National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014

A review of the current concept of operations of the Littoral Combat Ship and a comparison of such concept of operations with the original concept of operations of the Littoral Combat Ship.

An assessment of the ability of the Littoral Combat Ship to carry out the core missions of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower of the Navy.

A comparison of the combat capabilities for the three missions assigned to the Littoral Combat Ship sea frames (anti-surface warfare, mine counter measures, anti-submarine warfare) with the combat capabilities for each of such missions of the systems the Littoral Combat Ship is replacing.

An assessment of expected survivability of the Littoral Combat Ship sea frames in the context of the planned employment of the Littoral Combat Ship as described in the concept of operations.

The current status of operational testing for the sea frames and the mission modules of the Littoral Combat Ship.

An updated test and evaluation masterplan for the Littoral Combat Ship.

A review of survivability testing, modeling, and simulation conducted to date on the two sea frames of the Littoral Combat Ship.

An updated assessment of the endurance of the Littoral Combat Ship at sea with respect to maintenance, fuel use, and sustainment of crew and mission modules.

An assessment of the adequacy of current ship manning plans for the Littoral Combat Ship, and an assessment the impact of increased manning on design changes and the endurance of the Littoral Combat Ship.

A list of the casualty reports to date on each Littoral Combat Ship, including a description of the impact of such casualties on the design or ability of that Littoral Combat Ship to perform assigned missions.

Armed, cargo, and utility helicopters provide the Department of Defense with critical capabilities to support operations in the air, on land, and at sea.

According to the Aerospace Industries Association of America’s 2012 Year-End Review and Forecast, the United States military aircraft manufacturing sales declined by 2.4 percent between 2011 and 2012.

According to the Aerospace Industries Association of America’s July 2012 report on the aerospace industrial base, aviation industry employment of aerospace research and development scientists and engineers numbering 140,000 in 1996 has declined to 40,000 in 2008.

Today, five corporations manufacture all United States military helicopters.

Helicopter program unpredictability and reduced defense procurement have a negative impact on the ability to recruit and retain a qualified and capable aerospace workforce thereby increasing risk for the helicopter industrial base’s ability to design, build, and support the next generation of manned and unmanned military helicopters.

armed, cargo, and utility helicopters are instrumental to the Department of Defense’s ability to execute the President’s National Security Strategy;

the Department of Defense should take into consideration the health and viability of the military helicopter industrial base in its analysis and decision making when building its annual research, development, and acquisition budget request; and

the Department of Defense and Congress should endeavor to maintain budget and program predictability in order to attract and retain a skilled workforce to ensure the technological capabilities required to sustain the preeminence of the United States military helicopter fleets.

by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following new paragraph (1):

in paragraph (2)(A), by striking goals and inserting objectives;

by striking paragraph (3);

by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively; and

in paragraph (3), as redesignated by paragraph (4) of this subsection, by striking for the programs of that agency and inserting for programs demonstrating military systems to one or more of the armed forces.

coordinate with the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command to ensure that the replacement program for the Blue Devil 1 aircraft system meets the operational needs of the United States Special Operations Command;

coordinate with the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to transfer to the Air Force the technology developed under the Wide-Area Network Detection program for operational integration of wide-area motion imagery and near-vertical direction finding data for effective target detection, identification, and tracking for incorporation, as practical and appropriate, into the replacement program for the Blue Devil 1 aircraft system; and

make available, to all companies that the Secretary determines are credible potential competitors for the future provision of near-vertical direction finding capabilities to the Air Force, the Blue Moon near-vertical direction finding technology, including hardware, software, algorithms, and drawings developed by a federally funded research and development center.

the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

The Ballistic Missile Defense Review of February 2010 stated as its first policy priority that the United States will continue to defend the homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack and that an essential element of the United States' homeland ballistic missile defense strategy is to hedge against future uncertainties, including both the uncertainty of future threat capabilities and the technical risks inherent to our own development plans.

The United States currently has an operational Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system with 30 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) deployed in Alaska and California, protecting all of the United States, including the East Coast, against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack from both North Korea and Iran. During 2013, senior military and civilian defense leaders have stated repeatedly that they have confidence in the ability of the current Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to protect the United States from limited ballistic missile attack from North Korea and Iran.

On March 15, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced a series of planned steps to enhance United States homeland ballistic missile defense, to stay ahead of the future missile threat from North Korea and Iran. These steps include the deployment of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska, by 2017, a nearly 50 percent increase in the number of such interceptors deployed by the United States.

In response to provocative behavior and public threats by North Korea to launch missiles at the United States, the Department of Defense took a number of actions to enhance United States homeland missile defense capabilities, including deployment of the Sea-Based X-band radar into the Pacific Ocean.

Before the March 15, 2013, announcement by Secretary of Defense Hagel, General Robert Kehler, Commander of the United States Strategic Command, testified that I am confident that we can defend against a limited attack from Iran, although we are not in the most optimum posture to do that today… it doesn’t provide total defense today. Shortly after the announcement by Secretary Hagel, General Charles Jacoby, Commander of the United States Northern Command, testified that we have the capability of limited defense right now. And I think it’s not optimum and I think that we’ve made some important steps forward in what was rolled out. And I think we need to continue to assess the threat and make sure we stay ahead of it.

As its highest near-term priority, the Missile Defense Agency is designing a correction to the problem that caused a December 2010 flight test failure of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system using the Capability Enhancement-II (CE-II) model of exo-atmospheric kill vehicle, and plans to demonstrate the correction through flight testing, including an intercept test, before resuming production, assembly, or refurbishment of additional Capability Enhancement-II kill vehicles.

The Department of Defense has a program to improve the performance and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system. According to Department officials, the goal of the Ground-Based Interceptor reliability program is to double the number of threat Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) that the current United States inventory of Ground-Based Interceptors could defeat, thereby effectively doubling the capability of the current Ground-based Midcourse Defense system.

The Missile Defense Agency, working with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and with United States Strategic Command, has developed a comprehensive Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) for missile defense, with flight tests for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system planned through fiscal year 2023, including salvo testing, multiple simultaneous engagement testing, and operational testing. The current test plan includes an additional intercept flight test using the Capability Enhancement-I kill vehicle, scheduled for mid-2013, to demonstrate the reliability enhancements to Ground-Based Interceptors quipped with that kill vehicle. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation reviewed and approved the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system test plan and pace, including the plan to demonstrate the correction of the Capability Enhancement-II kill vehicle.

In May, 2013, Vice Admiral James Syring, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, testified to Congress that he is seeking to improve the performance and reliability of the Ground-Based Interceptors, and to make the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system more operationally effective and cost-effective, including by improving its sensors, discrimination, kill assessment, and battle management. He testified that these improvements are absolutely needed and are equally important to interceptors in terms of staying ahead of the threat.

As part of its United States homeland defense hedging strategy, the Department of Defense has already decided upon or implemented a number of actions to improve the missile defense posture of the United States to stay ahead of the evolving threat of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles from North Korea and Iran. These include the following actions:

As part of its United States homeland missile defense hedging strategy, the Department of Defense is considering additional options to enhance the future United States posture and capability to defend the homeland, including the feasibility, advisability, and affordability of deploying additional Ground-Based Interceptors beyond the 14 Ground-Based Interceptors announced by Secretary of Defense Hagel, including possibly at a missile defense site on the East Coast of the United States.

