PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, nearly 10 years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, every one of us in the Senate knows America continues to face threats of terrorism. Our allies know this, as well. The President's dogged pursuit and success earlier this month against Osama bin Laden does not mean we can become complacent or less vigilant. We must remain vigilant and ensure the men and women of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies have all the appropriate tools necessary to protect our Nation and the American people. But as every Vermonter knows, tools are only useful if they are regularly checked and maintained. Otherwise they become blunt instruments that can do harm, rather than accomplish the job.

Congress recognized this basic notion in 2001, when we first wrote the USA PATRIOT Act. I worked with the then-Republican House majority leader, Dick Armey to include sunsets on certain surveillance authorities in the bill. Even though we had vastly different political philosophies, we both agreed we had to have sunset provisions. In 2006, when Congress reauthorized the USA PATRIOT Act, I worked to ensure that certain sunsets were renewed, and added audits on the use of powers with the potential to unnecessarily intrude on the privacy of Americans. We should not give a blank check to anybody--whether it is a Republican or Democratic administration. We are, after all, Americans who believe in our individual liberties.

Having granted the Government broad authority to gather vast amounts of information about the daily lives of Americans, I wanted to do what we could to ensure that unfettered information gathering did not occur at the expense of Americans' basic constitutional rights and civil liberties. The sunsets and audits provide Congress an opportunity to examine whether the PATRIOT Act tools are being used appropriately, and if not, to sharpen, refine, or restrain those tools accordingly.

The audits we added in 2005 or 2006 proved to be very helpful because they identified that there were abuses in the way the PATRIOT Act was being used, specifically with respect to national security letters and the use of ``exigent letters.'' Without this oversight, we probably never would have found out about those abuses. But we found out about them and we worked with the FBI to correct those matters.

That brings us to today. The Senate has the opportunity to reexamine and redefine key PATRIOT Act provisions, and I think we should take that opportunity to make improvements to our

current law. That is why I have led the Senate Judiciary Committee to diligently consider these matters through a series of hearings and meetings. The committee responded by reporting improvements, both last year and again this year, through bipartisan legislation. They are good measures, and we have worked to ensure that they would not compromise the effectiveness of our law enforcement and intelligence capabilities. In fact, much of the language was derived after consultation with the administration, including the intelligence community.

The Attorney General and others have repeatedly assured us that the measures to enhance oversight and accountability--such as audits and public reporting--would not sacrifice ``the operational effectiveness and flexibility needed to protect our citizens from terrorism'' or undermine ``the collection of vital foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information.''

In fact, the Attorney General has consistently said the bill passed out by the Senate Judiciary Committee struck ``a good balance'' by extending the PATRIOT Act authorities while adding accountability and civil liberties protections. For additional detail and legislative history, I refer Senators to the Senate report on the bill reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee this year, Senate Report No. 112-13.

I ask unanimous consent that a December 9, 2010, letter from the Attorney General to me making these points be printed in the Record, along with a February 19, 2010, letter from the Director of National Intelligence to House leaders.

Unfortunately, the bill now before the Senate merely extends the expiring authorities to June 1, 2015. Regrettably, these authorities have not been refined since 2006. If that remains the case through the extensions that are contemplated by this bill, it will amount to 9 years of this law without any legislative improvement. I think most of us understand that we can do better. The amendment I have filed seeks to change that by improving the PATRIOT Act.

I appreciate the efforts made by the majority leader to craft a compromise. I am sorry that the Republican leadership in Congress has insisted on an extension of authorities without any improvements. The amendment I have filed and wish to offer along with Senators Paul, Cardin, Bingaman, Coons, Shaheen, Wyden, Franken, Gillibrand, Harkin, Durbin, Merkley, Boxer, and Akaka, makes significant improvements to current law, promotes transparency, and expands privacy and civil liberties safeguards.

I ask unanimous consent to have a sectional analysis of the amendment printed in the Record.

One of the improvements Congress should make is to repair a constitutional infirmity in the current law. Three years ago, in Doe v. Mukasey, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the nondisclosure provision of the statute authorizing issuance of national security letters was constitutionally defective. If we do not make a change, that constitutionally defective part of the national security letter provision would remain. As part of the comprehensive set of reforms in the bill reported favorably by the Judiciary Committee, I proposed a simple statutory fix that would enable the FBI to obtain the information it needs, while addressing the constitutional concerns. In fact, this proposal has never been controversial. In fact, during the last Congress, Senator Sessions and Senator Bond, the ranking Republicans on the Senate Judiciary and Intelligence Committees, cosponsored a bill incorporating the very legislative remedy I proposed.

This is a straightforward matter that needs to be fixed. The underlying bill does not fix the problem; our amendment would. I trust Senators would not want to proceed to vote on an unconstitutional law, one that violates our fundamental charter as a nation and, of course, the liberty of all Americans. No one who claims to honor the Constitution should proceed in so cavalier a manner. If we are to restore the constitutional underpinning of the NSL authority, the Senate should adopt this needed improvement.

I am also troubled by the refusal of the Republican leadership to agree on periodic audits on the use by the government of PATRIOT Act surveillance authorities. When I speak of the Republican position, I want to mention that this is not uniform within the Republican Party, as there are many Republicans who believe we should have these audits. Basic transparency and accountability are vital to ensuring that the government does not overstep its legal authority. We grant many authorities to our government, but we should do so with the confidence that if the Government oversteps its authority, Congress has the power to bring it back in line. In fact, it is only because of the audits that were mandated by the 2006 PATRIOT Act reauthorization bill that the American public became aware of some of the abuses and misuses of the national security letters, which were significant.

Without that public accountability and congressional oversight, the FBI would not have made improvements to its system of tracking NSL issuance. Because of those audits, we are more confident today that FBI agents are following proper procedures for obtaining private information about Americans--rather than improperly using ``exigent letters'' to circumvent the rules, or using Post-it Notes to keep track of records. Yet the underlying bill omits audits and public reporting; our amendment includes important audit requirements and public reporting to provide accountability and protect Americans' rights.

No one can seriously contend that audits by the inspector general of past operations present any operational concerns to law enforcement or intelligence gathering. Audits do not interfere; they provide accountability and ensure that government follows the rules.

Mr. President, you and I and 98 other Members of this body have to follow the rules. Certainly, those in law enforcement should have to follow the rules, as well. These audits have been demonstrated to be vital oversight tools, and they should be incorporated into the law. The language in our amendment is the product of more than a year and a half of extensive negotiations with Republicans and Democrats, the intelligence community, the Department of Justice. This year, the Senate Judiciary Committee bill won the support of Senator Lee. Last Congress, a virtually identical bill received the votes of Senators Kyl and Cornyn and was reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee to the Senate. The bipartisan amendment we seek to offer is a reasonable package of reforms that preserves the ability of the government to use the PATRIOT Act surveillance tools, while promoting transparency, accountability, and oversight.

