Madam Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume. Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 6439, the Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program Authorization Act of…
Madam Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 6439, the Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program Authorization Act of 2018.
I have long supported Department of Homeland Security overseas programs aimed at preventing terrorist threats from ever arriving at our borders. In fact, over the years, I have sponsored a number of measures that specifically seek to drive greater international collaboration and expand DHS' overseas border security footprint.
Two well-established overseas DHS programs that come to mind are:
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Preclearance program, in which officers are posted abroad to screen travelers prior to boarding U.S.- bound flights; and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Visa Security Program, in which ICE special agents are posted at overseas consulates to assist State Department staff in visa vetting.
Earlier this Congress, Representative Filemon Vela, the lead Democrat on our Border and Maritime Security Subcommittee, introduced two bills aimed at bolstering international border and counterterrorism cooperation:
H.R. 2218 would authorize ICE's Border Enforcement Security Task Force, a program that has been proven to be effective at enhancing cooperation and information sharing among law enforcement along the U.S.-Mexico border.
The second bill, H.R. 4578, is targeted at expanding efforts carried out by CBP's National Targeting Center aimed at disrupting and dismantling terrorists and other criminal networks.
When presented to the full House, both bills received unanimous support from Democrats for good reason: They are effective counterterrorism programs.
However, I am sorry to say, as of today, there is not enough data to assess whether the same can be said for ICE's Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program, or BITMAP, pilot. As such, I cannot support permanently authorizing it, as set forth under H.R. 6439.
I would expect that some Members of this body are unfamiliar with the program, as it is largely a classified program and, as such, little information about BITMAP is in the public domain.
Since 2011, ICE's BITMAP pilot program has trained and equipped foreign law enforcement partners on collecting biographic and biometric data of foreign nationals migrating through partner countries so that such information can be checked against U.S. intelligence and law enforcement databases.
The stated goal of the program is to identify known or suspected terrorists or criminals prior to arrival at our borders. Though in operation for several years, the volume of data collected only started to be significant in the last 2 years.
Prior to considering H.R. 6439 in committee, committee members had repeatedly been presented in a classified setting with anecdotes about successes that the program has experienced. While we appreciated hearing positive news about this pilot, anecdotes are not enough to justify permanently authorizing this program. Anecdotes are no substitute for data and evidence of efficiency.
In an effort to secure data prior to committee consideration, I submitted a number of basic questions about the program's efficacy and operations to ICE.
I received a response prior to the committee's markup that raised further questions about BITMAP's efficacy as well as core operational questions, such as:
After checks against databases, what does the U.S. Government do with the records it collects on migrants who are not found to have terrorist ties?
What, if any, protections exist to guard against the collection of highly personal and sensitive information from migrants with no criminal or terrorist ties who are encountered nowhere near the U.S.- Mexico border and have no intentions of coming anywhere close to it?
What, if any, audit or oversight mechanisms exist to ensure that foreign partners adhere to requirements of the program and do not use this sophisticated law enforcement tool to suppress domestic activities?
Over the recess, ICE officials briefed the committee staff about BITMAP, but fundamental questions remain.
I hope that there will be a day when I can say without reservation that, after careful review of BITMAP's operational documents and data, I fully support making it permanent. Unfortunately, today is not the day.
In the absence of evidence, I cannot support H.R. 6439, but I am supportive of the pilot continuing so that ICE can work to aggregate and assess critical data to make an evidentiary case to Congress for why the program should be permanently authorized.
I would note that enactment of H.R. 6439 is not necessary for BITMAP to continue to operate. With or without passage of H.R. 6439, ICE expects to continue to be able to operate the pilot.
Madam Speaker, before I close, I include in the Record a letter from the American Civil Liberties Union in opposition to this legislation.
September 4, 2018.
Re Vote NO on H.R. 6439, the Biometric Identification
Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP)
Authorization Act of 2018.
Dear Representative: On behalf of the American Civil
Liberties Union, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, National
Immigration Law Center and the National Immigration Project
of the National Lawyers Guild, we urge you to oppose H.R.
6439, legislation that would permanently authorize the
biometric pilot program known as ``BITMAP'' within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The House is expected
to consider this bill under suspension of the rules on
Tuesday, September 4, 2018. We urge you to oppose H.R. 6439.
H.R. 6439 would permanently authorize BITMAP, a program
which has existed since 2010--but with no privacy or
transparency protections, and with insufficient fact-finding
during committee consideration of the bill. Although BITMAP
would continue without enactment of this legislation, the
House should not permanently authorize the BITMAP program
with limited information, no information on whether DHS takes
any steps to protect privacy, no studies regarding its
efficacy, and no statutory privacy or transparency
protections.