In discussing the possible benefits of a potential additional missile defense interceptor site in the United States, General Jacoby testified that exploring a third site is an important next step. What a third site gives me, whether it’s on the East Coast or an alternate location, would be increased battle space. That means increased opportunity for me to engage threats from either Iran or North Korea.

it is a national priority to defend the United States homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack from North Korea and Iran;

the currently deployed Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, with 30 Ground-Based Interceptors deployed in Alaska and California, provides protection of the entire United States homeland, including the East Coast, against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack from North Korea and Iran, although this capability can and should be improved;;

it is essential for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to achieve the levels of reliability, availability, sustainability, and operational performance that will allow it to continue providing protection of the United States homeland against limited ballistic missile attack and to stay ahead of the threat as it develops;

the Missile Defense Agency should, as its highest priority, correct the problem that caused the December 2010 Ground-based Midcourse Defense system flight test failure and demonstrate the correction through flight testing, including a successful intercept test, before resuming production of the Capability Enhancement-II kill vehicle, in order to provide confidence that the system will work as intended;

the Department of Defense should continue to enhance the performance and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, and enhance the capability of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (including through improved sensors, discrimination, kill assessment, exo-atmospheric kill vehicles, and battle management) to provide improved capability to defend the United States homeland against the evolving missile threats from North Korea and Iran;

the Missile Defense Agency should continue its robust, rigorous, and realistic testing of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, as described in the Integrated Master Test Plan, including salvo testing, multiple simultaneous engagement testing, and operational testing;

the Department of Defense has taken a number of prudent, affordable, cost-effective, and operationally significant steps to hedge against the possibility of future growth in the ballistic missile threat to the United States homeland from North Korea and Iran, including the planned deployment of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors; and

the Department of Defense should continue to evaluate the evolving long-range missile threat from North Korea and Iran and consider further possibilities for prudent, affordable, cost-effective, and operationally significant steps to improve the posture of the United States to defend the United States homeland against possible future growth in the threat from North Korea and Iran.

Report required

Not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on potential future options for enhancing United States homeland ballistic missile defense.

Elements

The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

Evaluation of potential options

For each option described under paragraph (2)(D), the Secretary shall provide an evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of such option. The evaluation of each such option shall include consideration of the following:

Conclusions and recommendations

Based on the evaluation required by paragraph (3), the Secretary shall include in the report required by paragraph (1) such findings, conclusions, and recommendations as the Secretary considers appropriate for potential future options for United States homeland ballistic missile defense.

Form

The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

In the introduction to the Ballistic Missile Defense Review of February 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote that I have made defending against near-term regional threats a top priority of our missile defense plans, programs and capabilities.

In describing the threat of regional ballistic missiles, the report of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review stated that there is no uncertainty about the existence of regional threats. They are clear and present. The threat from short-range, medium-range, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs) in regions where the United States deploys forces and maintains security relationships is growing at a particularly rapid pace.

North Korea has hundreds of regional ballistic missiles, including short-range Scud missiles and medium-range Nodong missiles. North Korea also has publicly displayed, but not flight-tested, intermediate-range Musudan missiles. These regional missiles can reach United States forces and allies in South Korea and Japan, and perhaps Guam. In the spring of 2013, North Korea made public threats to use nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles against South Korea, Japan, and Guam.

In response to these threats from North Korea, the United States deployed Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships, armed with Standard Missile–3 interceptors, to the waters near the Korean Peninsula, and a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to Guam. It also deployed the Sea-Based X-band missile defense radar into the Pacific Ocean to enhance United States missile defense capabilities. On March 15, 2013, Secretary of Defense Hagel announced a series of planned steps to enhance missile defense, including the deployment of a second AN/TPY–2 missile defense radar in Japan to improve regional and homeland defense against North Korean missiles. As part of their response to the provocations of North Korea, South Korea deployed vessels equipped with Aegis missile defense radars, and Japan deployed its Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships, equipped with Standard Missile–3 interceptors.

Iran has the largest inventory of regional ballistic missiles in the Middle East, with hundreds of missiles that can reach as far as southeastern Europe and all of the Middle East, including Israel. Iran is improving its existing missiles and developing new and longer-range regional missiles.

In September 2009, President Barack Obama announced that he had accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish a European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense, designed to protect deployed United States forces, allies, and partners in Europe against the large and growing threat of ballistic missiles from Iran.

In November 2010, at the Lisbon Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided to adopt the core mission of missile defense of its population, territory, and forces. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization agreed to enhance its missile defense command and control system, the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, to provide a North Atlantic Treaty Organization command and control capability. This is in addition to voluntary contributions of missile defense capabilities from individual nations.

During 2011, the United States successfully implemented Phase 1 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, including deployment of an AN/TPY–2 radar in Turkey, deployment of an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ship in the eastern Mediterranean Sea with Standard Missile–3 Block IA interceptors, and the establishment of a missile defense command and control system in Germany.

Phase 2 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach is planned for deployment around 2015, and is planned to include the deployment of Standard Missile–3 Block IB interceptors on Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships and at an Aegis Ashore site in Romania.

Phase 3 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach is planned for deployment around 2018, and is planned to include the deployment of Standard Missile–3 Block IIA interceptors on Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships and at an Aegis Ashore site in Poland.

At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit in Chicago in May 2012, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization announced it had achieved an interim capability for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization missile defense system, including initial capability of its Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system at a command and control facility in Germany.

The United States has a robust program of missile defense cooperation with Israel, including joint development of the Arrow Weapon System and the new Arrow–3 interceptor, designed to defend Israel against ballistic missiles from Iran. These jointly developed missile defense systems are designed to be interoperable with United States ballistic missile defenses, and these interoperable systems are tested in large joint military exercises, such as Austere Challenge in 2012. The United States has also deployed an AN/TPY–2 radar in Israel to enhance missile defense against missiles from Iran.

The United States is working with the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council on enhanced national and regional missile defense capabilities against the growing missile threat from Iran. As part of this effort, the United Arab Emirates plans to purchase two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense batteries, as well as other equipment. During 2012, the United States deployed an AN/TPY–2 radar in the United States Central Command area of responsibility to enhance missile defense capability of forward-deployed United States forces, allies, and partners against missiles from Iran.

The United States has a strong program of missile defense cooperation with Japan, including the co-development of the Standard Missile–3 Block IIA interceptor for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system, intended to be deployed in Phase 3 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, the Japanese fleet of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships using Standard Missile–3 Block IA interceptors, and the United States deployment of two AN/TPY–2 radars in Japan.

the threat from regional ballistic missiles, particularly from North Korea and Iran, is serious and growing, and puts at risk forward-deployed United States forces, allies, and partners in the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, and the Middle East;

the Department of Defense has an obligation to provide force protection of forward-deployed United States forces and facilities from regional ballistic missile attack;

the United States has an obligation to meet its security commitments to its allies, including ballistic missile defense commitments;

the Department of Defense has a balanced program of investment and capabilities to provide for both homeland defense and regional defense against ballistic missiles, consistent with the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and with the prioritized and integrated needs of the commanders of the combatant commands;

elements of United States regional missile defenses enhance and enable the homeland defense capabilities of the United States, including forward-deployed radars and defense of critical forward-deployed missile defense systems;

the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense is an appropriate and prudent response to the existing and growing ballistic missile threat from Iran to forward-deployed United States forces, allies, and partners in Europe;

the Department of Defense should, as a high priority, continue to develop, test, and plan to deploy Phases 2 and 3 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, including the planned Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland;

the Department of Defense should also continue with its other phased and adaptive regional missile defense efforts tailored to the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region;

European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are making valuable contributions to missile defense in Europe, by hosting elements of United States missile defense systems on their territories, through individual national contributions to missile defense capability, and by collective funding and development of the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system;

the actions taken by the Department of Defense to improve its regional missile defense posture in response to the provocative actions and threats of North Korea were prudent and appropriate and demonstrated the flexible and adaptive nature of its regional missile defense capabilities, which allows for surge deployments to meet regional contingencies in a timely manner; and

Japan and South Korea are making notable progress in enhancing their missile defense capabilities, in partnership with the United States, to protect against regional missiles from North Korea.

Report required

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the status and progress of regional missile defense programs and efforts.

Elements

The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

Form

The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

For more than a decade, the United States and Russia have discussed a variety of options for cooperation on shared early warning and ballistic missile defense. For example, on May 1, 2001, President George W. Bush spoke of a new cooperative relationship with Russia and said it should be premised on openness, mutual confidence and real opportunities for cooperation, including the area of missile defense. It should allow us to share information so that each nation can improve its early warning capability, and its capability to defend its people and territory. And perhaps one day, we can even cooperate in a joint defense.

Section 1231 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted into law by Public Law 106–398; 1654A–329) authorized the Department of Defense to establish in Russia a joint center for the exchange of data from systems to provide early warning of launches of ballistic missiles and for notification of launches of such missiles, also known as the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC).