I have often said that the Senate should not shirk its duty to reexamine carefully and critically the provisions of the PATRIOT Act. We should consider ways to improve the law consistent with our core constitutional principles. That is what I have tried to do. That is what Vermonters expect. I intend to vigilantly guard Americans' privacy and civil liberties, while doing all I can to keep all Americans secure. That is what we expect in Vermont, and I must assume that is what we expect in the other 49 States. Without a single improvement or reform, without even a word that recognizes the importance of protecting the civil liberties and constitutional privacy rights of Americans, the underlying bill represents a missed opportunity. Let us provide our law enforcement and intelligence professionals with the tools they need and give these professionals the security and certainty they need to protect our Nation. But let us also at the same time faithfully perform our duty to protect the constitutional principles and civil liberties upon which this Nation was founded and on which the American people depend.

The vast majority of the 300 million Americans in this great country are law-abiding, honest men and women. We should protect against arbitrarily lumping them all into the category of potential lawbreakers, or enabling the government to search homes or businesses without proper reason. We fought a revolution in this country to stop that from happening, and it is no different today.

One of the things that has kept us so strong as a nation is our ability to protect the individual rights of all Americans. We can go after the lawbreakers, just as we got Osama bin Laden, while at the same time protecting the principles of our country. We must not let the terrorists win by compromising our own rights and liberties in this country. The terrorists who seek to harm us would certainly take away from all of us--women and men alike--the constitutional rights we hold dear. We must not allow that.

The American people expect us both to protect our rights and to keep us safe, and I believe our amendment does just that. That is why I hope all Senators will support the Leahy-Paul amendment.

Exhibit 1

Washington, DC, December 9, 2010.

Hon. Patrick J. Leahy,

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate,

Washington, DC.

Dear Chairman Leahy: This responds to your letter of March

17, 2010, which asked the Department of Justice to consider

implementing administratively certain enhanced civil

liberties protections that were included in S. 1692, the USA

PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act, as reported by the Senate

Judiciary Committee.

In my letter of November 9, 2009, I expressed strong

support on behalf of the Department for the bill as reported,

which would reauthorize several important Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) authorities while

enhancing protections for civil liberties and privacy in the

exercise of these essential national security tools.

The bill would reauthorize section 206 of the USA PATRIOT

Act, which provides authority for roving surveillance of

targets who take steps that thwart FISA surveillance; section

215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which provides authority to

compel production of business records and other tangible

things with the approval of the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Court (the FISA Court); and section 6001 of the

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which

provides authority to target with FISA searches or

surveillance non-United States persons who engage in

international terrorist activities but are not necessarily

associated with an identified terrorist group. Earlier this

year, Congress acted to extend the expiring authorities until

February 28, 2011. As that date approaches, I strongly urge

that Congress again take action to ensure that these

provisions remain in force.

Assuming these authorities are reauthorized, the Department

has determined that many of the privacy and civil liberties

provisions of S. 1692 can be implemented without legislation.

Indeed, in a number of instances, we have already taken steps

to do so. I am confident that these measures will enhance

standards, oversight, and accountability, especially with

respect to how information about U.S. persons is retained and

disseminated, without sacrificing the operational

effectiveness and flexibility needed to protect our citizens

from terrorism and facilitate the collection of vital foreign

intelligence and counterintelligence information.

National Security Letters

Your letter seeks our response regarding several matters

related to National Security Letters (NSLs): notification to

recipients of NSLs of their opportunity to contest the

nondisclosure requirement; issuance of procedures related to

the collection, use and storage of information obtained in

response to NSLs; retention of a statement of specific facts

that the information sought is relevant to an authorized

investigation; and increased public reporting on the use of

NSLs.

You will be pleased to know that as of February 2009, all

NSLs are required to include a notice that informs recipients

of the opportunity to contest the nondisclosure requirement

through the government initiated judicial review. In most

cases, this notice is automatically generated by the NSL

subsystem. Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide

(DIOG) 11.9.3.E. The FBI also will ensure that in any case in

which a recipient challenges a nondisclosure order, the

recipient is notified when compliance with the order is no

longer required. Thus far, there have been only four

challenges to the non-disclosure requirement, and in two of

the challenges, the FBI permitted the recipient to disclose

the fact that an NSL was received. If and when the volume of

such requests becomes sufficiently large that solutions

beyond ``one-off' notifications are required, the FBI will

develop appropriate policies and procedures to notify the

recipient when non-disclosure is no longer required.

I also am pleased to report that I approved Procedures for

the Collection, Use and Storage of Information Derived from.

National Security Letters on October 1, 2010, and these

procedures have been provided to the Judiciary and

Intelligence Committees. The FBI's current practice is

consistent with the procedures and the FBI is working on

formal policy to implement them. In addition, DOJ and ODNI

will shortly complete work on a joint report to Congress on

NSL ``minimization'' as required by the PATRIOT

Reauthorization Act of 2005.

As to the information retained internally in connection

with the issuance of NSLs, it is current policy for the FBI

to retain a statement of specific facts showing that the

information sought through NSLs is relevant to an authorized

investigation. DIOG Sec. 11.9.3.C.

The Department appreciates the desire of the Committee for

enhanced public reporting on the use of NSLs. Accordingly,

although the FBI cannot provide information regarding

subcategories of NSLs in a public setting, it will continue

to report publicly the aggregate numbers of NSLs on an annual

basis and will evaluate whether any additional information

can be publicly reported.

Section 215 Orders

Your letter also raises a number of matters related to

section 215 orders. You seek assurances that the government

will not rely on the conclusive presumption in section 215

and will present the FISA Court with a complete statement of

facts sufficient to show relevance of the tangible things

requested to an authorized investigation. It is current FBI

practice to provide the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

Court with a complete statement of facts to support issuance

of an order. The FBI is reviewing the DIOG to determine

whether changes need to be made to reflect this practice.

With respect to section 215 records that contain bookseller

records, or are from a library and contain personally

identifiable information about a patron of the library, we

are prepared to require a statement of specific and

articulable facts as would have been required under S. 1692,

and to notify Congress should it become necessary to change

that practice.

You ask the Department to issue policy guidance providing

that certifications accompanying applications for section 215

nondisclosure orders must include an appropriately thorough

statement of facts that sets forth the need for

nondisclosure. I am pleased to report that this is current

FBI practice, and the FBI is reviewing the DIOG to determine

whether revisions should be made to reflect this practice.

You also ask the Department to institute guidelines to

require court-approved minimization procedures for section

215 orders and pen register and trap and trace (PR/TT)

devices. Minimization procedures are already required by

statute in relation to section 215 orders. 50 USC

1861(b)(2)(B). The proposal to extend this requirement to PR/

TT orders is intended to apply only to certain intelligence

collection activities. Procedures governing these operations

are currently in effect, having been proposed by the

government and approved by the FISA Court.

Finally, you ask the Department to consider providing an

annual unclassified report on the use of FISA authorities and

the impact on privacy of United States persons. I believe

that providing greater transparency regarding the U.S.

government's exercise of FISA authorities is an important

objective, and will show the care taken by officials to

implement and comply with constitutional and statutory

requirements to protect the privacy of United States persons.

Although the Department has concerns that there may be little

additional information that can be provided in an

unclassified format and that such unclassified information

could be unintentionally misleading, we are prepared to work

with the committee and our partners in the Intelligence

Community to determine whether there is a way to overcome

these difficulties and make additional information publicly

available regarding the use of these authorities.

