Mr. President, today I join with my senior colleague from Iowa, Senator Grassley, and with the distinguished chair of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Leahy, in reintroducing the Protecting Older…
Mr. President, today I join with my senior colleague from Iowa, Senator Grassley, and with the distinguished chair of the Judiciary
Committee, Senator Leahy, in reintroducing the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act.
The need for this legislation was vividly demonstrated by the experience of an Iowan--Jack Gross. Mr. Gross gave the prime of his life, a quarter century of loyal service, to one company. Despite Mr. Gross's stellar work record, FBL Financial demoted him and other employees over the age of 50 and gave his job to a younger employee.
Expressly to prevent this kind of discrimination, in 1967 Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, ADEA. Modeled from and using the same language as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-- which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national origin and religion--the ADEA makes it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of age.
When Mr. Gross sought to enforce his rights under this law, a jury of Iowans heard the facts and found that his employer discriminated against him because of his age. That jury awarded him almost $47,000 in lost compensation.
The case was ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court. In June 2009, in Gross v. FBL Financial, Inc., the Court ruled against Mr. Gross, and in doing so made it harder for those with legitimate age discrimination claims to prevail under the ADEA. In fact, on remand, despite the fact Mr. Gross had established that age discrimination was a factor in his demotion, he lost his retrial.
For decades, the law was clear. In 1989, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court ruled that if a plaintiff seeking relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act demonstrated that discrimination was a ``motivating'' or ``substantial'' factor behind the employer's action, the burden shifted to the employer to show it would have taken the same action regardless of the plaintiff's membership in a protected class. As part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified the ``motivating factor'' standard with respect to Title VII discrimination claims.
Since the ADEA uses the same language as Title VII, was modeled from it, and had been interpreted consistent with the Civil Rights Act, courts rightly and consistently held that, like a plaintiff claiming discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion and national origin, a victim bringing suit under the ADEA need only show that membership in a protected class was a ``motivating factor'' in an employer's action. If an employee showed that age was one factor in an employment decision, the burden was on the employer to show it had acted for a legitimate reason other than age.
In Gross, the Court, addressing a question on which it did not grant certiorari, tore up this decades' old standard. In its place, the Court imposed a standard that makes it prohibitively difficult for a victim to prove age discrimination. According to the Court, a plaintiff bears the full burden of proving that age was not only a ``motivating'' factor but the ``but for'' factor, or decisive factor. And, unfortunately, just last month the Supreme Court, in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, extended Gross to retaliation cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Moreover, lower courts have extended Gross to other civil rights claims, including cases arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.
The extremely high burden Gross imposes radically undermines workers' ability to hold employers accountable. As Professor Helen Norton testified to the HELP Committee, ``Gross entirely insulates from liability even an employer who confesses discrimination so long as that employer had another reason for its decision. By permitting employers to escape liability altogether even for a workplace admittedly infected by discrimination, with no incentive to refrain from similar discrimination in the future, the Gross rule thus undermines Congress's efforts to stop and deter workplace discrimination.''
Bear in mind, unlawful discrimination is often difficult to detect. Obviously, those who discriminate do not often admit they are acting for discriminatory reasons. Employers rarely post signs saying, for example, ``older workers need not apply.'' To the contrary, they go out of their way to conceal their true intent. The employer is in the best position to offer an explanation of why a decision that involves discrimination or retaliation was actually motivated by legitimate reasons. As Professor Norton testified, ``[s]uch burden shifting appropriately recognizes and responds to employers' greater access to information that is key to proving or disproving an element of a particular claim . . .'' By putting the entire burden on the worker to demonstrate the absence or insignificance of other factors, the court in effect has freed employers to discriminate or retaliate.
Unfortunately, as Mr. Gross and his colleagues know all too well, age discrimination does indeed occur. Countless thousands of American workers who are not yet ready to voluntarily retire find themselves jobless or passed over for promotions because of age discrimination. Older workers often face stereotypes: That they are not as productive as younger workers; that they cannot learn new skills; that they somehow have a lesser need for income to provide for their families.
Indeed, according to an AARP study, 60% of older workers have reported that they or someone they know has faced age discrimination in the workplace. According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in Fiscal Year 2012, over 2,800 age discrimination complaints were filed, a more than 20 percent increase from just five years ago. Given the stereotypes that older workers face, it is no surprise that on average they remain unemployed for more than twice as long as all unemployed workers.
The Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act reiterates the principle that Congress established when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act--when making employment decisions it is illegal for race, sex, national origin, religion, age or disability to be a factor.
The bill repudiates the Supreme Court's Gross v. FBL Financial decision and will restore the law to what it was for decades. It makes clear that when an employee shows discrimination was a ``motivating factor'' behind a decision, the burden is properly on the employer to show the same decision would have been made regardless of discrimination or retaliation. And, like the Civil Rights Act of 1991 with respect to discrimination cases under Title VII, if the employer meets that burden, the employer remains liable, but remedies are limited.
This is a common sense, bipartisan bill. In fact, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, key provisions of which served as a model for this legislation, passed the Senate on a bipartisan basis 93-5. Further, we are introducing this bill only after countless hours of consultation with civil rights stakeholders and representatives of the business community. Moreover, this bill addresses the concerns that were raised about an earlier version of the bill at a hearing held before the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee in March 2010.
In fact, I want to comment on two changes from that earlier version of this bill introduced in the last Congress. Since October 2009, when Senator Leahy and I first introduced the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, we have had the benefit of nearly three and a half years of lower court application of the Gross decision.
The 2009 bill would have expressly amended the ADEA to make clear that the analytical framework set out in McDonnell Douglas v. Green applied to that statute. Even though, before Gross, every Court of Appeals had held that McDonnell Douglas had applied to age claims, this clarification was meant to address a footnote in Gross in which the Court arguably questioned the applicability of McDonnell Douglas to the ADEA. Since the bill was first introduced, however, every lower court that has examined the issue has continued to apply McDonnell Douglas to the ADEA. As a result, because McDonnell Douglas applies to the ADEA already, we deem it unnecessary to amend the statute.
Second, the initial bill expressly amended only the ADEA. Since Gross, however, lower courts have applied the Court's reasoning in that decision to
other statutes. Because the most notable application has been to the ADA, Rehabilitation Act and Title VII retaliation claims, those statutes are expressly amended here too.
Finally, in Gross, the Court defended the Court's departure from well-established law by noting that it ``cannot ignore Congress' decision to amend Title VII's relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the ADEA.'' In other words, the Court found that because Congress, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, codified the ``motivating factor'' framework for discrimination claims under Title VII, but not for the ADEA, Congress somehow must have intended Price Waterhouse not to apply to any statute but Title VII.
Because of the Court's reasoning, I want to emphasize that this bill in no way questions the motivating factor framework for other anti- discrimination and anti-retaliation statutes that are not expressly covered by the legislation. As the bill's findings make clear, not only does this bill repudiate the Gross decision itself, but it expressly repudiates the reasoning underlying the decision, including the argument that Congress's failure to amend any statute other than Title VII means that Congress intended to disallow mixed motive claims under other statutes. It would be an error for a court to apply similar reasoning following passage of this bill to other statutes. The fact that other statutes are not expressly amended in this bill does not mean that Congress endorses Gross's application to any other statute.
In conclusion, this bill is very straightforward. It reiterates what Congress said in 1967 when it passed the ADEA--when making employment decisions it is illegal for age to be a factor. A person should not be judged arbitrarily because he or she was born in a certain year or earlier when he or she still has the ability to contribute as much, or more, as the next person. This bill will help ensure that all our citizens will have an equal opportunity, commensurate with their abilities, for productive employment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.