On March 31, 2008, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England stated that we have offered Russia a wide-ranging proposal to cooperate on missile defense—everything from modeling and simulation, to data sharing, to joint development of a regional missile defense architecture—all designed to defend the United States, Europe, and Russia from the growing threat of Iranian ballistic missiles. An extraordinary series of transparency measures have also been offered to reassure Russia. Despite some Russian reluctance to sign up to these cooperative missile defense activities, we continue to work toward this goal.

The February 2010 report of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review established as one of its central policy pillars that increased international missile defense cooperation is in the national security interest of the United States and, with regard to cooperation with Russia, the United States is pursuing a broad agenda focused on shared early warning of missile launches, possible technical cooperation, and even operational cooperation.

At the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided to develop a missile defense system to protect NATO European populations, territory and forces and also to seek cooperation with Russia on missile defense. In its Lisbon Summit Declaration, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization reaffirmed its readiness to invite Russia to explore jointly the potential for linking current and planned missile defense systems at an appropriate time in mutually beneficial ways. The new NATO Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit stated that we will actively seek cooperation on missile defense with Russia, that NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance, and that the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia is intertwined.

In a December 18, 2010, letter to the leadership of the Senate, President Obama wrote that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invited Russia to cooperate on missile defense, which could lead to adding Russian capabilities to those deployed by NATO to enhance our common security against common threats. The Lisbon Summit thus demonstrated that the Alliance's missile defenses can be strengthened by improving NATO-Russian relations. This comes even as we have made clear that the system we intend to pursue with Russia will not be a joint system, and it will not in any way limit United States' or NATO's missile defense capabilities. Effective cooperation with Russia could enhance the overall efficiency of our combined territorial missile defenses, and at the same time provide Russia with greater security.

Section 221(a)(3) of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111–383; 124 Stat. 4167) states that it is the sense of Congress to support the efforts of the United States Government and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to pursue cooperation with the Russian Federation on ballistic missile defense relative to Iranian missile threats.

In a speech in Russia on March 21, 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates cited the NATO-Russian decision to cooperate on defense against ballistic missiles. We've disagreed before, and Russia still has uncertainties about the European Phased Adaptive Approach, a limited system that poses no challenges to the large Russian nuclear arsenal. However, we've mutually committed to resolving these difficulties in order to develop a roadmap toward truly effective anti-ballistic missile collaboration. This collaboration may include exchanging launch information, setting up a joint data fusion center, allowing greater transparency with respect to our missile defense plans and exercises, and conducting a joint analysis to determine areas of future cooperation.

In testimony to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on April 13, 2011, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy Bradley H. Roberts stated that the United States has been pursuing a Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement with Russia since 2004, and that such an agreement is necessary for the safeguarding of sensitive information in support of cooperation on missile defense, and to provide the legal framework for undertaking cooperative efforts.

In a March 2012 answer to a question from the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on missile defense cooperation with Russia, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Jim Miller wrote that I support U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defenses first and foremost because it could improve the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO missile defenses, thereby improving the protection of the United States, our forces overseas, and our Allies. Missile defense cooperation with Russia is in the security interests of the United States, NATO, and Russia, first and foremost because it could strengthen capabilities across Europe to intercept Iranian missiles. He also wrote that [t]he United States has pursued missile defense cooperation with Russia with the clear understanding that we would not accept constraints on missile defense, and that we would undertake necessary qualitative and quantitative improvements to meet U.S. Security needs.

In February 2012, an international group of independent experts known as the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative issued a report proposing missile defense cooperation between the United States (with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies) and Russia. The group, whose leaders included Stephen Hadley, the National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush, proposed that the nations share satellite and radar early warning data at joint cooperation centers in order to improve their ability to detect, track, and defeat medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles from the Middle East.

In a letter dated April 13, 2012, Robert Nabors, Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Legislative Affairs, wrote that it is Administration policy that we will only provide information to Russia that will enhance the effectiveness of our missile defenses. The Administration will not provide Russia with sensitive information that would in any way compromise our national security, including hit-to-kill technology and interceptor telemetry.

The May 20, 2012, NATO Chicago Summit Declaration included the following statement: Given our shared security interests with Russia, we remain committed to cooperation on missile defense in the spirit of mutual trust and reciprocity, such as the recent [NATO-Russia Council] Theatre Missile Defense Exercise. Through ongoing efforts in the NATO-Russia Council, we seek to determine how independent NATO and Russian missile defense systems can work together to enhance European security. We look forward to establishing the proposed joint NATO-Russia Missile Data Fusion Centre and the joint Planning Operations Centre to cooperate on missile defense. We propose to develop a transparency regime based upon a regular exchange of information about the current respective missile defense capabilities of NATO and Russia.

The United States currently has agreements and programs of cooperation on shared early warning with eight nations in addition to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The United States has developed procedures and mechanisms for sharing early warning information with partner nations while ensuring the protection of sensitive United States information.

Russia and the United States each have ballistic missile launch early warning and detection and tracking sensors that could contribute to and enhance each others' ability to detect, track, and defend against ballistic missile threats from Iran.

The Obama Administration has provided regular briefings to Congress on its discussions with Russia on possible missile defense cooperation.

it is in the national security interest of the United States to pursue efforts at missile defense cooperation with Russia that would enhance the security of the United States, its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, and Russia, particularly against missile threats from Iran;

the United States should pursue ballistic missile defense cooperation with Russia on both a bilateral basis and a multilateral basis with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, particularly through the NATO-Russia Council, when it is in the national security interests of the United States to do so;

missile defense cooperation with Russia should not in any way limit United States' or NATO's missile defense capabilities, as acknowledged in the December 18, 2010, letter from President Obama to the leadership of the Senate, and should be mutually beneficial and reciprocal in nature;

the United States should not provide Russia with sensitive missile defense information that would in any way compromise United States national security, including hit-to-kill technology and interceptor telemetry;

the United States should pursue missile defense cooperation with Russia in a manner that ensures that—

the sovereignty of the United States and its ability to unilaterally pursue its own missile defense program shall be protected.

In general

The Secretary of Defense shall conduct an evaluation of options and alternatives for future sensor architectures for ballistic missile defense in order to enhance United States ballistic missile defense capabilities.

Scope of evaluation

In conducting the evaluation, the Secretary shall consider a wide range of options for a future sensor architecture for ballistic missile defense, including options for future development, integration, exploitation, and deployment of sensor systems and assets.

Objective

The objective of the evaluation shall be to identify one or more future sensor architectures for ballistic missile defense that will result in an improvement of the performance of the Ballistic Missile Defense System in a cost-effective, operationally effective, timely, and affordable manner.

Sensor types

The types of sensors as follows:

Sensor modes

Deployment modes of sensors as follows:

Sensor functions

Missile defense-related sensor functions as follows:

Sensor architecture capabilities

Maximization or improvement of sensor-related capabilities as follows:

In general

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth the results of the evaluation required by subsection (a). The report shall include such findings, conclusions, and recommendations on future sensor architectures for ballistic missile defense as the Secretary considers appropriate in light of the evaluation.

Form

The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

In general

Not later than March 1 each year, the Comptroller General shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the review of the acquisition program for the VXX Presidential Helicopter aircraft conducted under subsection (a) during the preceding year.

Elements

Each report under paragraph (1) shall include such matters as the Comptroller General considers appropriate to fully inform the congressional defense committees of the stage of the acquisition process for the VXX Presidential Helicopter aircraft covered by the review described in such report. Such matters may include the following:

the date on which the Navy awards a contract for full rate production for the VXX Presidential Helicopter aircraft; or

the date on which the acquisition program for the VXX Presidential Helicopter aircraft is terminated.

Manufacturing requirements

The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the military services and defense agencies, shall review current and expected manufacturing requirements across the military services and defense agencies to identify critical manufacturing competencies and supplies, components, end items, parts, assemblies, and sub-assemblies for which there is no or limited domestic commercial source and which are appropriate for manufacturing within an arsenal owned by the United States in order to support critical manufacturing capabilities.