Taken together, I believe these measures will advance the

goals of S. 1692 by enhancing the privacy and civil liberties

our citizens enjoy without compromising our ability to keep

our nation safe and secure.

I hope this information is helpful. The Department stands

ready to work with Congress to ensure that the expiring FISA

authorities are reauthorized in a timely way.

Sincerely,

Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

Attorney General.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, as Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I wish to point out that as of Friday, there are three provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act which are going to expire. Those three provisions are something called roving wiretaps, the ``lone wolf'' provision, and the business records authority.

Because of prior discussions, let me point out up-front that this does not include national security letters, just these three provisions: ``roving wiretaps,'' the ``lone wolf,'' and the ``business records'' authorities.

I very much appreciate that the majority leader and the Republican leader have come together in agreement to bring this legislation to the Senate floor. Because of its importance, particularly at this point in time, I hope we will be able to conclude this business and see that those provisions are extended for 4 years before Friday.

Many of us strongly believe when it comes to national security there should be no partisan divide, only strong bipartisan support. So this measure should receive a substantial vote this afternoon, and the Senate will pass it quickly this week before these key authorities expire.

But before talking about the substance of the legislation, let me describe the context in which this debate occurs.

Three weeks ago, on May 1, the United States carried out a risky, complicated but ultimately successful strike against Osama bin Laden, in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The strike was the culmination of nearly a decade-long intelligence operation to locate bin Laden.

Similar to most complex intelligence challenges, finding bin Laden was the product of multiple intelligence sources and collection methods. It was a seamless effort led by the CIA, with important contributions from the National Security Agency--known as the NSA--and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency as well.

The intelligence mechanisms that are employed in counterterrorism operations are carefully and regularly reviewed by the Senate's Intelligence Committee, which I have the honor to chair. Some are also overseen by the Judiciary Committee, on which I also have the pleasure to serve.

These intelligence tools include the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, and in particular the three provisions that will, if not reauthorized, expire on May 27. Again, they are the ``roving wiretap,'' the ``lone wolf,'' and the ``business records'' authorities.

The point is, we as a nation rely on certain secret sources and methods to protect our national security. Most other nations do as well.

It is also important to note that the strike against bin Laden, while a critical strategic blow to al-Qaida, is also very likely to lead to reprisal attempts.

There have been calls for attacks against the United States after the bin Laden strike from al-Qaida in Pakistan, from al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen and North Africa. There is a very real concern that radicalized Americans here at home may contemplate violence in response to extremists' calls for retribution.

So this is a time of heightened threat--maybe no specific threat, but certainly heightened threats. We are seeing attacks in Pakistan carried but by the Taliban in reprisals for this attack as well. Therefore, this is a time when our vigilance must also be heightened.

Key officials from the National Counterterrorism Center, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security recently described to the Intelligence Committee in closed session how their respective agencies have heightened their defensive posture over these very concerns.

Clearly, this is a time where every legal counterterrorism and intelligence-gathering mechanism should be made available.

It is also a time to seize the opportunity to further disrupt al- Qaida. The assault on the bin Laden compound netted a cache of valuable information: papers, videos, computer drives, and other materials about al Qaeda's vision and al-Qaida's plans.

The intelligence community established an interagency task force to go through that material as quickly as possible. I am hopeful that previously unknown terror plots will be identified and information leading to the location of terrorists will be found.

Authorities such as the three provisions set to expire this Friday may well prove critical to thwarting new plots and finding terrorists. They must be renewed.

Let me describe the three provisions in more detail.

First, the roving wiretap provision. Roving wiretap authority was first authorized for intelligence purposes in the PATRIOT Act in 2001. But, as you know, it has been used for years in the criminal context. This provision, codified in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, provides the government with the flexibility necessary to conduct electronic surveillance against elusive targets.

Let me explain.

In most cases under FISA, the government can go to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court--which I will describe in detail later--and present an application to tap the telephone of a suspected terrorist or spy. The FISA Court reviews the application and can issue an order--basically a warrant--to allow the government to tap a phone belonging to that target.

We all know in this day and age there are disposable or ``throw away'' cell phones that allow foreign intelligence agents and terrorists not only to switch numbers but also to throw away their cell phone and replace it with another.

This roving wiretap authority allows the government to make a specific

showing to the FISA Court that the actions of a terrorist or spy may have the effect of thwarting intelligence. In other words, they make one appearance, and the government can thus seek, and the FISA Court can authorize, a roving wiretap so that the FBI, for example, can follow the target without having to go back to the Court for each cell phone change.

Instead, the FBI in this case would report to the FISA Court, normally within 10 days of following the target to a new cell phone, with information on the fact justifying the belief that the new phone was or is being used by the target.

The Justice Department has advised Congress that the authority to conduct roving electronic surveillance under FISA has proven to be operationally useful in some 20 national security investigations annually. So this provision is both used and very necessary in this day of throw away cell phones.

``Lone wolf'' authority allows the government to request, and the FISA Court to approve, intelligence collection against non-U.S. persons who engage in international terrorism but for whom an association with a specific international terrorist organization may not yet be known.

Let me explain that more clearly. All other FISA surveillance and searches must be focused on a target who the government can prove is tied to a foreign power. Before the government can tap a phone or search a residence, it needs to demonstrate that the person it is after is an employee or spy or otherwise working for, or on behalf of, another country or terrorist group.

The ``lone wolf'' provision, which was added to FISA in 2004, recognizes that there may be cases where the government suspects an individual inside the United States of plotting a terrorist attack, but it has not been able to link that individual to al-Qaida or al Shabaab or another group.

The ``lone wolf'' authority allows the government to go to the FISA Court, show why it believes a non-U.S. person is engaging in terrorist activity, and get a warrant to begin surveillance. This is not done without a warrant from the court.

It also allows for court-ordered collection against a non-U.S. target who may have broken with a terrorist organization while continuing to prepare for an act of international terrorism.

The Justice Department has advised Congress that although to date it has not used this authority, the ``lone wolf'' authority nevertheless fills an important gap in U.S. collection capabilities, and we have it if we need it.

The recent case of Khalid Aldawsari, a Saudi national arrested in Texas this past February, shows why the ``lone wolf'' authority is necessary. Aldawsari was arrested after the FBI learned he had purchased chemicals and conducted research needed to make improvised explosive devices. He had also researched bomb targets, including dams in California and the Dallas residence of former President George W. Bush.

Unlike other recent terrorists such as Najibullah Zazi, David Headley, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Aldawsari was not identified on the basis of his connections to foreign terrorist organizations or known at the time of his capture to be working with one.

He is better described as one of the most recent cases of individuals already inside the United States who became radicalized and committed to carrying out terrorist attacks.

So it is for this kind of threat that the ``lone wolf'' authority is important and why we should extend this mechanism. It is also this kind of threat that the Intelligence Community is now especially worried about, as people inside the United States may be spurred to action in retaliation for the strike against bin Laden.

If the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, or a State or local police officer identifies someone building bombs, it is necessary to move quickly and not take time to research a possible connection to al- Qaida before we use FISA authorities to learn what they are up to and when and how they might strike.

