Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentlewoman for yielding and for her great work on this issue. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 37, the so-called Promoting Job Creation and Reducing…
Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentlewoman for yielding and for her great work on this issue.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 37, the so-called Promoting Job Creation and Reducing Small Business Burdens Act.
I served on the Financial Services Committee during the 2008 financial crisis, and I had an opportunity to witness the harmful impact that lack of regulation had on hardworking families around our Nation at a total cost of more than $22 trillion, according to the Government Accountability Office. My constituents--and many of yours-- lost their homes, their jobs, and their retirement savings during that period. Many pension funds today continue to suffer and are on the brink of collapse because of the reckless policies that were observed during that time by many of our major banks.
While I voted against the bailout of the Wall Street banks who were rewarded with bonuses as a result of the bailout, I did have the honor of helping to assist in reforming our financial system through the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. I regret the bill under consideration today rolls back many of those reforms that my colleagues and I fought so hard to adopt.
I would note that after being defeated last week under a suspension process that offered no opportunity for amendments, this bill now has inexplicably been brought to the House floor under a closed rule that again does not include any of the 14 amendments that were filed with the Rules Committee. At a minimum, a bill that does so much harm to our financial system necessitates the normal committee process and additional time for debate.
H.R. 37 contains 11 separate bills, a few of them which I support, others I strongly oppose. Portions of H.R. 37 have entirely new provisions that the members of the committee and of this Congress have not had the opportunity to thoroughly analyze.
By the way, if you desire a good review of this legislation, in this past Sunday's New York Times there is an article written by Gretchen Morgenson that I think is extremely well-written and goes into great detail beyond the time that I am allocated here tonight.
Title II of this bill would allow banks with commercial business to trade derivatives privately rather than on clearinghouses. This would increase risk and reduce transparency for these transactions. My amendment, which was not accepted, would have improved the provisions by prohibiting systematically important financial institutions, whose collapse would pose a serious risk to our financial system, from claiming the exemption under this title.
Title VIII of this bill includes new language that has not been considered by the Financial Services Committee under regular order. If passed, title VIII would give banks an additional 2 years to comply with the provisions of the Volcker rule that mandates that banks divest collateralized loan obligations--packages of risky debt.
I thank the gentlewoman.
This 2-year extension is in addition to the extension we already provided by the regulation last year. That further delay adds unnecessary risk to our financial system. And that is why I sponsored another amendment to remove this additional 2-year delay, so banks will be required to comply with this provision of the Volcker rule no later than July 21, 2017.
Again, title XI of this bill modifies the SEC rule 701 by allowing private companies to compensate their employees up to $10 million in company securities without having to provide those employees with certain basic financial disclosures about the company stock.
I strongly support employees receiving equity benefits from their firms in which they work, but those benefits should be tangible and real. We all remember Enron and WorldCom where employees were pressured to buy stock as part of their compensation, and at the end of the day, that stock was completely worthless.
Why can't we enable employees to receive some equity in the company in which they work and ensure that those workers get accurate financial disclosure as part of that deal? This is why I offered three amendments to reform title XI in order to make certain workers get accurate information about the equities shares that they are receiving from the companies they work for. Unfortunately, the Rules Committee chose to deny all the amendments to this bill.
In closing, this harmful bill uses the veneer of job creation to provide special treatment for well-connected corporations and financial institutions while doing very little for the workers that it professes to help.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this bill, and, again, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
[From NYTimes.com, Jan. 10, 2015]
Kicking Dodd-Frank in the Teeth
(By Gretchen Morgenson)
The 114th Congress has been at work for less than a week,
but a goal for many of its members is already evident: a
further rollback of regulations put in place to keep markets
and Main Street safe from reckless Wall Street practices.
The attack began with a bill that narrowly failed in a
fast-track vote on Wednesday in the House of Representatives.
It is scheduled to come up again in the House this week.
The bill, introduced by Representative Michael Fitzpatrick,
a Pennsylvania Republican who is a member of the House
Financial Services Committee, has three troublesome elements.
First, it would let large banks hold on to certain risky
securities until 2019, two years longer than currently
allowed. It would also prevent the Securities and Exchange
Commission from regulating private equity firms that conduct
some securities transactions. And, finally, the bill would
make derivatives trading less transparent, allowing unseen
risks to build up in the system.
Of course, you wouldn't know any of this from the name of
the bill: the Promoting Job Creation and Reducing Small
Business Burdens Act. Or from the mild claim that the bill
was intended only ``to make technical corrections'' to the
Dodd-Frank legislation of 2010.