Mechanisms for determining manufacturing capabilities

The Secretary shall review mechanisms within the Department for ensuring that appropriate consideration is given to the unique manufacturing capabilities of arsenals owned by the United States to fulfill manufacturing requirements of the Department of Defense for which there is no or limited domestic commercial capability.

In general

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a plan for implementation of the prepositioning strategic policy required under section 2229(a) of title 10, United States Code, as amended by subsection (a).

Elements

The implementation plan required under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

in subsection (a), by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following new paragraph (2):

in subsection (b)(2), by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the following new subparagraph (B):

In general

The Secretary of Defense shall establish a policy setting forth the programs and priorities of the Department of Defense for the retrograde, reconstitution, and replacement of units and materiel used to support overseas contingency operations. The policy shall take into account national security threats, the requirements of the combatant commands, the current readiness of the operating forces of the military departments, and risk associated with strategic depth and the time necessary to reestablish required personnel, equipment, and training readiness in such operating forces.

Elements

The policy required under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

In general

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a plan for implementation of the policy required under this section.

Elements

The implementation plan required under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

Updates

Not later than one year after submitting the plan required under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for two years, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees an update on progress toward meeting the goals of the plan.

In general

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a comprehensive strategy for improving asset visibility tracking and in-transit visibility across the Department of Defense, together with the plans of the military departments for implementing the strategy.

Elements

The strategy and implementation plans required under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

include the elements set forth under subsection (a)(2);

align to achieve the overarching asset visibility and in-transit visibility goals and objectives of the Department of Defense; and

have been implemented.

A description of the purpose of the USSOCOM-NCR.

A description of the activities to be performed by the USSOCOM–NCR.

An explanation of the impact of the USSOCOM-NCR on existing activities at United States Special Operations Command headquarters.

A detailed, by fiscal year, breakout of the staffing and other costs associated with the USSOCOM-NCR over the future years defense program.

A description of the relationship between the USSOCOM-NCR and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

A description of the role of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict in providing oversight of USSOCOM-NCR activities.

Any other matters the Secretary determines appropriate.

In general

Not later than September 30, 2013, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, in coordination with the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the establishment of RSCCs.

Elements

The report required under paragraph (1) shall outline, at a minimum—

the combat or camouflage utility uniform will be adopted by all military services;

the military service adopts a uniform currently in use by another military service; or

the Secretary of Defense grants an exception, based on unique circumstances or requirements.

In general

Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall issue guidance to implement this section.

Content

At a minimum, the guidance required by paragraph (1) shall—

The Army National Guard of the United States, 354,200.

The Army Reserve, 205,000.

The Navy Reserve, 59,100.

The Marine Corps Reserve, 39,600.

The Air National Guard of the United States, 105,400.

The Air Force Reserve, 70,400.

The Coast Guard Reserve, 9,000.

the total authorized strength of units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component which are on active duty (other than for training) at the end of the fiscal year; and

the total number of individual members not in units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component who are on active duty (other than for training or for unsatisfactory participation in training) without their consent at the end of the fiscal year.

National Guard

Within the limitation provided in section 10217(c)(2) of title 10, United States Code, the number of non-dual status technicians employed by the National Guard as of September 30, 2014, may not exceed the following:

Army Reserve

The number of non-dual status technicians employed by the Army Reserve as of September 30, 2014, may not exceed 595.

Air Force Reserve

The number of non-dual status technicians employed by the Air Force Reserve as of September 30, 2014, may not exceed 90.

An officer of the Army National Guard who fills a vacancy in a federally recognized unit of the Army National Guard may be transferred from the active Army National Guard to the inactive Army National Guard.

An officer of the Army National Guard transferred to the inactive Army National Guard pursuant to paragraph (1) may be transferred from the inactive Army National Guard to the active Army National Guard to fill a vacancy in a federally recognized unit.

An officer of the Air National Guard who fills a vacancy in a federally recognized unit of the Air National Guard may be transferred from the active Air National Guard to the inactive Air National Guard.

An officer of the Air National Guard transferred to the inactive Air National Guard pursuant to paragraph (1) may be transferred from the inactive Air National Guard to the active Air National Guard to fill a vacancy in a federally recognized unit.

in paragraph (1)—

in paragraph (2)—

in paragraph (4), by striking may use and inserting shall use.

by striking Secretary of Defense and inserting Chief of the National Guard Bureau; and

by striking Secretary and inserting Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

in paragraph (1)—

in paragraph (2), by inserting after any favorable action the following: , or a significant change in a member's duties or responsibilities not commensurate with the member's grade.

in paragraph (1), by striking paragraph (3) and inserting paragraph (4);

by redesignating paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) as paragraphs (4), (5), and (6), respectively;

by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph (3):

in paragraph (5), as so redesignated—

in paragraph (1)—

in paragraph (3), by inserting and the Secretary of the military department concerned after the Secretary of Defense.

by redesignating subsections (f), (g), (h), and (i) as subsections (g), (h), (j), and (k), respectively; and

by inserting after subsection (e) the following new subsection (f):

in paragraph (1), by adding at the end the following new sentence: In a case referred to a board by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary of a military department when such Secretary has determined that a personnel action prohibited by subsection (b) has occurred, the board shall review the matter.; and

in paragraph (3), by striking board elects to hold in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting board holds.

by striking The Armed Forces shall accommodate the beliefs and inserting Unless it could have an adverse impact on military readiness, unit cohesion, and good order and discipline, the Armed Forces shall accommodate individual expressions of belief;

by inserting sincerely held before conscience; and

by striking use such beliefs and inserting use such expression of belief.

In general

Not later than 180 days after the date on which the regulations required by subsection (c) of section 533 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–239; 126 Stat. 1726; 10 U.S.C. prec. 1030 note) are prescribed, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth an assessment by the Inspector General of the compliance of the Department of Defense with that section.

Elements

The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

In general

Not later than 18 months after the date on which the regulations required by subsection (c) of section 533 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 are prescribed, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth the results of an investigation by the Inspector General into the compliance by the Armed Forces with the elements of the regulations on adverse personnel actions, discrimination, or denials of promotion, schooling, training, or assignment for members of the Armed Forces based on conscience, moral principles, or religious beliefs.

Elements

The report required by paragraph (1) shall include an identification of the number of times the Inspector General or the Inspector General of a military department was contacted during the 18-month period beginning on the date the regulations were prescribed regarding an incident involving the conscience, moral principles, or religious beliefs of a member of the Armed Forces.

by striking established and inserting headquartered; and

inserting after advanced degrees the following: , undergraduate degrees, and certificates and certifications.

in subsection (d)—

in subsection (e)(3) by inserting after programs the following: , including undergraduate degree programs and certificate and certification programs,.

In general

The Secretaries of the military departments, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, shall, to the maximum extent practicable, make information on civilian credentialing opportunities available to members of the Armed Forces beginning with, and at every stage of, training of members for military occupational specialties, in order to permit members—

Coordination with Transition Goals Plans Success program

Information shall be made available under paragraph (1) in a manner consistent with the Transition Goals Plans Success (GPS) program.

Types of information

The information made available under paragraph (1) shall include, but not be limited to, the following:

Use and adaptation of certain programs

In making information available under paragraph (1), the Secretaries of the military departments may use and adapt appropriate portions of the Credentialing Opportunities On-line (COOL) programs of the Army and the Navy and the Credentialing and Educational Research Tool (CERT) of the Air Force.

In general

The Secretaries of the military departments, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, shall, to the maximum extent practicable consistent with national security and privacy requirements, make available to entities specified in paragraph (2), upon request of such entities, information such as military course training curricula, syllabi, and materials, levels of military advancement attained, and professional skills developed.

Entities

The entities specified in this paragraph are the following:

Central repository

The actions taken pursuant to paragraph (1) may include the establishment of a central repository of information on training and training materials provided members in connection with military occupational specialities that is readily accessible by entities specified in paragraph (2) in order to meet requests described in paragraph (1).

Army

Section 3744(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking medal of honor, distinguished-service cross, or and inserting distinguished-service cross or.

Navy and Marine Corps

Section 6247 of such title is amended by striking medal of honor,.