Business records. The third authority covered by this legislation is known as the business records provision and provides the government the same authority in national security investigations to obtain physical records that exist in an ordinary criminal case through a grand jury subpoena.

Business records authority has been used since 2001 in FISA to obtain driver's license records, hotel records, car rental records, apartment leasing records, credit card records, among other business records. This is the way in which you track a target.

Let me note that while the debate over this provision has often focused on library circulation records, the Justice Department has advised the Congress that this authority has never--let me stress, never--been used to obtain library circulation records.

We had a big debate on this issue when this came up before. In fact, this authority has never been used for library circulation records.

The Department has informed Congress that it submitted 96 applications to the FISA Court for business record orders last year. The Justice Department has further stated that some business records orders have been used to support critically important and highly sensitive intelligence collection activities. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees have been fully briefed on that collection.

Information about this sensitive collection has also been provided to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, and information has been available for months to all Senators for their review.

The details on how the government uses all three of these authorities are classified and discussion of them here would harm our ability to identify and stop terrorist attacks and espionage. But, if any Senators would like further details, I encourage them to contact the Intelligence Committee, or to request a briefing from the Intelligence Community or the Department of Justice.

I have mentioned several times the role of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Let me describe what it is and how it operates.

The FISA Court is a special court. It is a set of 11 Federal district judges, each of whom is appointed by the Chief Justice to specifically serve in this role.

At least one of these judges is available at all times--24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year--for the purpose of reviewing government applications to use FISA authorities and, if those applications are sufficient, approving them by issuing an order, or what we call in the criminal law, a warrant.

The FISA Court judges meet in closed session to review classified declarations, and they provide very careful judicial review of the government's applications. They are expert in this specialized area of the law, as is their expert staff. The Department of Justice officials who come before them take all care in making their case and presenting their facts, as they do in public court.

The American people should understand that these FISA authorities we are discussing now--the ability to conduct electronic surveillance and obtain records--are subject to strict oversight. A Senate-confirmed official in the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney General for National Security--one of these three must, and I stress ``must''--sign off on every application before it goes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.

Federal judges, also confirmed by the Senate, must approve the applications. Inspectors General conduct regular audits and oversight as well. The Senate and House Intelligence and Judiciary Committees receive regular reports from the Department of Justice on the use of all FISA authorities, as well as receiving briefings from the FBI and NSA on the implementation of the FISA statute.

The three authorities reauthorized by this legislation have been debated extensively on this floor and in this Congress since it came up for reauthorization in 2009. Every single national security official to come before the Congress in the past 2 years has testified that these provisions are vital to protect America and has urged their reauthorization.

It is very hard, I think, to vote no in the face of what we have been told in classified intelligence briefings and in hearings by officials from the Attorney General's office and the FBI. In fact,

the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence wrote a letter to Leaders Reid and McConnell today, May 23, expressing their strong support for immediate enactment of the legislation we are now considering.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the letter to Leaders Reid and McConnell.

Mr. President, let me point out there are no recent cases of abuse of these authorities. The oversight system in place is working well, I believe, to ensure they will not be misused in the future.

Other Senators may come to this floor and talk about abuses of these authorities, but I ask: Listen carefully. Chances are they are talking about a section not involved here, and that is the section on national security letters. Again, national security letters are not touched by these three sections we are renewing today. And I would say, yes, they were abused or misused in years past, according to the Inspector General of the Department of Justice. But corrections have been made since then. More important, for today's debate, there is nothing we are taking up today that affects or mentions national security letters at all. I have referred to this now four times. I hope I get it across because that is what happened last time. People came to the floor and what they were talking about was not in the legislation we were considering.

Earlier this year, I was pleased to support legislation authored by Senator Leahy that would have made several improvements in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in order to better protect privacy rights and civil liberties. But the point I made during the debate in the Judiciary Committee, which I will repeat again today, is that many of these changes were in fact codifying practices the Department of Justice and the FBI have already implemented.

For example, minimization. That was one of the issues that was discussed. It has been implemented. The departments are listening and they have taken action where there have been problems.

I wish to say to my colleagues that the Executive Branch has heard and has acted to address concerns about intrusions into Americans' civil liberties. The Office of the Inspector General in the Department of Justice has indicated that it intends to conduct audits and inspections to ensure that the implementation of FISA is in full compliance with the law, and its reports will be carefully reviewed by this Congress and by the concerned Committees. A major priority of the Intelligence Committee in this house is to conduct regular oversight on the use of FISA authorities, and we will continue to do so after passage of this legislation.

Just about every administration official to testify on the use of FISA authorities has also noted the importance of having the stability that comes with a long-term extension. Since December of 2009, when we reauthorized it, the Congress has passed three short-term extensions-- one for 2 months, one for 1 year, and one for 3 months. By lurching from one sunset to another, we run the risk that these intelligence authorities are going to expire. And here we are, once again, because they expire this Friday. I hope Members will think about that. I hope Members who want to produce an amendment will think about the following: if they expire, what if NSA and other agencies have to stop, what if they miss something, what if something happens? That is a responsibility that rests on the heads of everyone in these two bodies--both the House of Representatives and the Senate of the United States.

Even short of that, by providing one short-term extension after another--2 months here, 1 year there--we create significant uncertainty in the Intelligence Community as investigators are not sure whether these tools will continue to be available to them. I can tell you as one who tries to read the intelligence rather assiduously, we are not out of harm's way, and no one should believe that. People are plotting every day as to how they can send someone into the United States or convince someone in the United States to attack this country. The only thing we have to prevent this from happening is intelligence and an FBI that is now able to institute surveillance and tracking on possible targets in this country.

We have come, in my judgment, a long way since 9/11, but we cannot leave this country vulnerable. We must keep our guard up, and we must see that the intelligence mechanisms that are available to this country are able to be utilized.

This legislation now extends the use of these sunsetting authorities for 4 years, to June 1, 2015. In view of the times we are living in, I believe this is appropriate, it is keeping with past practice, and it is vital to the protection of the United States of America.

The PATRIOT Act was enacted in October 2001, and several provisions were up for review and reauthorization 4 years later in December of 2005. After some significant debate, some of the original PATRIOT Act provisions were made permanent and some were reauthorized for another 4 years until the end of 2009.

The lone-wolf authority that expires later this week was first enacted in the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 and placed in the same sunset cycle as the roving wiretap and business records authorities. Under the model established in the PATRIOT Act and a subsequent reauthorization, a 4-year extension from the end of May 2011 to June 2015 is based on sound congressional practice.

These issues have been debated and re-debated and should be very familiar to Members, especially those on the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees.

I hope we are now going to act in the best interests of protecting the people of this country from another terrorist attack by passing this legislation so our intelligence professionals can continue to keep this Nation secure.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, today Senator Vitter and I are introducing legislation to ensure and protect the jobs of thousands of individuals who are blind or have significant disabilities and provide important services to the U.S. Government and taxpayers alike.

In 1938, during the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Administration, Congress passed the Wagner-O'Day Act to help provide employment opportunities for people who are blind. At the time, most of the work the Wagner-O'Day Act created was in manufacturing mops and brooms that would be sold for use in Federal Government buildings and facilities.

