Mr. Speaker, I rise to address an important institutional issue. Under the Constitution, it is the prerogative of the House of Representatives to originate revenue measures. Article 1, section 7,…
Mr. Speaker, I rise to address an important institutional issue. Under the Constitution, it is the prerogative of the House of Representatives to originate revenue measures. Article 1, section 7, clause 1 of the United States Constitution provides that ``All Bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.'' This clause is commonly known as the Origination Clause. As chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, I have a special responsibility in guarding this important House prerogative.
A recent court decision has caused me to come to this floor to re- affirm the House position on the Origination Clause. The rationale used by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in their July 29, 2014 decision in Sissel v. HHS is at odds with consistent House Origination Clause practice. Specifically, the ruling from a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit held that because the primary aim of PPACA was not to raise revenue, but rather to ``induce participation in health insurance plans,'' it was not a ``bill for raising Revenue'' within the meaning of the Origination Clause. Sissel v. HHS, Op. at 13 (July 29, 2014).
Although some courts have taken a narrower view of what constitutes a ``a bill for raising revenue,'' the ``primary purpose'' test articulated in Sissel presents heightened challenges in interpretation that not only threaten the constitutional balance in Congress but invite subjective judicial scrutiny of the legislative process. This analysis may lead to confusion between the legislative and judicial branch on measures where the primary purpose is not easily ascertainable, measures that contain multiple, competing purposes, and measures that state a purpose that is in conflict with its content.
The House's traditional provision-by-provision review of a measure and the effect of each on revenue is the more sound approach. This interpretation has served the Congress well when resolving differences between the House and Senate on the Origination Clause.
I offer H.R. 4310, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, as a recent example. H.R. 4310, as passed by the House on May 18, 2012, was a lengthy measure that addressed nearly every aspect of our national defense. The Senate amended it on December 4, 2012 with its own version of the bill. Rather than attempting to assess the purpose of this diverse, multifaceted measure, the Committee on Ways and Means reviewed both the House and Senate measures in their entirety. This review of the Senate amendment revealed a subtitle that included import restrictions on Iran. Import restrictions invoke the revenue jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means and have been the subject of Origination Clause action in the past. In response to this institutional infringement, I offered House Resolution 829, a measure returning H.R. 4310 and the offending amendment to the Senate. House Resolution 829 was adopted by the House unanimously on December 12, 2012. In response to the House action, the Senate, also by unanimous consent, stripped the Iran sanctions content from its amendment, and the measure proceeded to conference. The bill was enacted into law on January 2, 2013.
As chair of the oldest committee in the House, I have strived to protect this venerable institutional prerogative and clarify its application when needed. I am especially grateful to the majority and minority staff of the committee for their vigilance in this area. I hope these remarks will clarify the House position on this important constitutional issue.