Air Force

Section 8744(a) of such title is amended by striking medal of honor, Air Force cross, or and inserting Air Force cross or.

Coast Guard

Section 494 of title 14, United States Code, is amended by striking medal of honor, both places it appears.

Army

Section 3744 of title 10, United States Code, is further amended—

Air Force

Section 8744 of such title is further amended—

In general

Chapter 57 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

Clerical amendment

The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 57 of such title is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

Automatic entitlement

Section 1562(a) of title 38, United States Code, is amended—

Election to decline special pension

Section 1562 of such title is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

Technical amendment

Section 1562(a) of such title is further amended by striking roll and inserting Roll.

Repeal of superseded provisions

Sections 1560 and 1561 of title 38, United States Code, are repealed.

Clerical amendments

The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 15 of such title is amended by striking the items relating to sections 1560 and 1561.

in subsection (d)—

in subsection (f), by striking paragraphs (2) and (3) and inserting paragraphs (3) and (4).

Section 2130a(a)(1), relating to nurse officer candidate accession program.

Section 16302(d), relating to repayment of education loans for certain health professionals who serve in the Selected Reserve.

Section 302c-1(f), relating to accession and retention bonuses for psychologists.

Section 302d(a)(1), relating to accession bonus for registered nurses.

Section 302e(a)(1), relating to incentive special pay for nurse anesthetists.

Section 302g(e), relating to special pay for Selected Reserve health professionals in critically short wartime specialties.

Section 302h(a)(1), relating to accession bonus for dental officers.

Section 302j(a), relating to accession bonus for pharmacy officers.

Section 302k(f), relating to accession bonus for medical officers in critically short wartime specialties.

Section 302l(g), relating to accession bonus for dental specialist officers in critically short wartime specialties.

Incorporation of escorts of dependents under general authority

Section 451(a)(2)(C) of title 37, United States Code, is amended by inserting before the period the following: or as an escort or attendant for dependents of a member of the armed forces for necessary travel performed not later than one year after the member is unable to accompany the dependents who are incapable of traveling alone.

Repeal of superseded authority

in subsection (a)(1), by striking round-trip transportation and all that follows through may be paid at the expense of the United States and inserting travel and transportation allowances may be furnished necessary attendants. The dependents and any attendants shall be provided such travel and transportation allowances as specified in regulations prescribed under section 464 of title 37.; and

by striking subsection (d).

Incorporation of expenses under general authority

Section 453 of title 37, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

Repeal of superseded authority

in subsection (a), by striking reimbursement for reasonable travel expenses and inserting travel and transportation allowances as specified in regulations prescribed under section 464 of title 37; and

in subsection (b), striking Reimbursement for travel under exceptional circumstances.—The Secretary of Defense may provide reimbursement for reasonable travel expenses of and inserting Allowable travel and transportation under exceptional circumstances.—The Secretary of Defense may provide travel and transportation allowances as specified in the regulations referred to in subsection (a) for.

Repeal

Section 2634 of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.

Clerical amendment

The table of section at the beginning of chapter 157 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 2634.

in paragraph (1)—

by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and

by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph (2):

In general

Subsection (a) of section 1450 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

Conforming amendment

Subsection (i) of such section is amended by inserting (a)(4) or after subsection.

in the subsection caption, by striking and fiduciaries and inserting , fiduciaries, and special needs trusts;

in paragraph (1)—

in paragraph (2)—

in paragraph (3), by striking or fiduciary in the paragraph caption and inserting , fiduciary, or trust.

Covered decedents

Section 1481(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

Authorized expenses relating to care and disposition of remains

Section 1482 of such title is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

to facilitate the identification and analysis of best practices in connection with the processes described in subsection (b) that are used in nonmilitary health care facilities; and

to permit a cost-benefit analysis of the processes used under the pilot program, including an analysis of—

Such installation has a military medical treatment facility with both inpatient and outpatient capabilities.

The catchment area of such installation contains a significant-sized military beneficiary population who are potentially covered by third-party payers (as defined in section 1095(h)(1) of title 10, United States Code).

A description of the pilot program.

A comparative description of—

An assessment of the feasibility and advisability of using processes described in subsection (b) to increase the amounts collected from third-party payers for charges for health care services incurred by the United States at military medical treatment facilities, including a cost-benefit analysis of the implementation of such processes for third-party collections for health care services at military medical treatment facilities.

Such recommendations for legislative or administrative action to improve third-party collections for health care services at military medical treatment facilities as the Secretary considers appropriate in light of the pilot program.

The electronic health records systems used by the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs have been independently developed and implemented by each Department. As a result, and despite more than 15 years of efforts including numerous initiatives and programs, full interoperability between the systems has yet to be achieved.

The lack of full interoperability between the health records systems negatively impacts members of the Armed Forces who separate from military service and transition to veteran status. Medical records may be lost, requiring patients to repeat tests, increase overall costs, and further exacerbate the backlog of disability claims at the Department of Veterans Affairs.

The Government Accountability Office has identified several problems that the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs face in their efforts to achieve full interoperability of their health records systems. The Government Accountability Office points to the failure of the Departments to define performance goals and measures that would allow for program management and assessment of progress. The Government Accountability Office also highlights inadequate management in the Departments and the Interagency Program Office, which oversees the integration of Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs medical records.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs to jointly develop and implement fully interoperable health record capabilities by September 30, 2009.

despite clear congressional direction, years of effort, and the expenditure of significant resources, full electronic interoperability between the health records systems of the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs has not been achieved;

the Secretary of Defense, in collaboration with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, should fully staff the Interagency Program Office and provide it with a robust charter meeting the original intent of Congress;

the Secretary of Defense, in collaboration with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, should establish challenging, but achievable, deadlines for the development and implementation of measures and goals for electronic health records for the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs, including measures and goals relating to—

the Interagency Program Office should establish a secure, remote, network-accessible computer storage system (commonly referred to as cloud storage) to—

the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Veterans' Affairs of the Senate; and

the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Veterans' Affairs of the House of Representatives.

by striking and the NATO International Security Assistance Force and inserting or NATO forces; and

by striking to Afghanistan and inserting to or from Afghanistan.

Acquisition personnel classified as ACAT I personnel.

Acquisition personnel classified as ACAT IA personnel.

Acquisition personnel classified as ACAT II personnel.

take into consideration the training, qualifications, and experience of covered personnel to perform acquisition program management functions for the Department of Defense;

summarize assessments by covered personnel of the practicality and comprehensiveness of the training provided such personnel in acquisition program management;

identify, describe, and analyze trends in the training and experience of covered personnel in acquisition program management between the time of the report referred to in subsection (a) and the updated version of the report as required by subsection (a); and

set forth such recommendations for improvements to the training and experience of covered personnel in acquisition program management as the Secretary considers appropriate.

in subparagraph (F), by striking and at the end;

by redesignating subparagraph (G) as subparagraph (H); and

by inserting after subparagraph (F) the following new subparagraph (G):

Processes and procedures that provide little or no value added, or for which any value added is outweighed by the cost or schedule delay of the processes or procedures.

Elements of organizations and layers of review that are redundant or unnecessary, add cost, or create schedule delays to the acquisition of weapon systems without adding commensurate value.

In general

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the results of the review required by subsection (a).

Elements

The report required by paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following:

Consistency with WSARA

Any modification or elimination of a process, procedure, organization, or layer of review recommended in the report required by paragraph (1) shall be consistent with the requirements of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Public Law 111–23) and the amendments made by that Act.

by striking the benchmark and all that follows through section 1127 of title 41 and inserting $487,000 per year, adjusted annually to reflect the change in the Employment Cost Index for all workers, as calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics; and

by striking scientists and engineers and inserting scientists, engineers, medical professionals, cybersecurity experts, and other workers with unique areas of expertise.

Identification of persons and entities

The Secretary of Defense shall designate in each geographic combatant command an element to carry out intelligence missions within the area of responsibility of such combatant command outside the United States to identify persons and entities that—

Notice on supporters identified

Upon the identification of a person or entity as meeting subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1), the element making the identification shall notify the commander of the combatant command concerned, and any deputies of the commander specified by the commander for purposes of this section, of such identification of such person or entity.