In 1971, under the leadership of New York Republican Senator Jacob Javits, Congress amended the act to include people with significant disabilities and expand the program to also include services provided to the Federal Government.

The Javits-Wagner-O'Day Program eventually changed its name to ``AbilityOne.'' Today, this expanded work program for people who are blind or have significant disabilities provides Federal customers, including the U.S. Senate, with a wide array of products, like wall mounted clocks, paint, military uniforms, hardware and cleaning supplies. AbilityOne also helps put people to work in service positions, like call center operations, grounds-keeping, food service, administration and processing positions, and vehicle fleet maintenance.

People who are blind or have significant disabilities struggle particularly hard to find work. While the current job climate is challenging for all Americans, the employment rate for individuals in this group hovers around 30 percent. Oftentimes these individuals must rely on taxpayer funded government entitlement programs like Medicaid, SNAPS--food stamps--supplemental security income, and subsidized housing. AbilityOne helps these Americans find jobs and alleviates the expenditures of these entitlement programs.

Recent independent studies of the AbilityOne Program found that in just the four business lines analyzed, the AbilityOne Program saved the Government $34 million in both reduction of

entitlements and increases in income and payroll taxes.

AbilityOne provides nearly 48,000 people who are blind or who have significant disabilities with quality job opportunities, to earn a living which provides a pathway towards increased independence.

There are nearly 600 nonprofit organizations across the country working to find job opportunities for people who are blind or have significant disabilities, through the AbilityOne program. With Maryland's proximity to the seat of the Federal Government, AbilityOne creates considerable job opportunities in the service sector for Marylanders with disabilities.

However, there is a growing trend among Federal facilities that is undoing the progress that the AbilityOne Program has made and in turn is contributing to the growth of unemployment for Americans with disabilities. The bill Senator Vitter and I are introducing today aims to address this problem.

More and more Federal facilities are moving out of federally owned and operated properties and into leased space in privately owned buildings and facilities. The General Services Administration estimates that the Federal Government leases more than 7,300 buildings in more than 2,000 communities across the country. When GSA has sought lease space in Maryland I have generally supported these moves.

Federally leased properties create terrific economic opportunities for the business districts they come to. Federally leased properties bring revenues for State and local governments, increase the tax base of the regions they come to and often provide the backbone for small business growth and consulting services around the federally leased facilities.

The economic opportunities a Federal lease on private real estate provides for a community are great for everyone except for service workers with disabilities who are no longer helped by AbilityOne because federally leased space falls outside the scope of the Javits- Wagner-O'Day Act.

As the law is written, Javits-Wagner-O'Day only applies to federally owned and operated facilities.

Our bill makes a simple and practical fix to the Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act to apply the AbilityOne Program services to federally leased space. My bill states that when the Federal Government occupies 60 percent or more of the usable space within a private building or facility that the Federal Government, the lessor, or property manager must comply with the service contract procurement requirements of the Javits-Wagner- O'Day Act.

The Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act, and the thousands of men and women who have found employment opportunities through the AbilityOne Program, have a proven track record of success in terms of providing exceptional services and products for the Federal Government at rates that make for very sound spending of taxpayer dollars.

Finding job opportunities has always been a challenge for individuals who are blind or have significant disabilities. We must maintain the Federal Government's commitment to these hard working Americans.

I urge my colleagues to join Senator Vitter and me in cosponsoring the AbilityOne Improvements Act.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2011.

While this bill bears Sergei Magnitsky's name in honor of his sacrifice, the language addresses the overall issue of the erosion of the rule of law and human rights in Russia. It offers hope to those who suffer in silence, whose cases may be less known or not known at all.

While there are many aspects of Sergei's and other tragic cases which are difficult to pursue here in the United States, there are steps we can take and an obvious and easy one is to deny the privilege of visiting our country to individuals involved in gross violations of human rights. Visas are privileges not rights and we must be willing to see beyond the veil of sovereignty that kleptocrats often hide behind. They do this by using courts, prosecutors, and police as instruments of advanced corporate raiding and hope outsiders are given pause by their official trappings of office and lack of criminal records. Further, we must protect our strategic financial infrastructure from those who would use it to launder or shelter ill-gotten gains.

Despite occasional rhetoric from the Kremlin, the Russian leadership has failed to follow through with any meaningful action to stem rampant corruption or bring the perpetrators of numerous and high-profile human rights abuses to justice.

My legislation simply says if you commit gross violations of human rights don't expect to visit Disneyland, Aspen, or South Beach and expect your accounts to be frozen if you bank with us. This may not seem like much, but in Russia the richer and more powerful you get the more danger you are exposed to from others harboring designs on your fortune and future.

Thus many are standing near the doors and we can certainly close at least one of those doors. I know that others, especially in Europe and Canada are working on similar sanctions.

I first learned about Sergei Magnitsky while he was still alive

when his client William Browder, CEO of Hermitage Capital, testified at a hearing on Russia that I held as Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe in June 2009.

At the Helsinki Commission we hear so many heartbreaking stories of the human cost of trampling fundamental freedoms and it's a challenge not to give up hope and yield to the temptation of cynicism and become hardened to the suffering around us or to reduce a personal tragedy to yet another issue. While we use trends, numbers, and statistics to help us understand and deal with human rights issues, we must never forget the face of the individual person whose reality is the issue and the story of Sergei Magnitsky is as unforgettable as it is heartbreaking.

Sergei Magnitsky was a young Russian tax lawyer employed by an American law firm in Moscow who blew the whistle on the largest known tax fraud in Russian history. After discovering this elaborate scheme, Sergei Magnitsky testified to the authorities detailing the conspiracy to defraud the Russian people of approximately $230 million and naming the names of those officials involved. Shortly after his testimony, Sergei was arrested by subordinates of the very law enforcement officers he had implicated in this crime. He was held in detention for nearly a year without trial under torturous conditions. He developed severe medical complications, which went deliberately untreated and he died in an isolation cell while prison doctors waited outside his door on November 16, 2009.

Sadly, Sergei Magnitsky joins the ranks of a long list of Russian heroes who lost their lives because they stood up for principle and for truth. These ranks include Natalia Estemirova a brave human rights activist shot in the head and chest and stuffed into the trunk of a car, Anna Politkovskaya an intrepid reporter shot while coming home with an arm full of groceries, and too many others.

Often in these killings there is a veil of plausible deniability, gunmen show up in the dark and slip away into the shadows, but Sergei, in inhuman conditions, managed to document in 450 complaints exactly who bears responsibility for his false arrest and death. We must honor his sacrifice and do all we can to learn from this tragedy that others may not share his fate.

Few are made in the mold of Sergei Magnitsky, able to withstand barbaric deprivations and cruelty without breaking and certainly none of us would want to be put to the test. A man of such character is fascinating and in some ways disquieting because we suspect deep down that we might not have what it takes to stay loyal to the truth under such pressure. Magnitsky's life and tragic death remind us all that some things are more valuable than success, comfort, or even life itself--truth is one of those things. May his example be a rebuke to those whose greed or cowardice has blinded them to their duties, an inspiration to still greater integrity for those laboring quietly in the mundane yet necessary tasks of life, and a comfort to those wrongly accused.