This bill raises significant concerns regarding the sharing
of information across foreign governments related to
suspicion of terrorism, gang violence, and other so-called
national security concerns with very little information as to
how this information is used and retained. In 2010, DHS began
piloting BITMAP to collect and share biometric and
biographical data on ``special interest aliens, violent
criminals, fugitives and confirmed or suspected terrorists.''
According to previous testimony by DHS officials, this also
includes gang members and other persons of interest who may
pose a potential national security concern.
There is no information or proof as to BITMAP's
effectiveness. Despite numerous requests from Congress,
including members of the House Homeland Security Committee,
DHS has failed to provide information since the program's
inception in 2010 that shows its effectiveness or that it is
tailored to meet its needs. Given this, it is premature to
permanently authorize the program, particularly given the
significant privacy and civil liberties concerns.
The legislation fails to require that the program adhere to
privacy protections. This program includes the sharing of
extraordinarily sensitive information regarding individuals
without warrant or analogous legal process. Yet, the
legislation fails to include any privacy standards that DHS
must follow with regards to the program. For example, what
information can be collected, how long can it be stored, when
can it be disseminated to other agencies, and can it be
shared with foreign partners? The omission of these
protections in the bill is particularly striking given that
the agency has not provided any public information regarding
what, if any, privacy protections currently apply to the
execution of BITMAP.
The legislation fails to place limits on how information
collected under BITMAP can be used. There is little to no
information regarding what actions may be triggered as a
result of these database checks nor information regarding
what is considered ``suspicion'' or a ``national security
concern.'' The terms used by officials in discussing this
program such as terrorism, gang members, and national
security concern have historically been used to target
Muslim, Arab, Iranian, Latinx, Middle Eastern, and South
Asian populations. The failure to provide information
regarding policies governing BITMAP raises significant
concerns that the program may result in unjust profiling and
discrimination. The existing legislation fails to include any
language that would prohibit such improper uses. Moreover,
insufficient information has been made public to assess
whether such profiling and discrimination are current
problems with the program.
Under this bill, DHS would have the authority to enter into
agreements with foreign countries to carry out BITMAP
operations without legislative or judicial review. Although
this bill would require DHS to notify Congress before the
execution of BITMAP agreements, the agreements would not be
subject to congressional authorization. This legislation
would significantly undermine Congress' oversight role by
allowing DHS to take measures without sufficient checks or
balances. Additionally, the bill fails to ensure that the
public is made aware of how DHS is exercising its authority.
It is irresponsible to permanently authorize BITMAP without
a full understanding of its effectiveness, policies and
procedures, privacy and civil rights protections, and
oversight mechanisms.
We urge you to oppose H.R. 6439.
Sincerely,
American Civil Liberties Union.
Immigrant Legal Resource Center.
National Immigration Law Center.
National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild.
Madam Speaker, it is our duty as Members of Congress to ensure that counterterrorism pilot programs are effective prior to permanently authorizing them. As I mentioned at the outset, DHS has a number of proven overseas, border, and counterterrorism programs that have strong congressional bipartisan support.
However, with all due respect to the chairman, the efficacy of BITMAP as a counterterrorism program has not been established. As such, a permanent authorization of H.R. 6439 is premature.
Given the classified nature of this program, some Members are unfamiliar with it and there are natural limitations as to what we are able to discuss on the House floor. But I understand that at an unclassified staff-level briefing during the recess on threats in the Caribbean, ICE officials stated that BITMAP is working and successful, but failed to provide data to back up the assertions.
I will concede that ICE has shared some promising anecdotes, and I do not object to ICE officials touting what they see as a successful overseas program to Congress. However, when ICE's broad-based assertions and anecdotes are not backed up with data and metrics, it falls to Congress to carry out oversight of the program, not blindly authorize it.
Let's not reward the administration for failing to provide Congress with necessary data and metrics. Let's come
together and vote down H.R. 6439. By taking such action, we will be communicating to ICE our expectations, while in no way preventing the BITMAP pilot from continuing as it has for the past 7 years.
As I said earlier, I sincerely hope that the positive aspects of BITMAP being touted by the other side of the aisle today can be backed up by reliable data and facts. Unfortunately, the little information we have on BITMAP to date simply does not justify a standalone authorization.
Madam Speaker, I ask my colleagues to oppose H.R. 6439, and I yield back the balance of my time.