Responsive actions

Upon receipt of a notice under paragraph (2), the commander of the combatant command concerned may, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the appropriate Chief of Mission, notify the heads of appropriate contracting activities, in writing, of such identification and request that the heads of such contracting activities exercise the authorities provided pursuant to paragraph (4) and in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, as revised pursuant to subsection (b), with respect to any contract, grant, or cooperative agreement that provides funding directly or indirectly to the person or entity covered by the notice.

Authorities

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall revise the Department of Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation to authorize the head of contracting activity in each geographic combatant command, pursuant to a request from the commander of a combatant command under paragraph (3)—

In general

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Federal Acquisition Regulation shall be revised to require that—

Clause described

The clause described in this paragraph is a clause that—

Covered contract, grant, or cooperative agreement

In this subsection, the term covered contract, grant, or cooperative agreement means a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement with an estimated value in excess of $20,000.

Treatment as void

For purposes of subsection (a)(4) and the exercise under subsection (a)(3) of the authorities in the Federal Acquisition Regulation pursuant to this subsection:

To require that any head of contracting activity taking an action pursuant to subsection (a)(3) or (a)(4) to terminate, void, or restrict a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement notify in writing the contractor or recipient of the grant or cooperative agreement, as applicable, of the action.

To permit, in such manner as the Federal Acquisition Regulation as so revised shall provide, the contractor or recipient of a grant or cooperative agreement subject to an action taken pursuant to subsection (a)(3) or (a)(4) to terminate or void the contract, grant, or cooperative agreement, as the case may be, an opportunity to contest the action within 30 days of receipt of notice of the action.

Responsibilities relating to identification and review

The commander of a geographic combatant command may delegate the responsibilities in subsection (a)(3) to any deputies of the commander specified by the commander pursuant to that subsection. The commander may delegate under any responsibilities under subsection (d) to the deputy commander of the combatant command. Any delegation of responsibilities under this paragraph shall be made in writing.

Nondelegation of responsibility for contract actions

The authority provided by subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) to terminate, void, or restrict contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements may not be delegated below the level of head of contracting activity.

In general

Not later than March 1 each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the use of the authorities in this section in the preceding calendar year, including the following:

Form

Any report under this subsection may be submitted in classified form.

The term combatant command means a command established pursuant to chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code.

The term head of contracting activity has the meaning given that term in subpart 601 of part 1 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

In general

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting forth the plan of action of the Department of Defense to achieve the following:

Information on recommendations not To be implemented

If the plan of action does not provide for implementation of one or more of the recommendations of the Comptroller General described in paragraph (1)(A), the report shall include a description of each such recommendation and a detailed statement of the reasons why the plan of action does not include implementation of such recommendation.

the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and

the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives.

In general

Chapter 4 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

Conforming repeal of superseded authority

Section 132a of such title is repealed.

Continuation of office

Notwithstanding subsection (a) of section 137a of title 10, United States Code (as amended by paragraph (1)), the individual serving in the position of Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense as of the date of the enactment of this Act may serve as Under Secretary of Defense for Management under that section until a successor is appointed Under Secretary of Defense for Management as specified in that subsection.

In general

Title 10, United States Code, is further amended as follows:

Clerical amendments

The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 4 of such title is amended—

Executive schedule matters

Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Deputy Chief Management Office of the Department of Defense and inserting the following new item:

In general

Chapter 7 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 171 the following new section:

Clerical amendment

The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 7 of such title is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 171 the following new item:

The charter and organizational structure of the Council.

Such recommendations for legislative action as the Secretary considers appropriate to improve the authorities relating to the Council.

A funding plan over the period of the current future-years defense program under section 221 of title 10, United States Code, to ensure a robust and modern nuclear command, control, and communications capability.

in the matter preceding paragraph (1)—

in paragraph (1), by striking National Academy of Science and inserting National Academies; and

by striking paragraphs (2) and (3); and

by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs (2) and (3), respectively.

by inserting , through the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, after The Council;

by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs (4) and (5), respectively; and

by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following new paragraphs (2) and (3):

The Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Joint Staff.

The Defense Agencies.

The Department of Defense field activities.

The headquarters of the combatant commands.

Headquarters, Department of the Army, including the Office of the Secretary of the Army, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Army Staff.

The major command headquarters of the Army.

The Office of the Secretary of the Navy, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.

The major command headquarters of the Navy and the Marine Corps.

Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, including the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Office of the Air Force Chief of Staff, and the Air Staff.

The major command headquarters of the Air Force.

The National Guard Bureau.

Initial report

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees the plan required by subsection (a).

Status report

The Secretary shall include with the Department of Defense materials submitted to Congress with the budget of the President for each of fiscal years 2016 through 2025 (as submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code) a report describing the implementation of the plan required by subsection (a) during the preceding fiscal year and any modifications to the plan required due to changing circumstances. Each such report shall include the following:

in subparagraph (B), by inserting and technical standards, and executing actions, after policies;

in subparagraph (C), by striking and training; and

by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:

In general

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall, acting through the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, submit to Congress a report setting forth a comprehensive analysis comparing the cost, schedule, and performance of personnel security clearance investigations and reinvestigations for employees and contractor personnel of the Department of Defense that are conducted by the Office of Personnel Management with the cost, schedule, and performance of personnel security clearance investigations and reinvestigations for such personnel that are conducted by the components of the Department of Defense.

Elements of analysis

The analysis under paragraph (1) shall do the following:

In general

If the Secretary of Defense determines that the current approach for obtaining personnel security investigations and reinvestigations for employees and contractor personnel of the Department of Defense is not the most advantageous approach for the Department, the Secretary shall develop a plan, by not later than October 1, 2014, for the transition of personnel security investigations and reinvestigations to the approach preferred by the Secretary.

Considerations

In selecting the most advantageous approach preferred for the Department under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall consider whether cost, schedule, and performance could be improved through increased reliance on private-sector entities to conduct, or provide supporting information for, personnel security investigations and reinvestigations for employees and contractor personnel of the Department.

Strategy required

The Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly develop and implement a strategy to continuously modernize all aspects of personnel security for the Department of Defense with the objectives of lowering costs, increasing efficiencies, enabling and encouraging reciprocity, and improving security.

Metrics

Elements

In developing the strategy required by paragraph (1), the Secretary and the Director shall consider, and may adopt, mechanisms for the following:

Appropriate committees of Congress defined

In this subsection, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—

By providing for reciprocity of personnel security clearances among positions requiring personnel holding secret, top secret, or sensitive compartmented information clearances (the latter with a counterintelligence polygraph examination), to the maximum extent feasible consistent with national security requirements.

By permitting personnel, when feasible and consistent with national security requirements, to begin work in positions requiring additional security requirements, such as a full-scope polygraph examination, pending satisfaction of such additional requirements.

The current level of mobility and personnel security clearance reciprocity of cleared personnel as personnel make a transition between Department of Defense components, between Department contracts, and between government and the private sector.

The costs due to lost productivity in inefficiencies in such transitions arising from personnel security clearance matters.

In general

Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall, acting through the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation of the Department of Defense and in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence (acting through the Director of the Cost Analysis Improvement Group) and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment of the savings and added effectiveness to be achieved in clandestine human intelligence collection by consolidating clandestine human intelligence collection operations in the National Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency through the establishment of a military support division in the National Clandestine Service.

Assumption on supervision of detailed personnel

For the purposes of the assessment required by paragraph (1), the Secretary and the Director of National Intelligence shall assume that the military and civilian case officers and support personnel in the military support division referred to in that paragraph shall be detailed to the National Clandestine Service under the supervision of a general or flag officer of the Armed Forces assigned to the National Clandestine Service.

Elements

The assessment required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

In general

Not later than January 15, 2015, the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting forth an assessment of the implementation of the Defense Clandestine Service through September 30, 2014.