The Wall Street Journal described Sergei Magnitsky's death as a ``slow-motion assassination,'' while the Moscow Prison Oversight Committee called it a ``murder to conceal a fraud.'' Pulitzer Prize- winning reporter Ellen Barry writing in the New York Times stated that, ``Magnitsky's death in pretrial detention at the age of 37 . . . sent shudders through Moscow's elite. They saw him--a post-Soviet young urban professional, as someone uncomfortably like themselves.''

Outside the media, President of the European Parliament Jerzy Buzek noted that ``Sergei Magnitsky was a brave man, who in his fight against corruption was unjustifiably imprisoned under ruthless conditions and then died in jail without receiving appropriate medical care.'' While Transparency International observed that, ``Sergei did what to most people seems impossible: he battled as a lone individual against the power of an entire state. He believed in the rule of law and integrity, and died for his belief.''

One might have thought that after the worldwide condemnation of Sergei Magnitsky's arrest, torture, and death in the custody, the Russian government would have identified and prosecuted those responsible for this heinous crime. Instead, the government has not prosecuted a single person and many of the key perpetrators went on to receive promotions and the highest state honors from the Russian Interior Ministry. Moreover, the officers involved feel such a sense of impunity that they are now using all instruments of the Russian state to pursue and punish Magnitsky's friends and colleagues who have been publicly fighting for justice in his case.

They have forced the American founding partner of Magnitsky's firm, Jamison Firestone, to flee Russia in fear for his safety in the months following his colleague's death after learning that the same people were attempting to take control of an American client's Russian companies and commit a similar fraud. And they have used the same criminal case that was used to falsely arrest Magnitsky to indict Sergei's client Bill Browder. They have opened up retaliatory criminal cases against many of Hermitage's employees and all of its lawyers, who were forced to leave Russia to save their own lives. These attacks have only intensified since my colleague and friend Congressman Jim McGovern introduced the Justice for Sergei Magnitsky Act of 2011, a similar measure in the House of Representatives, last month.

In the struggle for human rights we must never be indifferent. On this point, I am reminded of Elie Wiesel's hauntingly eloquent speech, The Perils of Indifference which he delivered at the White House in 1999. On this ever-present danger and demoralizer he cautions us, ``Indifference elicits no response. Indifference is not a response. Indifference is not a beginning, it is an end. And, therefore, indifference is always the friend of the enemy, for it benefits the aggressor--never his victim, whose pain is magnified when he or she feels forgotten. The political prisoner in his cell, the hungry children, the homeless refugees--not to respond to their plight, not to relieve their solitude by offering them a spark of hope is to exile them from human memory. And in denying their humanity we betray our own.''

Speaking of our humanity, I offer the following words as a contrast. They are from Russian playwright Mikhail Ugarov who created One Hour Eighteen, which is the exact amount of time it took for Sergei Magnitsky to die in his isolation cell at Moscow's Matrosskaya Tishina prison. Ugarov asks, ``When a person puts on the uniform of a public prosecutor, the white lab coat of a doctor, or the black robe of a judge, does he or she inevitably lose their humanity? Do they lose their ability to--even in a small way--empathize with a fellow human being? In the case of Sergei Magnitsky, each of the people who assumed these professional duties in the case left their humanity behind.''

The coming year will be a significant moment in the evolution of Russian politics. With Duma elections scheduled for the end of 2011 and presidential elections for early 2012, there is an opportunity for the Russian government to reverse what has been a steady trajectory away from the rule of law and respect for human rights and toward authoritarianism.

Private and even public expressions of concern are not a substitute for a real policy nor are they enough, it's time for consequences. The bill I introduce today sends a strong message to those who are currently acting with impunity in Russia that there will be consequences for corruption should you wish to travel to and invest in the United States. Such actions will provide needed moral support for those in Russia doing the really heavy-lifting in fighting corruption and promoting the rule of law, but they will also protect our own interests--values or business related.

We see before us a tale of two Russias, the double headed eagle if you will. To whom does the future of Russia belong? Does it belong to the Yevgenia Chirikovas, Alexey Navalnys, Oleg Orlovs and countless other courageous, hard working, and patriotic Russians who expose corruption and fight for human rights or those who inhabit the shadows abusing and stealing from their fellow citizens?

Let us not put aside our humanity out of exaggerated and excessively cautious diplomatic concerns for the broader relationship. Let us take the long view and stand on the right side--

and I believe the wise side--with the Russian people who have suffered so much for the cause of liberty and human dignity. They are the ones who daily risk their safety and freedom to promote those basic principles enshrined in Russian law and many international commitments including the Helsinki Final Act. They are the conscience of Russia. Let us tell them with one voice that they are not alone and that concepts like the rule of law and human rights are not empty words for this body and for our government. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record.

Would my colleague yield for a question?

It seems to me the Senator has laid out the case for why there needs to be a thoughtful debate about the PATRIOT Act and what is necessary to strike the key balance between fighting terrorism ferociously and protecting our liberties.

I am interested in what my colleague thinks about the proposition of how you have a thoughtful debate on these issues, when there is secret law where, in effect, the interpretation of the law, as it stands today, is kept secret. So here we are, Senators on the floor, and we have colleagues of both political parties wanting to participate. Certainly, if you are an American, you are in Oregon or Colorado, you are listening in, you want to be part of this discussion. But yet the executive branch keeps secret how they are interpreting the law.

What is the Senator's sense about how we have a thoughtful debate if that continues?

Well said.

Mr. President, before my colleague leaves the Chamber, I wished to tell him what a welcome addition he has been to the Intelligence Committee. I have served on that committee for 10 years. We have had excellent chairs--first, Senator Roberts, then Senator Rockefeller, Senator Feinstein.

So we continue to try to look for bipartisan support for trying to strike that balance between collective security and individual liberty. I am struck both by the clarity of your statement and the fact that those who are going to vote on these amendments and the American people who are listening in tonight ought to be able to get, in a straightforward, easy-to-access fashion, how the executive branch is currently interpreting the PATRIOT Act.

The fact is, law professors give assignments to their students to write analyses of the PATRIOT Act. The Congressional Research Service actually has an analysis out. But it is not possible to get the official interpretation of how the U.S. Government frames this law as far as the operations are so essential for our country. The Senator has laid it out very well. It is a pleasure to serve with him on the Intelligence Committee.

Mr. President, let me sum up with what this issue has come down to, to me.

These are dangerous times. If you go into the Intelligence Committee several times a week, as Senator Udall and I do, you come away with the indisputable judgment that there are threats to the well-being of this country, that there are people who do not wish our citizens well. In these dangerous times, the sources and methods of our antiterror operations absolutely must be kept secret. That is fundamental to the work of the intelligence community--keeping the sources and methods of those who serve us so gallantly secret and ensuring that they are as safe as possible.

But while we protect those sources and methods, the laws that authorize them should not be kept secret from the American people. That is what this is all about--whether the laws that authorize the operations that are so essential, which have been passed by the Congress--that their interpretation should be kept secret from the American people. I call it ``secret law.'' I want to say to this body, yes, we need secret operations, but secret law is bad for our democracy. It will undermine the confidence the American people have in our intelligence operations.

