board would need to define a solution, which is inappropriate
and would hamper the Secretary's flexibilities to respond to
a Board recommendation. Mr. Gene Aloise, Director of Natural
Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability
Office, testified at the Committee's February 16, 2012,
hearing on Governance, Oversight, and Management of the
Nuclear Security Enterprise. He said, ``NNSA currently lacks
the basic financial information on the total costs to operate
and maintain its essential facilities and infrastructure,
leaving it unable to identify return on investment or
opportunities for cost savings.'' If NNSA isn't capable of
performing cost-benefit analyses, it's unreasonable to expect
the Board to produce valid estimates of those costs. Needless
to say, the Board would require a significant increase in
budget and manpower to perform any meaningful cost-benefit
analysis.
The Board is very mindful of the need for efficient and
cost-effective solutions to safety problems at defense
nuclear facilities. In evaluating the proper course of action
for existing facilities that do not meet modern industry
standards and design requirements, both the Board and DOE
consider the entire suite of options for mitigating hazards
as well as factors such as the remaining life of the
facilities, schedules for replacing them, and means to
mitigate disruptions to ongoing operations that may result
from recommended safety improvements. However, the Board has
no authority to specify a particular solution; that authority
is the Secretary's.
The proposed legislation also weakens the arm's length
relationship between the Board and Department of Energy
necessary for the Board to provide independent oversight by
requiring the Board to obtain DOE review and comments on
Board recommendations. This proposed requirement will enable
the Secretary to provide comments to Board recommendations
prior to their issuance. Board recommendations are fully
vetted by intense staff-level discussions that typically take
place over months and sometimes years. The Board shapes its
recommendation already fully taking into account the feedback
it has received from the Department. In the final analysis,
the Secretary has the power to accept or reject a Board
recommendation. This provision to require comments from the
Secretary will delay needed safety improvements to ensure
adequate protection of the public at DOE's defense nuclear
facilities and erode public confidence that the Board is
faithfully executing its mission to provide truly independent
oversight.
Under its existing statute, the Board's jurisdiction is
limited to the Department of Energy's defense nuclear
facilities. ``Defense Nuclear Facilities'' are defined to
include production or utilization facilities, and certain
types of storage facilities under the control or jurisdiction
of the Secretary of Energy. Unless this element is met, the
Board's jurisdiction, authority, powers or duties are not
triggered. It does not allow the Board to write
Recommendations to the NNSA Administrator. Under this
legislation, NNSA may become a separate entity. An NNSA
independent from the Department of Energy, where the
Secretary of Energy would have no authority over NNSA, would
defeat (1) the Board's recommendation jurisdiction, (2) the
Board's jurisdiction and duty to report to the President in
the case of imminent or severe threats issuing from defense
nuclear facilities, and (3) the Board's information gathering
jurisdiction. Essentially, the NNSA would have no independent
safety oversight body.
The Department of Energy has a well-established regulatory
structure, with a significant body of rules, orders, manuals,
and standards. These would have no standing in an independent
NNSA. The set of safety standards to be used in NNSA would
have to be reconstituted. Based on recent experience,
I am concerned that many standards necessary to safely
perform complex, high-hazard nuclear operations would be
automatically deleted as a part of standing up this newly
independent organization. It must be understood that the
Board evaluates safety at defense nuclear facilities based on
DOE's requirements and standards. The Board does not have
separate requirements. Lack of an adequate set of safety
standards would rapidly degrade safety at defense nuclear
facilities.
In summary, I am deeply concerned that the proposed
legislation will diminish both the effectiveness of the Board
and safety at DOE's defense nuclear facilities. The proposed
changes, if enacted, would all but erase the Board's
oversight independence and authority with respect to NNSA's
facilities and activities. NNSA would become essentially
self-regulating without any significant oversight from the
Secretary of Energy, the Board, or any other Federal entity.
Additional provisions in the legislation encourage the NNSA
in large part to delegate its inherent responsibility to
protect public and worker safety to its contractors.
If I can answer any question or provide additional
insights, please don't hesitate to call. Once again, I
appreciate the opportunity to provide my views on this
legislation.
Sincerely,
Peter S. Winokur, Ph.D.,
Chairman,
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.