Elements

The report required by paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of the following:

the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

ensure that the transfer does not affect ongoing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere around the world;

identify the appropriate size, composition, and configuration of the fleet of manned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft of the Army;

identify the appropriate size, composition, configuration, and disposition of the remaining fleet of Air Force C–12 Liberty Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance aircraft;

provide for the modification of the Air Force Liberty C–12 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance aircraft transferred under the plan to meet the long-term needs of the Army and the United States Special Operations Command; and

include a timeline for the orderly transfer of Air Force Liberty C–12 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance aircraft in manner consistent with the requirement in paragraph (1).

the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

Determination of necessity of assignment

The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, determine whether the United States Cyber Command requires signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection authorities to execute its missions in support of the Department of Defense, the other combatant commands, and the national cyber defense generally, whether in peacetime or conflict, including in the operational preparation of the environment.

Delegation of authority

If the Secretary determines pursuant to paragraph (1) that the United States Cyber Command requires signals intelligence collection authorities to execute its missions, the Secretary, as the executive agent of the President for signals intelligence pursuant to Executive Order No. 12333, shall, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, delegate appropriate signals intelligence collection authorities to the United States Cyber Command.

In general

The Secretary shall review existing cyber ranges and adapt one or more such ranges, as necessary, to support training and exercises of cyber units that are assigned to execute offensive military cyber operations.

Elements

Each range so adapted under this subsection shall have the capability to support offensive military operations against targets that—

Designation

The Secretary shall designate, from among the existing personnel of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, an official to act as the principal advisor to the Secretary on offensive military cyber forces. Any official so designated shall be an official who holds the official's current position by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Responsibilities

The official designated under this subsection shall have responsibility for the following:

In general

The Secretary of Defense shall provide for the establishment of a joint software assurance center for the Department of Defense (in this section referred to as the center).

Purpose

The purpose of the center shall be to serve as a joint, Department-wide resource for efforts of the Department to ensure security in the software developed, acquired, maintained, and used by the Department.

The role of the center in supporting program offices in implementing the supply chain risk management strategy of the Department.

The software assurance expertise and capabilities of the center, including policies, standards, requirements, best practices, contracting, training, testing, and code analysis and remediation.

Requirements for the discharge by the center, in coordination with the Center for Assured Software of the National Security Agency, of a program of research and development to improve automated software code vulnerability analysis and testing tools.

Requirements for the center to procure, manage, and distribute enterprise licenses for automated software vulnerability analysis tools.

In general

The Secretary of Defense shall, acting through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, supervise the following:

Direction

The Secretary shall provide direction to the Armed Forces and the Defense Agencies on the matters covered by paragraph (1) by not later than March 15, 2014.

A description and assessment of potential cyber threats or threat systems to major weapon systems and tactical communications systems that could emerge in the next five years.

A description and assessment of cyber vulnerabilities of current major weapons and tactical communications systems.

A detailed description of the current strategy to detect, deter, and defend against cyber attacks on current and planned major weapon systems and tactical communications systems.

An estimate of the costs anticipated to be incurred in addressing cyber vulnerabilities to Department of Defense weapons systems and tactical communications systems over the next five years

In consultation with the Secretaries of the military departments and the Commander of the United States Cyber Command, identify the Department of Defense cyber mission requirements that could be discharged by members of the reserve components.

In consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, ensure that the Governors of the several States, through the Council of Governors, as appropriate, have an opportunity to provide the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security an independent evaluation of State cyber capabilities, and State cyber needs that cannot be fulfilled through the private sector.

Identify the existing capabilities and plans for cyber activities of the reserve components, including by the following:

Assess whether the National Guard, when activated in a State status (either State Active Duty or in a duty status under title 32, United States Code) can operate under unique and useful authorities to support domestic cyber missions and requirements of the Department or the United States Cyber Command.

Assess the appropriateness of hiring on a part-time basis non-dual status technicians who possess appropriate cyber security expertise for purposes of assisting the National Guard in protecting critical infrastructure and carrying out cyber security missions in defense of the United States homeland.

Assess the current and potential ability of the reserve components to—

Determine how the reserve components could contribute to total force solutions to cyber operations requirements of the United States Cyber Command.

Develop an estimate of the personnel, infrastructure, and training required, and the costs that would be incurred, in connection with implementing the strategy for integrating the reserve components into the total force for support of the cyber missions of the Department and United States Cyber Command.

To identify the types of dangerous software that can and should be controlled through export controls, whether unilaterally or cooperatively with other countries.

To identify the intelligence, law enforcement, and financial sanctions tools that can and should be used to suppress the trade in cyber tools and infrastructure that are or can be used for criminal, terrorist, or military activities while preserving the ability of governments and the private sector to use such tools for legitimate purposes of self-defense.

To establish a statement of principles to control the proliferation of cyber weapons, including principles for controlling the proliferation of cyber weapons that can lead to expanded cooperation and engagement with international partners.

In general

Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth the integrated policy developed pursuant to subsection (a).

Form

The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

information assurance has become a mature academic discipline that warrants the creation of a non-government national accreditation body for the development of curricula and other criteria for accrediting the information assurance programs of institutions of higher education; or

a direct Government role is still required for the development of curricula and other criteria for certifying the information assurance programs of the existing Centers of Academic Excellence for Information Assurance.

In general

Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a plan on the following:

Consultation

In developing the plan, the President shall consult with appropriate representatives of information assurance interests in all departments and agencies of the Federal Government, State and local governments, academia, and the private sector.

Conforming of process to processes for other academic disciplines

In developing the plan, the President shall seek to conform the accreditation or certification process for the Centers of Academic Excellence for Information Assurance to the peer-based accreditation practices used for all other established academic disciplines, including a process involving all appropriate constituency communities, and covering standards for curriculum, quality of instruction, contribution to the discipline, and supporting facilities.

Authority

Upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is necessary in the national interest, the Secretary may transfer amounts of authorizations made available to the Department of Defense in this division for fiscal year 2014 between any such authorizations for that fiscal year (or any subdivisions thereof). Amounts of authorizations so transferred shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes as the authorization to which transferred.

Limitation

Except as provided in paragraph (3), the total amount of authorizations that the Secretary may transfer under the authority of this section may not exceed $4,000,000,000.

Exception for transfers between military personnel authorizations

A transfer of funds between military personnel authorizations under title IV shall not be counted toward the dollar limitation in paragraph (2).

may only be used to provide authority for items that have a higher priority than the items from which authority is transferred; and

may not be used to provide authority for an item that has been denied authorization by Congress.

In general

The Fund shall be managed by a senior official of the Department of Defense designated by the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) for that purpose.

Consultation

The senior official designated under paragraph (1) shall manage the Fund in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness.

In general

The Fund shall consist of the following:

Transfers

The Secretary of Defense may transfer to the Fund, in accordance with established procedures governing such transfers, any unobligated funds available to the Department of Defense. Any amount so transferred shall be credited to the Fund.

In general

Subject to the provisions of this subsection, amounts in the Fund shall be available to the Secretary of Defense for transfer to the operation and maintenance accounts of a military department or Defense Agency for expenditure for training activities of the Armed Forces (including flying hours and steaming days) and the maintenance of military equipment.

Limitation

Amounts in the Fund may not be obligated for any purpose other than purposes described in paragraph (1).

Priority in readiness needs

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness shall establish a process for identifying, evaluating, and prioritizing the key readiness needs of the Department and for ensuring that amounts in the Fund are made available for the highest priority readiness needs so identified.

Period of availability

The period of availability for obligation of amounts in the Fund shall not be affected by a transfer of such amounts under this section.

Effect on authorization amounts

A transfer made from one account to another under the authority of this section shall be deemed to change the amount authorized for the account to which the amount is transferred by an amount equal to the amount transferred.

Transfers to Fund

The transfer of amounts to the Fund pursuant to subsection (d)(2) shall not be counted toward the dollar limitation on transfer authority in section 1001, any similar provision in an annual Act authorizing appropriations for a fiscal year for the Department of Defense, or any other provision of law imposing a ceiling on amounts that may be transferred by the Department.

Transfers from Fund

The transfer of amounts from the Fund to a military department or Defense Agency pursuant to subsection (e)(1) shall not be counted toward the dollar limitation on transfer authority in section 1001, any similar provision in an annual Act authorizing appropriations for a fiscal year for the Department of Defense, or any other provision of law imposing a ceiling on amounts that may be transferred by the Department.