You might recall that it was only a few years ago, during the Bush administration, that they secretly reinterpreted the warrantless wiretapping statutes to say that it was possible to wiretap our people without a warrant. When it came out, it took years to sort that out, with the executive branch and the Congress working together. I don't want to see that happen again. So that is why I have joined Senator Udall in these amendments, and we hope we can get bipartisan support for what we are trying to do and especially ensure that the official interpretation of the PATRIOT Act, an important intelligent statute, is made public to the American people, and I think it can be done in a way without jeopardizing our sources and methods.

One of the reasons Senator Udall, I, and others feel so strongly about this is--and Senator Udall touched on this--that this is a time when Congress should finally say we are not just going to keep kicking the can down the road. That is what has been done again and again over the last decade. The PATRIOT Act was passed a decade ago, during a period of understandable fear, having suffered in our Nation the greatest terrorist attack in our history. So the PATRIOT Act was born out of those great fears.

It seems to me that now is the time to revisit that and ensure that a better job is done of striking the balance between fighting terror and protecting individual liberty. Unfortunately, every time over the last decade there has been an effort to do just that--revisit this and strike a better balance--we have had the same pattern; we have said we just have to get it done quickly and we really don't have any time to consider, for example, the thoughtful ideas Senator Udall has mentioned. I just don't think it is time now to once again put off a real debate on the PATRIOT Act for yet another always-distant day.

There is an irony about what this is all about, and that is that Senators are going to want to consider the amendments of Senator Udall--and I believe Senator Paul is here, and others who care strongly about this. It is awfully hard to have a thoughtful debate on these specific amendments, whether it is the Leahy amendment, the Paul amendment, the Udall amendment, or the ones we have together, if, in fact, you cannot figure out how the executive branch is interpreting the law.

An open and informed debate on the PATRIOT Act requires that we get beyond the fact that the executive branch relies on the secret legal interpretations to support their work, and Members of the Senate try to figure out what those interpretations are.

Here are the rules. If a U.S. Senator wants to go to the Intelligence Committee--and I think Senator Udall touched on this--the Senator can go there and get a briefing. Many Members of Congress, however, don't have staff members who are cleared for those kinds of briefings. Under Senate rules, it is not possible for Senators to come down here and discuss what they may have picked up in one of those classified briefings.

I just don't think, with respect to the legal interpretation, that is what the American people believe we ought to be doing. The American people want secret operations protected. They understand what sources and methods are all about and that we have to have secrecy, for example, for those in the intelligence community to get the information we need about sleeper cells and terrorist groups and threats we learn about in the Intelligence Committee. But that is very different from keeping these legal interpretations secret.

In my view, the current situation is simply unacceptable. The American people recognize that their government can better protect national security if it sometimes is allowed to operate in secrecy. They certainly don't expect the executive branch to publish every detail about how intelligence is collected. Certainly, Americans never expected George Washington to tell them about his plans for observing troop movement at Yorktown. But Americans have always expected their government to operate within the boundaries of publicly understood law. As voters, they certainly have a right to know how the law is being interpreted so that the American people can ratify or reject decisions made on their behalf. To put it another way, Americans know their government will sometimes conduct secret operations, but they

don't believe the government ought to be writing secret law.

The reason we have felt so strongly about this issue of secret law is that it violates the trust Americans place in their government and it undermines public confidence in government agencies and institutions, making it harder to operate effectively. I was on the Intelligence Committee, before Senator Udall joined us, when Americans were pretty much stunned to learn the Bush administration had been secretly claiming for years that warrantless wiretapping was legal. My own view was that disclosure significantly undermined the public trust in the Department of Justice and our national intelligence agencies. Our phones were ringing off the hook for days when the American people learned about it. The Congress and executive branch had to retrench and figure out how to sort it out.

I certainly believe the public will be surprised again when they learn about some of the interpretations of the PATRIOT Act. Government officials cannot hope to indefinitely prevent the American people from learning the truth. This is going to come out, colleagues. It is going to come out at some point, just as it came out during the Bush administration about warrantless wiretapping. It is going to come out. It is not going to be helpful to the kind of dialog we want to have with the American people, an open and honest dialog, to just continue this practice of secret law.

The reason I am offering or seeking to offer this amendment with Senator Udall, Senator Merkley, and other colleagues with respect to changing the practice of secret law is that we have raised this issue numerous times--on the Senate floor, in correspondence, in meetings with senior administration officials--and I have been joined in the past by other Senators, and we talked about it with respect to the problem in the news media. But the problem persists and the gap between the public's understanding of the PATRIOT Act and the government's secret interpretation of it remains today. Once information has been labeled ``secret,'' there is a strong bureaucratic tendency--it almost gets in the bureaucratic chromosomes to keep it secret and not revisit the original decision.

So what Senator Udall and I and colleagues seek to do is correct this problem. We seek to offer an amendment that states that it is entirely appropriate for particular intelligence collection techniques to be kept secret but that the laws that authorize these techniques should not be kept secret and should instead be transparent to the public. We seek to offer an amendment that states that U.S. Government officials should not secretly reinterpret public laws and statutes in a manner that is inconsistent with the public's understanding of these laws or describe the execution of these laws in a way that misinforms or misleads the public.

So under this proposal, the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence would--and we note this--provide a classified report to the congressional intelligence committees. It makes it clear that intelligence collection continues to go forward, and our amendment would simply require the Attorney General to publicly lay out the legal basis for the intelligence activities described in the report. The amendment specifically directs the Attorney General not to describe specific collection, programs, or activities, but simply to fully describe the legal interpretations and analyses necessary to understand the government's official interpretation of the law.

Let me close--I see colleagues waiting to speak--and say that we can have honest and legitimate disagreements about exactly how broad intelligence collection authorities ought to be, and members of the public do not expect to know all of the details about how those authorities are used, but I hope each Senator would agree that the law itself should not be kept secret and that the government should always be open and honest with the American people about what the law means. All that Senator Udall and I seek to do, along with other colleagues, is to restore some of that openness and honesty in an area where it is now needed. I hope colleagues on the floor of the Senate and in the Obama administration will join in that effort.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I rise today to speak in opposition to the proposed reauthorization of the expiring provisions of the PATRIOT Act incorporated in S. 1038. I have to tell you, I find reauthorization especially troubling since we have waited until the last minute and are now being told we must rush this bill through the Senate of the United States.

There are a number of PATRIOT Act provisions that are permanent, and they remain in place to give our intelligence community important tools to fight terrorism. But there are three controversial provisions we are debating, commonly known as roving wiretap, lone wolf, and business records. I have to tell you, at least from my point of view--and I think there are other Senators here who agree with me--they are ripe for abuse, and they threaten Americans' constitutional freedoms.

As I start my remarks at the onset, I want to state that I firmly believe, as we all do, that terrorism is a serious threat to our great country, the United States, and we have to be focused like no other time in our history in seeking to protect our people, the American people.

I sit on the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Intelligence Committee. On those two committees, much of my attention is centered on keeping Americans safe, both here and abroad. I recognize that despite bin Laden's death--which we all celebrate because justice was delivered--we still live in a world where terrorism is a serious threat to our country, our economy, and to American lives.