Here's the game plan for lawmakers eager to relax the
nation's already accommodating
financial regulations: First, seize on complex and esoteric
financial activities that few understand. Then, make
supposedly minor tweaks to their governing regulations that
actually wind up gutting them.
``We're going to see repeated attempts to go in with
seemingly technical changes that intimidate regulators and
keep them from putting teeth in regulations,'' predicted
Marcus Stanley, policy director at Americans for Financial
Reform, a nonpartisan, nonprofit coalition of more than 200
consumer and civic groups across the country. ``If we return
to the precrisis business as usual, where it's routine for
people to accommodate Wall Street on these technical changes,
they're just going to unravel the postcrisis regulation piece
by piece. Then, we'll be right back where we started.''
The bill was put forward on the second day of the new
Congress, in an expedited process, which didn't allow for
debate among members. This process is supposed to be reserved
for noncontroversial bills and requires support from a two-
thirds majority to prevail. It fell just short of achieving
that level, with a vote of 276 to 146, overwhelmingly backed
by Republicans and opposed by most Democrats.
A central element of the bill chipped away at part of the
Volcker Rule, the regulation intended to reduce speculative
trading activities among federally insured banks. The bill
would give the institutions holding collateralized loan
obligations--bundles of debt--two additional years to sell
those stakes.
The sales were required under the Volcker Rule, which bars
banks from ownership in or relationships with hedge funds or
private equity firms, many of which issue and oversee these
instruments. Like the mortgage pools that wreaked such havoc
with United States banks in the most recent crisis, C.L.O.s
can pose high risks for banks.
The creation of such securities has been torrid recently;
$124.1 billion was issued last year, compared with $82.61
billion in 2013, according to S&P Capital IQ. Among the banks
with the largest C.L.O. exposures are JPMorgan Chase and
Wells Fargo; according to SNL Financial, a research firm,
JPMorgan Chase held $30 billion and Wells Fargo $22.5 billion
in the third quarter of 2014, the most recent figures
available. The next-largest stake--$4.7 billion--was held by
the State Street Corporation.
Given the size of these positions, it's not surprising the
institutions want more time to jettison them. But the new
legislation represents Wall Street's second reprieve on these
instruments. After banks objected to the sale of their
holdings last spring, the Federal Reserve gave them two years
beyond the initial 2015 deadline to get rid of them.
Now they want another two years.
Although the top three banks had unrealized gains in their
C.L.O. holdings in the third quarter, SNL said some banks
were facing losses. And that was before the collapse in the
price of oil, which has undoubtedly pummeled some of these
securities.
A second deregulatory aspect in the Fitzpatrick bill
relates to the lucrative private equity industry, which
remains loosely regulated. The bill would exempt some private
equity firms from registering as brokerage firms with the
S.E.C. Under securities law, such registration is required of
firms that receive fees for investment banking activities,
like providing merger advice or selling debt securities.
Private equity firms are typically registered only as
investment advisers, so submitting to broker-dealer
regulation would result in more frequent examinations and
more rules.
These firms don't like that. But their investors could
benefit from closer regulatory scrutiny of costly conflicts
of interest in these operations. For example, a private
equity firm providing merger advice to a company its
investors own in a fund portfolio--not an arm's-length
transaction--could easily charge more for those services than
an unaffiliated firm would.
Finally, the bill's changes in derivatives would reduce
transparency and increase risks in this arena by allowing
Wall Street firms with commercial businesses like oil and gas
or other commodities operations--to trade derivatives
privately and not on clearinghouses.
Trading on clearinghouses generates accurate price data
that help both banks and regulators value these instruments.
Because these clearinghouses perform risk management,
problematic positions are easier to spot.
If this change goes through, it will be the second recent
victory on derivatives for big banks. Last month, Congress
reversed a part of the Dodd-Frank law barring derivatives
from being traded in federally insured units of banks.
Taxpayers may be on the hook for bailouts, therefore, if
losses occur in the banks' derivatives books.
The Dodd-Frank law, as written back in 2010, was by no
means a comprehensive fix for a risky banking system. And it
is more vulnerable to attack, in part, because of its
complexity and design. Dodd-Frank delegated so much rule-
making to regulators that it essentially invited the
institutions they oversee to fight them every inch of the
way.
And when Congress backs the industry in these battles, it's
no contest.
Still, it is remarkable to watch the same financial
institutions that almost wrecked our nation's economy work to
heighten risks in the system.
``The truth about Dodd-Frank is it's pretty moderate and
pretty compromised already,'' Mr. Stanley of Americans for
Financial Reform said. ``Any further compromise and it tends
to collapse into nothingness.''
Which is exactly what Wall Street seems to be hoping for.