Transfers of unobligated funds

The authority to transfer unobligated funds to the Fund under subsection (d)(2) shall cease on September 30, 2014.

Transfers from Fund

The authority to transfer amounts from the Fund under subsection (e) shall expire on April 1, 2015.

Exceptions from transfer limitations

The exception from the provisions of law referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (f) of transfers of amounts referred to in such paragraphs shall cease on September 30, 2014.

A statement of the amounts transferred, appropriated, credited, or deposited to or into the Fund, and the source of such amounts.

A description of the expenditures made from the Fund (including expenditures following a transfer of amounts in the Fund to a military department or Defense Agency), including the purpose of such expenditures.

A description and assessment of the improvements to the readiness of the Department of Defense resulting from such expenditures.

A statement of the balance in the Fund at the beginning and end of such fiscal year.

in subsection (a), by striking 2013 and inserting 2015; and

in subsection (c), by striking 2013 and inserting 2015.

in paragraph (1)—

in paragraph (2)—

by redesignating subsections (d), (e), and (f) as subsections (e), (f), and (g), respectively; and

by inserting after subsection (c) the following new subsection (d):

A description of the naval capability requirements identified by the combatant commands in developing the Force Structure Assessment (FSA) in 2005 and revalidating that Assessment in 2010.

The capabilities for each class of vessel that was assumed in the Force Structure Assessment.

An assessment of the capabilities of the current fleet of combatant vessels of the Navy to meet current and anticipated requirements.

An assessment the capabilities of the anticipated fleet of combatant vessels of the Navy to meet emerging threats over the next 30 years.

An assessment of how the Navy will meet combatant command requirements for forward-deployed naval capabilities with a smaller number of ships and submarines.

An assessment of how the Navy will manage the risk of massing a greater set of capabilities on a smaller number of ships while facing an expanding range of asymmetrical threats, such as—

Section heading

The heading of such section is amended to read as follows:

Table of sections

The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 633 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 7306 and inserting the following new item:

the Secretary determines, following a review conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 1023 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (10 U.S.C. 801 note) and Executive Order No. 13567, that the individual is no longer a threat to the national security of the United States;

such transfer or release outside the United States is to effectuate an order affecting disposition of the individual by a court or competent tribunal of the United States having jurisdiction; or

such individual has been tried in a court or competent tribunal of the United States having jurisdiction on charges based on the same conduct that serves as the basis for the determination that the individual is an enemy combatant and—

actions that have been or are planned to be taken will substantially mitigate the risk of such individual engaging or reengaging in any terrorist or other hostile activity that threatens the United States or United States persons or interests; and

the transfer is in the national security interest of the United States.

The recommendations of the Guantanamo Detainee Review Task Force established pursuant to Executive Order No. 13492 and the recommendations of the Periodic Review Boards established pursuant to No. Executive Order 13567, as applicable.

Any confirmed case in which an individual transferred to the foreign country to which the individual is to be transferred subsequently engaged in terrorist or other other hostile activity that threatened the United States or United States persons or interests.

Any actions taken by the United States or the foreign country to which the individual is to be transferred, or change in circumstances in such country, that reduce the risk of recidivism of the type described in paragraph (2).

Any assurances provided by the government of the foreign country to which the individual is to be transferred, including that—

An assessment of the capacity, willingness, and past practices (if applicable) of the foreign country described in paragraph (4) in meeting any assurances it has provided, including assurances under paragraph (4) regarding its capacity and willingness to mitigate the risk of recidivism.

Any record of cooperation by the individual to be transferred with United States intelligence and law enforcement authorities, pursuant to a pre-trial agreement, while in the custody of or under the effective control of the Department of Defense, and any agreements and effective mechanisms that may be in place, to the extent relevant and necessary, to provide continued cooperation with United States intelligence and law enforcement authorities.

A detailed statement of the basis for the transfer or release.

An explanation of why the transfer or release is in the national security interests of the United States.

A description of any actions to be taken to mitigate the risks of recidivism by the individual to be transferred or released.

The term appropriate committees of Congress means—

The term individual detained at Guantanamo means any individual located at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of October 1, 2009, who—

Section 1033 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111–383; 124 Stat. 4351).

Section 1028 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81; 125 Stat. 1567; 10 U.S.C. 801 note).

Section 1028 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–239; 126 Stat. 1914; 10 U.S.C. 801 note).

the Senior Medical Officer, Joint Task Force–Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has determined that the medical treatment is necessary to prevent death or imminent significant injury or harm to the health of the individual;

based on the recommendation of the Senior Medical Officer, Joint Task Force–Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the medical treatment is not available to be provided at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, without incurring excessive and unreasonable costs; and

the Department of Defense has provided for appropriate security measures for the custody and control of the individual during any period in which the individual is temporarily in the United States under this subsection.

remain in the custody and control of the Secretary of Defense at all times; and

be returned to United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as soon as feasible after a Department of Defense physician determines that—

shall be considered to be paroled into the United States temporarily pursuant to section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A));

shall not be permitted to apply for asylum under section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), be placed in removal proceedings under section 240 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1229a), or be eligible to apply for admission into the United States; and

shall not be permitted to avail himself of any right, privilege, or benefit of any law of the United States beyond those available to individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

is not a United States citizen or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States; and

is or was held on or after January 20, 2009, at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense.

determines that the transfer is in the national security interest of the United States;

determines that appropriate actions have been taken, or will be taken, to address any risk to public safety that could arise in connection with the detention and trial in the United States; and

notifies the appropriate committees of Congress not later than 30 days before the date of the proposed transfer.

A statement of the basis for the determination that the transfer is in the national security interest of the United States.

A description of the actions the Secretary determines have been taken, or will be taken, to address any risk to public safety that could arise in connection with the detention and trial in the United States.

the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

Number of members

Subsection (a) of section 948m of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

General rules

Such section is further amended—

Excuse of members

Subsection (d) of such section, as redesignated by paragraph (2)(A), is amended—

Absent and additional members

Subsection (e) of such section, as redesignated by paragraph (2)(A), is amended—

in subsection (a), by inserting primary or alternate before members; and

in subsection (b), by adding at the end the following new sentence: Nothing in this section prohibits the military judge from awarding to each party such additional peremptory challenges as may be required in the interests of justice..

by inserting primary before members each place it appears; and

in subsection (b), by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

by striking paragraph (10); and

by redesignating paragraphs (11) and (12) as paragraphs (10) and (11), respectively.

In general

The Secretary of Defense, acting through the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, shall estimate the costs of life extension activities for the following:

Submission

The Secretary shall submit the cost estimate required by paragraph (1) to the congressional defense committees not later than February 1, 2014.

In general

The Secretary, acting through the Director, shall compare the costs of life extension activities for the warheads referred to in subsection (a)(1), using the cost estimate required by that subsection, to the costs of replacing the W88 Trident II D5 missile warheads and the W78 intercontinental ballistic missile warheads with an interoperable warhead, using the cost estimate for phase 6.2A (relating to design definition and cost study) for the interoperable warhead.

Submission

The Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the cost comparison required by paragraph (1) not later than April 1, 2014.

Congress is committed to providing the resources needed to achieve the objectives stated in subsection (a) at a minimum at the level set forth in the 10-year plan provided to Congress on an annual basis pursuant to section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81), as amended;

Congress supports the modernization or replacement of the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems: a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise missile, an ICBM, and an SSBN and SLBM; and

the President and Congress should work together to meet the objectives stated in subsection (a) in the most cost-efficient manner possible.

retain intercontinental ballistic missile launch facilities currently supporting deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles within the limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic launchers;

maintain intercontinental ballistic missiles on alert or operationally deployed status; and

preserve intercontinental ballistic missile silos in operational or warm status.

In general

Chapter 2 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

Clerical amendment

The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 2 of such title is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

Section 113 is amended by striking subsection (m).

Section 117 is amended—

Section 127 is amended by striking subsection (d).

Section 153 is amended by striking subsection (c).

Section 1781b is amended by striking subsection (d).

Section 2216 is amended—