Our government does need the appropriate surveillance and antiterrorism tools to achieve these important goals--indeed, many of the PATRIOT Act's provisions which I support and have made our Nation safer since those devastating attacks on that day we will always remember, on 9/11, we know that for a fact. But the problem we confront today is there are three provisions we are debating that fail to strike the right balance between keeping us safe, while protecting the privacy rights of Coloradans and all Americans.

Instead, these three provisions are far too susceptible to abuse by the Federal Government, even in the name of keeping us safe from terrorism. I do not say this lightly, but my concerns about some of these provisions have only grown since I have been briefed on their interpretation and their implementation as a member of the Intelligence Committee.

Let me share some examples. Currently, the intelligence community can place wide-ranging wiretaps on Americans without even identifying the target or the location of such surveillance. That is one concern. Second concern. The intelligence community can target individuals who have no connection to terrorist organizations. A third concern I have is they can collect business records on law-abiding Americans who have no connection to terrorism. We ought to be able to at least agree that the source of an investigation under the PATRIOT Act should have a terrorist-related focus. If we cannot limit investigations to terrorism, my concern is, where do they end? Is there no amount of information our government can collect that should be off-limits? I know Coloradans are demanding that we at least place commonsense limits on government investigations and link data collection to terrorist- related activities.

If we pass this bill to extend the PATRIOT Act until 2015, it would mean that for 4 more years the Federal Government will continue to have unrestrained access to private information about Americans who have no connection to terrorism, with little to no accountability as to how these powers are used.

Again, I wish to go back because we all agree the intelligence community needs effective tools to combat terrorism. But we must provide those tools in a way that protects the constitutional freedoms of our people and lives up to the standard of transparency democracy demands.

The three controversial provisions I have mentioned can be much better balanced to protect our people. Yet it seems to me that many of my colleagues, many of our colleagues, oppose any changes. By making the PATRIOT Act provisions I have outlined permanent, we would be, in effect, preventing debate on them ever again.

To travel that path would be to threaten constitutional and civil liberties we hold dear in this country. That is not the right path. Let me be clear. I do not oppose the reauthorization of these three provisions of the PATRIOT Act, but I do aim to bring forward some commonsense reforms that will allow us to strike an important balance between keeping our Nation safe, on the one hand, while also protecting privacy and civil liberties.

Toward that goal, I have worked side by side with my colleagues in coming up with commonsense fixes that could receive bipartisan support. Senator Wyden from Oregon has filed an amendment, which I have cosponsored, that would require the Department of Justice disclose to Congress the official legal interpretation of the provisions of the PATRIOT Act. While I believe our intelligence practices should be kept secret, I do not believe the government's official interpretation of these laws should be kept secret.

I have also filed my own amendments to address some of the problems I see with the three expiring provisions. The first amendment I have filed is bipartisan with Senator Paul of Kentucky, who is on the floor, and Senator Wyden, who has joined as well. Our amendment would modify the roving wiretap authority under section 206 of the PATRIOT Act.

Specifically, our bipartisan amendment would require intelligence agencies to identify either the target or the place to be wiretapped. They currently do not have to do so. I believe that when seeking to collect intelligence, law enforcement should at least have to identify who is being targeted.

I have also filed an amendment to address the so-called ``lone wolf'' provision which currently allows the government to conduct wiretap surveillance on individuals, even when that person has no connection to a government or a terrorist organization.

This amendment would simply require that should the intelligence community use the ``lone wolf'' provision, that Congress simply be notified--again, a safeguard that is not in place as we stand here today. Without safeguards like that, how do we in this body conduct our constitutional duties of oversight?

Finally, I was joined by Senator Wyden in filing an amendment designed to narrow the scope of business record materials that can be collected under section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. This amendment would still allow law enforcement to use the PATRIOT Act to obtain such records but would require these entities to demonstrate that the records are in some way connected to terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.

Right now, law enforcement can currently obtain any kind of records. In fact, the PATRIOT Act's only limitation states that such information has to be related to any tangible thing. That is right. As long as these business records are related to any tangible thing, the U.S. Government can require businesses to turn over information on all their customers, whether or not there is any link to terrorism.

Yes.

The Senator from Oregon has put his finger on why it is so important to have a debate on the floor and not rush these provisions to the House because of a deadline that I think we can push back. We can, as you know, extend the PATRIOT Act in its present form a number of other days or a number of weeks in order to get this right.

But the Senator from Oregon makes the powerful point that the law should not be classified--as far as its interpretation goes. Of course, we can protect sources and methods and operations, as we well should. Both of us serve on the Intelligence Committee. We are privy to some information that should be classified. But we have come to the floor to make this case because of what we have learned on the Intelligence Committee.

I thank the Senator for his question. I look forward to his comments in a few minutes. The Senator from Oregon, in effect, points out that these are just a few of the reform ideas we could debate. But without further debate on any of these issues, this or any other administration can abuse the PATRIOT Act and could actually deny us, as Members of Congress, whether in this Congress or future Congresses, the opportunity to fulfill our oversight responsibilities on behalf of the American people.

I voted against the original passage of the PATRIOT Act in 2001, and I plan to vote against the reauthorization of the expiring provisions this week, unless we implement some reforms that will sensibly restrain these overly broad provisions. Simply put--again, to make the point that the Senator from Oregon made so importantly--I believe Congress is granting powers to the executive branch that lead to abuse and, frankly, shield the executive branch from accountability.

It has been 10 years since we first passed this law, and there has been very little opportunity to improve the law. I resist this rush to again rubberstamp policies that threaten the very liberty we hold dear. I recently supported a short-term extensions of the expiring provisions before us as a bridge to take time and debate and amend the PATRIOT Act and its controversial provisions.

But we were notified--unfortunately, a few days ago--that we would be voting on a 4-year extension of these expiring provisions. That is not the way to assure Americans that we are diligently considering these important public decisions.

In Federalist 51, James Madison, whom we venerate, who was the author of many of the documents that structure the way in which we organize and operate our democracy, wrote: ``In

framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.''

The bill before us does not live up to that standard. I believe it seriously risks the constitutional freedoms of our people. We need to strike a better balance between giving our national security and law enforcement officials the tools necessary to keep us safe, while not damaging the very Constitution we have sworn to support and defend.

By passing an unamended reauthorization, we are assuring that Americans will live with the status quo for 4 more long years. I believe this bill may well be a lost opportunity to improve the balance between our security and our civil liberties. That is not the result that our Founding Fathers envisioned, and it is not a result that our constituents want.

For these reasons, if the PATRIOT Act provisions are not amended, I plan to vote no on the motion to invoke cloture and on passage of S. 1038. Before I yield the floor, I wish to make one last historical reference.

Ben Franklin, one of our Founding Fathers, said, compellingly and presciently: ``A society that would sacrifice essential liberties for short-term security deserves neither.''

I think that is the question before us. There is a way forward. There is a way to keep the PATRIOT Act in place to protect our national security but also to protect our essential liberties. But in order to do that, we have to have a chance to debate and pass these important amendments.

I yield the floor.